CONTENTS
| PART I—PRIMARY ASPECTS OF ORGANIZATION | |
| CHAPTER I | |
| SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL ASPECTS OF MIND | |
| PAGE | |
| Mind an Organic Whole—Conscious and Unconscious Relations—DoesSelf-Consciousness Come First? Cogito, Ergo Sum—TheLarger Introspection—Self-Consciousness in Children—PublicConsciousness | [3] |
| CHAPTER II | |
| SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL ASPECTS OF MIND—(CONTINUED) | |
| Moral Aspect of the Organic View—It Implies that ReformShould Be Based on Sympathy—Uses of Praise and Blame—ResponsibilityBroadened but Not Lost—Moral Value ofa Larger View—Organic Morality Calls for Knowledge—Natureof Social Organization | [13] |
| CHAPTER III | |
| PRIMARY GROUPS | |
| Meaning of Primary Groups—Family, Playground, and Neighborhood—HowFar Influenced by Larger Society—Meaningand Permanence of “Human Nature”—Primary Groups theNursery of Human Nature | [23] |
| CHAPTER IV | |
| PRIMARY IDEALS | |
| Nature of Primary Idealism—The Ideal of a “We” or MoralUnity—It Does Not Exclude Self-Assertion—Ideals Springingfrom Hostility—Loyalty, Truth, Service—Kindness—Lawfulness—Freedom—TheDoctrine of Natural Right—Bearingof Primary Idealism upon Education and Philanthropy | [32] |
| CHAPTER V | |
| THE EXTENSION OF PRIMARY IDEALS | |
| Primary Ideals Underlie Democracy and Christianity—WhyThey Are Not Achieved on a Larger Scale—What They Requirefrom Personality—From Social Mechanism—ThePrinciple of Compensation | [51] |
| PART II—COMMUNICATION | |
| CHAPTER VI | |
| THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COMMUNICATION | |
| Meaning of Communication—Its Relation to Human Nature—ToSociety at Large | [61] |
| CHAPTER VII | |
| THE GROWTH OF COMMUNICATION | |
| Pre-Verbal Communication—The Rise of Speech—Its Mentaland Social Function—The Function of Writing—Printingand the Modern World—The Non-Verbal Arts | [66] |
| CHAPTER VIII | |
| MODERN COMMUNICATION: ENLARGEMENT AND ANIMATION | |
| Character of Recent Changes—Their General Effect—TheChange in the United States—Organized Gossip—PublicOpinion, Democracy, Internationalism—The Value ofDiffusion—Enlargement of Feeling—Conclusion | [80] |
| CHAPTER IX | |
| MODERN COMMUNICATION: INDIVIDUALITY | |
| The Question—Why Communication Should Foster Individuality—TheContrary or Dead-Level Theory—Reconciliationof These Views—The Outlook as Regards Individuality | [91] |
| CHAPTER X | |
| MODERN COMMUNICATION: SUPERFICIALITY AND STRAIN | |
| Stimulating Effect of Modern Life—Superficiality—Strain—PathologicalEffects | [98] |
| PART III—THE DEMOCRATIC MIND | |
| CHAPTER XI | |
| THE ENLARGEMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS | |
| Narrowness of Consciousness in Tribal Society—Importance ofFace-to-Face Assembly—Individuality—Subconscious Characterof Wider Relations—Enlargement of Consciousness—Irregularityin Growth—Breadth of Modern Consciousness—Democracy | [107] |
| CHAPTER XII | |
| THE THEORY OF PUBLIC OPINION | |
| Public Opinion as Organization—Agreement Not Essential—PublicOpinion versus Popular Impression—Public ThoughtNot an Average—A Group Is Capable of Expression throughIts Most Competent Members—General and Special PublicOpinion—The Sphere of the Former—Of the Latter—TheTwo Are United in Personality—How Public Opinion Rules—EffectiveRule Based on Moral Unity | [121] |
| CHAPTER XIII | |
| WHAT THE MASSES CONTRIBUTE | |
| The Masses the Initiators of Sentiment—They Live in the CentralCurrent of Experience—Distinction or Privilege Apt toCause Isolation—Institutional Character of Upper Classes—TheMasses Shrewd Judges of Persons—This the MainGround for Expecting that the People Will Be Right in theLong Run—Democracy Always Representative—Conclusion | [135] |
| CHAPTER XIV | |
| DEMOCRACY AND CROWD EXCITEMENT | |
| The Crowd-Theory of Modern Life—The Psychology of Crowds—ModernConditions Favor Psychological Contagion—Democracya Training in Self-Control—The Crowd Not Alwaysin the Wrong—Conclusion; the Case of France | [149] |
| CHAPTER XV | |
| DEMOCRACY AND DISTINCTION | |
| The Problem—Democracy Should Be Distinguished fromTransition—The Dead-Level Theory of Democracy—Confusionand Its Effects—“Individualism” May Not Be Favorableto Distinguished Individuality—Contemporary Uniformity—RelativeAdvantages of America and Europe—Haste,Superficiality, Strain—Spiritual Economy of a SettledOrder—Commercialism—Zeal for Diffusion—Conclusion | [157] |
| CHAPTER XVI | |
| THE TREND OF SENTIMENT | |
| Meaning and General Trend of Sentiment—Attenuation—Refinement—Senseof Justice—Truth as Justice—As RealismAs Expediency—As Economy of Attention—Hopefulness | [177] |
| CHAPTER XVII | |
| THE TREND OF SENTIMENT—(CONTINUED) | |
| Nature of the Sentiment of Brotherhood—Favored by Communicationand Settled Principles—How Far ContemporaryLife Fosters It—How Far Uncongenial to It—General Outcomein this Regard—The Spirit of Service—The Trend ofManners—Brotherhood in Relation to Conflict—Blame—Democracyand Christianity | [189] |
| PART IV—SOCIAL CLASSES | |
| CHAPTER XVIII | |
| THE HEREDITARY OR CASTE PRINCIPLE | |
| Nature and Use of Classes—Inheritance and Competition theTwo Principles upon which Classes Are Based—Conditionsin Human Nature Making for Hereditary Classes—CasteSpirit | [209] |
| CHAPTER XIX | |
| CONDITIONS FAVORING OR OPPOSING THE GROWTH OF CASTE | |
| Three Conditions Affecting the Increase or Diminution of Caste—Race-Caste—Immigrationand Conquest—Gradual Differentiationof Functions; Mediæval Caste; India—Influenceof Settled Conditions—Influence of the State ofCommunication and Enlightenment—Conclusion | [217] |
| CHAPTER XX | |
| THE OUTLOOK REGARDING CASTE | |
| The Question—How Far the Inheritance Principle ActuallyPrevails—Influences Favoring Its Growth—Those AntagonizingIt—The Principles of Inheritance and Equal Opportunityas Affecting Social Efficiency—Conclusion | [229] |
| CHAPTER XXI | |
| OPEN CLASSES | |
| The Nature of Open Classes—Whether Class-Consciousness IsDesirable—Fellowship and Coöperation Deficient in OurSociety—Class Organization in Relation to Freedom | [239] |
| CHAPTER XXII | |
| HOW FAR WEALTH IS THE BASIS OF OPEN CLASSES | |
| Impersonal Character of Open Classes—Various Classifications—Classes,as Commonly Understood, Based on Obvious Distinctions—Wealthas Generalized Power—Economic Bettermentas an Ideal of the Ill-Paid Classes—Conclusion | [248] |
| CHAPTER XXIII | |
| ON THE ASCENDENCY OF A CAPITALIST CLASS | |
| The Capitalist Class—Its Lack of Caste Sentiment—In WhatSense “the Fittest”—Moral Traits—How Far Based on Service—Autocraticand Democratic Principles in the Controlof Industry—Reasons for Expecting an Increase of theDemocratic Principle—Social Power in General—OrganizingCapacity—Nature and Sources of Capitalist Power—Powerover the Press and over Public Sentiment—Upper ClassAtmosphere | [256] |
| CHAPTER XXIV | |
| ON THE ASCENDENCY OF A CAPITALIST CLASS—(CONTINUED) | |
| The Influence of Ambitious Young Men—Security of the DominantClass in an Open System—Is There Danger of Anarchyand Spoliation?—Whether the Sway of Riches Is GreaterNow than Formerly—Whether Greater in America than inEngland | [273] |
| CHAPTER XXV | |
| THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ILL-PAID CLASSES | |
| The Need of Class Organization—Uses and Dangers of Unions—GeneralDisposition of the Hand-Working Classes | [284] |
| CHAPTER XXVI | |
| POVERTY | |
| The Meaning of Poverty—Personal and General Causes—Povertyin a Prosperous Society Due Chiefly to Maladjustment—Arethe Poor the “Unfit”?—Who Is to Blame for Poverty?—Attitudeof Society toward the Poor—FundamentalRemedies | [290] |
| CHAPTER XXVII | |
| HOSTILE FEELING BETWEEN CLASSES | |
| Conditions Producing Class Animosity—The Spirit of ServiceAllays Bitterness—Possible Decrease of the Prestige ofWealth—Probability of a More Communal Spirit in theUse of Wealth—Influence of Settled Rules for Social Opposition—Importanceof Face-to-Face Discussion | [301] |
| PART V—INSTITUTIONS | |
| CHAPTER XXVIII | |
| INSTITUTIONS AND THE INDIVIDUAL | |
| The Nature of Institutions—Hereditary and Social Factors—TheChild and the World—Society and Personality—Personalityversus the Institution—The Institution as a Basis ofPersonality—The Moral Aspect—Choice versus Mechanism—Personalitythe Life of Institutions—Institutions BecomingFreer in Structure | [313] |
| CHAPTER XXIX | |
| INSTITUTIONS AND THE INDIVIDUAL—(CONTINUED) | |
| Innovation as a Personal Tendency—Innovation and Conservatismas Public Habit—Solidarity—French and Anglo-SaxonSolidarity—Tradition and Convention—Not so Opposite asThey Appear—Real Difference, in this Regard, betweenModern and Mediæval Society—Traditionalism and Conventionalismin Modern Life | [327] |
| CHAPTER XXX | |
| FORMALISM AND DISORGANIZATION | |
| The Nature of Formalism—Its Effect upon Personality—Formalismin Modern Life—Disorganization, “Individualism”—Howit Affects the Individual—Relation to Formalism—“Individualism”Implies Defective Sympathy—Contemporary“Individualism”—Restlessness under Discomfort—TheBetter Aspect of Disorganization | [342] |
| CHAPTER XXXI | |
| DISORGANIZATION: THE FAMILY | |
| Old and New Régimes in the Family—The Declining Birth-Rate—“Spoiled”Children—The Opening of New Careers toWomen—European and American Points of View—PersonalFactors in Divorce—Institutional Factors—Conclusion | [356] |
| CHAPTER XXXII | |
| DISORGANIZATION: THE CHURCH | |
| The Psychological View of Religion—The Need of SocialStructure—Creeds—Why Symbols Tend to Become Formal—Traitsof a Good System of Symbols—ContemporaryNeed of Religion—Newer Tendencies in the Church | [372] |
| CHAPTER XXXIII | |
| DISORGANIZATION: OTHER TRADITIONS | |
| Disorder in the Economic System—In Education—In HigherCulture—In the Fine Arts | [383] |
| PART VI—PUBLIC WILL | |
| CHAPTER XXXIV | |
| THE FUNCTION OF PUBLIC WILLPublic and Private Will—The Lack of Public Will—SocialWrongs Commonly Not Willed at All | [395] |
| CHAPTER XXXV | |
| GOVERNMENT AS PUBLIC WILL | |
| Government Not the Only Agent of Public Will—The RelativePoint of View; Advantages of Government as an Agent—MechanicalTendency of Government—Characteristics Favorableto Government Activity—Municipal Socialism—Self-Expressionthe Fundamental Demand of the People—ActualExtension of State Functions | [402] |
| CHAPTER XXXVI | |
| SOME PHASES OF THE LARGER WILL | |
| Growing Efficiency of the Intellectual Processes—OrganicIdealism—The Larger Morality—Indirect Service—IncreasingSimplicity and Flexibility in Social Structure—PublicWill Saves Part of the Cost of Change—Human Nature theGuiding Force behind Public Will | [411] |
| Index | [421] |
PART I
PRIMARY ASPECTS OF ORGANIZATION
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
CHAPTER I
SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL ASPECTS OF MIND
Mind an Organic Whole—Conscious and Unconscious Relations—Does Self-Consciousness Come First? Cogito, Ergo Sum—The Larger Introspection—Self-Consciousness in Children—Public Consciousness.
Mind is an organic whole made up of coöperating individualities, in somewhat the same way that the music of an orchestra is made up of divergent but related sounds. No one would think it necessary or reasonable to divide the music into two kinds, that made by the whole and that of particular instruments, and no more are there two kinds of mind, the social mind and the individual mind. When we study the social mind we merely fix our attention on larger aspects and relations rather than on the narrower ones of ordinary psychology.
The view that all mind acts together in a vital whole from which the individual is never really separate flows naturally from our growing knowledge of heredity and suggestion, which makes it increasingly clear that every thought we have is linked with the thought of our ancestors and associates, and through them with that of society at large. It is also the only view consistent with the general standpoint of modern science, which admits nothing isolate in nature.
The unity of the social mind consists not in agreement but in organization, in the fact of reciprocal influence or causation among its parts, by virtue of which everything that takes place in it is connected with everything else, and so is an outcome of the whole. Whether, like the orchestra, it gives forth harmony may be a matter of dispute, but that its sound, pleasing or otherwise, is the expression of a vital coöperation, cannot well be denied. Certainly everything that I say or think is influenced by what others have said or thought, and, in one way or another, sends out an influence of its own in turn.
This differentiated unity of mental or social life, present in the simplest intercourse but capable of infinite growth and adaptation, is what I mean in this work by social organization. It would be useless, I think, to attempt a more elaborate definition. We have only to open our eyes to see organization; and if we cannot do that no definition will help us.
In the social mind we may distinguish—very roughly of course—conscious and unconscious relations, the unconscious being those of which we are not aware, which for some reason escape our notice. A great part of the influences at work upon us are of this character: our language, our mechanical arts, our government and other institutions, we derive chiefly from people to whom we are but indirectly and unconsciously related. The larger movements of society—the progress and decadence of nations, institutions and races—have seldom been a matter of consciousness until they were past. And although the growth of social consciousness is perhaps the greatest fact of history, it has still but a narrow and fallible grasp of human life.
Social consciousness, or awareness of society, is inseparable from self-consciousness, because we can hardly think of ourselves excepting with reference to a social group of some sort, or of the group except with reference to ourselves. The two things go together, and what we are really aware of is a more or less complex personal or social whole, of which now the particular, now the general, aspect is emphasized.
In general, then, most of our reflective consciousness, of our wide-awake state of mind, is social consciousness, because a sense of our relation to other persons, or of other persons to one another, can hardly fail to be a part of it. Self and society are twin-born, we know one as immediately as we know the other, and the notion of a separate and independent ego is an illusion.
This view, which seems to me quite simple and in accord with common-sense, is not the one most commonly held, for psychologists and even sociologists are still much infected with the idea that self-consciousness is in some way primary, and antecedent to social consciousness, which must be derived by some recondite process of combination or elimination. I venture, therefore, to give some further exposition of it, based in part on first-hand observation of the growth of social ideas in children.
Descartes is, I suppose, the best-known exponent of the traditional view regarding the primacy of self-consciousness. Seeking an unquestionable basis for philosophy, he thought that he found it in the proposition “I think, therefore I am” (cogito, ergo sum). This seemed to him inevitable, though all else might be illusion. “I observed,” he says, “that, whilst I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be somewhat; and as I observed that this truth, I think, hence I am, was so certain and of such evidence that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be alleged by the sceptics capable of shaking it, I concluded that I might, without scruple, accept it as the first principle of the philosophy of which I was in search.”[1]
From our point of view this reasoning is unsatisfactory in two essential respects. In the first place it seems to imply that “I”-consciousness is a part of all consciousness, when, in fact, it belongs only to a rather advanced stage of development. In the second it is one-sided or “individualistic” in asserting the personal or “I” aspect to the exclusion of the social or “we” aspect, which is equally original with it.
Introspection is essential to psychological or social insight, but the introspection of Descartes was, in this instance, a limited, almost abnormal, sort of introspection—that of a self-absorbed philosopher doing his best to isolate himself from other people and from all simple and natural conditions of life. The mind into which he looked was in a highly technical state, not likely to give him a just view of human consciousness in general.
Introspection is of a larger sort in our day. There is a world of things in the mind worth looking at, and the modern psychologist, instead of fixing his attention wholly on an extreme form of speculative self-consciousness, puts his mind through an infinite variety of experiences, intellectual and emotional, simple and complex, normal and abnormal, sociable and private, recording in each case what he sees in it. He does this by subjecting it to suggestions or incitements of various kinds, which awaken the activities he desires to study.
In particular he does it largely by what may be called sympathetic introspection, putting himself into intimate contact with various sorts of persons and allowing them to awake in himself a life similar to their own, which he afterwards, to the best of his ability, recalls and describes. In this way he is more or less able to understand—always by introspection—children, idiots, criminals, rich and poor, conservative and radical—any phase of human nature not wholly alien to his own.
This I conceive to be the principal method of the social psychologist.
One thing which this broader introspection reveals is that the “I”-consciousness does not explicitly appear until the child is, say, about two years old, and that when it does appear it comes in inseparable conjunction with the consciousness of other persons and of those relations which make up a social group. It is in fact simply one phase of a body of personal thought which is self-consciousness in one aspect and social consciousness in another.
The mental experience of a new-born child is probably a mere stream of impressions, which may be regarded as being individual, in being differentiated from any other stream, or as social, in being an undoubted product of inheritance and suggestion from human life at large; but is not aware either of itself or of society.
Very soon, however, the mind begins to discriminate personal impressions and to become both naïvely self-conscious and naïvely conscious of society; that is, the child is aware, in an unreflective way, of a group and of his own special relation to it. He does not say “I” nor does he name his mother, his sister or his nurse, but he has images and feelings out of which these ideas will grow. Later comes the more reflective consciousness which names both himself and other people, and brings a fuller perception of the relations which constitute the unity of this small world.[2]
And so on to the most elaborate phases of self-consciousness and social consciousness, to the metaphysician pondering the Ego, or the sociologist meditating on the Social Organism. Self and society go together, as phases of a common whole. I am aware of the social groups in which I live as immediately and authentically as I am aware of myself; and Descartes might have said “We think,” cogitamus, on as good grounds as he said cogito.
But, it may be said, this very consciousness that you are considering is after all located in a particular person, and so are all similar consciousnesses, so that what we see, if we take an objective view of the matter, is merely an aggregate of individuals, however social those individuals may be. Common-sense, most people think, assures us that the separate person is the primary fact of life.
If so, is it not because common-sense has been trained by custom to look at one aspect of things and not another? Common-sense, moderately informed, assures us that the individual has his being only as part of a whole. What does not come by heredity comes by communication and intercourse; and the more closely we look the more apparent it is that separateness is an illusion of the eye and community the inner truth. “Social organism,” using the term in no abstruse sense but merely to mean a vital unity in human life, is a fact as obvious to enlightened common-sense as individuality.
I do not question that the individual is a differentiated centre of psychical life, having a world of his own into which no other individual can fully enter; living in a stream of thought in which there is nothing quite like that in any other stream, neither his “I,” nor his “you,” nor his “we,” nor even any material object; all, probably, as they exist for him, have something unique about them. But this uniqueness is no more apparent and verifiable than the fact—not at all inconsistent with it—that he is in the fullest sense member of a whole, appearing such not only to scientific observation but also to his own untrained consciousness.
There is then no mystery about social consciousness. The view that there is something recondite about it and that it must be dug for with metaphysics and drawn forth from the depths of speculation, springs from a failure to grasp adequately the social nature of all higher consciousness. What we need in this connection is only a better seeing and understanding of rather ordinary and familiar facts.
We may view social consciousness either in a particular mind or as a coöperative activity of many minds. The social ideas that I have are closely connected with those that other people have, and act and react upon them to form a whole. This gives us public consciousness, or to use a more familiar term, public opinion, in the broad sense of a group state of mind which is more or less distinctly aware of itself. By this last phrase I mean such a mutual understanding of one another’s points of view on the part of the individuals or groups concerned as naturally results from discussion. There are all degrees of this awareness in the various individuals. Generally speaking, it never embraces the whole in all its complexity, but almost always some of the relations that enter into the whole. The more intimate the communication of a group the more complete, the more thoroughly knit together into a living whole, is its public consciousness.
In a congenial family life, for example, there may be a public consciousness which brings all the important thoughts and feelings of the members into such a living and coöperative whole. In the mind of each member, also, this same thing exists as a social consciousness embracing a vivid sense of the personal traits and modes of thought and feeling of the other members. And, finally, quite inseparable from all this, is each one’s consciousness of himself, which is largely a direct reflection of the ideas about himself he attributes to the others, and is directly or indirectly altogether a product of social life. Thus all consciousness hangs together, and the distinctions are chiefly based on point of view.
The unity of public opinion, like all vital unity, is one not of agreement but of organization, of interaction and mutual influence. It is true that a certain underlying likeness of nature is necessary in order that minds may influence one another and so coöperate in forming a vital whole, but identity, even in the simplest process, is unnecessary and probably impossible. The consciousness of the American House of Representatives, for example, is by no means limited to the common views, if there are any, shared by its members, but embraces the whole consciousness of every member so far as this deals with the activity of the House. It would be a poor conception of the whole which left out the opposition, or even one dissentient individual. That all minds are different is a condition, not an obstacle, to the unity that consists in a differentiated and coöperative life.
Here is another illustration of what is meant by individual and collective aspects of social consciousness. Some of us possess a good many books relating to social questions of the day. Each of these books, considered by itself, is the expression of a particular social consciousness; the author has cleared up his ideas as well as he can and printed them. But a library of such books expresses social consciousness in a larger sense; it speaks for the epoch. And certainly no one who reads the books will doubt that they form a whole, whatever their differences. The radical and the reactionist are clearly part of the same general situation.
There are, then, at least three aspects of consciousness which we may usefully distinguish: self-consciousness, or what I think of myself; social consciousness (in its individual aspect), or what I think of other people; and public consciousness, or a collective view of the foregoing as organized in a communicating group. And all three are phases of a single whole.