OPINIONS ON THE BATTLE.
Many opinions have been given as to the causes that led to the defeat of the Union army at Bull Run. General Sherman, who commanded a brigade in the battle, said it was the best planned and worst fought battle of the war. It has been said by some writers that the plans of the commanding general were not carried out, and that each of the three division commanders whose forces were actually engaged acted on their own responsibility and were governed by circumstances. It is a fact well known to-day, that the Union army, at or in the vicinity of the battle field, were in numbers quite sufficient to have at least held any and every position that a portion of the army had gained. On a map now in possession of Charles E. Lawton Post, G. A. R. of this city, of Bull Run battlefield, drawn under the direction of Generals McDowell and Beauregard, by order of the War Department, the position of every regiment and brigade of both armies at the commencement of the engagement is defined, and in a note appended to the map it is stated that the engagement was commenced by the Burnside brigade, and it is a historical fact recognized at this time, that the battle was fought and won by the Second Division, commanded by Burnside, General Hunter having been wounded before the troops had been brought into position, supported by no other troops, until noon, when a brigade of the Third Division, which had followed us through the forest road, came to our assistance. From 9.30 A. M. to 1 P. M., these seventeen regiments of infantry and four light batteries, unaided by any other troops, fought and drove the enemy from their position on Buck's Hill; and when the two brigades of Tyler's First Division, commanded by Generals Sherman and Schenck, crossed Bull Run river, over Stone Bridge, at 1.30 P. M., there was not a rebel force of any description on the north side of Warrenton road, west of Stone Bridge. At this time victory was assured for the Union army. At the Stone Bridge was Tyler's entire division, comprising fifteen regiments of infantry and three batteries, the Fourth Division, General Runyon, with seven regiments, Fifth Division, General Miles, eight regiments, and one battery. Of these thirteen thousand men, only two brigades of the First Division crossed the river in the afternoon, and they were engaged only about one hour, namely, in the vicinity of the Henry House, when they were repulsed by the enemy, whose forces were now all concentrated at that point. Rickett's Regular battery (formerly Magruder's stationed at Fort Adams previous to the war) was lost, recaptured, and lost again. These two brigades of the First Division retreated, panic stricken, and our reserve of twelve thousand men, at Stone Bridge, retreated without firing a shot, while our Division, the 2d, was holding the position we had gained in the morning. This was the supreme moment, when a Sheridan or a Warren would have swept the opposing forces from the field, or captured their entire army. Colonel Burnside, seeing the aspect matters had assumed, formed his troops into line and fell back to the Warrenton road, fearing he might be cut off at Stone Bridge. Hunter's Division covered the retreat and were the last troops that crossed the bridge, and was the only Division of the army that occupied its former quarters, as these did, at Centreville that night.