An Appeal to the People in Behalf of Their Rights as Authorized Interpreters of the Bible

by Catharine Esther Beecher

The Susceptibilities.

In regard to the second general class of mental powers—the susceptibilities—the first particular to be noticed is the ceaseless and all-pervading desire to gain happiness and escape pain. This is the mainspring of all voluntary activity; for no act of volition will take place till some good is presented to gain, or some evil to shun. At the same time, as has been shown, the desire to escape evil is more potent and effective than the desire for good. Thousands of minds that rest in passive listlessness, when there is nothing to stimulate but hope of enjoyment, will exert every physical and mental power to escape impending evil. The seasons of long-continued prosperity in nations always tend to a deterioration of intellect and manhood. It is in seasons of danger alone that fear wakes up the highest energies, and draws forth the heroes of the race.

Mind, then, is an existence having the power of that [pg 111] self-originating action of choice which constitutes free agency, while this power can only be exercised when desires are excited to gain happiness or to escape pain. This surely is the highest possible evidence that its Author intended mind should thus act.

But a mind may act to secure happiness and avoid pain to itself, and yet may gain only very low grades of enjoyment, while much higher are within reach of its faculties. So, also, it may act to gain happiness for itself as the chief end in such ways as to prevent or destroy the higher happiness of others around.

In reference to this, we find those susceptibilities which raise man to the dignity of a rational and moral being.

In the first place, there is that impression of the great design of the Creator existing in every mind, either as a result of constitution or of training, or of both united, which results in a feeling that whatever lessens or destroys happiness is unfit and contrary to the system of things.

Next there is the power to balance pleasure and pain, and estimate the compound result, both in reference to self and to the commonwealth. With this is combined the feeling that whatever secures the most good with the least evil is right and fit, and that the opposite is wrong and unfitted to the nature of things.

Next comes the sense of justice, which results in an impulse to discover the cause of good and evil, and when this cause is found to be a voluntary agent, a consequent impulse to make returns of good for good, and of evil for evil, and also to proportion retributive rewards or penalties to the amount of good or evil done.

With this, also, is combined the feeling that those [pg 112] retributions should be applied only where there was voluntary power to have done otherwise. When it is seen that there was no such power, the impulse to reward or punish is repressed.

Such is the deep conviction that such retributions are indispensable, that where natural pains and penalties do not avail, others are demanded, both in the family and in the commonwealth.

Lastly, we find the susceptibility of conscience, which, by the very framework of the mind itself, apportions the retributive pangs of remorse for wrong doing, and the pleasure of self-approval for well doing. These, too, are retributions never to be escaped, and the most exquisite, both in elevated happiness and excruciating pain. The mind carries about in itself its own certain and gracious remunerator—its own inexorable prosecutor, judge, and executioner.

This same design of the Creator may be most delightfully traced in what may be called the economy of happiness and pain.

One particular of this is set forth at large in the chapter on the emotions of taste.[5] Here we find the mind formed not only to secure multitudinous enjoyment through the nerves of sensation, but that, by the principle of association, there is a perpetual reproduction of these emotions in connection with the colors, forms, sounds, and motions with which they were originally associated. Thus there are perpetually returning emotions of pleasure so recondite, so refined, so infinite in variety and extent, and yet how little noticed or understood!

Another indication of the same kind is the peculiarity pointed out on former pages, where it is shown that securing certain enjoyments which tend to promote the general happiness increases both desire and capacity for enjoyment, while those that terminate in the individual diminish by possession. Thus the enjoyment of power, which must, from its nature, be confined to a few, diminishes by possession. Thus, too, the pleasures of sense pall by indulgence. But the enjoyment resulting from the exercise and reciprocation of love, and that resulting from benevolent actions, and that which is included in a course of perfect obedience to all the rules of rectitude, increases the capacity for enjoyment.

Another illustration of the same principle is exhibited in the chapter on Habit, where it is seen that the power of pleasurable emotions increases by repetition, while painful emotions decrease when the good to be secured by their agency is attained. Thus fear serves to protect from danger till caution and habit reader it needless, and then it decreases. And so of other painful emotions.

It is interesting to trace the same design in the constitution of minds in regard to each other. We find that the purest and highest kind of happiness is dependent on the mutual relations of minds. Thus the enjoyment resulting from the discovery of intellectual and moral traits in other minds—that resulting from giving and receiving affection—that gained by sympathy, and by being the cause of happiness to others, and that resulting from conscious rectitude, all are dependent on the existence of other beings.

Now we find that minds are relatively so constituted [pg 114] that what one desires, it is a source of happiness in another to bestow. Thus one can be pleased by the discovery of certain traits in other minds, while, in return, the exhibition of these traits, and the consciousness that they are appreciated, is an equal source of enjoyment. One mind seeks the love of others, while these, in return, are desiring objects of affection, and rejoice to confer the gift that is sought. The desire of knowledge or the gratification of curiosity is another source of pleasure, while satisfying this desire is a cause of enjoyment to those around. How readily do mankind seize upon every opportunity to convey interesting news to other minds!

Again: we find that, both in sorrow and in joy, the mind seeks for the sympathy of others, while this grateful and soothing boon it is delightful to bestow. So, also, the consciousness of being the cause of good to another sends joy to the heart, while the recipient is filled with the pleasing glow of gratitude in receiving the benefit. The consciousness of virtue in acting for the general good, instead of for contracted, selfish purposes, is another source of happiness, while those who witness its delightful results rejoice to behold and acknowledge it. What bursts of rapturous applause have followed the exhibition of virtuous self-sacrifice for the good of others from bosoms who rejoiced in this display, and who could owe this pleasure to no other cause than the natural constitution of mind, which is formed to be made happy both in beholding and in exercising virtue.

This same beneficial economy is manifested in a close analysis of all that is included in the affections of love and gratitude.

It has been shown that, in the commencement of existence, the young mind first learns the sources of good and evil to self, and its sole motives are desire for its own enjoyment.

Soon, however, it begins to experience the happiness resulting from the relations of minds to each other, and then is developed the superior power of love, and its importance as a regulating principle.

In the analysis of this affection, it is seen to consist, first, in the pleasurable emotions which arise in view of certain traits of character in another mind. When these qualities are discovered, the first result is emotions of pleasure in the contemplation. Immediately there follows a desire of good to the cause of this pleasure. Next follows the desire of reciprocated affection—that is, a desire is awakened to become the cause of the same pleasure to another; for the desire of being loved is the desire to be the cause of pleasurable emotions in another mind, in view of our own good qualities. When we secure this desired appreciation, then follows an increased desire of good to the one who bestows it.

Thus the affection of love is a combination of the action and reaction of pleasurable emotions, all tending to awaken the desire of good to another. This passion may become so intensified that it will become more delightful to secure enjoyments to another than to procure them for self.

In what is thus far presented, we find that the desire of good to another results solely from the fact that certain mental qualities are causes of pleasure to self. Of course, this desire ceases when those qualities cease to exist or cease to be appreciated. This kind of love [pg 116] is the natural result of the constitution of minds in their relations to each other, making it easy and pleasant to live for the good of another in return for the pleasure received from their agreeable qualities and manifestations.

But the highest element of love consists in the desire and purpose of good to another without reference to any good received in return. It is good willing.

The desire of good to others exists as a natural impulse more or less powerful in differently constituted minds. It is the cause of that pleasure which is felt in the consciousness of being the cause of good to another. But this natural impulse can be so developed and increased by voluntary culture as to become the strongest impulse of the mind, and thus the source of the highest and most satisfying enjoyments. In many minds this becomes so strongly developed that securing happiness to others is sought with far more earnestness and pleasure than any modes of enjoyment that terminate solely in self.

This analysis lays the foundation for the distinction expressed by the terms impulsive benevolence and voluntary benevolence, or the love of complacency and the love of benevolence. The first is the involuntary result of good conferred on self; the last is a voluntary act. It is good willing toward others without reference to self. The first can only exist where certain qualities are perceived and appreciated in another mind. The second can result from voluntary effort, and become the subject of law and penalties.

We can never be justly required to love another mind with the love of complacency except when qualities are perceived that, by the constitution of mind, [pg 117] necessarily call forth such regard. But the love of benevolence can be justly demanded from every mind toward every being capable of happiness.

Here it is important to discriminate more exactly in regard to the principle of benevolence and the principle of rectitude.

It is seen that the benevolence which is the subject of rewards and penalties as a voluntary act consists in good willing—that is, in choosing the happiness of other minds as well as our own as the object of interest and pursuit.

But the principle of rectitude is more comprehensive in its nature. It relates to obedience to all the laws of the system of the universe—those relating to ourselves as much as those relating to others. It is true that, as obedience to these laws includes the greatest possible amount of good with the least possible evil, both to the individual and the commonwealth, the tendency of the two principles is to the same result. But benevolence may be exercised without any regard to the rules of right and wrong. Instead of striving to make the most possible happiness with the least possible evil, as our Maker's great design demands, a course may be taken that makes some happiness to some minds at the expense of vast suffering and wrong to others. No mind acts right, even in willing happiness to others, when it is done in disregard of those laws which demand that we should make happiness the right way, that is, the way which is best for all.

In the physical and mental constitution of man there is not a single arrangement the direct object of which is to produce suffering. The susceptibilities to pain seem designed to protect and preserve, while the [pg 118] greater the need the more strong is this protection. For example, in regard to physical organization, fire is an element that is indispensable to the life, comfort, and activity of man, and it must be accessible at all times and places. But all its service arises from its power to dissolve and destroy the body itself, as well as all things around it. Therefore the pain connected with contact with fire is more acute than almost any other. Thus even the youngest child is taught the care and caution needful to protect its body from injury or destruction.

Another fact in regard to the susceptibilities of pain is their frequent co-existence with the highest degrees of enjoyment. The experiences of this life often present cases where the most elevated and ecstatic happiness is combined with the keenest suffering, while such is the nature of the case that the suffering is the chief cause of the happiness thus secured. The highest illustration of this is in the suffering of saints and martyrs, when they “rejoice to be counted worthy to suffer shame,” or when, amid torturing flames, they sing songs of transport and praise.

Even in common life it is constantly found that a certain relative amount of happiness is felt to be more than a recompense for a given amount of pain. This relative amount may be such that the evil involved, though great, may count as nothing. Where there is a passionate attachment, for example, the lover exults in the labor and suffering that will joyfully be received as a proof of affection and will secure the compensating return.

It is a very common fact that painful emotions are sought, not for themselves, but as ministers to a kind [pg 119] of mental excitement which is desired. This is the foundation of the pleasure which is felt in tragic representations, and in poetry and novels that present scenes of distress. The little child will again and again ask for the tale of the Babes in the Wood, though each rehearsal brings forth tears; and the mature matron or sage will spend hours over tales that harrow the feelings and call forth sighs. This also is the foundation of that kind of music called the minor key, in which certain sounds bring emotions of sadness or sorrow.

Another striking fact in regard to the desire for pain is the emotions that are felt by the most noble and benevolent minds at the sight of cruelty and injustice. At such scenes, the desire for inflicting pain on the guilty offender amounts to a passion which nothing can allay but retributive justice. And the more benevolent the mind, the stronger this desire for retributive evil to another.

Thus it appears that the mind is so made as to desire pain both for itself and for others; not in itself considered, but as the indispensable means to gain some consequent enjoyment.

The highest kinds of happiness result from painful emergencies. The transports of love, gratitude, and delight, when some benefactor rescues suffering thousands from danger and evil, could exist in no other way. All the long train of virtues included in patient toil for the good of others, in heroic daring, in brave adventure, in fortitude, in patience, in resignation, in heavenly meekness, in noble magnanimity, in sublime self-sacrifice, all involve the idea of trial, danger, and suffering. It is only the highest and noblest class of [pg 120] minds that can fully understand that the most blissful of all enjoyments are those which are bought with pain.

But the most cheering feature in the constitution of mind is all that is included in the principle of habit. We see in the commencement of existence that every action of mind and body is imperfect, and more or less difficult, while each effort to secure right action increases the facility of so doing. We see that, owing to this principle, every act of obedience to law makes such a course easier. The intellect, the susceptibilities, the will, all come under this benign influence. Habit may so diminish the difficulty of self-denial for our own good that the pain entirely ceases; and self-sacrifice for the good of others may so develop benevolence and generate a habit that it will become pleasure without pain. There are those even in this world, who have so attained this capacity of living in the life of those around them, that the happiness of others becomes their own, so that there is even less pain in self-denial for the good of others than for that of self. When this habit of mind is attained by all, the happiness of the commonwealth will become the portion of each individual, and thus be multiplied to an inconceivable extent.

Chapter XX. Additional Proof of the Moral Attributes of God.

We have presented the “nature” of mind as the chief evidence of the grand design of its Creator in forming all things, and thus also presented the proof of his perfect wisdom, benevolence, and rectitude. We now will trace the evidences of the same beneficent design in the nature of all social and material organizations.

First, then, in regard to the domestic relations. We have seen that while all happiness depends on obedience to laws, every mind comes into existence in perfect ignorance of them, and without any power to learn what is good or evil but by experience and instruction. The intention of the Creator that each new-born being should be taught these laws and trained to obey them, is clearly seen in the first and highest domestic relation. In this we see two mature minds, who have themselves been trained to understand these laws, drawn by sweet and gentle influences to each other. They go apart from all past ties of kindred; they have one home, one name, one common interest in every thing. The one who has most physical strength goes forth to provide supplies; the delicate one remains behind, by domestic ministries to render home the centre of all attractions.

Then comes the beautiful, helpless infant, of no use to any one, and demanding constant care, labor, and attention. And yet, with its profound ignorance, its tender weakness, its delicate beauty, its utter helplessness, [pg 122] its entire dependence, how does it draw forth the strongest feelings of love and tenderness, making every toil and care a delight! And thus, month after month, both parents unite to cherish and support, while, with unceasing vigilance, they train the new-born mind to understand and obey the laws of the system into which it is thus ushered. Its first lessons are to learn to take care of its own body. And when the far-off penalty of pain can not be comprehended by the novice, the parent invents new penalties to secure habits of care and obedience. During all this period the great lesson of sacrifice constantly occurs. The child must eat what is best, not what it desires. It must go to bed when it wants to sit up. It must stay in the house when it wants to go out. It must not touch multitudes of things which it wishes thus to investigate. And so the habits of self-denial, obedience, and faith in the parents are gradually secured, while the knowledge of the laws of the system around are slowly learned.

But the higher part of the law of sacrifice soon begins to make its demands. The child first learns of this law by example, in that of the mother, that most perfect illustration of self-sacrificing love. Then comes a second child, when the first-born must practice on this example. It must give up its place in the mother's bosom to another; it must share its sweets and toys with the new-comer; it must join in efforts to protect, amuse, and instruct the helpless one. And thus the family is the constant school for training ignorant, inexperienced mind in the laws of the system of which it is a part, especially in the great law of self-control, for the best good of self, and of self-sacrifice for the best good of others.

Next comes the discipline of the school and the neighborhood, when the child is placed among his peers to be taught new rules of justice, benevolence, and self-sacrifice for the general good.

Next come the relations of the body politic, for which labors are demanded and pain is to be endured according to the grand law of sacrifice, by which the individual is to subordinate his own interests and wishes to the greater general good, so that the interests of the majority shall always control those of the minority.

Lastly, the whole world is to be taken into the estimate, and the nations are to be counted as members of one great family of man, for which every portion is to make sacrifices for the greater general good.

Thus, as age, and experience, and habits of obedience to the laws of rectitude increase, the duties and obligations grow more numerous and complicated. But the same grand principle is more and more developed, that each individual is to seek the greatest possible happiness with the least possible evil, for the vast whole as well as for each subordinate part, while self is to receive only its just and proper share.

The same great design of the Creator can be detected also in specific organizations, by which minds so differ from each other as to fit them for the diverse positions and relations that the common good demands. If all were exactly alike in the amount of constitutional powers and in the proportionate combinations, it can easily be seen that the general result would be far less favorable to the happiness of the whole. But as it is, some have the love of power very large, and seek to lead and control; others have it small, and prefer to follow. Some have elevated intellect, and love to [pg 124] teach; others have humbler capacities, and prefer humbler pursuits.

These varied combinations also give scope to the virtues of pity, tenderness, patience, mercy, justice, self-denial, and many other graces that could not be called into being without all the disparities, social, domestic, intellectual, and moral, that we find existing. Meantime the principle of habit and the power of the will give abundant opportunities for modifying these natural peculiarities to accommodate to varying circumstances.

To these indications of benevolent design may be added the “nature” of the bodily system, and the “nature” of the material world without. In examining the body we inhabit, so nicely adjusted, so perfectly adapted to our necessities, so beautifully and harmoniously arranged, so “fearfully and wonderfully made,” it is almost beyond the power of numbers to express the multiplied contrivances for ease, comfort, and delight.

We daily pursue our business and our pleasure, thoughtless of the thousand operations which are going on, and the busy mechanism employed in securing the objects we desire. The warm current that is flowing from the centre to the extremities, with its life-giving energies, and then returning to be purified and again sent forth; the myriads of branching nerves that are the sensitive discerners of good or ill; the unnumbered muscles and tendons that are contracting and expanding in all parts of our frame; the nicely-adjusted joints, and bands, and ligaments, that sustain, and direct, and support; the perpetual expansion and contraction of the vital organ; the thousand hidden contrivances and [pg 125] operations of the animal frame, all are quietly and constantly performing their generous functions, and administering comfort and enjoyment to the conscious spirit that dwells within.

Nor is the outer world less busy in performing its part in promoting the great design of the Creator. The light of suns and stars is traversing the ethereal expanse in search of those for whom it was created; for them it gilds the scenes of earth, and is reflected in ten thousand forms of beauty and of skill. The trembling air is waiting to minister its aid, fanning with cool breezes, or yielding the warmth of spring, sustaining the functions of life, and bearing on its light wing the thoughts that go forth from mind to mind, and the breathings of affection that are given and returned. For this design earth is sending forth her exuberance, the waters are emptying their stores, and the clouds pouring forth their treasures. All nature is busy with its offerings of fruits and flowers, its wandering incense, its garnished beauty, and its varied songs. Within and without, above, beneath, and around, the same Almighty Beneficence is found still ministering to the wants and promoting the happiness of the minds he has formed for ever to desire and pursue this boon.

We are now prepared to meet the questions proposed, (i.e.) is the Creator a being who, with the varying humors of man, sometimes prefers evil to good, and sometimes prefers good to evil, or does he invariably choose what is best for all, even in cases where it may involve personal sacrifices and suffering to himself?

In attempting to answer this question, we have set [pg 126] forth the evidence to be found in the works of the Creator which establishes the position that his chief end or ruling purpose is to produce the greatest possible happiness with the least possible evil.

The question then reads, does the Creator destroy happiness and cause needless pain, and thus thwart his own chief desire and great end; the end for which he made all things?

The very statement of the question is its most forcible answer.

We have seen that we are obliged to conceive of God as possessing such a social and moral nature as our own. This would lead him to desire the veneration, confidence, love, and gratitude of the children he has created.

But he has formed their minds to hate selfishness and to admire and reverence self-sacrificing benevolence. Will the Creator then oppose his own chief end and grand design by conduct which would make all his creatures necessarily, by the nature he implanted, withhold their respect and love, and feel only dislike and contempt? The very question involves its own answer.

Add to this, that all those causes which our experience and observation have shown to lead to wrong choices are necessarily excluded from our conceptions of the Creator.

The Eternal Mind can not err for want of knowledge, nor for want of habits of right action, nor for want of teachers and educators, nor for want of those social influences which generate and sustain a right governing purpose; for an infinite mind, that never had a beginning, can not have these modes of [pg 127] experience which appertain to new-born and finite creatures.

Again: Such is the eternal system of the universe, as we learn it by the light of reason, that the highest possible happiness to each individual mind and to the whole commonwealth is promoted by the right action of every mind in that system. This, of necessity, is seen and felt by the All-creating and Eternal Mind, and to suppose that, with this knowledge, he would ever choose wrong, is to suppose that he would choose pure evil. It is to suppose the Creator would do what he has formed our minds to believe to be impossible in any rational mind. It is to suppose that the Creator would do that which, if done by human beings, marks them as insane.

Chapter XXI. Nature of Mind as Perfect in Construction.

The first article in every system of religion is, who is the God who controls our destinies, and what is his character?

In attempting to answer this question by the light of nature, independently of revelation, we have gained these positions. There is an Intelligent Mind who created all things, whose natural attributes are the same as ours in kind, but vast beyond our comprehension in extent. In moral character, or that which is exhibited in choice or action, he is perfect in wisdom, benevolence, and rectitude; that is to say, he is a being whose chief end or ruling purpose is to do the [pg 128] best he can to make the most possible happiness with the least possible evil.

This being discovered as the grand design for which all human minds are created, we are thus enabled to decide as to what is the right and perfect construction or “nature” of mind, and also as to its right and perfect action.

In regard to the perfect construction of mind, we must again refer to the fact that in a system of things where both natural and moral evil exist, we are obliged to suppose a limitation of power by the nature of things, so that a system is perfect, not as excluding all evil; for as evil does exist, a system without any evil is impossible. All that remains, then, to constitute the idea of perfection, (as used in reference to things as they are) is this, that whatever is created by God, is the best possible in the nature of things.

The question then must be this, is the mind of man, as a race, the best in construction, that is possible in the nature of things? Is our mind made as good as it can be, so that no change is possible that would make it better?

In replying to this question, we must regard the matter in two relations. We have noticed, in the chapter on the Constitutional Varieties of the Human Mind, that while there are powers and attributes of mind which are common to all, there is an endless variety of character resulting from the diverse proportions and combinations of these several faculties, and also that there are diverse grades of mind, each having these diverse combinations. Some races of men are much lower in the scale of being, every way, than other races, while the same disparity exists among individuals of the same race.

Now when we compare individuals with each other, or when we compare races in these respects, we regard them as more or less perfect in organization with reference to the highest grade or species known to us. In this relation some minds are to be regarded as imperfect and defective in organization. And in reference to any one individual or race in this relation, we feel that the organization could be improved.

But when we regard each mind as a part of a vast system, in which the highest good of the whole will prove the highest possible good of each individual part, we are to judge of perfection in the organization of mind in another relation. If it is for the greatest happiness of the whole that there should be grades and ranks in mental powers; if disparities and varieties in organization give scope and exercise to virtues and modes of enjoyment that would be impossible were all minds exactly alike, and on the pattern of the highest in the scale of being, then the very points which are imperfections in the individual relations, become perfections in relation to the great whole. In this view, the lowest and humblest in the scale of being, when acting in his appropriate place and according to the great Creator's design, is perfect in mental construction, and is fitted to be happier in every respect than he could be if the whole system were changed by placing him among the highest in mental organization.

Just as it is with the human system—the lowly foot is perfect and complete in its place, though inferior in construction and service to the regal head and cunning hand. And should the foot be endowed with the higher gifts it would be a departure from its perfection [pg 130] in organization as related to the whole. The question, then, of the perfect nature of each human mind requires that we regard each one as a part of an infinite system demanding grades and ranks, and thus, also, relative disparities. And having proved that the chief design of the Creator is to make the best possible system, we are necessarily led to the conclusion that the lowest order of mind is as perfect in its nature, in relation to the great whole, as is the highest of all.

From the above we gain this definition:

A perfect mind, as to construction or nature, is one which is better fitted to its position in the best possible system of minds than it would be by any possible change.

In this use of the words nature and perfect it is claimed that in the preceding pages it has been proved that the mind of man is perfect in nature. Our next inquiry will relate to the perfect action of mind in respect to that which is voluntary or self-originated. In other words, we shall inquire as to the perfect moral action of the human mind, as discoverable by reason and experience, independently of revelation.

Chapter XXII. Right and Wrong—True Virtue.

Having discovered the end for which mind is made, and thus gained the idea of what is meant by perfectness, in its nature or construction, we next inquire as to what is the perfect action of mind.

Here we must again recognize the distinction between two classes of mental actions, viz., those acts which are natural as resulting necessarily from the constitution of mind, of which God is the producing cause, and those which are voluntary and of which man is the producing cause. The first are natural and involuntary, the latter are moral and voluntary.

This introduces the second part of the system of natural religion, that which relates to man's obligations or duty toward the Creator, toward his fellow beings, and toward himself. In other words, the question is, “what is right voluntary or moral action?”

In seeking the reply to this without the aid of revelation, the following particulars demand attention:

In all discussions on this question there is no mental analysis more important than the distinction between the desire, or what moves us to choose, and the act of choice.

The mind is always moved to choice by desire for some good to be gained or some evil to be avoided. The susceptibility or power of being thus led, in popular language is called a “bias,” an “inclination,” a “propensity,” a “tendency,” or a “proclivity” toward the object which causes the desire. Thus the susceptibility to desire stimulating drinks is excited by liquors, and this is called “a propensity” to strong drink.

The susceptibility to desire to amass money is called a bias, or propensity to avarice. The only thing ever meant by a bias or propensity to choose any thing is, that there are such susceptibilities that desire can be excited for that thing.

But all such propensities or biases are from evil and toward good in the widest sense of these terms. No rational mind ever desires pure evil, but always desires good of some sort. On the contrary, it is one of the implanted principles of common sense that no rational mind will choose pure evil. Any man who should do this would be regarded as insane—as having lost the distinctive feature of a rational mind.

But we find that desires are called strong, imperative, powerful, and the like, not at all with reference to the question whether what is desired would be best for all concerned. They are measured, as to strength or weakness, by the degrees of enjoyment their gratification secures, or the amount of pain that self-denial would involve. This measurement of varied degrees of pleasure and pain is a matter of consciousness to every mind, and is constantly referred to by all races and in all languages.

In this use of the term, the strongest desire often exists for that which is perceived to be the best good for all concerned. At other times the strongest desire is for that which is seen to be the lesser good. When the strongest desire is for that which is best, the choice is easy, and the mind always chooses the best good. But when the strongest desire is for that which is not best, then choice is more difficult, and there is a conscious struggle between the promptings of reason and conscience, and the importunities of strong desire for the lesser good.

At such periods there is a conscious power in every mind to choose either way, and sometimes we choose to gratify the strongest desire and give up the best good, and at other times we choose the best good and [pg 133] deny the strongest desire. Every human being has been conscious of this struggle between excited desire and the dictates of reason, and all the literature of the world refers to it as a universal fact. The terms self-denial, self-control, self-government, all are based on this experience of all minds.[6]

Right Actions and Rewardable Actions.

The preceding furnishes the ground for the distinctions [pg 134] always recognized between voluntary action which is right as best for all concerned, and those actions which are deemed praiseworthy, rewardable, and meritorious.

Whenever the dictates of reason and our strongest desire are coincident, so that choosing what is right and best involves no struggle; then the ideas of merit and of desert of reward, praise, and commendation are wanting. We say such acts are right, but there is no merit in them, and no proper ground for adding any other reward than that which naturally results from choosing what we desire most, and which is best for us and for all concerned.

On the contrary, when there is a struggle between a sense of what is right and best, and the strongest desire, and a choice is made which involves self-denial and self-sacrifice, we feel that the act is one which is meritorious, and deserving of reward and praise.

Any voluntary action, then, is right which is conformed to those rules of rectitude which tend to secure the most happiness for all, even when there is no temptation to another course. But an action is meritorious and rewardable only when there is a reference to the rules of rectitude in the mind of the actor and some degree of self-denial. To choose what we desire most, without any regard to what is right or wrong, even when it chances that our choice is that which is best, and thus right, does not meet our idea of a meritorious and praiseworthy act.

The greater portion of our choices are of those things which are good in all relations, as best for self and best for all concerned. Thus when we desire to eat, to drink, to breathe the pure air, to admire the [pg 135] beauties of nature, to enjoy the society of friends,—to choose these and a thousand other daily blessings, promotes our own best good and the best good of all concerned. In all such cases choosing what we desire most is morally right in all relations. But no acts of choice are meritorious, except as they involve a regard to law in the mind of the actor, and some degree of self-denial in conforming to rule.

The only cases where moral evil (or wrong choices) can exist, are where desires are excited for some good, either for ourselves or for others, which is not best for all concerned. In all such cases there is a “bias,” “tendency,” and “propensity” to choose good of some sort, but it is not the best good, and therefore to choose it would be morally wrong. Thus there is a bias or propensity to what is good in one relation, but evil in another; good as tending to give enjoyment, but evil as contrary to a law which enjoins that the best good should always be preferred.

In such cases the desires for a good which is not for the best are not morally wrong, for they arise involuntarily from those susceptibilities implanted by God, which are not to be exterminated, but only regulated by law. The moral evil consists not in the existence of such desires, but in choosing to gratify them at the sacrifice of the best good of self or of others.

It has been shown that one result of the wrong action of mind is such a change in its constitutional nature, that there will be a desire to inflict evil on others as a malignant pleasure to the guilty mind. In these cases such desires may properly be called morally wrong because they are the result of the voluntary action of the sinful mind, and not of the natural susceptibilities [pg 136] implanted by the Creator. As they result wholly from wrong previous choices, the guilty mind itself is the author of them and not the Creator of mind.

Here it is important to discriminate in regard to that natural impulse in all minds which is excited by the infliction of pain on self or on others. It is this natural impulse to inflict evil on the author of evil which is the foundation of justice in the family and in the civil state. Its design is for the best good of all concerned, and it becomes evil only by excess and misuse. So long as it is controlled by reason and conscience it is good and only good.

In view of the above distinctions, there can be no moral evil in desires for things which it would be wrong to choose, except as these desires are the result of previous wrong choices.[7]

It has been shown that the principle of habit renders it more and more easy and agreeable to regulate our choices by the rules of rectitude. The habit of sacrificing personal gratification to the rule of duty may be so cultivated that what at first was difficult, and involved a painful struggle, becomes easy. It is possible so to cultivate such habits that our highest desires, and the dictates of reason and conscience, shall continually be more and more coincident.

We can conceive of newly-created beings as placed in such circumstances that, for a considerable period, all their strongest desires may be coincident with the best good of themselves and of others, so that there can be no opportunity to practice self-control in regulating their desires by the rules of rectitude. In such a case, [pg 137] while acting simply from impulse, without reference to rule, they would always act right, and yet they would form no habits of self-control, and thus would be liable to fail at the first temptation where their strongest desire conflicted with the known law of rectitude.

The preceding statements are made in order to arrive at correct and discriminating definitions of certain fundamental terms on which the whole question of the “depraved nature” of the human mind will be found to turn.

Right in Tendency and Right in Motive.

Mankind in all ages and in all languages speak of certain acts as right or wrong in reference to their tendency or their effect on human happiness, and without reference to the intention of the author. Thus they affirm that the stealing and selling of men is wrong, whatever may be the motives of the slave trader.

Again, they speak of acts as right or wrong in reference to the motive or intention of the author. Thus they say a man who sacrificed his wealth and reputation, rather than to violate his conscience, acted right as to motive, although he was mistaken in his views of duty, so that his act, as it respects its tendency, may have been wrong.