CONTENTS
| THE CONTINENTAL NAVY | |
| Chapter I.—The Naval Committee. | |
| The need in 1775 for an army and for a navy | [31] |
| Agitation for a navy outside of Congress | [32] |
| Agitation for a navy in Congress | [34] |
| The first naval legislation | [35] |
| Appointment of the Naval Committee | [38] |
| First work of the Naval Committee | [38] |
| Reconstitution of the Naval Committee | [38] |
| John Adams’s description of the Naval Committee | [39] |
| The organization and decline of the Naval Committee | [40] |
| Growth in Congress of naval sentiment | [41] |
| Naval legislation under the Naval Committee | [42] |
| The procuring of a fleet | [51] |
| The appointment of officers | [52] |
| The first naval expedition | [55] |
| Résumé of the work of the Naval Committee | [60] |
| Chapter II.—The Fleets of Washington and Arnold. | |
| Fitting out of the “Hannah” | [61] |
| Fitting out of Washington’s “Boston fleet” | [62] |
| Washington’s opinion of his commanders | [64] |
| Services rendered by Washington’s “Boston fleet” | [65] |
| Broughton and Selman’s raid on Prince Edward island | [66] |
| The disposition of Washington’s prizes | [67] |
| The delay in bringing them to trial | [68] |
| History of the fleet after the evacuation of Boston | [69] |
| Washington’s “New York fleet” | [70] |
| Beginning of the fleet on lakes Champlain and George | [71] |
| Its increase in the summer of 1776 | [72] |
| The work of Benedict Arnold | [73] |
| The British fleet on the Lakes | [76] |
| The battle of Lake Champlain, October 11-13, 1776 | [77] |
| Results of the naval campaign on the Lakes | [77] |
| Chapter III.—The Organization of the Marine Committee. | |
| The maritime interests of New England | [79] |
| Naval enterprise in Rhode Island | [80] |
| The naval situation in Congress, 1775-76 | [81] |
| The Rhode Island instructions | [81] |
| The debate in Congress thereon | [82] |
| Postponement of action on instructions | [83] |
| Favorable action by Congress, December 11, 1775 | [85] |
| Decision of Congress to build thirteen frigates | [85] |
| Appointment of the Marine Committee | [86] |
| The Marine Committee absorbs the Naval Committee | [87] |
| The organization and pay of the Marine Committee | [87] |
| Its chairmen | [88] |
| Other valuable members | [90] |
| Naval agents for building the Continental frigates | [90] |
| Prize agents | [93] |
| Continental agents | [95] |
| Aid rendered the Marine Committee | [95] |
| Navy Board at Philadelphia | [96] |
| Navy Board at Boston | [97] |
| Designations of the boards | [99] |
| The organization of the boards | [100] |
| The personnel of the boards | [101] |
| Salaries | [102] |
| Enumeration of the principal agents of the Marine Committee | [103] |
| Minor agents | [103] |
| Chapter IV.—The Work of the Navy Boards and the Marine Committee. | |
| Lack of system in the Naval Department of the Revolution | [104] |
| Examples | [105] |
| Work and duties of the navy boards | [107] |
| Men and materials needed in building a ship | [110] |
| Provisions needed in fitting out a ship | [112] |
| Division of labor among the naval commissioners | [112] |
| The heavy work of the Boston Board | [113] |
| Two-fold duties of the Marine Committee | [115] |
| Administrative duties of the Marine Committee | [116] |
| Naval uniform | [117] |
| Communications of the Marine Committee | [118] |
| Reports of the Marine Committee | [120] |
| Naval legislation under the Marine Committee | [121] |
| Naval increases | [121] |
| Naval appointments and promotions | [123] |
| Relative rank | [125] |
| Captures and the sharing of prizes | [126] |
| Privateers | [127] |
| Naval pay | [128] |
| Naval pensions | [129] |
| Courts-martial and courts of enquiry | [131] |
| Important naval trials | [133] |
| The case of Commodore Esek Hopkins | [134] |
| Provision for the fleet of Count D’Estaing | [139] |
| The Marine Committee as a consular bureau | [139] |
| Chapter V.—The Conditions of the Continental Naval Service. | |
| The recent revolution in navies and naval conditions | [141] |
| Constancy of the principles of naval strategy | [143] |
| Maritime conditions in America in 1775, and in 1900 | [144] |
| Difficulties in procuring seamen during the Revolution | [144] |
| The privateers of the Revolution | [147] |
| State navies | [152] |
| The naval defence of America | [153] |
| Naval stations of the Americans | [154] |
| Naval stations of the British | [155] |
| Comparison of the British and American navies | [156] |
| Weakness of the American navies | [159] |
| Diffusion of authority in naval administration | [160] |
| Chapter VI.—Movements of the Continental Fleet under the Marine Committee. | |
| Work of the fleet of a non-military character | [161] |
| Classification of military operations | [162] |
| Primary naval operations | [163] |
| Enumeration of secondary operations | [164] |
| Defence of American commerce | [164] |
| Coöperation with the army | [166] |
| The striking of the enemy’s lines of communication | [167] |
| Commerce-destroying | [169] |
| The threatening and attacking of the enemy’s coasts | [173] |
| A naval plan of Robert Morris | [174] |
| The Marine Committee and its plans | [176] |
| Success and failure of the navy | [177] |
| The navy of the Revolution and of the Spanish-American war | [179] |
| Chapter VII.—The Board of Admiralty. | |
| Defects of the Marine Committee | [181] |
| Criticism of the administration of Congress | [182] |
| A new system of Executives | [184] |
| Criticism of the Naval Department by Washington and Jay | [184] |
| Establishment of a Board of Admiralty, October, 1779 | [187] |
| Powers and duties of the Board of Admiralty | [188] |
| Salaries | [189] |
| Selection of commissioners of Admiralty | [190] |
| Francis Lewis and William Ellery | [193] |
| Congress and the Board of Admiralty | [194] |
| Work of the Board of Admiralty | [195] |
| Decrease in naval machinery | [195] |
| Reports of the Board of Admiralty | [196] |
| Naval legislation under the Board of Admiralty | [197] |
| The granting of naval commissions by the states | [201] |
| The American navy and British models | [202] |
| Court of appeals for prize cases | [203] |
| The fleet under the Board of Admiralty | [203] |
| Embarrassments of the Board of Admiralty | [204] |
| Success and failure of the fleet | [205] |
| Discontinuance of the Board of Admiralty | [208] |
| Defects of the Board of Admiralty | [209] |
| Chapter VIII.—The Secretary of Marine and the Agent of Marine. | |
| The two factions during the Revolution | [210] |
| Supremacy of the “dispersive school” | [211] |
| The “concentrative school” in 1780 | [212] |
| Agitation for administrative reform | [213] |
| The success of the “concentrative school” | [214] |
| Establishment of the office of Secretary of Marine, February, 1781 | [216] |
| Duties of the Secretary of Marine | [216] |
| Appointment of McDougall as Secretary of Marine | [217] |
| Failure to obtain a Secretary of Marine | [218] |
| Robert Morris and the naval business | [218] |
| Reorganization of the Naval Department | [220] |
| The Agent of Marine | [223] |
| Robert Morris as Agent of Marine | [226] |
| The organization of the Naval Department under Morris | [227] |
| Reports of the Agent of Marine | [228] |
| Naval legislation under the Agent of Marine | [228] |
| The court-martialing of three seamen | [230] |
| Morris and the control of the fleet | [234] |
| The strength of the navy | [235] |
| Success and failure of the fleet | [235] |
| The cruise of the “Alliance,” 1782-1783 | [236] |
| The capture of the “Trumbull” by the “Iris” | [238] |
| Attempts of Morris to increase the navy | [239] |
| Morris’s views after the treaty of peace | [244] |
| Congress goes out of the naval business | [245] |
| Settling of the naval accounts | [245] |
| Disposing of the naval vessels | [247] |
| Retirement of the Agent of Marine | [250] |
| The end of the naval business | [250] |
| Chapter IX.—Naval Duties of American Representatives in Foreign Countries. | |
| Mutual interests of the United States and France | [252] |
| Duties of the Naval Office at Paris | [252] |
| Personnel of the Naval Office | [254] |
| Communication with the Naval Office | [255] |
| Agents of the Naval Office | [256] |
| Appointment and recommendation of officers | [257] |
| Privateers | [260] |
| The purchase and construction of vessels | [261] |
| The fitting out of vessels | [265] |
| The trial of prize cases | [266] |
| American prisoners | [267] |
| Breaches of neutrality | [273] |
| Miscellaneous duties | [274] |
| The Naval Office a channel of naval intelligence | [276] |
| Naval plans of the Naval Office | [276] |
| Plan of the Committee of Foreign Affairs | [278] |
| Chapter X.—Naval Duties of American Representatives in Foreign Countries. Continued. | |
| Work of the Naval Office in 1777 | [281] |
| Attempts to obtain the freedom of French ports | [282] |
| The first prizes of the “Reprisal” | [283] |
| Difficulties between the English and the French governments | [284] |
| The American Commissioners and the French government | [285] |
| The cruise of the “Reprisal,” February, 1777 | [286] |
| The cruise of Conyngham in the “Surprise” | [287] |
| The cruise of the “Reprisal,” “Lexington,” and “Dolphin” | [287] |
| Strained relations between the Commissioners and the French Court | [289] |
| The cruise of Conyngham in the “Revenge” | [290] |
| Departure of the “Reprisal” and the “Lexington” | [291] |
| Naval movements in 1778 | [292] |
| The cruise of Captain Jones in the “Ranger” | [293] |
| The Naval Office at Paris, 1779-1780 | [294] |
| John Paul Jones and Peter Landais | [294] |
| Plan for an expedition against England | [295] |
| The cruise of Captain Jones in the “Bon Homme Richard” | [295] |
| Dispute between Jones and Landais | [298] |
| Their departure for America | [300] |
| The trials of Franklin | [300] |
| Work of the Naval Office, 1781-1783 | [301] |
| Thomas Barclay, consul and commissioner | [302] |
| John Paul Jones, agent for settling accounts | [303] |
| Naval stations in the West Indies | [305] |
| Duties and work of the commercial agent at Martinique | [305] |
| Naval affairs on the Mississippi | [307] |
| Oliver Pollock and Galvez | [307] |
| Pollock and privateers | [308] |
| Pollock and the “Rebecca” | [308] |
| The “West Florida” | [310] |
| THE STATE NAVIES | |
| Chapter XI.—The Navy of Massachusetts. | |
| The state craft | [315] |
| Naval administration in the states | [316] |
| The problems of naval warfare | [317] |
| Military situation in Massachusetts, 1775 | [318] |
| Action of the Provincial Congress | [318] |
| Massachusetts seaports ask for naval aid | [319] |
| Act establishing privateering and prize courts, November 1, 1775 | [320] |
| Subsequent naval activities of the General court, 1775 | [323] |
| The fitting out of a fleet, 1776 | [324] |
| Naval legislation, 1776 | [325] |
| Remodelling of the law of November 1, 1775 | [327] |
| Orders to naval officers—a sample | [328] |
| Establishment of a Board of War, October, 1776 | [329] |
| Duties of the Board of War | [330] |
| A new naval establishment | [333] |
| Naval rules and regulations | [334] |
| Naval increases, 1777-1779 | [335] |
| Launching of the “Protector” | [336] |
| Naval administration, 1779-1783 | [337] |
| Naval increases, 1780-1783 | [338] |
| Massachusetts privateers | [339] |
| The cruises of the state fleet | [341] |
| Coöperation of state vessels and privateers | [344] |
| The engagements of the state vessels—a sample | [345] |
| The Penobscot expedition | [347] |
| Losses of the state fleet | [352] |
| The end of the navy | [353] |
| Chapter XII.—The Navy of Connecticut. | |
| The Revolutionary government of Connecticut | [354] |
| Fitting out of the “Minerva” and the “Spy” | [355] |
| Failure and discharge of the “Minerva” | [357] |
| The “Defence” and the “Oliver Cromwell” | [358] |
| The building of three row-galleys | [360] |
| Naval duties of the Governor and the Council of Safety | [360] |
| Naval agents | [361] |
| New London and Nathaniel Shaw, jr. | [362] |
| Bushnell’s submarine boat | [363] |
| Privateers and prize courts | [364] |
| Naval pensions | [366] |
| Naval rules and regulations | [366] |
| A new naval establishment, 1779 | [366] |
| Cruises of the navy | [367] |
| Losses of the navy | [369] |
| Warfare of whale-boats on Long Island Sound | [370] |
| Chapter XIII.—The Navy of Pennsylvania. | |
| Objects of naval enterprise in Pennsylvania | [373] |
| The fleet of galleys | [373] |
| Rules and regulations | [375] |
| The “Montgomery” | [375] |
| Strength of the navy, August, 1776 | [376] |
| Naval uniforms and flag | [377] |
| Organs of naval administration | [377] |
| Commodores of the navy | [378] |
| Naval pay and the sharing of prizes | [380] |
| The Pennsylvania Navy Board | [381] |
| Work of the Navy Board | [382] |
| The navy in 1777 | [383] |
| Services rendered by the fleet | [383] |
| The campaign on the Delaware, 1777-1778 | [384] |
| Trials for desertion | [386] |
| The Navy Board, 1777-1778 | [387] |
| The fleet, April-July, 1778 | [388] |
| Sale of the fleet and dismissal of the Navy Board | [388] |
| The “General Greene,” 1779 | [390] |
| Naval legislation | [391] |
| Privateers | [392] |
| Commissioners for the defence of the Delaware | [393] |
| The “Hyder Ally” and “Washington” | [394] |
| The end of the navy | [395] |
| Chapter XIV.—The Navy of Virginia. | |
| Lord Dunmore’s movements in Virginia, 1775 | [396] |
| Authorization of a navy, December, 1775 | [396] |
| Work of the Committee of Safety | [397] |
| The “Potomac River fleet” | [398] |
| The Virginia Navy Board | [398] |
| Duties of the Navy Board | [399] |
| The location of shipyards | [400] |
| Naval manufactories and magazines | [401] |
| James Maxwell, naval agent | [401] |
| Naval officers | [401] |
| Naval increases, 1776 | [402] |
| Courts of Admiralty | [403] |
| Privateers | [405] |
| The vessels of the Virginia navy | [405] |
| Condition and services of the navy, 1775-1779 | [407] |
| Losses of the navy, 1775-1779 | [408] |
| The Board of War and the Naval Commissioner | [408] |
| The Commissioner of the Navy | [409] |
| Military situation in the South in 1780 | [410] |
| Naval legislation, 1780 | [411] |
| The raid of Arnold and Phillips, 1781 | [413] |
| The navy at Yorktown | [415] |
| Dismissal of the officers, seamen, and Commissioner | [415] |
| Virginia’s defence of Chesapeake Bay, 1782-1783 | [415] |
| The end of the navy | [416] |
| Chapter XV.—The Navy of South Carolina. | |
| First naval enterprises of South Carolina | [418] |
| Events of September, 1775 | [419] |
| The “Defence” | [420] |
| Work of the Provincial Congress, November, 1775 | [420] |
| Work of the Committee of Safety, December, 1775 | [421] |
| The mission of Cochran | [421] |
| Naval legislation, February-March, 1776 | [422] |
| The Constitution of 1776 | [423] |
| Naval legislation, April, 1776 | [423] |
| South Carolina Navy Board | [424] |
| Work and organization of the Navy Board | [424] |
| Naval legislation, 1777-1778 | [427] |
| Naval increases, 1776-1779 | [428] |
| Privateers | [429] |
| Services rendered by the South Carolina navy, 1776-1779 | [429] |
| The “Randolph” and the State fleet | [430] |
| The campaign against Charleston, 1779-1780 | [431] |
| The navy in 1781 and 1783 | [434] |
| Commodore Gillon and the “South Carolina” | [435] |
| Gillon in Europe | [436] |
| The “South Carolina” in European waters | [436] |
| The expedition against the Bahamas | [438] |
| The “South Carolina” at Philadelphia | [439] |
| Capture of the “South Carolina” | [439] |
| Settlement of the Luxembourg claims | [439] |
| Chapter XVI.—The Minor Navies of the Southern States. | |
| Organs of naval administration in Maryland | [441] |
| Work of the Maryland Provincial Convention, 1776 | [441] |
| Work of the Maryland Committee of Safety, 1776 | [441] |
| Maryland vessels | [442] |
| Recruiting of the navy | [443] |
| Naval officers | [443] |
| Court of Admiralty | [444] |
| Maryland privateers | [444] |
| Sale of naval vessels, 1779 | [444] |
| Naval conditions, 1779-1783 | [445] |
| Acts for the defence of the Chesapeake | [445] |
| Transporting of the Continental army | [446] |
| British depredations, 1782-1783 | [446] |
| Commissioners for the defence of the Bay | [447] |
| Services rendered by the Maryland navy | [448] |
| The Battle of the Barges | [449] |
| End of the Maryland navy | [451] |
| The navy of North Carolina, December, 1775-May, 1776 | [451] |
| The “Washington,” “Pennsylvania Farmer,” and “King Tammany” | [452] |
| The defence of Ocracoke Inlet | [454] |
| Services of the “Caswell” | [456] |
| North Carolina admiralty courts and privateers | [459] |
| Georgia’s first naval enterprise | [459] |
| Naval preparations | [460] |
| Georgia’s galleys | [460] |
| Georgia’s prize court | [462] |
| Chapter XVII.—The Minor Navies of the Northern States. | |
| British depredations in Rhode Island, 1775 | [463] |
| Naval operations | [463] |
| The “Katy” and “Washington” | [464] |
| The “Washington” and “Spitfire” galleys | [465] |
| Organs of naval administration | [466] |
| Prize court and privateers | [467] |
| An attempted naval increase, 1777 | [468] |
| Coöperation of Rhode Island with Congress, 1778-1779 | [468] |
| The “Pigot” and the “Argo” | [469] |
| The “Rover” | [470] |
| Naval preparations in New York | [471] |
| New York’s naval establishment | [472] |
| Washington and the New York vessels | [473] |
| Services of the New York fleet | [474] |
| Additional facts about naval affairs in New York | [475] |
| New Hampshire and the Penobscot expedition | [476] |
| New Hampshire privateers and prize court | [476] |
| Naval suggestions of New Jersey | [477] |
| APPENDICES | |
| A bibliography | [481] |
| A list of commissioned officers in the Continental Navy | [506] |
| A list of commissioned officers in the Continental Marine Corps | [512] |
| A list of armed vessels | [516] |
PART I
THE CONTINENTAL NAVY
CHAPTER I
THE NAVAL COMMITTEE
The history of the Continental navy covers a period of ten years, extending from 1775 to 1785. During this time the Continental Congress made many experiments in naval legislation and devised several organs of naval administration. The first of these organs, with whose origin and work this chapter is concerned, was the Naval Committee. It lasted for only a few months. Its lineal successors, each of which will be duly considered, were the Marine Committee, the Board of Admiralty, and the Agent of Marine. These four executive organs, for the most part, administered the Continental navy. Certain odds and ends of the naval business, however, fell to the commander-in-chief of the army and his officers, and to the American representatives in foreign countries. The second chapter will treat of the fleets of the army, and the closing chapters of the narrative of the Continental navy will consider the naval services of our representatives in foreign lands.
In maritime countries the military service is generally ambidextrous. Whether the army or navy is first brought into play at the opening of a war depends upon various circumstances. The presence of a British army at Boston, already on colonial soil, when the American Resolution broke out early in 1775, naturally led to the immediate organization of an army by the colonists. The need of a navy was at this time not quite so insistent. Moreover, the building, or even the purchase, of an armed fleet required more time than did the raising of an army, which was rendered comparatively easy by the previous training of the colonists in the local militia. Nevertheless, since both countries engaged in the war were maritime, the creating of a navy could not long be delayed.
The reader recollects that by the middle of 1775 the battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill had been fought, a Continental army had been organized, and Washington had been made commander-in-chief. Outside of Congress the agitation in behalf of a Continental navy had begun. That the first suggestions and advances for a navy should come from New England, where the concrete problems of the defence of her ports and coasts were being faced, was to be expected. One of the first men to make such suggestions was Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts. On July 11, 1775, he wrote to John Adams in Philadelphia that the best method of securing the coastwise navigation of the colonies was by row-galleys. He then continued: “As the whole Continent is so firmly united, why not a Number of Vessels of War be fitted out and judiciously stationed, so as to intercept and prevent any supplies going to our Enemies; and consequently, unless they can make an Impression inland, they must leave the Country or starve.”[1] The first formal movement in behalf of a Continental navy came from Rhode Island, which state was during the summer of 1775 suffering serious annoyances from the British ships. On August 26 her legislature instructed the Rhode Island delegates to the Continental Congress to use their influence at the ensuing session of Congress to obtain a fleet for the protection of the colonies.[2] On September 2, 1775, Washington, in order to prevent reinforcements from reaching the enemy at Boston, instructed Nicholson Broughton to proceed in the schooner “Hannah” on a cruise against the British transports.[3]
That the question of providing a Continental navy would come up during the fall session of Congress was certain. The arguments in its behalf, which were made almost unanimously later in the session, must have been on the lips of several of the members when they assembled in Philadelphia in September: an army had been organized, why not a navy? The situation of the combatants, separated by the great Atlantic highway; and their character, one a great naval and commercial power, and the other with maritime interests by no means inconsiderable, would necessarily make the impending struggle in no small part a naval one. America had seacoasts and seaports to be defended, a coastwise navigation to be secured, and above all commercial and diplomatic communications with foreign powers to be kept open. These communications were a jugular vein, whose severing would mean death to the United Colonies. The urgent and specific calls for armed vessels, which were being made, must be met at once. Had not America conveniently at hand materials for ships, and abundant men who had the “habit of the sea”?
In the early months of the session there certainly would arise opposition to the new military project. The inertia and conservatism of some of the members would set them against so great an innovation. To others the fitting out of a fleet, at a time when the length, seriousness, and meaning of the war with the motherland were but half unveiled, would seem an unwise and hasty action.
The question of procuring a fleet of armed vessels was first brought to the attention of Congress on October 3, 1775, when the Rhode Island members presented their instructions, an account of which will be given in a succeeding chapter.[4] It is sufficient for present purposes to say that until December the Rhode Island instructions had little other result beyond crystallizing and clarifying opinion on naval affairs by means of the debates which they caused in Congress.
On October 5 sundry letters from London were laid before the Congress and read. They conveyed the intelligence of “the sailing of two north country built brigs, of no force, from England, on the 11th of August last, loaded with arms, powder, and other stores, for Quebec, without convoy.” Congress at once saw the importance of capturing these two vessels, in order both to deprive the British of these stores and to obtain them for the Continental army around Boston, which sorely needed all the munitions of war it could get. A motion was therefore made that a committee of three be appointed to prepare a plan for intercepting the two brigs, and that it “proceed on this business immediately.”[5] John Adams in his autobiography says that the opposition to this motion was “very loud and vehement,” and included some of his own colleagues, and also especially Edward Rutledge of South Carolina. It seems to have been recognized that the carrying of the motion would be the initial step in the establishment of a Continental navy. Such an undertaking its opponents declared, with a greater display of rhetoric than judgment, was the “most wild, visionary, mad project that ever had been imagined. It was an infant taking a mad bull by his horns; and what was more profound and remote, it was said it would ruin the character and corrupt the morals of all our seamen. It would make them selfish, piratical, mercenary, bent wholly upon plunder, etc., etc.” The friends of the motion, in colors equally glowing, set forth “the great advantages of distressing the enemy, supplying ourselves, and beginning a system of maritime and naval operations.” On the taking of the vote the motion passed in the affirmative; and according to John Adams’s recollection, he, John Langdon of New Hampshire, and Silas Deane of Connecticut, “three members who had expressed much zeal in favor of the motion,” composed the committee.[6]
A little later on the same day this committee reported; and thereupon Congress decided to write a letter to Washington directing him to obtain from the Council of Massachusetts two of that state’s cruisers, and to despatch them on the errand of intercepting the two supply ships. It also directed that letters be written to the governors of Connecticut and Rhode Island asking for the loan of some of their armed vessels, which were to be sent on the same mission. “The committee appointed to prepare a plan for intercepting the two vessels bound to Canada” made another report on the 6th, which was ordered to lie on the table “for the perusal of the members.”[7] This report was acted upon on October 13, when Congress decided to fit out two armed vessels, one of ten and the other of fourteen guns, to cruise three months to the eastward for the purpose of intercepting the enemy’s transports laden with warlike stores and other supplies. A committee consisting of Silas Deane, John Langdon, and Christopher Gadsden of South Carolina was appointed to estimate the expense which would be incurred in fitting out the two vessels.[8]
In four days this new committee reported an estimate, which was unsatisfactory and was recommitted.[9] When it again reported on October 30, two more vessels, one to mount not more than twenty and the other not more than thirty-six guns, were ordered to be prepared for sea, and “to be employed in such manner, for the protection and defence of the United Colonies, as the Congress shall direct.” It should be noted that the two vessels for which provision was now made were to engage in the defence of the colonies, and not merely in the interception of transports, an indication of an advance in the naval policy of Congress. Four additional members were now added to the committee, Stephen Hopkins of Rhode Island, Joseph Hewes of North Carolina, R. H. Lee of Virginia, and John Adams of Massachusetts.[10] This reconstituted committee composed of seven members was sometimes called “the committee for fitting out armed vessels,” occasionally the “Marine Committee,” but most frequently the “Naval Committee.” It secured for its use a room in a public house in Philadelphia, and in order that there should be no conflict between its meetings and those of Congress, it fixed its hours from six in the evening until the close of its business. Its sessions were sometimes pleasantly continued, even until midnight, by conversational diversions, marked by a rich flow of soul, history, poetry, wine, and Jamaica rum.
John Adams, who always wrote pungently, has left us a lively picture of the Naval Committee. His description makes it clear that the deliberations of this committee were not always marked by that exalted seriousness and impassive dignity, which we too habitually ascribe to the Revolutionary Fathers. “The pleasantest part of my labors for the four years I spent in Congress from 1774 to 1778,” he said, “was in this Naval Committee. Mr. Lee, Mr. Gadsden, were sensible men, and very cheerful, but Governor Hopkins of Rhode Island, above seventy years of age, kept us all alive. Upon business, his experience and judgment were very useful. But when the business of the evening was over, he kept us in conversation till eleven, and sometimes twelve o’clock. His custom was to drink nothing all day, nor till eight o’clock in the evening, and then his beverage was Jamaica spirit and water. It gave him wit, humor, anecdotes, science, and learning. He had read Greek, Roman, and British history, and was familiar with English poetry, particularly Pope, Thomson, and Milton, and the flow of his soul made all of his reading our own, and seemed to bring to recollection in all of us, all we had ever read. I could neither eat nor drink in these days. The other gentlemen were very temperate. Hopkins never drank to excess, but all he drank was immediately not only converted into wit, sense, knowledge, and good humor, but inspired us with similar qualities.”[11]
The active life of the Naval Committee lasted from October, 1775, until January, 1776, during which time it laid the foundations of the navy. Its chairman in January, 1776, was Stephen Hopkins; whether he was the first to fill this position is not known. His knowledge of the business of shipping made him particularly useful to the Committee.[12] The accounts of the Naval Committee were kept by Joseph Hewes, who was settling them with the Board of Treasury in September, 1776.[13] Early in December, 1775, John Adams returned home, and by January only four members of the Committee were left to transact its business.
In October Congress ordered the fitting out of four vessels, and appointed the Naval Committee, but did nothing more. By the first of November the sentiment of Congress was setting strongly towards organizing a navy. In its debates on the State of Trade during the latter half of October the necessity of having a navy in order both to defend the colonial commerce and to carry on the war was generally recognized.[14] The members from the South were as a rule now lining up with those of the North in behalf of a naval armament. Events had happened and were daily happening in New England which were convincing the doubtful members of Congress. As a military necessity for conducting the siege of Boston, and with no intention whatever to create a navy, as such, Washington had obtained seven small cruisers, and either had sent or was sending them to sea in pursuit of the enemy’s transports. The logic of events had forced him, on his own responsibility, to create a little fleet of his own.[15]
With the passage of each day, the gap between the mother-country and her revolting subjects widened, and the feeling became stronger and more general that an irrepressible war, which must be fought to a just conclusion, had begun. What in October seemed chimerical, might in November appear practicable.
Beginning with November the naval legislation of Congress moved rapidly. The duty of preparing much of it naturally fell to the Naval Committee. Its work in large part may be found in the Journals of the Continental Congress for November and December, 1775, and January, 1776. A brief summary of the most important Congressional resolutions for this period will be here presented.
On November 2, 1775, Congress voted $100,000 for the work of the Naval Committee, and empowered it “to agree with such officers and seamen as are proper to man and command” the four vessels already ordered to be prepared for sea. Congress also fixed the “encouragement” of the officers and seamen at “one-half of all ships of war made prize of by them, and one-third of all transport vessels.”[16]
On November 10 the first legislation relating to the Marine Corps of the United States was passed. Two battalions, which were to be called “the first and second battalions of American Marines,” were to be raised, consisting of one colonel, two lieutenant-colonels, two majors, and “other officers as usual in other regiments.” There is some doubt whether Congress fully understood the duties of marines, for it provided that “no persons be appointed to office, or inlisted into said Battalions, but such as are good seamen, or so acquainted with maritime affairs as to be able to serve to advantage by sea when required.”[17] Such a requirement seems to overlook the fact that the duties of marines are military in character, rather than naval.
The Naval Committee made what probably was its most important report on November 23, when it laid before Congress “a draught of rules for the government of the American navy, and articles to be signed by the officers and men employed in that service.” On the 25th and 28th of November, these were debated by paragraphs and after slight amendment were adopted.[18] The rules, eight or ten pages in length, are brevity itself as compared with the present rules and regulations of the United States navy, which make a book of some six hundred pages. More than one-half of the navy’s first rules are concerned with the feeding, care, rights, duties, and punishments of the ordinary sailor; while the present rules of the American navy in large part apply to officers.
A few of the provisions of these old rules are worthy of notice. The commanders of ships of the thirteen united colonies were “to take care that divine service be performed twice a day on board, and a sermon preached on Sundays, unless bad weather or other extraordinary accidents prevent.” Sailors were to be punished for swearing by the wearing of a wooden collar, “or some other shameful badge of distinction.” Sailors were to be put in irons for drunkenness; while officers guilty of the same offense forfeited two days’ pay. The extreme punishment which an officer might inflict on a seaman was “twelve lashes upon his bare back, with a cat of nine tails.” In case a sailor deserved greater punishment, he must be tried by a court-martial, which should consist of “at least three captains and three first lieutenants, with three captains and three first lieutenants of marines, if there shall be so many of the marines then present, and the eldest captain shall preside.” A penal code was established. A court-martial might inflict death for desertion, mutiny, or murder.
Rations for the sailors were fixed by these old rules for each day of the week. Saturday’s bill of fare, which consisted of “1 lb. bread, 1 lb. pork, half pint peas, and four ounces cheese,” may be taken as a sample one. Each seaman was given a half-pint of rum a day, with a “discretionary allowance on extra duty, and in time of engagement.” The following provision, for keeping the eatables sweet and palatable, is noted: “The captain is frequently to order the proper officers to inspect the condition of the provisions, and if the bread proves damp, to have it aired upon the quarter deck or poop, and also examine the flesh cask, and if any of the pickle be leaked out, to have new made and put in, and the cask made tight and secure.”
The following naval offices were established; the first two only were commissioned: captain, lieutenant, master, master’s mate, boatswain, boatswain’s first mate, boatswain’s second mate, gunner, gunner’s mate, surgeon, surgeon’s mate, carpenter, carpenter’s mate, cooper, captain’s clerk, steward, and chaplain. Five marine offices were established; the highest was that of captain. A pay-table was provided, according to which the monthly wage ranged form $32 for captains, to $6.67 for able seamen and marines. According to the form of a contract of enlistment which accompanied the rules, a bounty of $400 was to be deducted from the proceeds of prizes and to be paid to the commander, in all cases where he lost a limb in the engagement, or was incapacitated from earning a livelihood; if the commander was killed, an equal sum was to be paid to his widow. Minor officers under the same circumstances received proportionately smaller sums. The man who first discovered a vessel that was afterwards captured was rewarded with a double share of prize money; he who first boarded a prize was entitled to a treble share. Ten shares of every prize were set aside “to be given to such inferior officers, seamen and marines, as shall be adjudged best to deserve them by the superior officers.”
These rules, which were in force throughout the Revolution, and which were readopted for the government of the new navy under the Constitution,[19] were drawn up by John Adams, and “examined, discussed, and corrected” by the Naval Committee. They are an abridgment and adaptation of parts of the British naval statutes and regulations in force in 1775. That part of Adams’s rules which constitutes the penal code of the navy, he obtained from the Naval Discipline Act passed by the British Parliament in 1749.[20] In adapting the British code, however, he made it less stringent. The British also found it advisable in 1779 to lessen the severity of their code. The rest of Adams’s rules are, with verbal changes and omissions, chiefly taken from the King’s Regulations and Admiralty Instructions of 1772. An extract from the King’s regulations followed by the corresponding one from Adams’s rules will illustrate the closeness of the parallelism: “No Commander shall inflict any punishment upon a Seaman, beyond Twelve Lashes upon his bare Back with a Cat of Nine Tails, according to the ancient Practice of the Sea.”[21] “No commander shall inflict any punishment upon a seaman beyond twelve lashes upon his bare back, with a cat of nine tails.” An additional example of the influence of the British upon the American navy is found in the fact that the naval offices as given above were already established in the navy of the Stuarts, indeed, many of them in the navy of Elizabeth. The Americans were still British at the time of the Revolution, and they intuitively went home, so to speak, for the naval models with which they were familiar.
On November 25, 1775, Congress enacted some very important naval legislation, which in John Adams’s opinion was “the true origin and foundation of the American navy,” and in producing which he “had at least as great a share ... as any man living.”[22] The occasion of this legislation was certain recommendations of Washington. On October 5 he requested the “determination of Congress, as to the property and disposal of such vessels and cargoes, as are designed for the supply of the enemy, and may fall into our hands.” On November 8 he pointed out the necessity of establishing proper admiralty courts. On November 11 he recommended to Congress the establishment of an admiralty court for the trial of prize cases arising from Continental captures.[23] A report of a committee of seven members, which had been appointed on the 17th to take Washington’s request of November 8 into consideration, was, on the 23rd, laid on the table “for the perusal of the members,” and was debated and agreed to by paragraphs on the 24th and 25th.[24] Congress now took the decisive step of authorizing the capture of all British vessels employed against the United Colonies, either as armed vessels of war, transports, or supply ships. Provision for privateering was made in part. It was recommended to the legislatures of the several colonies to establish courts for the trial of prize cases. In all cases appeals to Congress were to be allowed, when made in accordance with certain prescribed rules. Prosecutions in prize cases must commence in the court of that colony in which the capture was made, but if the capture took place on the open sea the captor had the privilege of selecting the most convenient court. Congress fixed the shares of the proceeds of prizes. In the case of privateers the whole of the proceeds of captures went to the captors. In the case of vessels fitted out by a colony, or by Congress, two-thirds were to go in the first instance to the colony, and in the second, to Congress; and one-third was to go to the captors: provided that, if the prize should be a vessel of war, the captor’s share should be increased to one-half, and the government’s share correspondingly decreased.
On December 2, 1775, Congress authorized the Naval Committee to employ two additional vessels, and also to “prepare a proper commission for the captains or commanders of the ships of war in the service of the United Colonies.”[25] On the report of the committee on recaptures, Congress on December 5 fixed the compensation of recaptors, which varied from one-eighth to the whole of the value of the vessel and cargo, depending on the time which elapsed between the capture and recapture.[26] On December 9 the following new naval offices were established: midshipman, armorer, sailmaker, yeoman, quarter-master, quarter-gunner, cook, and coxswain.[27] On December 13 the wages of able-bodied seamen were raised to $8 a month; and on the 22nd the salary of the commander-in-chief of the navy was fixed at $125 a month.[28]
In accordance with the direction of Congress, the Naval Committee, on January 6, 1776, reported on the division of the captor’s share of prizes, among officers, seamen, and marines; whereupon, Congress divided the captor’s share into twenty parts, and allotted them equitably between the officers and men. The commander-in-chief received one-twentieth, and the captains of the fleet making the capture, two-twentieths. After the officers had been provided for, the remaining eight and one-half parts were allotted to the seamen, “share and share alike.”[29]
Meanwhile, the Naval Committee had been busy purchasing, fitting for sea, and officering a fleet. About the first of November John Adams was writing from Philadelphia to James Warren in Massachusetts, inquiring whether naval vessels might be purchased or built in Massachusetts, and whether suitable officers could be procured there; and also at the same time to Samuel Chase in Baltimore, in regard to the purchase of certain vessels in that city.[30] On November 17 the Committee ordered Silas Deane to go to New York and to purchase a 20-gun ship and a 10-gun Bermudan-built sloop.[31] Under the authorizations of Congress of October 13 and October 30, the Naval Committee purchased four vessels, the “Alfred,” “Columbus,” “Cabot,” and “Andrew Doria;” named, respectively, for the founder of the English navy, the discoverer of America, the first English explorer of America, and the great Genoese Admiral.[32] The first vessel to be bought was the “Alfred,” a ship of two hundred tons burden. The “Alfred” was originally the “Black Prince,” and belonged to John Nixon, the well-known Philadelphia merchant of Revolutionary times.[33]
On November 5 the Naval Committee appointed Esek Hopkins, of Rhode Island, commander-in-chief of the fleet.[34] The Committee may have created this office as analogous to Washington’s position in the army. It is more probable that the office was borrowed from the British navy, in which the commander-in-chief was the chief admiral of a port or station, who held command over all other admirals within his jurisdiction.[35] The first and only commander-in-chief of the American navy was at the time of his appointment fifty-seven years of age. He was a member of an influential Rhode Island family, and a brother of Stephen Hopkins, of the Naval Committee. About 1745 Esek Hopkins was a sea captain and merchant adventurer. In the French and Indian War he had commanded a privateer.[36] At the breaking out of the Revolution he received the appointment of captain and then of brigadier-general in the Rhode Island forces. Deliberate in action and irascible in temper, Hopkins was at the same time industrious, steadfast, and veracious. The following description was written by Henry Knox to his wife, probably in April, 1776: “I have been on board Admiral Hopkins’ ship, and in company with his gallant son, who was wounded in the engagement with the ‘Glasgow.’ The admiral is an antiquated figure. He brought to my mind Van Tromp, the famous Dutch admiral. Though antiquated in figure, he is shrewd and sensible. I, whom you think not a little enthusiastic, should have taken him for an angel, only he swore now and then.”[37] The choice of Hopkins as head of the navy was, at the time, as promising as could have been made.
On December 7, 1775, a commission was given to John Paul Jones, an energetic and capable young man, twenty-eight years old, whose brilliant career was still unforeseen.[38] On December 22 the Naval Committee laid before Congress a “list of the officers by them appointed.”[39] It included, besides Hopkins and Jones, the names of four captains, four first-lieutenants, five second-lieutenants, and three third-lieutenants. The little roll of captains was headed by Dudley Saltonstall, who owed his appointment to his brother-in-law, Silas Deane, a member of the Committee; and was ended by John Burroughs Hopkins, a son of the commander-in-chief. Immediately above J. B. Hopkins in rank was Nicholas Biddle, a young Philadelphian, twenty-five years old, and very promising material for a naval officer. He had entered the British navy in 1770, and had served as midshipman on board the same vessel with Lord Nelson. In the summer of 1775 he was appointed commander of the “Franklin” galley of the Pennsylvania navy. The fourth captain was Abraham Whipple, the commodore of the Rhode Island navy.
In these first appointments of the Committee it takes no eagle eye to discern the workings of nepotism and sectional influences. Of the five largest naval plums, New England plucked four. This may have been, however, right enough, as the South was credited with the commander-in-chief of the army, and New England greatly exceeded the Middle and Southern states in the number of men who were experienced in maritime affairs.
In December, 1775, the Naval Committee was preparing a fleet for sea, which was to make the first naval essay of the new government. The Pennsylvania Committee of Safety was contributing arms, ammunition, and sailors. Commodore Hopkins enlisted for the service of his fleet more than one hundred seamen in Rhode Island, whom Whipple brought to Philadelphia in the “Katy.” On December 3, 1775, John Paul Jones hoisted the Continental flag on board the “Alfred,” Hopkins’s flagship, the first Continental vessel to fly the colors of the new nation.[40] By the end of January, 1776, the Committee had added four other small vessels to the navy, the sloops “Providence,” and “Hornet,” and the schooners, “Wasp,” and “Fly.”[41] The “Providence” had been the “Katy” of the Rhode Island navy. The “Hornet” and the “Wasp” were obtained in Baltimore.
On January 5, 1776, the Naval Committee issued sailing orders to the commander-in-chief. He was ordered, “if Winds and Weather possibly admit of it, to proceed directly for Chesapeake Bay in Virginia.” Here he was to strike the enemy’s fleet under Lord Dunmore, unless it was found to be greatly superior to his own. If he was so fortunate as to execute this business successfully, he was to continue southward and master the British forces off the coast of the Carolinas, and from thence he was to sail northward directly to Rhode Island and “attack, take, and destroy all the enemy’s naval force that you may find there.”[42] This program seems rather ambitious, when one considers the motley assemblage of officers, seamen, and cruisers, that composed this fleet of made-over merchantmen.
The ice in the Delaware greatly delayed the expedition. Early in February, 1776, the fleet was assembling at Cape Henlopen. It then consisted of the flagship “Alfred,” 24, Captain Dudley Saltonstall; the ship “Columbus,” 20, Captain Abraham Whipple; the brigs “Andrew Doria,” 14, Captain Nicholas Biddle, and “Cabot,” 14, Captain J. B. Hopkins; the sloop “Providence,” 12; and the schooner “Fly,” 8. On February 15 the sloop “Hornet,” 10, and the schooner “Wasp,” 8, joined the fleet from Baltimore.[43] On the 17th the fleet sailed outside the Capes into the broad Atlantic. A new nation in whose veins flowed the blood of a long line of seafaring and sea-fighting ancestors was about to put to the initial test its skill in naval warfare, and under conditions far from auspicious. If the doughty Admiral should get all his queer craft once more into a safe harbor he would be doing well.
Hopkins had apparently concluded that his Armada might prove vincible on the stormy coasts of Virginia. Indeed, the enemy must have heard of his intended coming, and awaited it. Not only discretion, but good military judgment advised him to abandon for the present the visitation to the Chesapeake.[44] Before sailing on February 17 he had determined to make a descent on Nassau, New Providence, and accordingly he gave orders to his captains and commanders to keep in company, if possible, but if not, to make for the island of Abaco, one of the Bahamas, where the fleet would next rendezvous.[45]
On the 3rd and 4th of March Nassau was taken after a slight resistance and without bloodshed, by a landing party consisting of two hundred marines under one of their officers, Captain Samuel Nichols, and fifty sailors under Lieutenant Weaver of the “Cabot.” Eighty-eight cannon, fifteen mortars, a large quantity of shot and shell besides other munitions of war were captured. Since the governor of the island succeeded the night before the landing was effected in removing the gunpowder to a safe hiding place, the expedition failed of its chief object.[46]
On March 17, having loaded his vessels and a borrowed sloop with the warlike stores, Hopkins set sail for Rhode Island, taking with him as prisoners of war several important officials, including the Governor and Lieutenant-Governor of New Providence. On April 4 the squadron, having reached the eastward end of Long Island, captured the British schooner “Hawk,” 6, and the bomb brig “Bolton,” 8. At 1 o’clock on the morning of the 6th the “Alfred,” “Cabot,” “Columbus,” “Andrew Doria,” and “Providence” engaged His Majesty’s ship “Glasgow,” 20, Captain Tyringham Howe. After a severe fight of about three hours, the “Glasgow,” was permitted to escape, leaving her tender with the Americans.[47] The loss of the enemy was four; that of the Americans, twenty-four, of which number twenty-three were on board the “Alfred” and “Cabot,” the two vessels which bore the brunt of the encounter.[48] Each of these vessels had a lieutenant killed.
The American commanders in this engagement exhibited little skill in tactics. A fleet permitted a single vessel of the enemy to escape. Something can be said for them by way of extenuating circumstances. It should also be said that they showed no lack of spirit. As was natural, Commodore Hopkins was made the target for much adverse criticism. Nations, it is said, are seldom just under disgrace, imaginary or real.
The expedition to New Providence was the sole naval enterprise made by the Continental vessels, while they were under the direction of the Naval Committee. Early in 1776 this Committee, reduced in membership, yielded its control of marine affairs to a new committee with a fuller complement of members. It scarcely needs to be said that the Naval Committee’s claim to distinction rests not upon its military achievements, but upon its work of a civil character, whereby it laid the foundations of the Revolutionary navy. It acquired the first American fleet, selected its officers, and fitted it for sea. It drafted the first civil and penal code of the navy, and prepared not a little fundamental naval legislation.