CHAPTER XXIII.
Death of Mr. Thomas Grenville—Russian Measures in Poland—French Overtures to England—The Confidential Correspondence on the Spanish Marriage—Relations with France—Hostility of Lord Palmerston to France—Visit to Paris—Princess Lieven's Version of the Transaction—Lord Cowley's Opinion—Conversation with M. Guizot—M. Duchâtel's Opinion—The exact Truth as to the Spanish Marriage—Conversation with M. Thiers—A Dinner at M. Thiers'—Further Argument with M. Guizot—Character of Queen Christina—Papers laid before the Chamber—Relations of the British Embassy with the French Opposition—At the Tuileries—Mr. Baring's Opinion—Debate in the Chamber of Deputies—Mrs. Austin's Salon in Paris—Debates in England—Bad Effect of Lord Normanby's Intrigues with Thiers—Another Misunderstanding—M. de Tocqueville—Ball at the Hôtel de Ville—Animosity of Guizot and Lord Palmerston—A Call at the Sorbonne and at the Hôtel Lambert—Change of Government in Spain—Farewell Visit to M. Guizot—Effect of the English Blue Book—Conversation with M. Thiers.
CHARACTER OF MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE.
December 19th, 1846.—On Thursday evening at seven o'clock Mr. Grenville died, after a week's illness which was no more than a severe cold or influenza. If he had lived till the 31st of this month, he would have completed his ninety-first year. I had only known him with any sort of intimacy for the last five or six years, during which I saw a good deal of him. He was a remarkable man, not so much from great ability as from a singular healthiness of mind and body and the greenness of his old age. I never saw so old a man in possession of such mental and bodily faculties; his only infirmity was deafness; till about a year ago he used to walk vigorously; he never had an illness till the one with which he was attacked the year before last, and from which he recovered entirely though with strength somewhat impaired. His memory was remarkable; his cheerfulness, vivacity, and kindness of disposition delightful. He evinced an affection for his relations and a cordiality to his friends that were pleasant to behold, and he was not only entirely free from the moroseness and captiousness which so often attend old age, but he blended an extreme suavity of manner and sweetness of temper with the high-bred politeness of the more ceremonious age in which he had flourished. He was certainly the most amiable and engaging specimen of an old man I ever beheld. I do not conceive that his abilities were ever first-rate, and latterly (whatever may have been the case early in life) he entertained very strong prejudices and often very unreasonable ones; these prejudices caused him to act in some instances in a manner inconsistent with the urbanity of his disposition. He never could endure the Reform Bill or forgive its authors; he never would set his foot in Holland House after that measure; and he estranged himself from all his old political friends, even those with whom he had been the most intimate, not indeed absolutely quarrelling with them, but desisting from all intimacy. He was a scholar and a well-informed man, and he retained till the last all his literary tastes and habits; he loved the society of literary men, and to the last entered with zest and spirit and unimpaired intelligence into all questions both of literature and politics. It is difficult to say what the exact colour of his political opinions was. He used to be a Whig; but he was, at all events latterly, a moderate anti-reforming Whig, with a horror of organic changes and not fond of any changes, disliking free trade and disliking Cobden more; favourable to Catholic emancipation and the establishment of a Catholic Church, but abhorring O'Connell who was his bête noire, and in his eyes the incarnation of all evil and mischief. He never was married, but when he was young he was desperately in love with the Duchess of Devonshire, and he never married because her image remained enthroned in his breast, and he never could find any other woman to be compared with her. For many years he was a poor man, and he never became a rich one till the death of Lord Glastonbury, who left him an estate and a great deal of money; the estate, which was entailed on his nephew George Neville, he generously gave up to him at once. He lived hospitably and handsomely, and was, I am told, very generous and charitable. His greatest expense was in books; he had collected a library of extraordinary value, and which for the size of it has always been reckoned the most complete of any private collection. It continued to interest and occupy him to the last, and he never ceased to add to it as occasion offered; he was, indeed, one of the last of the great collectors, of the bibliomaniacs; he collated every book himself, and placed in the title-page of each, in his own handwriting, an account of the book, where purchased, and its history when of any interest. His society in latter years was restricted, and he was not fond of making new acquaintances unless he fell in with them by accident, when he was easily approachable and always disposed to carry them on. He had constantly dinners and very agreeable ones, and it was wonderful to see him at ninety years old doing the honours of his table with all the energy, gaiety, and gallantry of a man in the prime of life. A happier life and an easier death it would be difficult to discover; his life was extended to nearly a century without any intermission of bodily health, any decay of mental faculties, and, what is more extraordinary and more valuable, without any deadness or coldness of human affections. He was blessed with affluence, with the love of rational and elevating pursuits, and with ample leisure and power to enjoy them. He was a philosopher, a gentleman, and a Christian, and he lived in constant social intercourse with the relations to whom he was attached, or the friends of his predilection, to all of whom he was an object of the deepest respect and affection. A life so tranquil and prosperous was terminated by a death no less easy and serene; his indisposition was not such as to interfere with his usual habits; he rose at his accustomed hour and dressed himself to the last, even on the day of his death. He had always a book, latterly the Prayer Book, before him, and his mind was undisturbed and unclouded. He dined and went to sleep in his chair, and from that sleep he never awoke.
December 20th.—On Friday morning an article in the 'Times' announced that the Emperor of Russia was going to annex Poland to his empire, putting an end to the last vestige of Polish nationality. Yesterday morning the 'Chronicle' declared this report was exaggerated, if not erroneous, and that all that was contemplated was the abrogation of custom-house regulations between the Russian and Polish frontiers. The history of these contradictory articles is this: On Wednesday at the Cabinet dinner Palmerston brought this piece of news, communicated to him by Bunsen, who was in a great state of alarm and indignation, and said that Metternich was equally alarmed and eager to do something. The Austrian and Prussian proposals were severally these: Metternich wished for a declaration that the annexation of Cracow should not be used as a precedent, but considered as an exceptional case. Bunsen suggested that a naval demonstration should be made in the Baltic by us, of course in conjunction with Austria and Prussia. These two Powers now begin to see what an egregious folly they have committed in the Cracow affair, and are filled with shame and terror. The next morning, Friday, Palmerston saw Brunnow, and he asked him whether this story was true. Brunnow said he was glad he had asked him, and that he could assure him he had never heard one word of it and did not believe it, that he believed it to be a mere fiscal regulation which would be advantageous to the Poles and not agreeable to the Russians, but that the reported political move he disbelieved. He had, however, written to Nesselrode to ask what the real truth was. Palmerston, without doubt, on this sent the article to the 'Morning Chronicle;' there is a phrase at the end of it about Guizot quite Palmerstonian. It is amusing to see the two papers moved by different ministerial interests. John Russell told me at Windsor yesterday that he believed the first account. It certainly seems to me that it is a very bad piece of policy of the Emperor's, if true; he has accomplished the absorption of Poland already in fact, and what can it signify to him to do so in form? By degrees he has stripped the Poles of almost all national distinctions, and he has only to go on as he has been doing for some time past to complete his work; nobody opposed, nobody remonstrated with him at each successive violation of those privileges which all Europe guaranteed; and now the Powers, who patiently and tamely endured the most flagrant violations in fact, are ready to explode with indignation at an announcement of them in form.
RUSSIAN MEASURES IN POLAND.
James Rothschild is come over here, partly on his own concerns, and partly on Louis Philippe's, who is very intimate with him and talks to him often and confidentially. He has been with our Ministers, at least with Lord Lansdowne and Lord Clarendon (I do not know if he has been with any others), and said a great deal about the King's intense desire to be well with England again, asked if we wanted to get rid of Guizot, and intimated that if his fall would facilitate the reconciliation he would be sacrificed without scruple. They have no doubt whatever that he is authorised by the King to convey this to our Government. Clarendon told him that Palmerston would not walk across the room to get rid of Guizot, and did not care one farthing whether he was in or out; but that he was not surprised that they should fancy he might desire it, knowing as he did that they had left no stone unturned to bring about his removal from the Foreign Office, so far as they were able to say or to do anything to that end.
December 24th.—Jarnac was with me for three hours yesterday, and I am going to him to-day to see some of his papers. The whole of our conversation resolves itself into this: he said that they really had believed that the Coburg marriage was imminent; that they had given ample and repeated notice (especially in the note of February 27) that, if ever they saw this, they should act accordingly, consider the Eu engagement at an end, and take their own line; that they never could get Palmerston to put on paper distinctly that we did not and would not encourage this match. This, involved in a vast deal of phraseology, and many minute details, with a great deal of false reasoning, and facts contradictory of each other, made up his whole discourse. I endeavoured to pin him down to one or two points, from which he was always trying to escape, and to cover his retreat by verbiage.
I have made up my mind to go to Paris, Lady Normanby having offered to take me in at the Embassy: this temptation decides me.
December 25th.—Yesterday I was with Jarnac for three hours and a half, reading papers. He showed me everything: the copy of the famous despatch of July 19 (Palmerston to Bulwer), which was (as they say) the fons et origo mali; all Guizot's private letters to him, and his to Guizot; ditto, between him and the king; his procès-verbaux of conferences with Palmerston; copy of the note of February 27 (on which they so much rely); the letter of Guizot's which was sent to John Russell, and John's admirable answer; Jarnac's own rejoinder; Guizot and the King on this correspondence: in short, he gave me to read all that was material, and that I had time to read in these three or four hours. At all events, I believe I am now as completely in the possession of the case on both sides as it is possible to be, and all this information and knowledge has not changed my opinion.
It is clear that we have been jockeyed by France in a very shabby, uncandid, underhand way. Guizot's private letters, admirably written, bear on them all the stamp of sincerity and conviction, and are calculated to impress anybody with the belief that he was sincere, and that he thought he was doing what he had a right to do as regarded England, and what it was his duty to do as to France. But where rights and duties are clear, there is no need of concealment; everything may be, and ought to be, open and above board; and besides the object of defeating a Coburg scheme and securing the Spanish bride, there was that of preserving the entente cordiale, which he could not expect to do, acting as he did.
THE SPANISH MARRIAGES.
When disentangled from all its envelopments of verbiage and mutual insinuations, the case resolves itself into one of two very simple points, and lies in a very narrow compass:—The new ministers came into office about July 7; it was then about a fortnight afterwards that Jarnac spoke to Palmerston about the Queen of Spain's marriage (not a word about the Infanta de part ou d'autre). Palmerston had written to Bulwer on the 19th, and he read this despatch to Jarnac, and gave him a copy of it (confidentially) to send to Paris. This was the despatch on which they ground their whole case. It treated of two subjects: the marriage of the Queen, and the internal government of Spain. It was very able, very sound, but it was extremely imprudent to communicate it to the French Government. The substance of it was this: that we always had considered the marriage as a Spanish question, in which no foreign power had any right to interfere. That there were three candidates left in the field (Trapani and young Carlos being out of the field), 'Prince of Coburg and two sons of Don Francisco;' that we only desired that the Queen might take whichever of them would most conduce to her own happiness and the good of Spain. We neither supported nor objected to any of them; that therefore there were no instructions to be given to Bulwer, as it was only necessary to refer to those of his predecessor, on which he would continue to act. Then came a severe criticism on the Spanish Government, and the overthrow of all law and constitutional rights, still desiring Bulwer not to interfere in any way, but not to conceal the sentiments of the English Government thereupon. This was very strong, very bitter, and necessarily very offensive to the Spanish Government, and to their abettors and protectors at Paris; however true, and however fit to be written by Palmerston to Bulwer, it was not wise to put it in the hands of the French Minister.
After the communication of this despatch, various letters and conversations passed with remonstrances, and not without some vague threats. Jarnac at once objected to what was said about the Prince of Coburg, complained it was different from the understanding with Aberdeen, and asked if it could not be reconsidered. The reply was that it was already gone. Guizot's reply to the receipt of this despatch was confirmatory of Jarnac's objections, and the latter made various attempts to obtain from Palmerston something on paper to the same effect as the verbal assurances which Palmerston gave him. Palmerston replied (as Jarnac reported) that he could not do this without consulting his colleagues. In the meanwhile (I don't exactly recollect the date), Jarnac spoke to the Duke of Bedford and Clarendon, and had an interview with John Russell. From all of these he admits, as well as from Palmerston himself, he received the most positive assurances that we did not, and would not, support the pretensions of the Prince of Coburg, and that we had no thoughts of departing from the principle laid down by Lord Aberdeen. It was certainly very imprudent of Palmerston to show this despatch of the 19th, and it is clear to me that he did it for the pleasure of provoking the French Government, and showing them what we thought of the whole management of Spanish affairs. It was, in fact, a covert and indirect but a bitter attack on them. Next, he was inexcusable for not giving them in writing that which they required, and for allowing nearly five weeks to pass away after their urgent demand for it, before he wrote (on August 28) the despatch, which did not reach Madrid till long after the marriages had been settled and proclaimed. The despatch of the 19th, which Bulwer was not desired to communicate to the Court of Spain, having been placed in Guizot's hands, he forthwith sent it to Bresson, who lost no time (but without Bulwer's knowledge) in communicating it to the Spanish Ministers, to whom it was sure to be most offensive. Taking dates into consideration, it is difficult to doubt that at the same time, or very shortly after, Bresson was ordered to settle the marriages of both princesses, for this despatch is dated July 19, and on August 28 the 'Gazette' at Madrid published the Royal announcement of the Queen's marriage. Not one word, however, was ever hinted to our Government of any such instructions being given or being contemplated. In one of Guizot's letters to Jarnac he gives him to understand that, much as he is dissatisfied, he shall do nothing fresh; and, during the whole of this interval, Jarnac continued to press Palmerston for some positive and written disclaimer—that is, he did when he had the opportunity, for during a considerable part of this time Palmerston was sailing with the Queen. There was, indeed, one letter of Guizot's hinting at his taking a line of his own, 'une politique isolée;' but this was too vague (if it were communicated, which is not clear) to excite any serious apprehension in anybody's mind. It is, however, clear that well-informed persons did think it imprudent of Palmerston not to give the French Government at once the satisfaction they demanded, and, as I have before said, both Normanby and William Hervey wrote over very strongly on the subject.
BREACH OF THE ENGAGEMENT.
At last, early in September, the news came like a thunderclap that both the marriages were settled and declared; and then began the feeling of indignation and resentment which broke up the intimacy between the two Courts, and infused such bitterness into our diplomatic relations. The war of notes began, and the world will judge whether Palmerston or Guizot had the best of it. The flimsiness of their pretext for breaking an engagement they admit to have made is the more obvious the more it is considered; and that it was a pretext, and one of which they wanted to avail themselves, is evident from the care they took to make no previous allusion to the note of February 27, which they have since endeavoured to turn to so much account. This was a note not delivered but read to Aberdeen, in which they said that, if the Coburg marriage appeared to be imminent, they should hold themselves disengaged from their pledges. They now pretend that they forgot this note was not delivered, and did not know that Palmerston was not cognisant of it, but they never took any opportunity of finding out whether he was, nor of renewing to him the menace or intimation it contained. This omission and their secret instructions to Bresson, while they not only kept us in the dark, but did their best to blind us, are sufficient to convict them of duplicity and bad faith. Palmerston, on his side, may be blamed for imprudence and negligence. The way in which it was taken up here, and especially the things Palmerston said, exasperated Guizot prodigiously, and no doubt the King still more; and it was under this irritation that he wrote his letter (September 15) to Jarnac, containing a bitter philippic against Palmerston, his whole character and policy, and a comparison between him and John Russell, much to the advantage of the latter. This letter Jarnac was instructed to send to John Russell. He told me that he was so well aware of its imprudence that he remonstrated against the order, and delayed several days to obey it. His remonstrance was disregarded, and he was desired to give the letter to John Russell. He took it, however, to Palmerston, told him he had a letter which he was charged to show to John Russell, but, as it contained matter relating to him (Palmerston), he thought it right to place it in his hands that he might read it first and forward it to Lord John after. Palmerston said he did not want to see it, and would not look at it. On this he sent it to Lord John, who showed it to Palmerston, and wrote Jarnac an admirable but very severe answer, commenting in strong terms on the conduct of France, and expressing his entire concurrence with Palmerston in every particular. This reply must have been gall and wormwood to Louis Philippe, and very disagreeable to Guizot. Jarnac wrote an answer to Lord John, rather a rigmarole, but defending the King. This answer seems to have had great success at Paris, whatever it may have had here, for there were letters from both the King and Guizot; the first thanking his champion in very warm terms, and the latter praising his zeal and eloquence.
THE RUPTURE.
The estrangement was now complete, and resentment openly testified. The two Courts were brouillés; the Ministers collectively, Palmerston individually, and Normanby at Paris, all put themselves in a cold and forbidding attitude. Our refusal to join with France in the Cracow affair was received as a hostile expression, and it is evident that the King and Guizot have been getting more and more uneasy at the estrangement, in which we persist. It is, however, not easy to discover how far the Monarch and the Minister are acting in real conjunction, and whether the former is faithful or false to the latter. Guizot's conduct and the tone of his letters do not entirely correspond; the latter evince a strong desire to obtain a sufficient security about the Coburg alliance, and certainly strenuous efforts were made by Jarnac to extract some document which might have been so considered; while, if we judge by his acts, it would seem that all the French wanted was a pretext for concluding the marriage, and such a written assurance as he kept demanding would have counteracted their clever scheme of deception and fraud. It strikes me as very possible that the King and Guizot were not acting together; that the intrigue was the King's, which Guizot did not dare or could not defeat or obstruct, but that while he was obliged to work out the King's design, he would have been really glad if we had given such clear and formal assurances as would have rendered the execution of the plan impossible. I did not conceal from Jarnac my opinion that he had failed to make his case any better; he was not a little mortified at the admiration I expressed of John Russell's letter, in which I in vain attempted to get him to join.
The next morning, just as I was setting off to Badminton, he came to me in consequence of letters he had received from Paris, in which he was informed that Normanby had openly said that the two countries could never be on good terms again till Guizot was turned out and we had obtained a renunciation from the Duchess de Montpensier; this they believed, and that it was the echo of sentiments entertained here. I told him I did not believe a word of it, either that Normanby had said it, or that anybody here wanted to turn Guizot out; that lies of this sort were always rife on such occasions, and I had just heard a story of Louis Philippe's abusing our Queen at the tea-table at Neuilly, which I had no doubt was just as false as the one he had told me, and they might be set against one another. He then asked if our Government were not going to lay papers before Parliament in which Guizot would be implicated, and if so, if they would not first give him a copy of them, and he glanced at the printed papers to which I had referred in my conversation with him. He said in Aberdeen's time such things were always done in concert, and each Government previously communicated to the other everything it meant to publish, but of course this could not be the case now. I told him I did not believe anything was decided about papers; I knew of none, and what he saw in my hands was nothing but the notes of the recent correspondence printed at the Foreign Office by the Government press for the exclusive use of the Cabinet, to whom it would have been too long a process to send written copies; that such was the practice here with regard to all important papers of any length.
Broadlands, December 30th.—I came to town on Monday from Badminton, where I went to spend Christmas. When I got back I wrote a long letter to the Duke of Bedford giving him an account of my communications with Jarnac and my opinion of Palmerston's conduct of the affair. I told him I was going to Paris, begged he would show Lord John my letter, and said that if he (Lord John) wished me to say anything or to take any particular tone, to let me know. I received an answer this morning, cold enough. Lord John only replied that as I was coming here it was not necessary for him to see me. There was a very foolish passage about our relations with France, 'that there could be no reconciliation, and the spirit of Lord John's letter to Jarnac must be maintained.' The sort of disposition they evince, half desirous to make it up, and half to bouder on, seems to me exceedingly little and unwise.
PROPOSED REVIVAL OF THE SALIC LAW.
Yesterday I found Clarendon at the Board of Trade, and had a very long conversation with him; he is now all for trying to make something of the proposal to get the Salic Law re-established in Spain, having in the first instance scouted it. It was first proposed to him by Baron Billing as a solution of the difficulty; he at once rejected it as impossible. Now he has changed his mind, and he wrote to Palmerston and Lord John to say so, and to propose writing to Billing to ask whether he had made this proposal with the knowledge and assent of Guizot, and if the French Government was prepared to assist in procuring such a settlement at Madrid. Lord John expressed doubts, and thought nothing would come of it but some fresh falsehood and deceit. Palmerston thought the plan a good one, and that it was worth while to write to Billing, which Clarendon had done, and he showed me the letter. I think the scheme utterly chimerical, and so I told him; in fact, it strikes me as one of the most absurd and impracticable that ever entered the mind of man. I stated the different objections that occurred to me, one (not the least) being that no Spaniard would be likely to support a measure almost sure eventually to produce another civil war. He said that before Olozaga left Paris he had been to William Hervey, who asked him if he would be willing to support such a measure. He replied that he would, and he thought all the Progressista party would likewise; but while he now looks to this as a possible solution of our difficulty, Clarendon is very anxious by some means to restore a good understanding, and he begged me to tell Guizot that if his language in the King's Speech and in the Chambers was moderate, he would compel a corresponding moderation here, but at the same time he informed me that it was Palmerston's intention to supply Thiers with information to use against Guizot; and he said this without any expression of disapprobation. It was at the end of our conversation, but the next day, upon reflecting on this, I wrote him a very strong letter denouncing the impolicy and the danger of such a communication to such a man. I might have also urged the immorality of it, and its inconsistency with the profession of not wanting to injure Guizot or turn him out; the more I think of this the more shocked I am. If it is done, and Thiers exhibits good information, the French Government will know well enough how he came by it.
LORD PALMERSTON ON THE SPANISH MARRIAGE.
Here I have had a long conversation with Lady Palmerston, from which I infer that Palmerston's fixed idea is to humble France and to make her feel her humiliation, and, in order to do so, to connect himself more closely with the three Powers, who appear to be ready to do anything for him if he will break with France. She abused Aberdeen, and said he had made his agents all over the world act in subserviency to the French; this system Palmerston considers it his mission to put an end to, and I gather that he means on the contrary to thwart and oppose France whenever and wherever he can. She told me that these Powers were now better disposed than ever to us, and regarding France as the most encroaching Power, only wanted to join us in keeping her down. I took an opportunity of telling Palmerston that Bunsen and Prince Albert want to have a pamphlet written about Cracow and German affairs, and that the former had proposed to Reeve to write it; Reeve said he had no objection provided Palmerston was first consulted and approved, and this he wrote to Bunsen.[1] I told Palmerston that Reeve wished him to be apprised of this. He said he was much obliged to me for giving him an opportunity of thinking of it, but that his impression was that it would be better not to write anything, as Cracow was now an affair settled and done, and it was not desirable to say anything offensive to the three Powers, whose co-operation with us was essential in the far more important concern of the Spanish marriages. From this I infer that he means to continue to wage war on the Montpensier marriage, and to form a sort of preparatory league against France. I am greatly alarmed at the spirit he evinces, and fully expect we shall sooner or later get into some scrape. This evening (31st) I had a long conversation with him, in which he discussed Jarnac's communications with me (which I had told Lady Palmerston) and with him. He declares he gave him the verbal assurances he asked for as strongly as possible, and he does not believe anything else he might have done would have produced any effect in arresting the progress of the intrigue at Madrid. The French pretend that the Spanish Court insisted on having Montpensier, and that the Queen only consented to marry her cousin on condition that the King gave his son to the Infanta; that this match was therefore a Spanish and not a French object. He said that Villa Franca (Montemolin's man) told him that when he was at Paris Louis Philippe said to him that he wished the Count de Montemolin to marry the Queen; that he had only to renounce his claims, which would be a mere form, as he would declare himself King as soon as he was married, and that he contemplated the restoration of the Salic Law, which at all events he should insist on, as far as the Infanta was concerned, whenever the Duke de Montpensier married her. Palmerston's present idea is that this restoration of the Salic Law may be effected, and that the Spaniards will adopt such a course. I pointed out the difficulty and the levity of such a proceeding: enacting a law one day which cuts off the contingent rights of Don Carlos and his family and lets in Ferdinand's two daughters; then abrogating this law and restoring the former course of succession, but preserving only one of the sisters thus let in and excluding the other, and excluding also the heir under the abrogated law now again to be restored, thus re-establishing the law but not re-establishing the rights which that law conferred. All this would make such a mass of confusion and contradictions, and abrogating some rights and creating others so partially, arbitrarily, and capriciously, that the certain result would be a future state of uncertainty, rivalry, and strife. He did not say a word to me of my journey to Paris, nor I to him.
London, January 2nd, 1847.—Returned from Broadlands yesterday; I had written from thence to Clarendon, and told him my impressions. He thinks that part of what was said of Aberdeen is true. English agents everywhere were made subservient to the French, and to such an extent that they did not dare complain of any French misconduct, because they knew they should be reproved and run the risk of being humiliated in their public capacities, and he attributes to this laissez faire of Aberdeen's much of Louis Philippe's success in his intrigues, and the uncomfortable state of things in Europe. He had been over to John Russell at Chorley Wood, and found him in no state of bitterness, but sick of foreign affairs and the plots and intrigues he had been so troubled with, and so absorbed with the much more important subject of Ireland that he could take no interest in the former. In short, Clarendon has in great measure succeeded in dissipating my alarm. He recommends that I should advise moderation, and give the French Government to understand that a moderate tone there will secure one here, and he has sent me a letter for Duchâtel, with whom he wishes me to communicate confidentially.[2]
January 3rd.—I saw M. de St. Aulaire and Jarnac yesterday, and had much conversation with both. St. Aulaire said he saw he had nothing to do but remain les bras croisés, and say as little as possible.
I go to-night.
M. GUIZOT'S EXPLANATION.
Paris, January 6th.—Arrived here yesterday morning at half-past twelve o'clock, travelling all night from Boulogne. I had no sooner got here than Normanby put into my hands a box of papers, copies of his despatches to Palmerston, containing details he was anxious I should know, and filling up gaps in the history of the Spanish affair. The most essential of these papers are despatches to Palmerston, giving an account of two interviews with Guizot, and as to which there could be no mistake, as he read to Guizot his letter, giving the details of one of them (the most important). Guizot acknowledged its general accuracy, and made a verbal amendment or two in it. I take for granted these papers will be published. Normanby is very anxious they should, and justly considers that unless they are, the strength of our case will never be known. There are certain things contained in them which Guizot never can explain away satisfactorily, and which must leave a stain on his candour and good faith. On August 28 Normanby formally proposed to Guizot a joint action in favour of Enrique; he replied that this would suit him perfectly, and that he would write to Bresson and instruct him accordingly. On that very day the announcement of the two marriages appeared in the Spanish Gazette. Normanby of course subsequently asked for an explanation of this extraordinary conduct. Guizot seems to have lost his head in the excitement of his exploit, for he replied that hearing nothing to satisfy him, and on the strength of his note of February 27, 'J'ai agi'—that is, that he had already acted independently and hostilely long before the day on which he pretended that he would give instructions to Bresson to act conjointly with us. He endeavoured to excuse this duplicity by saying that Bresson had acted on general, not on particular instructions; but this was inconsistent with his 'J'ai agi.' Then about the time of the celebration of the marriages, he had said they would not take place at the same time; again, on being pressed on this point, he said he had meant that they would not take place together, and that such had not been the intention when he said so. Jarnac told me the other day that he had heard great stress was laid on this by us, and that we meant to make it a matter of grave charge. I said I did not believe it was so seriously considered, and doubted that much more was thought about it, though at first it had been considered as a proof of insincerity; but I find that it is of importance, for upon the expectation thus conveyed by Guizot rests Palmerston's defence for one of the weakest points of his case, his long silence after hearing of the marriages being settled. Palmerston's conduct and his delays throughout have been quite inconceivable, and certainly will, if not weaken his case, draw considerable censure upon him if it all comes out. There was, in the first place, his neglect and obstinacy in not giving in writing the assurances he had given verbally; next, as to the proposal of joint action, Jarnac came to him, intending to make the proposal, but in consequence of the despatch of July 19 he did not make it. He then went to Paris, and on his return he did make it. He could get no answer, and none was sent till August 22. Bulwer was then instructed to propose Enrique, and the French Government was invited to instruct Bresson to co-operate, but he allowed a month to elapse before he wrote this instruction; then when the conclusion of the marriages was imparted to him, he suffered three weeks to elapse before he took any notice, and then sent his protest. It never would have been effectual, but the only chance for him would have been an instantaneous remonstrance by return of post. All these delays, such tardiness, coupled with other slight circumstances, give some colour to the proceedings of the French Government, and, to a certain degree, help out their case. Normanby is fully conscious of the damage thus done to ours, and the only excuse for the last delay is, that Palmerston was reposing on the assurance that the marriage of the Infanta was not to take place at the same time with that of the Queen; but this, when examined, will appear hardly any excuse.
PRINCESS LIEVEN ON THE QUARREL.
I called yesterday afternoon on Madame de Lieven, who was very glad to see me, and we forthwith broke into the subject, without, however, any sort of agreement. She abused Palmerston, and said if Aberdeen had been in office it would not have happened. As to argument, she really had none to offer, but repeated over and over that 'we had departed from the agreement with Aberdeen;' and if not, 'pourquoi nommer le Cobourg?' She said all Europe was against us, that we had with little dignity knocked at the doors of the three Powers who turned their backs on us, and that we had done good to France and harm to ourselves by this useless appeal, as they were now more alienated from us and better inclined to the French, and that they all thought us in the wrong. She said much about Normanby, his greenness as ambassador, and the follies he committed; asking advice of different people, and very incompetent people too; and she repeated the story Jarnac had told me of his saying we never should have harmony restored till Guizot was turned out and the Infanta had renounced, which, she said, had been told her by Apponyi, who had heard it from Normanby himself. She had got other stories of the same kind, and a heap of little charges of holding communications with Thiers, Molé, and others hostile to the Government. She said that the King was very angry with our Queen for having said that he had broken his word, and never would be reconciled to her till she had withdrawn that accusation. I said that between his word and hers I could not for a moment doubt, and that I suspected he would have a long time to wait if he did so till she withdrew the charge she had made. She said Guizot was very strong, the King very firm, the marriage very popular, and that they all desired nothing so much as to make known all that had passed, secure that in so doing they should have public opinion all the world over on their side. We parted wide as the poles asunder, but very good friends.
January 7th.—Guizot appointed me at four o'clock yesterday, but when I went there he was not returned from the Council. I called again and saw him for a moment; but as he said he had his courier to despatch, and 'avait à me parler sérieusement,' he begged me to go to him to-day at half-past four.
I called on Lord Cowley,[3] and had a long conversation with him. He is impatient for a reconciliation, and thinks that far too great importance has been attached to the question itself. He blames Palmerston severely for his despatch of July 19, and thinks that more warning and menace were held out than I had conceived;[4] that his communications ought to have satisfied Palmerston that the French Government were in an excited state and prepared to do something unless he prevented them. This makes his delays still more inexcusable. He also fancies that it would never have happened if Aberdeen had remained in office.
At night to the Opera, where I met Thiers and was introduced to Molé. I am to call on Thiers to-morrow afternoon. Molé told Normanby that he was very uneasy about two things,—the arrest of Olozaga in Spain, and the intervention of the Austrians in Italy, which he expected to take place. Molé, by Normanby's account, speaks very disparagingly of Guizot, and, by Madame de Lieven's, very contemptuously of Normanby. It is amusing enough to hear all the stories the people here tell and the opinions they express of one another.
DISCUSSION WITH M. GUIZOT.
At night.—This morning I called on Madame de St. Aulaire, whom I found, and Madame de Gontaut, whom I did not; then, Madame de Lieven. Much talk on the old subject, and the fire of my tongue extinguished the fire of hers, for, without the least convincing her, I reduced her to silence. The great gun I brought to bear on her was Aberdeen's despatch to the Duke de Sotomayor, which proved that Palmerston had in no way departed from the system of conduct pursued by Aberdeen. From her I went to Guizot, and was with him for an hour and a half. We began with an agreement that we should be mutually frank and sincere. He went through the whole case and exhibited all his causes of complaint and suspicion against Palmerston, that when he came into office he never said a word (in public or private) expressive of a desire to be on good terms with France, neither in his speech at Tiverton, nor in the House of Commons, nor to Jarnac; that he never alluded to the Spanish question nor sought to establish or confirm an understanding thereupon with France; that the despatch he wrote to Bulwer (19th), which contained instructions for his conduct, was not imparted to the French Government; and that when Jarnac spoke to him, and Palmerston showed him the despatch, it was already gone. All this apparent reserve and uncommunicativeness excited suspicions that he was not well disposed and, above all, not going to tread in the footsteps of Aberdeen. I defended him by saying that he ought to have considered Palmerston's situation—just come into office, encumbered with business, occupied with questions of much more urgent importance in the House of Commons. Nothing new having occurred about Spain, he contented himself with desiring Bulwer to abide by his predecessor's instructions, and really had nothing to say on the subject; that it was his habit to write in a rather familiar, offhand style, and his despatch to Bulwer, which was not intended to be published or communicated, was of that description, but that it meant nothing; and when asked, and the objection urged to the obnoxious passage, he gave the most positive assurance that no change of policy was contemplated. Guizot insisted that it did not signify what he meant; that the question was, what impression it was calculated to convey. Then he went into the various delays, and the impossibility of getting an answer from him; all of which served to confirm his suspicions that a different and hostile policy was already in active operation, that the note of February 27 gave him a right to act, le cas échéant, and that in a letter to Jarnac (which he gave me to read) he plainly indicated his intention by saying that if England adopted une politique isolée, he would adopt one also, and he asked me whether I would not have understood what this meant—and that it meant, what he afterwards did. I said I did not mean to acquit Palmerston of much negligence and tardiness; that I thought he ought to have at once come to a satisfactory understanding with France about the marriages; that he was greatly to blame in all his delays, but that he did him less than justice; that Palmerston was not the bitter enemy of France which he supposed, and that he was reposing all along on the faith of the engagements which Aberdeen had communicated to him, never thought the matter pressed, nor had the least idea that they took it so seriously; that he must remember we did not regard Spanish affairs with the deep interest and attach to them the same importance they did. He said he was convinced that Palmerston came into office with a resolution to overturn French influence all over the world; that he fancied (as many others did) that Aberdeen had sacrificed the interests or the dignity of England to the French Government, while he himself had continually been charged with doing the same thing in France: charges which destroyed each other. But that this was Palmerston's idea, and that he was resolved to oppose France everywhere, to display his independence; that this was especially his object in Spain, where he wanted to raise the Progressista and depress the Moderado party as the most effectual means of substituting English for French influence; that the real reason he supported Don Enrique, and called him 'the only fit husband,' was that he was the head of the Progressista party, and his being chosen as the Queen's husband would be a great encouragement and triumph to it; that this party was the enemy of Christina and of the present government, and for this reason our choice was obnoxious to them; that except for these reasons he had no objection to Don Enrique, and long ago had desired Bresson to get him recalled in a despatch which he showed me; that he was convinced that Palmerston not only had determined to act in the way he had stated, but that he thought he could intimidate France.[5]
M. GUIZOT DEFENDS THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT.
I replied that he was entirely mistaken: that he exaggerated Palmerston's disposition and mistook his position; that in Melbourne's time he did what he chose in his own department, but that was not now the case; that all important affairs were decided by the Government, and that John Russell was far from having any bitter feeling against France, and had always entertained sentiments of esteem towards Guizot personally; that neither he nor anyone else (not even Palmerston) wished to see him out of office. It was true that they did think there had been on different occasions and in various places an undue succumbing to France, but that there was no desire to commence a general struggle against French interests; that they would certainly see with pleasure the Liberal party in Spain again lift up its head, and some such reaction as should promise a Government disposed to act in a constitutional manner, and put an end to the despotism that now prevailed. He said that he considered this the best and most constitutional Government that Spain had ever had; that it was far more so than Espartero's; that every change had been effected in a legal, constitutional manner by the Cortes itself; while all former changes, especially the expulsion of Queen Christina, had been effected by violence. I said I was amazed to hear him say so, and begged to ask him how the Cortes itself was constituted, and whether it had not been packed by stratagem and force, and by the most unscrupulous use of despotic power—the municipalities having been suppressed and all free opinion overborne. He only replied that the municipal question was made the instrument of the Queen's deposition, and that it had been voted by the Cortes.
It is very difficult to record accurately a conversation in which we often diverged and then returned to the same topic. I pressed him hard on his want of openness and confidence, and urged that when the two countries had been so long on such terms of amity, and the two Sovereigns also, that before he proceeded to act in so serious and decisive a manner and which could not fail to offend England, he ought to have left nothing vague, but have said distinctly and at once what he intended to do. He ought, if he took the note of February 27 as his justification, to ascertain that Palmerston was cognisant of that note. Why did he not as soon as he came into office renew to Palmerston the notice he had thought it necessary to convey to Aberdeen, and why not say frankly that he regarded the state of the case to be such that, acting on the right he had reserved to himself, he should send instructions to Bresson to conclude the marriages. His answers to this were very weak. He said that it was not his business to look after Palmerston's affairs, and that he had a right to conclude, since Aberdeen had communicated with him, that he had imparted to him this note; that he showed confidence to those who showed confidence to him, and that he did not think Palmerston had acted towards him in such a manner as to require such confidential communication on his part. His real reason was (though I did not think it necessary to charge him with it), that if he had given notice to Palmerston, the latter would have sent off to Madrid and probably counteracted his scheme. He insisted that his letters to Jarnac, and the conversation he had had with Lord Cowley (which he repeated to me word for word as Lord Cowley had done), were warning enough and were sufficient indication of his intentions. Besides that Bresson's instructions were general, he had had them above a year with a discretionary power to act upon them whenever he had reason to believe the Coburg marriage was imminent, which case he contended had arrived. I said if its imminence arose from our despatch, Bresson had himself created it, inasmuch as he had shown it to the Spanish Government. He said that was not true, that Bresson had given him his most positive assurance that though he had spoken of it to different people he had never shown it to the Spanish Ministers. He spoke with great energy of the King's feelings and of his own, especially at the strong language that had been applied to him personally, and of his having been accused in a formal document as well as in a letter, of bad faith; that it was impossible to transact business with any confidence and in a useful manner with those who charged him with bad faith. Such accusations were intolerable. He then spoke of his letter to John Russell; that he had only intended to call his attention to the difficulty of going on with Palmerston while he put such a tone into the discussions; that it was absurd to suppose that he had ever thought or dreamt of effecting Palmerston's removal from office. He excused this letter very clumsily, and said he had not expected any answer to it (being evidently to the last degree nettled at that which he had received). I admitted that this letter was very imprudent, that it was very strong, and spoke of Palmerston in terms he was likely to feel and not easily to forgive; that he should have recollected what a situation he placed John Russell in, who really was compelled to answer it as he did, or to quarrel outright with Palmerston; that if he had not answered it as he did, the indignation and resentment of Palmerston would have been very great, and he would probably have resigned; and that he might have found means of conveying his sentiments in some manner less dangerous and offensive. He insisted on the clear intention of Palmerston, from the despatch, the delays, and various circumstances, to depart from the engagement with Aberdeen. I said that we could prove that Aberdeen himself had laid down precisely the same rule of conduct on which Palmerston had acted, and expressed the very same sentiments; that they were recorded in a former despatch addressed to the Duke de Sotomayor for the information of the Spanish Government; that this was very different from the letter to Bulwer which was neither to be shown nor any thing done upon it, but was a reply to two important questions: the first, whether if the Spaniards chose a husband for the Queen not a Bourbon prince, such choice would be displeasing to England; and secondly, if France attempted to coerce their choice, whether England would support them. His reply was plain and decisive: viz. that their choice would not be objected to by England, whatever it might be; and that while it was impossible to conceive that France ever would attempt coercion, if she did, Spain would have the 'sympathy' of England and of all Europe. He said he had no copy of this despatch, and did not well recollect its contents. I said, 'But you have seen it.' He 'had not had it in his hands, it had been read to him.' He was evidently much put out by the citation of it.
EFFECT OF LORD PALMERSTON'S DESPATCH.
After a great deal more talk he spoke of his intentions. First, however, he complained of our refusal to join with him in the Cracow affair, and that we had done so in an offensive manner, giving him to understand that his breach of the Treaty of Utrecht made it improper to join with him in enforcing that of Vienna, but that, nevertheless, he was resolved to observe the greatest moderation and to evince no rancune; that he should lay the papers he thought necessary before the House of Peers, and make such a statement of the whole case as he was convinced would prove to demonstration to France, to Europe, and even to many people in England itself, that he was clear and blameless in the transaction; that he might deceive himself, but that such was his sincere belief; that he should, however, do this in language of moderation and with an earnest desire to avoid furnishing any fresh matter for irritation; that he should continue his endeavours to act towards England in a friendly spirit, and he should not be deterred by her past conduct from offering to communicate and consult with her on all those subjects which it was desirable they should consider with reference to their mutual or common interests. He said he had a great deal more to say to me, hoped to see me again, and that I would dine with him, and so we parted.
January 10th.—On Friday I called by appointment on Duchâtel. There is nothing of much interest to record of my conversation with him. He talked in the same strain as Guizot, expressed great desire for reconciliation, confidence in the goodness of their case, said their majority was stronger and more secure than ever, and any change of government impossible.
LORD COWLEY'S VIEW OF THE CASE.
Yesterday morning I went to Lord Cowley, who showed me his letters to Palmerston giving him an account of the state of the Spanish question and of his conversations thereupon with the King and Guizot. These communications ought certainly to have drawn Palmerston's attention to the subject, and have induced him to lose no time in coming to some understanding with the French Government. At the same time the anxiety of the King to gain time, and his urgent recommendations to Miraflores to have patience, may have misled Palmerston and made him think there was no danger. It is clear to me that what they took alarm at was Miraflores' communication; that they really did believe the Coburg alliance was imminent, and that when it was followed up by Palmerston's despatch of the 19th their fears were still more increased. They all along suspected both Palmerston and Bulwer; and they did, in truth, think that between Christina's impatience, the difficulty of finding an eligible Bourbon, the probable intrigues of Bulwer, and the suspected co-operation of Palmerston, unless they settled the matter themselves somehow it would be settled in the way they most dreaded. They knew, or at least they thought, that their difficulty would be very agreeable to Palmerston, and that it was not likely he would help them out of it. In this state of things I have no doubt that Guizot wrote to Bresson and told him to settle the affair if he could, and that Bresson was furnished with fresh instructions on which he did act, and not on the old discretionary ones on which they now pretend that he acted. Lord Cowley thinks Christina told Bresson that if he would at once strike a bargain and give the Duke de Montpensier for the Infanta, Don Francisco should have the Queen; that he instantly accepted this proposal, sent it off to Paris by telegraph, where it was confirmed at once. Whether this was the exact mode or not, or whoever took the initiative, I believe this is the way it was done; certainly the King seemed anxious to put the question off. Lord Cowley thinks he expected to be able to bring back Trapani. Guizot's vehemence (for he spoke much more strongly than the King) ought to have alarmed Palmerston. The mischief has arisen from Palmerston being careless and thoughtless, Guizot suspicious and alarmed.
Yesterday morning at two o'clock I called on Thiers by appointment, found him in a very pretty apartment full of beautiful drawings, copies of Italian frescoes, pictures, bronzes, books and cahiers of MS., the sheets (much corrected and interlined I could see) of his work. These he told me were his 'seul délassement,' and that politics never interrupted his literary labour. We then talked about the present state of affairs, and very amusing he was, sparing nobody and talking with his usual abundance and openness. He said he had read the notes that had passed between Palmerston and Guizot; that his own opinion was that Guizot would break down on the procédés, but that at all events it was a quarrel à outrance; that each accused the other of bad faith, and could only justify himself by fixing that imputation on his antagonist; that moderation became impossible when such charges were bandied, and he had read with astonishment the strong things contained in these notes; that if Guizot had the worst of this encounter he would fall, not however by the desertion of the majority, not by this Chamber, but through the King. 'You must not,' he said, 'believe what you hear of the strength of the Government and of its security; don't believe all Madame de Lieven tells you; c'est une bavarde, une menteuse, et une sotte; vous l'avez beaucoup connue, vous avez été son amant, n'est-ce pas?' I defended myself from the imputation, and assured him that though she had had lovers when first she came to England I never had had the honour of being one of them. He then said he would tell me what would happen: the King se faisait illusion that the Whig Government could not stand; but when he found out that this was an error il aurait peur; and if we continued to refuse to be reconciled, he would get rid of Guizot. The present Chamber would not overthrow him, but the King would. 'Savez-vous ce que c'est que le Roi? Le mot est grossier, mais vous le comprendrez. Eh bien, c'est un poltron.'[6] I said I was surprised to hear this, for we thought he was un homme de coeur, and had given proofs of his courage very often. 'Non, non, je vous dis qu'il est poltron, et quand il se trouvera définitivement mal avec vous il aura peur; alors il suscitera des embarras à Guizot; il y a quarante ou cinquante hommes dans la Chambre, je les connais, qui tourneront contre lui, et de cette manière il tombera, pas par la Chambre, encore moins par vous.' He said the accusations had been so strong that each Minister was bound to prove his own case and the mauvaise foi of his adversary, and Guizot would stand or fall by the result of the explanations. 'Vous pouvez être sûr que ce que je vous dis est la vérité, d'autant plus que ce n'est pas moi qui lui succéderai, c'est Molé. Cependant je vous parle franchement, et je vous avoue que je serais enchanté de sa chute; d'abord parce que je le déteste, et après, parce que l'alliance anglaise est impossible avec lui; c'est un traître et un menteur qui s'est conduit indignement envers moi, mais je ne serai pas ministre.' However, he could afford to wait; he was forty-eight years old, and his health excellent. As long as the King was in no danger he would never send for him; as soon as he was he would send for him. The King could endure nobody who would not consent to be his tool; he would never take office without being his master, et j'en viendrai à bout; he would rather continue in his independence than take office on any other terms. He told me he had seen the notes, and was amazed at the sharpness of their contents. We then went out together, and walked to the Faubourg St. Honoré, talking about his book, Napoleon, etc.
CONVERSATION WITH M. THIERS.
At night.—I have been dining with Thiers, and met Odilon Barrot, Cousin, Rémusat, Duvergier de Hauranne, Mignet, and several others I can't remember. They were all prodigiously civil to me, and with Cousin and Mignet I had a great deal of conversation. Palmerston's note arrived this morning. It is very clever and well done, but too long, and his polémique about the Treaty of Utrecht in my opinion déplacée and mischievous. But he is determined to urge this point, and is endeavouring to get the Allied Powers to join with him in a protest or some formal expression of opinion upon it. I don't believe they will ever do this; but if they did, it would probably produce most serious consequences. His policy in this is perfectly inconceivable to me. Normanby read it to Guizot this afternoon, and at the same time offered him the despatch of the 19th July (to Bulwer), and Aberdeen's to Sotomayor to publish with the other pieces, both or neither, but he refused them. I had another furious set-to with Madame de Lieven, who is the most imprudent woman I ever saw; but we always part friends. Normanby has shown Thiers several papers, and Molé many more he tells me. I have begged him to be cautious.
FEAR OF THE COBURG MARRIAGE.
January 12th.—I called on Guizot yesterday by appointment; found him more stiff and reserved than the first time, and not apparently in good sorts. He did not appear to have anything particular to say, but reverted to the old topics; that he would not go again over the same arguments; but it was clear that from the beginning Lord Palmerston had a fixed policy which he had immediately begun to carry out: to raise the Progressista party in Spain, and destroy the Moderado and French influence with it; that we fancied ourselves obliged to substitute English for French influence there as an indispensable security for our power in the Mediterranean; and we appealed to the Treaty of Utrecht; that great changes had taken place since that time. It was true France had acquired Algeria, and through it a certain power in the Mediterranean; but that we had acquired Gibraltar, Malta, and Corfu, which we had not been possessed of before, and which were quite sufficient to secure our power there. He said a great deal more of Palmerston, for he still insists, and either believes, or at all events pretends to believe, that Palmerston was bent on the Coburg marriage, and doing his utmost to bring it about. He really thinks it was sound policy on his part, and for that reason was pursuing it. I again and again assured him he was mistaken. 'You forget,' I said, 'that when this affair began, Palmerston had not been ten days in office, was overwhelmed with business, and had many other things more pressing to occupy his attention. He had found an understanding concluded with Aberdeen, which he accepted. He had no thoughts of doing anything; he knew of nothing urgent that had occurred, and the truth is, il n'y pensait pas.' 'Comment!' he said, rather angrily, 'il n'y pensait pas? Est-ce que vous nous prenez pour dupes que vous voulez nous faire croire cela? 'I said I believed it was so; that this Spanish question which was of such deep interest to them was of much less interest to us; and 'why,' I said, 'if you considered the matter so urgent, if you knew what was going on in Spain (which Lord Palmerston did not), and considered the marriage you so feared to be imminent, why did not you go at once to Palmerston and tell him so?' 'Ce n'était pas à moi,' he replied, 'de faire l'éducation de Lord Palmerston.' 'No,' I said; 'mais c'était à vous de faire vos propres affaires, and to communicate frankly with him when you wanted his assistance.' He would not allow this. I said, since I had been here and had seen and heard a great many things I did not know before, I had become convinced that his alarm about the Coburg marriage was perfectly sincere, that he really did believe it was likely to take place, and that the real object of the King had been to get the Spanish Court to wait and not insist on an immediate marriage; that it was not the despatch of July 19, but the mission of Miraflores and what he had said to the King which had really alarmed them. He said this was not exact; it was not that which had given them the alarm, but from various circumstances they were convinced that the Coburg marriage would have been settled offhand if they had not taken decisive steps to prevent it; that this marriage it was impossible for France to tolerate. There was already a Coburg in England, another in Portugal, and to have had a third at Madrid would have been to make Spain a part of Portugal, and to have exhibited to all the world the triumph of English over French influence; that this combination which we wanted to bring about, they were bound to defeat, and then again assuming that our Court was bent on it, he said: 'Le fait est que vous êtes meilleurs courtisans que nous.' I told him that I was assured the Court had never sought this alliance, and that Prince Albert had long ago written to his cousin to say that he must not think of it, as it was impossible.
I then asked him why Christina had been so impatient to conclude a marriage of some sort, and why she could not wait as the King had advised. He said, for reasons partly personal and partly political; that Queen Christina was a very extraordinary woman—'très habile, avec un esprit très impartial'—that she had no prejudices, and he had heard her talk of her greatest enemies, of Espartero even, without rancour and with candour; that she had great courage, patience and perseverance, and never quitted a purpose she had once conceived; that royalty was irksome to her, and government and political power she did not care about except so far as they were instrumental to the real objects of her life, which were to live easily, enjoy herself, and amass money for her children, who were numerous, and whom she was very anxious to enrich; that she was aware of the precarious nature of her influence, and felt the necessity of connecting herself with, and obtaining the support of, one of the great Powers—England or France—the latter by preference, but the former if not the latter; that she had, therefore, always wanted the King to give her his son for the Queen, and when he refused this, she had got angry and turned to the Coburg alliance and the English connexion; that besides, the young Queen was impatient to be married, and that if they had not found her a husband, she would infallibly have taken a lover. 'Vous ne savez pas ce que c'est que ces princesses Espagnoles et Siciliennes; elles ont le diable au corps, et on a toujours dit que si nous ne nous hâtions pas, l'héritier viendrait avant le mari.' For these reasons she was impatient to conclude, and she infallibly would have concluded the marriage with the Prince of Coburg if we had persisted in refusing the Duke de Montpensier, and had not effected some other arrangement. She trusted that the King, her uncle, would have accepted the fait accompli, and at all events that she should have been secure of English support.
THE FRENCH PAPERS.
I then said that after all what was now most important was to look to the future, that our quarrel must be fought out, but that a short time would bring those discussions to an end. What was to happen then? I believed and hoped that he was not likely to be renversé here, and I was satisfied Lord Palmerston would not be in England, and how were the affairs of the two Governments to be conducted between them? If Spain, which had once been a military champ de bataille, was henceforward to be a political champ de bataille between the two countries, I did not see how any entente was possible. Must this last for ever? or was it impossible that the two Governments should unite in bringing about a better state of things in Spain, and giving to her in reality something of the freedom and independence which she possessed in name? He seemed by no means disposed to enter on this subject, and as I thought I observed in his manner some symptoms of a desire that our conversation should terminate, I rose and took leave of him. He was very civil, but rather formal and ceremonious on my going away.
Paris, January 13th.—This morning we read in the newspapers the pièces remises by Guizot to the Chamber of Peers, and among them, to our great surprise, an extract of Palmerston's despatch to Bulwer of July 19, Guizot having refused Palmerston's offer to place it (with Aberdeen's to Sotomayor) at his disposal. Normanby immediately wrote him a very strong note complaining of this publication after what had passed between them. In the afternoon I saw Madame de Lieven, who made very light of it, and treated it as a frivolous complaint. Bacourt, who was there, endeavoured to find excuses for Guizot, but was obliged to confess that he had no right to use this without our permission. When I got home I found Guizot's reply had come. He said he had given nothing more than he had quoted in one of his notes, and had done no more than produce the English version of what he had quoted in French, and he asserted his right to do this. He finished, however, by saying that if Normanby would send him the two despatches, he would add them to the other documents. Normanby wrote back word that he regretted he should have produced this extract in a manner calculated to give a false impression of the tenor of the despatch, sent him the documents, and hoped, as he was going to publish more, he would produce Palmerston's last note. There has been a schism here in the Opposition; Billault, Dufaure, and thirty or forty deputies have separated from Thiers, and are preparing to join Molé if Guizot falls. It seems clear that neither party will take our side on the marriage question, and that the Government will not be attacked at all in the Peers, and very probably very feebly in the Deputies.
January 16th.—For the last two days I have been sightseeing, Hôtel Cluny, Churches, Notre-Dame, Saint-Germain l'Auxerrois, the Gallery of the Louvre, and all day yesterday was at Versailles. I had not seen it for above thirty years, and was struck with the vast dimensions and the ugliness of the building; it is, however, interesting on the whole.
I dined with Guizot on Friday; had very little talk on politics. He came into one of the rooms where Bacourt and I were talking and joined us. I then said that though I had come here without any mission I had come not without the hope of being able to take back with me something which promised a renewal of good understanding. Guizot said he was ready to be on good terms with us, but he could do nothing of any sort or kind, and this he repeated in a very peremptory tone. He was probably (though very civil to me) not in the best of humours in consequence of the article which had appeared that morning in the 'Constitutionnel' (Thiers's paper), with a circumstantial and quite accurate account of what has recently passed between Guizot and Normanby about the despatches. This, which could only come from the Embassy, has shocked I suppose everybody, and made Guizot and his friends indignant. Normanby was himself very much annoyed when he read the article, and at once perceived the bad effect it would have. He said he did not know how it got there, but he suspects Thiers who probably sent it or caused it to be sent; however, both William Hervey and Craven are so hot and so unreserved that the Opposition paper might very easily get over it. Normanby has told Thiers and Molé everything, and Thiers came twice in three days to the Embassy. All this is well known, and Normanby passes for an ambassador in constant and confidential communication with the enemies and rivals of the Ministers. In spite of all this, within the last two days I have found a less excited tone. We had, however, our own complaint to make, which probably kept them more quiet about the 'Constitutionnel.' When all the papers came out it appeared that Guizot had published another fragment that he had no right to do of one of Palmerston's despatches, about 'the only fit husband.' This had been read to him, but no copy given to him, and he took the words down with his pencil at the time. These words he published in a formal official shape. His excuse is the same, that the words had been quoted in one of his notes.
AT THE TUILERIES.
January 19th.—Went last night to the Tuileries; the King was very civil, but did not talk to me on any subject. We were there only twenty minutes. I saw all the Princesses, the Duchesse de Montpensier decidedly the best; she is a pretty, plump little thing, and looks three or four years older than she is. The Duchesse d'Orléans is still in mourning. The King looks very well, and is grossly caricatured by 'Punch;' he is a very good-looking old gentleman, and seems to have many years of life in him still.
Normanby saw Guizot on Sunday about the affairs of the Plate, when he took the opportunity to speak to him about his second extract (from the despatch which was not communicated to him); he made the same sort of excuse as for the other, and reminded him that he had taken the words down in pencil.
Went last night to a ball at the Duchesse de Galiera's, where I met Francis Baring,[7] who told me a good deal about French politics. He says Thiers is quite out of the question, and that his own errors and the schism in his party hare demolished him. Billault and Dufaure are making a second opposition. He thinks Guizot has more to fear from the effects of the very grave financial embarrassment which exists, and that if he got the country into any political difficulty in the midst of it he might be sacrificed, but Molé is a man without courage; the majority is the King's majority on the whole, but still Guizot has many followers and is not without power. It would not, therefore, be quite so simple and easy to dismiss Guizot unless some good opportunity presented itself. Everybody here will support the Government in its present contest with us. He said he should not dare to speak a contrary language to his wife, who would tear both his eyes out if he did. He thinks we were right to decline joint operation in the affair of Cracow, but that it is an enormous blunder to make so much of the Treaty of Utrecht; that it would have been wise to have made a protest, the more vague and general the better, but reserving to ourselves to take any course we thought fit in respect to Spanish marriages and successions, keeping all treaties and laws bearing on the subject in reserve, to be used or not according to our discretion. This is what I have always thought: the Treaty of Utrecht, the renunciations, the laws of Spain, and the other treaties between Spain and Austria furnish materials for a very good argument such as an astute counsel might turn to excellent account; but Palmerston has made the Treaty so prominent, and has been so decisive and peremptory, that he has got into a position where he can neither advance without danger nor recede without discredit. I saw the other day his protest at Madrid against the marriage in which he declared that England would never acknowledge the issue of the Duchesse de Montpensier as heirs to the crown of Spain.
THE DUC DE BROGLIE'S SPEECH.
January 21st.—Was at Madame de Lieven's on Tuesday afternoon when Guizot came in from the Chamber. He said the Duc de Broglie had spoken for an hour and a half avec un grand succès. The next morning I read this successful speech, which was as bad as it well could be, and calculated to make matters worse with us. The Queen's Speech arrived yesterday, and was thought very moderate, as it is, but very ill written. In consequence of the passage about Cracow none of the Ambassadors of the three Courts would appear at the séance royale. Yesterday Guizot spoke for two hours, and certainly very adroitly in reference to his position and his object; being quite sure of whatever he said being accepted as all-sufficient by the Chamber, he could afford to glide over the difficult points and not attempt to grapple with them, and he carefully abstained from saying anything irritating or offensive to us, sparing even Palmerston as much as he could. I went to Madame de Lieven to-day, when she asked me what I thought of the debate. I said, 'If you want my candid opinion, I will give it you. Le discours du Duc de Broglie a été mauvais; il est indigne de lui et de la réputation qu'il s'est acquise; il n'est ni juste, ni vrai, ni sage. S'il avait eu le désir d'envenimer l'affaire, ce que je ne crois pas, il n'aurait pas pu parler autrement.' I then said that the speech of M. Guizot was of a very different character, that I did not attach much value to his argument, and that he had eluded all the real difficulties of the question, but that he had contrived to make a defence which was quite sufficient for his purpose here (though if it had been addressed to an English Parliament or court of justice it might have been easily answered), and to do so with a perfect reserve and moderation, and without allowing one word to escape him of a violent or offensive character; that it was very clever, very adroit, admirably adapted to the occasion, and I thought would produce a salutary effect chez nous. She was much pleased, and expressed her satisfaction that I thought this; when I said she must not forget that I said so always with a reserve as to the argument, and that I only meant to speak of the tone; that as to the value of the speech in reference to the question at issue, I agreed entirely with the 'Constitutionnel.' She laughed at this, affected to treat it with derision, and said that all the world knew the articles in that paper came from the Embassy, which I treated with derision in my turn. Guizot then came in, but only stayed a moment; she told him that I admired his speech, but would tell him more of what I had said when he came to her in the evening. I then told her of the absence of the Ambassadors at the House of Lords, which struck her prodigiously, and she would hardly believe it. We afterwards talked of the future and how matters could be got right, and we both agreed that where 'la confiance avait été ébranlée' entirely, it was very difficult to restore it. I said the only way I knew was to act with mutual truth and good faith, to have no dessous des cartes on either side, and then by degrees each party would discover that the other really was doing so, and by degrees confidence might revive. But the notion of Palmerston's hatred of Guizot is so strong, of his independent power in the Government and his disposition to use it, that it is very difficult to bring them into anything like a quiet and confiding state of mind. I told her it was an error to suppose Palmerston was so powerful and that he could drag his colleagues with him unreasonably, and that if they found him wantonly and unfairly endangering the peace of the two countries, they would force him to desist or to go. Guizot's speech seems to have been received very favourably by most people for one reason or another, and it certainly was very able and judicious.
I dined to-day with Madame Graham (a dull party), and went afterwards to Mrs. Austin's, where I met M. de Tocqueville, Mignet, Alfred de Vigny, M. de Circourt, Mr. Wheaton, and several others whose names I cannot recollect. There was also a Mr. Schwabe, who has been travelling all over Spain with Cobden, and has a great deal to say about the country and the people. He says there is a sprinkling of Free Trade tendencies, but not at Barcelona. They were well received everywhere, and by nobody better than by the French consuls (especially Lesseps at Barcelona), whom they found advocates of Free Trade. The country appeared miserably desolate and depopulated, but they were told that the improvement within the last ten or twelve years was prodigious. The Infanta's marriage was unpopular, French influence on the wane, and he is convinced that if the country is only left alone, the feeling of Spanish independence will be enough to provide an opposition to French influence.
THE DEBATE IN ENGLAND.
January 24th.—On Friday the newspapers brought the English debate on the Address, which has made a great sensation here. The speeches, especially Lord Lansdowne's, all so moderate and expressive of an earnest desire for a reconciliation with France. Everybody, those who hoped and those who feared, were astonished; Guizot delighted, but taking it coolly. We think that Lansdowne's tone was too low, that he was too empressé, and that it will be misunderstood at Paris. Then the 'Times' has been writing articles abusing Palmerston and giving out that public opinion is all against him, and inclines to Guizot, doing all the mischief it can. These articles were received with a great deal of chuckling by Guizot and his people, and the low tone taken by Government and others corroborated their impressions. John Russell spoke very properly, very conciliatorily, but with more of firmness. There was a ball here on Friday night, where I had some conversation with Molé, Cousin, Duvergier, and Francis Baring. All are struck with our discussion. Molé, who wishes for reconciliation and rejoices at the spirit that has been evinced, told me he thought Broglie's speech very bad, and Guizot's very good and discreet, but that the latter was already triumphing. 'Avez-vous vu,' he asked him, 'les journaux anglais? Eh bien, vous voyez qu'on recule.' Cousin said that it was impossible for them to say anything for us in the Chamber when we did not seem disposed to say anything for ourselves. Duvergier said the same thing, and he with Thiers and his people are excessively disgusted and disappointed at the ground appearing to be taken from under their feet. M. de Beaumont said to me last night, 'Il paraît que vous avez mis bas les armes.' They now write from England that it is probable there will be no discussion in either House, a conclusion so impotent and discreditable that I hope it will not end thus. Palmerston can never permit this; both he and the Embassy and Thiers will cut a ridiculous figure enough.
With great imprudence and impropriety, in my opinion, Normanby, with Palmerston's concurrence, has been in confidential communication with Thiers for the purpose of enabling the latter to attack the Government in the Chamber, it being of course expected and understood that we were to make a strong case against Guizot at home. All the world here knows of this connexion and blames it. Guizot is of course indignant at it, and it renders all communication between him and Normanby as cold and distant as possible. Thiers is as sulky as a bear; he knows that his alliance with the Embassy has done him no good, and now it seems unlikely to enable him to do anybody else any harm. It is clear to me that we are in great danger of cutting a contemptible figure and something more, for nothing can be so impolitic as to create a belief here that the people of England are resolved to submit to anything rather than go to war, and that the French Government may follow their own devices without hindrance, for if the Minister for Foreign Affairs (especially Palmerston) remonstrates and complains he will probably not be supported at home. The fact is, Palmerston's mismanagement of his case and his most unwise persistence in his argument about the Treaty of Utrecht have ruined him and given gain de cause to Guizot. I must say that I begin to think no reliance is to be placed on him, and that he really is a very bad and dangerous Minister. It appears that before the Session opened Lansdowne wrote to Palmerston and desired to know what he meant to do, what to insist on, and, in short, how they stood. He wrote back word that he had no thoughts of insisting on any renunciations, as it was clearly impossible to obtain them, and that he was ready to go on with France amicably and frankly on all matters of common interest, though of course there could not be the same confidence as heretofore. On this Lansdowne made his speech. But yesterday morning in the midst of all these honeyed words there arrives a letter from Palmerston to Normanby desiring him to go and complain formally of the affair of the extracts, and particularly that what he did publish was not textually correct, and that Guizot's excuses were not satisfactory. Normanby never told me of this till the evening when he had done it. He went to him and read the letter, and Guizot was very angry and said excuses was not a proper word between gentlemen, and that it was difficult to carry on communications when such expressions were used. Normanby said he could only answer for the English word in which sense he ought to have understood it.
M. DE TOCQUEVILLE.
Evening.—I saw the despatch this morning; it was short enough, but it would have been better not to have read it to Guizot. This evening, however, Normanby met him at Madame de Lieven's, when he told him he thought it not worth while to write to Palmerston what had passed between them yesterday, as he had misunderstood the meaning of the English word. Guizot said as that was the case he had nothing to say, and thought too it would be as well to say nothing to Palmerston about it. So this matter is in a manner blown over, but the same animus will probably generate fresh things of the same kind.
This morning I called on Tocqueville and sat some time with him and his wife, an Englishwoman. He looks as clever as he is, and is full of vivacity, and at the same time of simplicity, in his conversation. He gave me an account of the state of parties in France substantially the same as I had heard before; the schism of Billault and Dufaure, to whose section he belongs; they could not go on any longer with Thiers, who, he says, does not command above twenty or thirty votes, and is out of the question. He had formerly belonged rather to Odilon Barrot than to Thiers; said the marriage question was most decidedly popular in France, because considered as having given us a check which had paid off old scores, and that the being now quits had rendered a future good understanding more easy; and never did he remember so general a disposition to be on friendly terms with us, and to act in concert with us; he thinks the King could turn out Guizot and make another Government, but that he is not likely to do it.
I went last night to a ball at the Hôtel de Ville, where amongst many fine people were all the bourgeoisie. It was a magnificent ball and very well worth seeing, many of the women very good-looking and all well dressed. There must have been two thousand people there, and the house extraordinarily fine. From thence to a ball at Madame Pozzo di Borgo's, the most beautiful house I ever saw, fitted up with the greatest luxury, and recherché and in excellent taste. There were to be seen all the exquisitely fine people, the cream of Parisian society, all the Faubourg St. Germain, the adherents of the old and frondeurs of the new dynasty who keep aloof from the Court, and live in political obedience to, but in social defiance of, the ruling powers. They are knit together by a sort of compact of disloyalty to the de facto sovereign, and if any one of them suffers himself or herself to be attracted to Court the offender immediately loses caste, is treated with the utmost scorn and indignation, and if a man very probably does not escape without some personal quarrel and is sure to be deserted by his friends.
M. GUIZOT AND LORD NORMANBY.
January 26th.—Yesterday morning the 'Morning Chronicle' came with a bitter and violent article against Guizot's speech in the Chamber; the courier at the same time brought copies of our printed papers, and I took one to Madame de Lieven. There I found Guizot furious at this article, which he said he was sure had been dictated by Palmerston himself. I said I was as much shocked at it as he was, and that Normanby regretted it very much, but that I was persuaded Palmerston had had no hand in it, and no knowledge of it; that he had written to Lord Lansdowne the day after his speech saying he entirely approved of it and agreed in all he said, and it was impossible he should have at the same time written such a letter and sanctioned such an article, but that I was sorry he had not taken means to prevent such diatribes, and inspired the 'Chronicle' with a better spirit. It was preaching to the winds. His dislike of Palmerston is so great, and his conviction of the reciprocity of the sentiment so rooted, that he will not allow himself to doubt. I left them because I was engaged, and promised to return in the afternoon to her. When I did return I found the perusal of the papers had made a great impression on her. She said there were many curious things she did not know before. I said 'Certainly, so I told you,' and I then pointed out to her certain letters and asked her if they did not prove to demonstration, first, that the proposal of a Coburg came entirely from Madrid and was the desire of the Spanish Court; secondly, that we had constantly refused to lend ourselves to it; and thirdly, that if we had answered the appeal to us according to the disposition they always had imputed to us, the marriage might have been made. She was obliged to own that it was so, but then again returned to the old question 'Why, then, did you name him?' I said once more for the fiftieth time that it never had entered into the head of Palmerston or of anybody else that the mention of his name would have raised such a notion or suspicion in them or in anybody, and that it was wonderful they would not see that if he had had the intention and that this letter contained the expression of it, the last thing he would have done would have been to show it to them. She then talked again about the 'Chronicle' and the difficulty of going on, of the unsatisfactory relations between the Foreign Office and the Embassy, and of the great difficulty of ever restoring them to such a condition as they ought to be in for any useful purpose. 'How,' she asked, 'could M. Guizot open his mind to Normanby, or talk confidentially to him, when he knows he is intimately connected with the Opposition, and that what he says may be repeated the next moment to Thiers and appear in the "Constitutionnel" on the following morning?' This is the real embarrassment, and it is not easy to see how it is to be got over. Guizot and Normanby are on civil terms, and that is all. When they meet on business they discuss the particular matter in hand, and never anything more; to William Hervey Guizot does not speak at all; when they meet at Madame de Lievens, Guizot appears not to see him. She says that I am the only Englishman to whom he can talk openly, and consequently they are very sorry for my departure.
After I left her in the morning I drove all over Paris: to the University to see Cousin, who lives up a staircase just like a Bencher or a Collegian. He was not at home, nor anybody there to answer the bell, so I stuffed my card through a crevice in the door. He is a Peer. Then to Prince Czartoryski's, who lives in a great old house in the Isle St. Louis, close to the Pont d'Austerlitz. The establishment is curious and interesting. The Princess told me she wanted a house which was spacious and cheap, and not therefore in the fashionable and dear part of the town. They were fortunate enough to find this, which exactly suits them. It was the hotel of the Duc de Sully, and there was formerly a subterraneous passage with a communication to the Arsenal. It afterwards fell into the hands of Lambert, a great financier, and is still called the Hôtel Lambert. Madame du Châtelet had it, and they show the apartment which Voltaire occupied for many years. At the Revolution it became a shop or magasin, I forget of what, but no change was made in the building. The Czartoryskis found it all délabré and dirty, bought it very cheap, and spent twice as much as the purchase-money in restorations. It is a great fine house, handsome staircase and gallery, very vast, with court and garden, and a delightful airy prospect towards the river and the Jardin des Plantes. The thick coat of dirt which was cleared away had preserved the original painting and gilding, which have come out, not indeed bright and fresh, but still very handsome, and they have furnished it in a corresponding style. It is not, however, for the purpose of being well lodged that they have thus provided themselves, but to perform a great work of beneficence and charity. The Princess has converted the whole of the upper stories into a great school for the daughters of distressed Polish officers and gentlemen, where they are lodged, fed, clothed, and educated, and what is left of their fortune they spend in this manner. She took me all over the apartments; they are like those in a very well-regulated pauper school, clean to an extreme nicety, but modest and economical. The girls crowded about her to kiss her hand. There they are prepared to become governesses; the Princess's daughter is their 'Professeur d'Anglais,' she told me. It is a very striking sight and well worth support. I went from thence to the Place Royale; then to where the Bastille formerly stood, and down the whole length of the Boulevards, which is the way to see this curious town.
FALL OF THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT.
Wednesday.—Yesterday morning news came that the Spanish Ministry was out; a majority in the Cortes on the question of the Presidency, composed of Progressistas and discontented Moderados, turned them out. The movement is anti-French and said to be brought about by a coalition of the two brothers against the Queen-mother. Guizot is evidently disconcerted by it; Madame de Lieven affects a supreme indifference; she told me that Sotomayor was making a Government, a Moderado Government, that he had proposed to Mon to remain. Mon would not without Pidal (his brother-in-law), and the others were willing to have Mon, but would not have Pidal, because the two would make the Cabinet too French. They now acknowledge that 'sans contestation vous n'avez jamais voulu ni rien fait pour le Cobourg.' I asked her whether this was Guizot's opinion, and she said 'parfaitement.' This is incomparably cool. After having had the most reiterated assurances before the fact, which they utterly disregarded, and did not choose to believe, now that the fact is accomplished, and it suits their purpose to make it up, they acknowledge that they were in error, and acted on a mistaken notion.
I went last night to Madame de Circourt, who has a brilliant salon, but I knew none of the people; then to Madame de Girardin, where were people of a totally different description.
Thursday.—I prevented Normanby from going to Thiers' salon the night before last, and yesterday morning I gave him to understand as delicately as I could that all his communications with him and others in opposition to the Government were noted, reported, and much resented. He is, however, still impressed with the notion that Guizot may be got out, and that his connexion with his opponents may conduce to that object, in my opinion a dangerous error.
Kisseleff gave me an account of what had passed between him and Guizot about the despatch which he read in the Chamber. Kisseleff said it was very irregular and improper, but he did not think it had done any harm. Kisseleff received it the morning of the debate in the Peers, and took it to Guizot, telling him it might be of use to him to know the contents. Kisseleff left it with him to read at his ease, and begged him to return it directly, giving him no authority to produce it. Guizot read it in extenso. He said afterwards that he believed it was the best thing he could do for France and Russia too. Strange that a man so formal should be so loose in his transaction of business.
Friday.—I saw Guizot yesterday, my last day; he is very sorry I am going, being the only Englishman he could speak to; he does not see how he can go on with Normanby in his notorious relations avec tous ses ennemis; then as to the press, the 'Morning Chronicle;' Palmerston's connexion with it is so notorious that one might as well try and persuade him day was night as that Palmerston was not concerned in the 'Morning Chronicle.' I told him frankly that I regretted both the appearance and the existence of intimacy between the Embassy and the Opposition, that it was exaggerated, but that I could not be surprised at its producing an effect on him. I did not think it worth while to go again into the case or to triumph over the effect produced by our blue book; I only said 'that he now admitted himself that he had been wrong about Palmerston before, and that this might inspire him with more confidence for the future;' but he said, 'No, he did not admit it; that Palmerston had come into office with the resolution of attacking him anywhere; that the Marriage question in Spain was merely subsidiary to that object, and he had only put forward Don Enrique in order to set up the Progressista party against him and French influence.' He said the greatest danger proceeded from les agents subalternes; that he had given a proof of his resolution to act justly by at once recalling the French Consul at the Mauritius, for which he was well aware he should be attacked here, but that it was right, and he had therefore done it. He said he would communicate with me, but he thinks the disposition of the other Ministers of little consequence so long as Palmerston's are what they are. All our conversation ran on this; his on the difficulty of going on after all that had passed, mine on the necessity of trying. I said what I could for Normanby, and assured him he would find him personally easy to deal with. I then went to Madame de Lieven, who followed in the same strain, and said what is true enough, that Normanby, once having let himself drop into Thiers' hands, will find it difficult to get out again. This has always struck me. I have said what I could to Normanby, but I came too late for that. I am certain they are very uneasy at the effect produced both in England (even in the midst of its apathy) and here by the publication of our papers. Here it is unquestionably great, although they have not yet been distributed fully. I met Cousin last night, who was vehement on the subject, and told me, if he had been aware of their contents, nothing should have prevented his replying to the Duke de Broglie. Tocqueville told me that they had produced a very great effect; that men like himself who approved of what had been done were inexpressibly shocked at the way in which it had been done, and at the revelation of so much that was false and dishonourable in the conduct of the French Government.
THE EMBASSY AND THE OPPOSITION.
Saturday.—Just setting off to London and not sorry to leave Paris, where I am, after all, a fish out of water. I have been most kindly and hospitably entertained, interested, and amused, but the excitement of the particular question once over, I feel that I have no business here, that I am not fit for the society, and should never take root in it; the exertion required, the stretch and the continual alacrity of attention, would be intolerable. I have fallen in here with Scrope Davies, a social refugee, whom I have not seen these twenty-five years, almost the last remnant of a circle of clever men of the world, and once the intimate friend of B.
Yesterday I went about taking leave and went to both the clubs: with Mrs. Austin to M. de Triqueti's studio, and then of course to Madame de Lieven. At the clubs I learnt the confirmation of what I had been led to believe the day before, the extraordinary impression made here by the publication of our blue book. It quite surprised me, not because I do not think it very strong; but having been myself long ago convinced and familiar with most of the details, I did not know that people here were so little prepared for what they had seen. There can be no doubt of the reality and vivacity of the impression. Francis Baring told me that men who had before told him they thought Guizot had the advantage, now came to tell him how entirely their opinions were changed; in short, if it be any advantage, it has done our case infinite good and prodigiously disconcerted the Government. I found Madame de Lieven very low and full of resentment, especially for the publication of Normanby's conversation with Guizot, which she said must make their personal relations still more difficult and unpleasant. It is, however, this document which has produced the strongest effect of all. I told her all I had heard, and that Guizot must make up his mind to be bitterly attacked in the Chamber by Lamartine, Billault, and Thiers. She said that she had no doubt of his coming triumphantly out of the fight.
BITTERNESS OF M. THIERS.
Last night there was a party at the Embassy, at which Thiers and Duvergier were present. Thiers had been with Normanby in the morning. He made an attack on me for believing all Madame de Lieven told me; said I was 'une éponge trempée dans le liquide de Madame de Lieven,' and tried his best to persuade me that Guizot was weak, his majority not worth a rush, and that the King could and would get rid of him whenever he found himself in any sort of danger. 'Tell Lord Palmerston,' he said, 'when he speaks, to say "beaucoup de bien de la France, et beaucoup de mal de Monsieur Guizot."' I said I should give him one-half the advice and not the other, and that Palmerston's wisest course would be to hold moderate language, tell his story, and leave everybody to draw the inferences. I have no doubt he will make a very powerful speech and present an admirable résumé of the whole question. But this new vigour infused into the Opposition, which will bring on an acrimonious debate, though it may cover Guizot with mud, will not shake him from his seat. I told Thiers he was quite mistaken in supposing that I took my opinions from Madame de Lieven or believed one half she told me, but nevertheless I could not believe that the King would part with Guizot if he could possibly help it, for he would look in vain for so supple an instrument, and one so well able to defend him and his measures in the Chambers. However, Thiers thinks of nothing but mischief, of gratifying his own personal passions and resentments. He has evidently persuaded Normanby, and I have no doubt Normanby tries to persuade Palmerston of the same. The cool people here meanwhile tell me that Guizot will not be turned out, and I am inclined to believe it. I leave the Embassy in certainly a very painful and unbecoming condition. Normanby seems not to care who sees his intimacy with Thiers, and he has none whatever with Guizot. They do not and cannot converse on anything but the merest matters of business, and their relations get worse, and seem likely to do so; the obstacles to an understanding sufficiently frank to be useful appear almost insurmountable. Thiers, having got Normanby into his clutches, will not easily let him go again, and the resentment of Guizot will hardly be appeased, nor do I see any chance of their ever being on really good terms. So ends my mission, and it only now remains for me to give the truest account I can of the state of affairs here to those whom it most concerns to know it; but then it will be very difficult for them to adopt any decisive and satisfactory course.