APPENDIX
Between St. Eufemia and Monte Leone,
July 6, 1806.
My dearest Father—In the first place I give you joy of a most complete victory gained by a body of English troops over a French force very superior in number, another proof that the extraordinary bravery of our countrymen is not solely to be attributed to salt provisions and sea air. This army had been reviled as fugitive in consequence of the wise retreat of Sir J. Craig from Naples.
General Regnier, the old calumniator of British troops, had threatened a speedy invasion of Sicily.
It was generally believed that the Calabrians, a ferocious race, held the French in abhorrence, and Sir J. Stuart’s plan, as far as I have been able to make out, was to raise the country—arm it—and then give the people a lesson in the art of war by beating the French. It was presumed that the effect of this would be to render the country uninhabitable to the French, and finally to deliver the territory from the general scourge of continental tranquillity.
Sir John left Messina on the night of the 30th of June, in pursuance of his object, which was then unknown.
At about midnight of the 1st of July the transports were collected in the Bay of St. Eufemia. Orders were then given for the landing at two o’clock. It was not expected that there was any enemy at hand, but upon the Light Infantry running forward, a firing commenced, which continued in bush-fighting the greater part of the morning, the enemy consisting of about three hundred Poles, scattered about in a very thick brushwood, they retiring and the Light Infantry pursuing.... They ran at the enemy like lions, and the event of the day was—about twenty of the enemy wounded (some badly), two officers, and about one hundred prisoners.
We had only one man wounded.
The army then took a position, one flank upon the town of Nicastro, and the other below the village of Eufemia. Until the 2nd, the reports concerning the enemy were various.... On the 2nd the enemy was discovered on the heights above the plain of Maida. He exhibited lights at night, and it was reported that he intended battle. In the course of the next day some information was obtained, and the enemy then was supposed to consist of between two and three thousand men. On the night of the 3rd the order of march was given to commence at two o’clock.
The enemy still continuing his lights, some time after daylight it was suspected that he had withdrawn. His position, however, was at right angles with the beach, and so far from it as to admit of operations on his left flank, which was weak from the nature of the ground. This the enemy could not avoid, from our being masters of the water, upon which was Sir Sidney Smith with a line-of-battle ship and three frigates. The British marched with their flanks in line and centre in column, the right flank on the sea, the left exposed, so that in the approach the corresponding flank of each force was exposed to the operations of the other. The Frenchman, seeing his left threatened, changed his position with admirable order, and formed on the Englishman’s left, on which the French cavalry charged. The 20th regiment, having just landed, immediately advanced in support of this flank to meet the cavalry with fixed bayonets, which forced them to retire, the Artillery playing upon their retreat. The French Light Infantry now charged ours, which advanced to meet it. The two regiments were point to point, when at this anxious moment the enemy to a man fled in the utmost confusion, we pursuing. The slaughter of this regiment was dreadful. Other regiments now charged and volleyed, as is usual in battles, and, as I hope will always be the case, the victory fell on us, the enemy flying with the utmost precipitation, and we having no cavalry, he escaped. The slaughter on the side of the French was immense and almost incredible when compared to ours. In killed, wounded, and taken, it has been estimated at 3000, while ours exactly amounts to so many hundreds. If I were a Frenchman I would tell you what I think of the British troops, but the modesty of an Englishman imposes silence when the merits of his countrymen are the subject. Fighting appears their delight, and they seek the enemy with the ardour of sportsmen; let him, however, drop his arms, and he is safe; let him be wounded, he is pitied and assisted—in short, upon my honour, I think the lion and the lamb are here most strikingly united.
I could recite several interesting anecdotes, such as battles generally give rise to, but I am much hurried. We only lost one officer and forty men killed. The officer’s servant had one leg shattered and the other badly wounded, yet his own misery he did not think of. “But my poor master was killed,” said he. “I hope, however, the day was ours. Well, then, I die content.” “Here” (said a Highlander) “is this —— brute that has been firing at me and wounded me in so many places.” “Water! water!” cried the wretch. The Highlander revenged himself immediately with his canteen!
A general officer was among the prisoners, severely wounded, and the Commander-in-Chief was also severely wounded. The French force, from returns taken, is considered to have amounted to upwards of 7,000; ours was 4,500, so that considering the vast superiority and other circumstances in favour of the enemy, the victory was as brilliant as one could wish.... An extraordinary coincidence with respect to the armies was observed. General Sir J. Stuart was opposed to General Regnier, a man of acknowledged military eminence, who had called Sir John a man of no talents. The two Light Infantries were immediately opposed, as were two regiments of Watteville in the different services. Our Highland Regiment was opposed to their 42nd (to cover embarkation), our 31st to theirs.
After having advanced some miles after the enemy our army marched back to the position it had left in the morning. The action began at half-past eight and the firing ceased at 11 on the 4th of July. On the 5th the army marched to this place near the sea, and about a mile from the field of battle.
I am now sitting on the ground sheltered by a round tent.... I write this on my hat. Adieu, my dearest father.—Your ever affectionate and dutiful son,
C. Boothby.
July 6, 1806.
* * * * *
Monte Leone, July 11, 1806.
My ever dearest Mother— ... The day after I wrote you an account of the battle we advanced some miles beyond the field towards the Adriatic, just under the town of Maida. The enemy had retired to Catanzaro, and it was generally expected that we should seek another battle before he could reinforce himself. It was judged, however, that the coming up with him was precarious, and the advantage of the chance of beating him still more—not adequate to the inconvenience of harassing the victors this burning weather, which reasoning was probably strengthened by the risk of any junction having been formed between two parties of the enemy’s force. No prejudgment would have given victory to five thousand men against eight, supposed to be the best troops in the world, fully prepared for the enterprise against them, having all the local advantages and local knowledge, commanded by a General of the greatest reputation, and particularly for manœuvring skill.
Our General went into the field under the idea that the force he was to attack was between two and three thousand men.
The fatal error of the French General was that, obstinately blind to experience, he despised his enemy—an enemy which the battles of Egypt should have taught him to consider at least equal to himself. He had suffered prejudice to mislead him until his slaughtered and flying troops and the severe personal wound forced open his eyes; but he opened them too late. In defiance of the general principle to avoid an invading enemy until you have involved him in a country of which he is ignorant, and from your own knowledge are certain to destroy him, General Regnier descended from the advantages of his position to fight front to front in the plain.
With the battle of the 21st of March before his eyes, he tells his troops that those very Egyptian regiments cannot stand the bayonet. The deluded Frenchmen charge with confidence, and, expecting to pursue hares, are met by lions.
The same error which has been so fatal to so many Generals was fatal to Menon, and was deservedly still more fatal to Regnier; for Menon could not know us, and Regnier would not.
But I stray from the point.
After staying a day under Maida the troops marched to Monte Leone, and there the General missed his baggage, which did not turn up until yesterday, when the General’s cook gave a very good account of himself. The inhabitants of the country were to be deceived as to the intentions of the retrograde movement, and consequently what conversation could be gleaned from the General’s table tended to an advance to Catanzaro. The troops marched backwards at two in the morning, but the baggage, with a guard of thirty men, not being properly attended to, was not quite so alert, but marched about an hour later towards the enemy, whose outposts (taking this little force for our advanced guard) retired and gave intelligence of the approach of the English army, which, corresponding with the report of our intentions, the enemy left Catanzaro to thirty men commanded by a cook, and retreated with precipitation to the borders of the Adriatic. The quick cook, smelling the rat, squeezed himself into the General’s coat and personated the General, until, finding himself neither attacked by the French nor joined by the English, he could retire without disgrace and seek the true situation of his allies.
The design of the march through Calabria was to seize the enemy’s garrisons and stores all the way to Reggio, which is just opposite Messina. This has already been done, as Reggio has been taken by a party from Messina, so that we now expect to embark from Pizzo, which lies just before this place. But nothing you know is certain.
In taking possession of the stores we have seen innumerable papers. One letter from Regnier[30] says, “When I have been with the English I shall come to you. They are only 12,000. I shall very soon finish with them.” Somewhere else he says he will take good care that we shall not reach our shipping again. Indeed everything betrays a most ridiculous confidence, arising not only from the consciousness of great merit (which was just), but from a most unreasonable contempt of an enemy which had before shown itself superior. Every prisoner whom I have heard speak upon the subject acknowledges to have been deceived, and condemns the order to charge an unbroken regiment. The French soldiers are generally remarkably fine men.
My dearest mother, I have not written you a very proper letter for a lady, but to make it a little more acceptable it assures you of my perfect health and spirits and constant love and affection to all of you. Adieu, my dearest mother.—Your most affectionate and devoted son,
C. B.
1808
Expedition to Sweden
Two Letters to Sir Brooke Boothby, Bart., from Captain Charles Boothby[31]
Quite private. Don’t speak of this.
July 1, 1808.
My dear Uncle—We are certainly bound for England. Sir John Moore was made prisoner at Stockholm, and escaped in disguise, having, I suppose, been previously provided with couriers’ passes, etc.
I am now going on board the Victory to ask Sir John if there will be any objection to your going in this ship, and as no objection can be made, you had better, if it suits you, put yourself afloat as soon as possible, as we shall sail to-morrow.
If you think of any comforts for yourself on the voyage, procure them. We have no tea.
God bless you.
You may as well make use of the boat that brought Jack, bringing him also with you.
C. B.
To Sir Brooke Boothby, Bart.,
Seagerlind’s Hotel.
* * * * *
2nd July 1808.
My dear Uncle—The information I sent you yesterday was from the Fountain head, and is indeed perfectly true.
The General found himself, by his instructions, obliged to return to England, but the King wished him to wait for despatches from England. This the General declined, upon which he received a message in the night not to leave Stockholm without the King’s consent.
Sir John sent a messenger to embark the army and horses immediately, and then remonstrated through the minister. No attention was paid, until a second remonstrance was made, when the prohibition was repeated.
Sir John then made his escape in his travelling dress. The Secretary of Legation drove him beyond the first stage in his curricle, and a messenger was despatched by Mr. Thornton with orders to take him up on the road. This is incredible, but certainly true.
I went on board the Victory yesterday. Sir J. M. was very kind, and went himself to the Admiral to get an order for your coming on board this ship (which I carried through its several stages), and she is prepared to receive you, and Mr. Christer will describe her accommodations. If you come you will be sorry to learn that I am not going straight to England, being ordered on board the Superb, at the request of Admiral Keats, to reconnoitre the little Isle of Sproe in the Belt, after which I shall be sent to England by the first ship of war that goes. Pray, if I do not see you this evening (for I shall not go on board the Admiral till to-morrow), communicate this to Edwinstowe. It is an excursion which I am delighted to make, because it is creditable, useful, and agreeable. I hope to see you here this evening. In the meantime believe me ever most affectionately yours,
C. B.
Your fellow passengers are very pleasant young men—quite young.
Major Cockburn, the General’s secretary, arrived to-day. He reports that on Wednesday the King did not know of Sir John’s departure, which took place on Monday. When his Majesty does discover it, he will not unlikely take some very strong, furious measures. Therefore pray do not delay getting off.
1809
CORUNNA
Before reading the official despatches on the battle of Corunna it is important to have some idea of the plan adopted by the enemy, and it is with the greatest interest we read that,[32] “When Buonaparte received intelligence that the British were moving to the Duero,” he said, ‘Moore is the only General now fit to contend with me; I shall advance against him in person.’
“Orders were then sent to the Duke of Dalmatia to give way, if attacked, and to decoy the British to Burgos, or as far eastward as possible, and at the same time to push on a corps towards Leon, on their left flank. And should they attempt to retreat, he was ordered to impede this by every means in his power. The corps on the road to Badajoz was stopt, and ordered to proceed towards Salamanca, while he himself moved rapidly with all disposable force to Madrid, and the Escurial, directly to Benaventa. Neither Buonaparte nor any of his Generals had the least doubt of surrounding the British with between 60 and 70,000 men before they could reach Galicia.
“Sir John Moore, as appears both by his letters and his conduct, saw clearly the whole of this plan; he had prepared for the danger, calculated the time, and has acquired the glory of being the first General who has frustrated Buonaparte.”