The Navy of the American Revolution

by Charles Oscar Paullin

FOOTNOTES:

[88] See Chapter XVII, The Minor Navies of the Northern States.

[89] Force, American Archives, 4th, III, 231; Sparks, American Biography, 2nd, IX, 314-15.

[90] Journals of Continental Congress, October 3, 1775; Force, American Archives 4th, III, 1888-91; Works of John Adams, II, 462.

[91] Works of John Adams, II, 463-4.

[92] Journals of Continental Congress, October 16, November 16, 1775.

[93] Gammell, Life of Samuel Ward, in Sparks’s American Biography, 2nd, IX, 316.

[94] Journals of Continental Congress, December 9, 1775.

[95] Ibid., December 11, 1775.

[96] Ibid., December 13, 1775.

[97] Journals of Continental Congress, December 14, 1775.

[98] Journals of Continental Congress. January 25, September 19, 1776. See Ford’s new edition of the Journals.

[99] The Secretary of the Marine Committee was John Brown.

[100] Journals of Continental Congress, June 6, 1777.

[101] Ibid., June 16, 1778.

[102] Ibid., January 27, 1780.

[103] Journals of Continental Congress, December 27, 1777.

[104] Lee, however, signed a letter as chairman in March, 1779. Relative to Samuel Adams’s work in the Marine Committee, these words of his biographer possess interest: “Upon his arrival in Congress [May 21, 1778], he was added to the Marine Committee, of which important Board he was made chairman, and continued to direct its duties, for the next two years. In this arduous position, judged from the great number of reports and the multiplicity of business submitted to it, Adams might fairly have claimed exemption from all other employments.”—Wells, Life and Public Services of Samuel Adams, III, 13. Mr. Wells exaggerates the length of the naval services of Adams, who left Philadelphia about June 20, 1779; whereupon William Whipple succeeded him as chairman of the Marine Committee.

[105] New Hampshire Gazette, June 1, 1776.

[106] Probably put upon the stocks at Salisbury and completed at Newburyport.

[107] Edward Field, State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, II, 423.

[108] Staples, Annals of Providence, 267-8; Marine Committee Letter Book, Marine Committee to Stephen Hopkins, and Marine Committee to Committee for Building the Continental Frigates at Providence, October 9, 1776.

[109] Colonial Records of Connecticut, XV, 526.

[110] Records of State of Connecticut, I, 177.

[111] Force, American Archives, 5th, II, 350, 636, 989; III, 827.

[112] Marine Committee Letter Book, Marine Committee to David Stodder, master-builder, April 11, 1778.

[113] Journals of Continental Congress, April 23, 1776.

[114] Ibid., June 25, 1776.

[115] Force, American Archives, 5th, III, 671, 739-40. The first prize agents to be appointed, many of whom held their offices throughout the greater part of the Revolution, were as follows: John Langdon, Portsmouth; John Bradford, Boston; Daniel Tillinghast, Providence; Nathaniel Shaw, jr., New London; Jacobus Vanzant, New York; John Nixon and John Maxwell Nesbit, Philadelphia; William Lux, Baltimore; John Tazewell, Williamsburg; Robert Smith, Edenton; Richard Ellis, Newbern; Cornelius Harnet, Wilmington; Livinus Clarkson and John Dorsius, Charleston; John Wereat, Savannah; and Okey Hoaglandt, New Jersey.

[116] Journals of Continental Congress, September 1, 1779.

[117] Force, American Archives, 5th, II, 1113-14.

[118] Journals of Continental Congress, October 28, November 6, 1776.

[119] Journals of Continental Congress, April 19, 1777.

[120] On May 6, 1777, John Adams wrote to James Warren notifying him of his appointment. He added a few words explaining the character of the position: “You will have the building and fitting of all ships, the appointment of officers, the establishment of arsenals and magazines, which will take up your whole time; but it will be honorable to be so capitally concerned in laying a foundation of a great navy. The profit to you will be nothing; but the honor and the virtue the greater. I almost envy you this employment.”—Works of John Adams, IX, 465. On May 9, the Rhode Island member of the Marine Committee notified William Vernon of his appointment.—Publications of the Rhode Island Historical Society, VIII, 206. See also Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 7th, II, 45.

[121] New England Historical and Genealogical Register, XXX, 316-18.

[122] When the Navy Board at Philadelphia was being established and its commissioners appointed, William Ellery wrote to William Vernon as follows: “I should be glad to know what is the Office of Commissioners of the Navy, and that you would point it out particularly; unless you can refer me to some Author who particularly describes. The Conduct of the Affairs of a Navy as well as those of an Army, We are yet to learn. We are still unacquainted with the systematical management of them, although We have made considerable Progress in the latter. It is the Duty of every Friend to his Country to throw his Knowledge into the common Stock. I know you are well skilled in Commerce and I believe you are acquainted with the System of the British Navy, and I am sure of your Disposition to do every Service to the Cause of Liberty in your Power.”—Publications of Rhode Island Historical Society, VIII, 201, Papers of William Vernon and the Navy Board.

[123] Journals of Continental Congress, October 23, 1777.

[124] Ibid., May 9, 1778.

[125] Ibid., August 19, 1778.

[126] Ibid., September 28, 1778.

[127] Ibid., November 4, 1778.

[128] Marine Committee Letter Book, Marine Committee to Navy Board of Middle Department, January 22, 1778. The Philadelphia Board was ordered on January 22 to remove to Baltimore, but it appears that it did not go until April.

[129] For salaries of the Commissioners of the Navy and their employees, see Journals of Continental Congress, November 7, 1776; April 19, 1777; October 23, 1777; October 10, 1778; October 31, 1778; November 12, 1779; January 28, 1780; and September 25, 1780.

[130] Miscellaneous Manuscripts, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress.

CHAPTER IV
THE WORK OF THE NAVY BOARDS AND THE MARINE COMMITTEE

There was a painful lack of system about the business methods of the Naval Department of the Revolution. Then, official routine was not settled as at present. Usage had had no opportunity to establish fixed and orderly forms of procedure; and amid the distractions of war, when some real or supposed emergency was continually inviting one authority or another to disregard regularity and order, usage could obtain but scant permission to begin its work. Wars are famous for breaking through, not for forming a crust of official precedent. The administrative machinery of armies and navies tends to adapt itself to the conditions of peace—now the normal state of nations. During long periods of partial stagnation this machinery becomes complicated; its tension is weakened; and many of its axles grow rusty from disuse. When war breaks out, the conditions of administration are greatly changed. A thousand extra calls for work to be done at once are loud and inexorable. Expedition must be had at all hazards and costs. Rapid action of the administrative machinery must be obtained, its tension screwed down, extra cog wheels discarded, and efficient machinists substituted for the dotards of peace. It is obvious that with this sort of difficulty those who managed the naval affairs during the Revolution did not have to contend, for the organ of naval administration was then created from its foundation. Their difficulties sprang not from the age, but from the newness of this organ. It lacked a nice correlation of parts, the smooth action that comes from long service, and the system that immemorial routine establishes.

The absence of system in the Naval Department was most conspicuous in the appointment of naval officers, from the captain to the coxswain. This work was shared by Congress, the Marine Committee, the Navy Boards, the Continental agents, the Commander-in-chief of the navy, the commanders of vessels, recruiting agents, the Commissioners at Paris, and the commercial agents residing in foreign countries. Appointments were sometimes actually determined by the governors of states, “conspicuous citizens,” and local governmental bodies. A good illustration of the way in which convenience was sometimes consulted is found in the resolution of Congress of June 14, 1777, which designated William Whipple, the New Hampshire member of the Marine Committee, John Langdon, Continental agent at Portsmouth, and John Paul Jones, the commander of the ship “Ranger,” to select the commissioned and warrant officers of the “Ranger,” then at Portsmouth.[131] In a new navy without esprit de corps, to permit a commander to have a voice in choosing his own officers often made for proper subordination.

It was a source of annoyance and confusion to the Navy Boards to find through accidental sources of information, as they sometimes did, that the Marine Committee had given orders to naval agents to transact business, the immediate control of which was vested in the Boards. Naval agents sometimes discovered that they were serving in a single task two or three naval masters. Irregularities were chargeable not alone to the Naval Department. The governor of a state was known on his own authority, to the vexation of the rightful executive, to take part in the direction of the cruises of Continental vessels. Naval commanders were now and then guilty of breaches of their orders. Congress had its share in the confusing of business. On one occasion, making a display of its ignorance, it suspended Captain John Roach from a command to which he had not been appointed; Roach in fact was not an officer in the Continental navy.[132] It sometimes made impracticable details of the armed vessels. It also exercised its privilege of referring to special committees bits of business that logically belonged to the Marine Committee.

These irregularities, notwithstanding their number, were after all exceptions. The very nature of business forces it to follow some system, however imperfectly. Where there is a number of agents there must be a division of labor. Without such arrangements chaos would exist. It is therefore possible to set forth with some detail the respective duties of the Marine Committee, the Navy Boards, and the various naval agents. The work and duties of the naval agents have already been treated with sufficient particularity. The work of the Navy Boards and the Marine Committee will be considered in this chapter.

The duties of the Navy Boards were of a varied character. Each Board superintended the building, manning, fitting, provisioning, and repairing of the armed vessels in its district. It kept a register of the vessels which it built, showing the name, dimensions, burden, number of guns, tackle, apparel, and furniture of each vessel. Each Board had records of all the officers, sailors, and marines in its district, and required the commanders to make returns of these items upon the termination of their cruises. It was the duty of the Boards to notify the Marine Committee of the arrivals and departures of the Continental vessels. They were required to settle the naval accounts and “to keep fair Books of all expenditures of Publick Moneys.” The records of their transactions were to be open to the inspection of Congress and the Marine Committee. They rendered to the Committee annually, or oftener when required, an account of their disbursements. The Boards paid the salaries of officers and seamen, and audited the accounts of the prize agents.[133]

In the appointment of officers the Navy Board at Boston was given a freer rein than was its colleague at Philadelphia. The share of the Navy Boards in selecting officers and in enlisting seamen was about as follows. The Boards superintended the appointing of petty officers and the enlisting of seamen, both of which duties were chiefly performed by the commanders of vessels and by recruiting agents. The Boards generally selected the warrant officers, very frequently on the recommendation of the commanders. If the one appointment to the office of Commander-in-chief be disregarded, there existed but two classes of commissioned officers in the Revolutionary navy, captains and lieutenants. The Boards often chose the lieutenants; and they generally recommended the captains to the Marine Committee. The Committee furnished the Boards with blank warrants and commissions, signed by the President of Congress. When one of these forms was properly filled out by a navy board for an officer, the validity of his title to his position and rank could not be questioned.

The Boards were empowered under certain circumstances, and in accordance with the rules and regulations of the navy and the resolutions of Congress, to order the holding of courts of enquiry and courts-martial. They could administer oaths to the judges and officials of these courts. A Board might suspend an officer of the navy who treated it with “indecency and disrespect.”[134] On October 23, 1777, the Navy Board at Boston was given power to suspend a naval officer, “until the pleasure of Congress shall be known.”[135] Not always did the kindliest relations exist between the Navy Boards and the commanders of the vessels. Officers who but yesterday tramped the decks of their own merchantmen, giving commands but not receiving them, chafed under the subordination that their position in the navy exacted.

The Navy Boards made public the resolutions of Congress on naval affairs, copies of which they lodged with the prize agents, the commanders of vessels, and all interested persons. They distributed among the naval captains the rules and regulations of the navy, the sea-books, and the naval signals. The Boards acted in an advisory capacity to the Marine Committee, which frequently called upon them for information or opinions; when a revision of the rules and regulations of the navy was under consideration their assistance in the work was requested. Sometimes they volunteered important suggestions looking to the betterment of the navy. They communicated frequently with the Committee, giving in detail the state of the naval business in their respective districts.

In the hiring, purchase, and building of vessels the Boards had to do with craft of all sorts, freight-boats, fire-ships, galleys, packets, brigs, schooners, sloops, ships, frigates, and men-of-war. Measured by the standards of the time, the building of one of the larger vessels was a work of some magnitude. A notion of the men and materials requisite for such an undertaking may be gained from an estimate, made early in 1780, of the sundries needed to complete the 74-gun ship “America,” the largest of the Continental vessels constructed during the Revolution. The construction of this ship had been begun at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in 1777. It was computed that one hundred and fifty workmen for an average period of eight months would be required. Fifty carpenters, twenty ordinary laborers, twenty caulkers, ten riggers, ten sailors, two master-builders, and an uncertain number of blacksmiths, sailmakers, coopers, plumbers, painters, glaziers, carvers, boat-builders, ship-copperers, tinners, cabinet-makers, and tanners were demanded. Materials and provisions were needed as follows: Seven hundred tons of timbers, one hundred casks of naval stores, forty tons of iron, one thousand water-casks, masts and spars of all sorts, sheets of lead, train oil, and oakum; provisions for most of the above workmen, and lastly, an indispensable lubricant for all naval services at this time, “rum, one half pint per day, including extra hands, say for 150 hands, 8 months, 12 hhds, 1310 gallons.”[136] In building the armed vessels, the Boards were greatly hampered by the difficulty of obtaining artisans, owing to their being called out for military service, or to their engaging in privateering. In providing armament and equipment, they were embarrassed by the inexperience of the colonists in casting cannon, and by the obstacles which they encountered in importing canvas, cables, arms, and ammunition.

For the future use of the fleet the Navy Boards collected in due season provisions and naval stores. In their work as purveyors for the navy a knowledge of the baking of bread and the curing of meats might not prove amiss. The kinds and quantities of provisions which they bought may be judged from an estimate of the supplies that were requisite to equip for sea and for a single cruise the 36-gun frigate “Confederacy.” The names and quantities of the articles needed were as follows: bread, 35,700 lbs.; beef, 15,300 lbs.; pork, 15,300 lbs.; flour, 5,100 lbs.; potatoes, 10,000 lbs.; peas, 80 bus.; mutton, 2,500 lbs.; butter, 637 lbs.; rice, 2,550 lbs.; vinegar, 160 gals.; and rum, 2,791 gals.[137] The Boards’ supplies of naval stores consisted chiefly of canvas, sails, cordage, cables, tar, turpentine, and ship chandlery.

The commissioners of each district made some division of their work among themselves. For instance, the special task of Wharton of the Philadelphia Board was the superintending of the accounting and the naval finances of the Middle District. During 1778 Deshon of the Boston Board spent much time in Connecticut attending to the naval business in that state. This had to do chiefly with freeing the “Trumbull” frigate from a sandbar upon which she had grounded. During the same year Vernon was for a time at Providence endeavoring to get to sea the Continental vessels which the British had blockaded in that port. For a part of the year Warren alone attended to the business of the Board at its headquarters at Boston. On August 4, 1778, Congress appropriated $365 to each of the commissioners of the Navy Board at Boston to pay their traveling expenses during the past year, since in the right discharge of their office they were obliged “frequently to visit the different parts of their extensive district.”[138]

In the extent of its powers and in the amount of its business the Boston Board exceeded the one at Philadelphia.[139] This was largely owing to the centering of naval affairs in New England after the occupation of Philadelphia in September, 1777; and to the capture or destruction in that year of a large part of the fleet to the southward of New England. After 1776 all the new vessels added in America to the navy, with the exception of two or three, were either purchased or built in New England. The long distance of the Marine Committee from Boston, with the consequent difficulties and delays in communication, made it necessary for the Committee to grant to the Boston Board larger powers than to the Philadelphia Board.

The most important work of a Naval Office is the directing of the movements of the fleet, or in other words, the determining of the cruises of the armed vessels. This power the Marine Committee jealously guarded, and was loathe to yield any part of it. The Committee was forced at times, however, to give to the Boston Board a considerable discretion. In July, 1777, it ordered the Board to send out the cruisers as fast as they could be got ready, “directing the Commanders to such Latitudes as you shall think there will be the greatest chance of success in intercepting the enemy’s Transports and Merchant Ships”; and in November, 1778, to send the vessels out, “either collectively, or singly, as you shall judge proper, using your discretion as to the time for which their Cruises shall continue, and your best judgment in directing the commanders to such places and on such stations as you shall think will be for the general benefit of the United States, and to annoy and distress the Enemy.”[140] Such general orders were always subject to the particular plans and directions of the Committee, which were by no means few. The Committee itself determined the service of all vessels that refitted at Philadelphia. As a consequence the duties of the Navy Board of the Middle Department had to do chiefly with the minor details of administration.

Turning now from the work of the Navy Boards to that of the Marine Committee, one finds the significant fact to be the two-fold relation that the Committee bore to the Continental Congress. By reason of the union in Congress of both legislative and executive functions, the Committee was at one and the same time an administrative organ of Congress charged with executing the business of its Naval Department, and its legislative committee on naval affairs. Naturally, there were at points no lines of demarkation between these two functions; and it is therefore not always easy, or even possible, to determine in which capacity the Committee is acting. The Committee’s administrative duties, par excellence, were the enforcing and the carrying out by means of its agents of the various resolutions of Congress upon naval affairs. Already much light has been thrown upon this phase of the Committee’s work in the treatment of the Navy Boards and the naval agents.

It was the duty of the Marine Committee to see that the resolutions on naval affairs were brought to the attention of the proper persons, officers, agents, and authorities. As the head of the Naval Department, it issued its commands and orders to the Navy Boards, the naval agents, and the commanders of vessels. This was done both verbally and by letters. The Navy Board of the Middle Department, the naval agents at Philadelphia, and often the naval officers in that port, conferred with the Committee and received orders by word of mouth. In the prosecution of its work outside of Philadelphia the Committee conducted a large correspondence, chiefly with the Navy Board at Boston, the naval agents at Portsmouth, Boston, New London, and Baltimore, and the leading captains of the navy. It addressed letters to the governors of most of the states and to many of the local governmental authorities; to the Commander-in-chief of the navy, Washington, General Heath, General Schuyler, the Commissary-General of Prisoners, Commissary-General of Purchases of the army, the merchants of Baltimore, Count D’Estaing, the Commissioners in Paris, and most of the captains of the navy. This list of correspondents well represents the range of the business of the Committee.

Through its recommendations to Congress the Marine Committee virtually selected almost all the captains of the navy and of the marine corps, many lieutenants of both services, as a rule the commissioners of the navy, the prize agents, and the advocates for the trying of maritime causes. Appointments to these offices were rarely made by Congress contrary to the recommendations of the Committee, or on its own initiative independent of the Committee. A few captains and lieutenants of the navy were appointed by representatives of the United States residing abroad.

As is well known, all executive offices are called upon to establish certain forms, rules, and regulations for the guidance and government of their agents. Of this character was the fixing by the Marine Committee of the naval signals, the forms for sea-books, and the proper uniforms for the naval officers. The Committee’s regulations on uniforms were dated September 5, 1776. For captains they prescribed a blue coat “with red lappels, slash cuff, stand-up collar, flat yellow buttons, blue britches, red waistcoat with narrow lace.” The uniform of the officers of the marines was equally resplendent in colors. It included a green coat, with white cuffs, a silver epaulet on the shoulder, white waistcoat and breeches edged with green, and black gaiters and garters. Green was the distinctive color of the marines. The privates were to display this badge in the form of green shirts, “if they can be procured.”[141] Not enough information is accessible to the writer to determine what influence the regulations prescribing the uniform of British officers had on those adopted by the Marine Committee. Both required in the uniform of captains, blue coats, standing-up collars, and flat buttons; neither required epaulets, the wearing of which, as is well known, originated in France.[142] It is probable that the prescribed uniform was little worn by the Continental naval officers. Grim necessity forced each officer to ransack whatever wardrobe Providence offered, and it is somewhat inaccurate to call their miscellaneous garbs “uniforms.”

As the Naval Office at Philadelphia developed, letters, memorials, and petitions poured in upon it in increasing numbers. Many of these communications were addressed to the President of Congress, were read in Congress, and were formally referred to the Marine Committee to be acted or reported upon. It was only infrequently that Congress offered any suggestions as to their proper disposition. These complaints and requests were of a varied character, and came from many sources; not a few originated with that obsequious crowd, with axes to grind, that always attends upon official bodies. The wide range of these communications may be judged from the following subjects selected at random:

New Hampshire and Massachusetts request that the frigates building in those states be ordered to defend the New England coast.[143] Governor Livingston of New Jersey asks for a naval office for a relative, Musco Livingston.[144] Gerard, the minister of France to the United States, wishes to know “the opinion of Congress respecting his offering a premium to the owners of privateers that shall intercept masts and spars belonging to the enemy, coming from Halifax to New York and Rhode Island.”[145] John Macpherson asserts that the position of commander-in-chief in the navy was promised to him by Messrs. Randolph, Hopkins, and Rutledge, to whom he communicated an important secret.[146] An affront has been offered several French captains in Boston by the commander of the Continental frigate “Warren.”[147] Twelve lieutenants, who had been dismissed from the navy for combining in order to extort an increase of pay, ask to be reinstated.[148] The ambassador of Naples at the Court of France, whose king has opened his ports to the American vessels, wishes “to know the colours of the flag, and form of the sea-papers of the United States.”[149] Captain Biddle writes concerning the cruel treatment inflicted by Lord Howe upon Lieutenant Josiah of the Continental navy.[150] Captain Skimmer has been killed in an action with the “Montague,” and has left eleven children, nine of whom are unable to earn a livelihood. His widow asks for a pension.[151]

The Marine Committee made frequent reports to Congress, both in response to previous orders therefrom, and of its own accord in the course of its business. Occasionally parts of its reports were recommitted by Congress to a limited number of the Committee’s members, doubtless for the purpose of obtaining prompt and expert action. The Committee sometimes assigned special business to sub-committees, or to single members. The subjects which the Committee considered, discussed, and reported upon ran the whole gamut of naval activities and interests. The substance of many of its reports may be found in the Journals of the Continental Congress for the years 1776, 1777, 1778, and 1779. During this period the Marine Committee prepared and reported the larger part of the naval legislation of Congress. It is true that special committees contributed something to this work, but these were composed in part of members of the Marine Committee. Congress, as a body, originated little, although occasionally it was moved to the passage of resolutions on naval affairs by some real or supposed emergency, the importunities of the self-seeking, or the whims of individual members. It of course amended the reports of its committees.

The principal legislation of Congress relating to the navy which was passed during the incumbency of the Marine Committee will now be noted. No attempt will be made to separate those provisions that were the special work of the Marine Committee from the whole legislative output.

During 1776 and 1777 Congress authorized important naval increases. It directed the Marine Committee in March and April, 1776, to purchase “the armed vessel now in the river Delaware” and the ship “Molly,” to fit out two armed cutters, and to build two galleys “capable of carrying two 36 or 42 pounders.”[152] On November 20, 1776, Congress resolved to build immediately, one ship, 74, in New Hampshire; two ships, 74 and 36, in Massachusetts; one ship, 74, a brig, 18, and a packet boat, in Pennsylvania; two frigates, 36 each, in Virginia; and two frigates, 36 each, in Maryland.[153] Later, the size and armament of some of these vessels were reduced by the Marine Committee, and some of them were never completed. Only three of these ten vessels were armed, manned, and sent to sea as a part of the forces of the Continental navy. They were the “Alliance,” 36, the “General Gates,” 18, both built in Massachusetts, and the “Saratoga,” 16, built in Pennsylvania. The 74-gun ship “America,” constructed at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, was not launched until shortly before the Revolution ended. On January 23, 1777, Congress ordered the construction of two frigates, 36 and 28, in Connecticut. These two ships were named respectively the “Confederacy” and “Bourbon.” On March 15, 1777, the Marine Committee was ordered to purchase three ships.[154] Congress gave directions for other naval increases, but they were not fully carried out. In July, 1777, owing to the “extravagant prices now demanded for all kinds of materials used in shipbuilding, and the enormous wages required by tradesmen and labourers,” Congress empowered the Committee to stop the building of such of the Continental vessels as they should judge proper.[155]

During 1776 many important appointments and promotions in the navy and the marine corps were made by the Marine Committee, and confirmed by Congress. Samuel Nichols was placed at the head of the marines, with the rank of major. Twenty captains of the navy were appointed. Four of these had been appointed lieutenants on December 22, 1775, and were promoted, but the remaining sixteen were new appointees. John Manly was taken from Washington’s fleet. Nicholas Biddle, Thomas Read, Charles Alexander, and James Josiah had seen service in the Pennsylvania navy; and James Nicholson in the Maryland navy. During this year there was a great scramble to obtain offices on board the thirteen frigates, and amid the rivalries of politics, it is not surprising that some candidates were successful that, unfortunately for the navy, had tasted little salt water.[156]

In military services questions of promotion and rank are perennial sources of heartburning and jealousy. The advancing of an officer on any other principle than that of seniority in service rarely fails to arouse feelings of injustice and suspicions of partiality, which are only too often warranted. The discontent and insubordination that such a promotion incites must always be weighed against its beneficial results. When, on October 10, 1776, Congress, in determining the rank of twenty-four captains and two lieutenants, disregarded the dates of their commissions and appointments, it was unable to defend its act on the usual, and under some circumstances, tenable ground of the conspicuous services, marked talents, and signal professional skill of those favored. Once more Southern influences prevailed, and James Nicholson, of Maryland, commander of the frigate “Virginia,” was made the senior captain of the navy. This distinguishing of Nicholson, who was appointed captain on June 6, 1776, worked a hardship to the officers, and especially to the four captains, appointed on December 22, 1775. John Paul Jones, who stood fifth in rank in the list of December 22, and now found himself eighteenth, smarted under the injustice which was done him.[157] It is noteworthy that from March, 1777, when Esek Hopkins was suspended from his position of commander-in-chief of the fleet, until the end of the Revolution, the head of the Continental army and the ranking officer of the navy came from adjoining Southern states.[158]

On November 15, 1776, Congress fixed the relative rank of army and naval officers as follows:[159]

Admiral, with General.

Vice-Admiral, with Lieutenant-General.

Rear-Admiral, with Major-General.

Commodore, with Brigadier-General.

Captain of a ship of 40 guns and upwards, with Colonel.

Captain of a ship of 20 to 40 guns, with Lieutenant-Colonel.

Captain of a ship of 10 to 20 guns, with Major.

Lieutenant of the navy, with Captain.

In this legislation on rank once more the influence of British models is apparent. The Committee was evidently building for the future, for the four higher ranks were not established at this time, nor during the Revolution. The present relative rank of army and naval officers is based on the above table.

On March 23, 1776, Congress passed most important resolutions supplementary to those of November 25, 1775, concerning captures and the shares of prizes. The resolutions of November 25 legalized the capture of the enemy’s vessels of war and transports. The new resolutions permitted for the first time the capture of all ships and cargoes, “belonging to any inhabitant, or inhabitants of Great Britain, taken on the high seas, or between high and low water mark,” by American privateers, vessels of the Continental navy, or ships fitted out by any of the colonies. In brief, the new resolutions legalized reprisals on British commerce. In the case of Continental vessels, one-third of the prize went to the officers and crew; in the case of privateers, the whole of the prize fell to the owners and captors. Each colony was permitted to fix the shares of the proceeds of merchantmen captured by its own ships of war.[160] On October 30, 1776, the share of prizes taken by vessels of the Continental navy was increased to one-half of merchantmen, transports, and store ships; and to the whole of ships of war and privateers.[161]

On April 2, 1776, Congress agreed to a form of commission for privateers. On the next day it resolved to send blank commissions, signed by the President of Congress, to the legislatures, provincial congresses, and committees of safety of the United Colonies. These were to be filled out and delivered to privateersmen. Blank bonds, which were to be executed by the owners or masters of privateers, were also sent. These bonds, which prescribed a penalty of five or ten thousand dollars, according to the size of the ship, were intended to discourage or prevent misconduct and unwarrantable acts on the part of officers and crews. Congress also drafted a form of instructions to the commanders of privateers.[162]

Congress on November 15, 1776, established a new pay-table. Officers were now divided into three classes, those serving on board of vessels of 20 guns and upwards, vessels of 10 to 20 guns, and vessels below 10 guns. The vessels of the first two classes were commanded by captains, and of the third class by lieutenants. The pay of the higher officers, which the new table generally raised, varied for each of the three classes, the commanding officers of which received, respectively, $60, $48, and $30 a month. Seamen were now paid a monthly wage of $8. The pay of officers below the captain ranged from $30 to $8.34 a month. A bounty of $20 for every cannon and $8 for every seaman captured on board a British ship of war was now voted.[163] On July 25, 1777, the “subsistence” of officers while in foreign or domestic ports was fixed.[164] On January 19, 1778, Congress resolved that officers not in actual service should be allowed pay, but not rations. While prisoners of war, their allowance for rations was to be diminished by the value of the supplies which they received from the enemy.[165] Pursers for vessels of 16 guns and upwards were authorized on November 14, 1778.[166]

Additional interest attaches to the initial legislation on pensions of the American government because of the unprecedented liberality which now marks its treatment of its veterans. The first legislation on naval pensions dates from the adoption by Congress on November 28, 1775, of a form of naval contract according to which certain bounties were granted officers, seamen, and marines disabled from earning a livelihood.[167] These bounties were derived from the proceeds of prizes captured by the aid of the beneficiaries. A more typical pension law was passed on August 26, 1776.[168] It had, however, a vital defect in that it was left to the enforcement of the individual states. According to its provisions every naval officer, seaman, or marine, “belonging to the United States of America, who shall lose a limb in any engagement in which no prize shall be taken, or be therein otherwise so disabled as to be rendered incapable of getting a livelihood, shall receive during his life, or the continuance of such disability, one half of his monthly pay.” When a prize was captured at the time the disability was contracted, the disabled person’s share of prize money was considered as a part of his half-pay. If the disabled person was rendered incapable of serving in the navy, although not totally disabled from earning a livelihood, he received a monthly sum, judged to be adequate by the legislature of the state in which he resided. Each state was to determine which of its citizens were entitled to a pension under this law, to pay such persons their half-pay or allowance, and to make a quarterly report of its work to the secretary of Congress. The distinguishing characteristic of the law lay in its dependence on the states for its enforcement. As might be expected, it was very imperfectly carried out.

On September 25, 1778, Congress extended the advantages of the law to all persons whose disabilities were acquired previous to August 26, 1776.[169] It is to be carefully noted that this was a pension for disabilities and not for service—a fundamental classification in pension law. An agitation for a service pension for life for the officers of the army was made in and out of Congress for a long time, until in 1780 it was at last successful.[170] Such emoluments were not at this time granted to naval officers; it was probably argued that their sharing in captured prizes offset the pensions of the army officers. Then, too, the army had ways of gaining the attention of Congress that the weak and insignificant navy did not possess.

Few more important duties fall to naval offices than the enforcing of discipline in the navy by means of naval courts. Adams’s rules of November 28, 1775, made provision for holding courts-martial, but not courts of enquiry, which are a sort of grand jury or inquest. They also provided that courts-martial should consist of at least six naval officers, with six officers of marines, if so many of the latter were convenient to the court.[171] The Committee and Navy Boards at times found it impossible to assemble so many officers. No definite procedure in investigating the loss of vessels was prescribed by Adams’s rules. Additional legislation was therefore demanded. On May 6, 1778, Congress adopted new regulations on naval courts, which were to be operative for one year.[172] They provided that, when a vessel of war was lost by capture or otherwise, a court of enquiry should be held, “consisting of that navy board which shall, by the marine committee of Congress, be directed to proceed therein, or any three persons that such navy board may appoint.” If the court of enquiry found that the loss of the vessel was caused by the negligence or malconduct of any commissioned officer, the Navy Board might suspend such officer pending his trial by a court-martial, which, in the event that six naval officers could not be assembled, was to consist of five men appointed by the Navy Board. The permitting of civilians to sit upon naval courts is the salient feature of these new resolutions, and is an anomaly in naval judicature. They also provided that in cases where one or more vessels out of a fleet were lost by capture or otherwise, the commanders of the escaping vessels were to be tried by a similar procedure. If a court-martial found that the loss of a vessel was caused by the cowardice or treachery of the commanding officer, it was directed to inflict the death penalty. On August 19, 1778, the procedure established on May 6 was extended to “all offences and misdemeanors in the marine department.”[173] The proceedings of courts-martial were forwarded to the Marine Committee, which laid them, together with its recommendations thereupon, before Congress for final action.

During the incumbency of the Marine Committee a number of interesting and important naval trials were held. Captain Thomas Thompson in 1778 and Captain Dudley Saltonstall in 1779 were broken by courts-martial. Other captains who lost their vessels were tried, but escaped so severe a punishment. The cases growing out of Commodore Hopkins’s expedition to New Providence, his engagement with the “Glasgow,” and the immediately succeeding events of his fleet in the spring of 1776 deserve more extended notice. During the summer of 1776 the Marine Committee ordered Commodore Hopkins and Captains Dudley Saltonstall and Abraham Whipple to leave the fleet, which was then stationed in Rhode Island, and to come to Philadelphia for trial. After calling before it the inferior officers of the “Alfred” and “Columbus,” and hearing their complaints against the two captains, the Committee reported to Congress on July 11 that the charge against Captain Saltonstall was not well founded, and that the charge against Captain Whipple “amounts to nothing more than a rough, indelicate mode of behaviour to his marine officers.” Congress ordered the two captains to repair to their commands, and recommended Captain Whipple “to cultivate harmony with his officers.”[174]

Commodore Hopkins was not to get off so easily. His whole conduct since he left Philadelphia early in January, 1776, was investigated. The principal charge against him was the disobeying of the instructions of the Naval Committee of January 5, 1776, to attack the forces of the enemy in the region of Virginia and the Carolinas. Hopkins based his defence on the statement that the enemy in that region had become too strong to attack by the time his fleet had sailed on February 17, and also on a certain clause in his instructions granting him discretionary powers.[175] After the Marine Committee had investigated the case, and reported upon it, Congress, on August 12, took into consideration the “instructions given to Commodore Hopkins, his examination and answers to the Marine Committee, and the report of the Marine Committee thereupon; also, the farther defence by him made, and the testimony of the witnesses.” On the 15th, Congress came to the resolution: “That the said commodore Hopkins, during his cruise to the southward, did not pay due regard to the tenor of his instructions ... and, that his reasons for not going from Providence immediately to the Carolinas, are by no means satisfactory.” The next day Congress resolved, “that the said conduct of commodore Hopkins deserves the censure of this house, and this house does accordingly censure him.”[176]

This action seems more severe than the facts justify. John Adams, who defended Hopkins, had with difficulty prevented Congress from cashiering the Commodore. According to Adams’s view, Hopkins was “pursued and persecuted by that anti-New-England spirit which haunted Congress in many other of their proceedings, as well as in this case.”[177] The action of Congress may be interpreted differently. Hopkins had not met the expectations of Congress or the Marine Committee. As the head of the fleet, blame naturally fell upon him, whether he deserved it or not. He had his shortcomings as a naval officer, and failure magnified them. By placing the blame upon him, the skirts of Congress, of the Marine Committee, and of the other naval officers were cleared, and the hopes of a few self-interested men were brightened.

Commodore Hopkins’s failure to carry out the plans of the Marine Committee during the fall of 1776, together with the partial inaction of the fleet under his command, increased his disfavor with Congress and the Marine Committee. His praiseworthy endeavors to man and prepare his fleet for sea won for him the enmity of the owners of privateers at Providence, for his success would mean the taking of men and materials sorely needed by the privateersmen. Hopkins’s intemperate language, lack of tact, and naval misfortunes bred a spirit of discontent, and gave an excuse for insubordination among his inferior officers. Encouraged by the discontented privateersmen of Providence, ten of the inferior officers of the “Warren,” the Commodore’s flagship, signed a petition and certain letters containing complaints and charges against Hopkins, and sent their documents to the Marine Committee. They were taken to Philadelphia by the chief “conspirator,” Captain John Grannis of the marines. These documents asserted that Hopkins had called the members of the Marine Committee and of Congress “ignorant fellows-lawyers, clerks-persons who don’t know how to govern men;” that he was “remarkably addicted to profane swearing;” that he had “treated prisoners in a most inhuman and barbarous manner;” that he was a “hindrance to the proper manning of the fleet;” and that “his conversation is at times so wild and orders so unsteady that I have sometimes thought he was not in his right mind.” Besides these accusations, there were a few others of even less substantial character.[178]

On March 25, 1777, the Marine Committee laid before Congress the complaints and charges against Commodore Hopkins, and on the next day Congress took them into consideration; whereupon it resolved that “Esek Hopkins be immediately, and he is hereby, suspended from his command in the American navy.”[179] Hopkins remained suspended until January 2, 1778. The Journals of Congress for this date contain the following entry: “Congress having no farther occasion for the service of Esek Hopkins, esq. who, on the 22nd of December, 1775, was appointed commander in chief of the fleet fitted out by the naval committee, Resolved, That the said Esek Hopkins, esq. be dismissed from the service of the United States.”[180]

Hopkins’s suspension and removal did not in any way improve the navy. Indeed, it was far less fortunate in 1777, than it had been in 1776. That its chief officer should have been suspended without a hearing, on flimsy charges, offered by a small number of inferior officers whose leader was guilty of insubordination, convicts Congress of acting with undue haste and of doing a possible injustice, and arouses the suspicion that it was not actuated wholly by a calm and unbiased judgment. The wording of Hopkins’s dismissal seems needlessly curt, and harsh. Since Hopkins had lost the confidence of Congress, the Marine Committee, and many of his countrymen, his removal from the office of commander-in-chief to that of a captain might have been justified.

On January 13, 1778, Hopkins brought a suit for libel against the ten officers concerned in the “conspiracy,” fixing his damages at £10,000. On July 30 Congress passed a resolution for defraying the reasonable expenses of the ten officers in defending their suit.[181] The case was tried before a jury in the Inferior Court of Common Pleas of Rhode Island. The decision was unfavorable to Hopkins, as the jury brought in a verdict for “the defendants and their costs.” The victory of the opposition to the Commodore was complete. He had not, however, lost the confidence of his fellow townsmen. He served in the General Assembly of his state, representing North Providence from 1777 until 1786, and he was from 1777 until the end of the Revolution a member of the Rhode Island Council of War.[182] No one who knew Hopkins intimately ever doubted his courage, his patriotism, or his honesty of purpose.

The arrival off the Delaware Capes, on July 8, 1778, of twelve sail of the line and four frigates under the command of Count D’Estaing, Vice-Admiral of France, threw additional work upon the Naval Department. No sooner did the Marine Committee learn of the presence of the French, than it exerted itself to supply the table of its naval guests with eatables and drinkables. Casks of fresh water, several hundred barrels of bread and flour, and a small supply of fresh provisions, were at once sent to the Count, and the Committee ordered a commissary to collect for the use of the French fleet fifty bullocks, seven hundred sheep, a number of poultry, and a quantity of vegetables. After the ill-starred expedition against Rhode Island in August, 1778, when the French fleet put into Boston for repairs, its provisioning again became a care to the Naval Department. The Marine Committee ordered three thousand barrels of flour to be sent on from Albany for the use of the French.[183]

The distinction of having performed the first work of a consular bureau in the United States belongs to the Marine Committee, since it had charge of the publication and record of the first consular appointments to this country. In accordance with the first commercial treaty between the United States and France, Gerard, the French minister, soon after his arrival in America in July, 1778, appointed John Holker, consul for the port of Philadelphia, and in September named a vice-consul for the same place. The latter appointment Congress referred to the Marine Committee “in order that the same may be made public.” A similar disposition was made of the appointments of consuls for Maryland, South Carolina, and Boston, and of the vice-consuls for Alexandria (Virginia), and Virginia. In the case of the vice-consul for Virginia, Congress ordered the Marine Committee to “cause the commission of Mr. d’Annemours to be recorded in the book by them kept for that purpose, and his appointment made known to all concerned.” The Committee was instrumental in obtaining the settling of the powers and duties of consuls as regards the United States and France. On August 2, 1779, the control of consular affairs was removed from the Marine Committee and vested in the Secretary of Congress.[184]