The Ancient History of the Egyptians, Carthaginians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Medes and Persians, Macedonians and Grecians (Vol. 1 of 6)

by Charles Rollin

Part The Second. The History of the Carthaginians.

The interval of time between the foundation of Carthage and its ruin, included seven hundred years, and may be divided into two parts. The first, which is much the longest and the least known, (as is ordinary with the beginnings of all states,) extends to the first Punic war, and takes up five hundred and eighty-two years. The second, which ends at the destruction of Carthage, contains but a hundred and eighteen years.

Chapter I. The Foundation of Carthage and its Aggrandizement till the Time of the first Punic War.

Carthage in Africa was a colony from Tyre, the most renowned city at that time for commerce in the world. Tyre [pg 117] had long before transplanted into that country another colony, which built Utica,[566] made famous by the death of the second Cato, who, for this reason, is generally called Cato Uticensis.

Authors disagree very much with regard to the æra of the foundation of Carthage.[567] It is a difficult matter, and not very material, to reconcile them; at least, agreeably to the plan laid down by me, it is sufficient to know, within a few years, the time in which that city was built.

Carthage existed a little above seven hundred years.[568] It was destroyed under the consulate of Cn. Lentulus, and L. Mummius, the 603d year of Rome, 3859th of the world, and 145 before Christ. The foundation of it may therefore be fixed in the year of the world 3158, when Joash was king of Judah, 98 years before the building of Rome, and 846 before our Saviour.

The foundation of Carthage is ascribed to Elisa, a Tyrian princess, better known by the name of Dido.[569] Ithobal, king of Tyre, and father of the famous Jezebel, called in Scripture Ethbaal, was her great-grandfather. She married her near relation Acerbas, called otherwise Sicharbas and Sichæus, an extremely rich prince, and Pygmalion, king of Tyre, was her brother. This prince having put Sichæus to death, in order that he might have an opportunity of seizing his immense wealth, Dido eluded the cruel avarice of her brother, by withdrawing secretly with all her dead husband's treasures. After having long wandered, she at last landed on the coast of the Mediterranean, in the gulf where Utica stood, and in the [pg 118] country of Africa, properly so called, distant almost fifteen[570] miles from Tunis, so famous at this time for its corsairs; and there settled with her few followers, after having purchased some lands from the inhabitants of the country.[571]

Many of the neighbouring people, invited by the prospect of lucre, repaired thither to sell these new comers the necessaries of life; and shortly after incorporated themselves with them. These inhabitants, who had been thus gathered from different places, soon grew very numerous. The citizens of Utica, considering them as their countrymen, and as descended from the same common stock, deputed envoys with very considerable presents, and exhorted them to build a city in the place where they had first settled. The natives of the country, from the esteem and respect frequently shown to strangers, did as much on their part. Thus all things conspiring with Dido's views, she built her city, which was charged with the payment of an annual tribute to the Africans for the ground it stood upon; and called Carthada,[572] or Carthage, a name that, in the Phoenician and Hebrew tongues, (which have a great affinity,) signifies the New City. It is said, that when the foundations were dug, a horse's head was found, which was thought a good omen, and a presage of the future warlike genius of that people.[573]

This princess was afterwards courted by Iarbas king of Getulia, and threatened with a war in case of refusal. Dido, [pg 119] who had bound herself by an oath not to consent to a second marriage, being incapable of violating the faith she had sworn to Sichæus, desired time for deliberation, and for appeasing the manes of her first husband by sacrifice. Having therefore ordered a pile to be raised, she ascended it; and drawing out a dagger which she had concealed under her robe, stabbed herself with it.[574]

Virgil has made a great alteration in this history, by supposing that Æneas, his hero, was contemporary with Dido, though there was an interval of near three centuries between the one and the other; Carthage being built three hundred years after the destruction of Troy. This liberty is very excusable in a poet, who is not tied to the scrupulous accuracy of an historian; and we admire, with great reason, the judgment which he has shown in his plan, when, to interest the Romans (for whom he wrote) in his subject, he has the art of introducing into it the implacable hatred which subsisted between Carthage and Rome, and ingeniously deduces the original of it from the very remote foundation of those two rival cities.

Carthage, whose beginnings, as we have observed, were very weak at first, grew larger by insensible degrees, in the country where it was founded. But its dominion was not long confined to Africa. This ambitious city extended her conquests into Europe, invaded Sardinia, made herself mistress of a great part of Sicily, and reduced to her subjection almost the whole of Spain; and having sent out powerful colonies into all quarters, enjoyed the empire of the seas for more than six hundred years; and formed a state which was [pg 120] able to dispute preeminence with the greatest empires of the world, by her wealth, her commerce, her numerous armies, her formidable fleets, and, above all, by the courage and ability of her captains. The dates and circumstances of many of these conquests are little known. I shall take but a transient notice of them, in order to enable my readers to form some idea of the countries, which will be often mentioned in the course of this history.

Conquests of the Carthaginians in Africa.—The first wars made by the Carthaginians were to free themselves from the annual tribute which they had engaged to pay the Africans, for the territory which had been ceded to them.[575] This conduct does them no honour, as the settlement was granted them upon condition of their paying a tribute. One would be apt to imagine, that they were desirous of covering the obscurity of their original, by abolishing this proof of it. But they were not successful on this occasion. The Africans had justice on their side, and they prospered accordingly; the war being terminated by the payment of the tribute.

The Carthaginians afterwards carried their arms against the Moors and Numidians, and gained many conquests over both.[576] Being now emboldened by these happy successes, they shook off entirely the tribute which gave them so much uneasiness,[577] and possessed themselves of a great part of Africa.

About this time there arose a great dispute between Carthage and Cyrene, on the subject of their respective limits. Cyrene was a very powerful city, situated on the Mediterranean, towards the greater Syrtis, and had been built by Battus the Lacedæmonian.[578]

It was agreed on each side, that two young men should set out at the same time, from either city; and that the place of their meeting should be the common boundary of both states. The Carthaginians (these were two brothers named Philæni) made the most haste; and their antagonists pretending that foul play had been used, and that the two brothers had set out before the time appointed, refused to stand to the agreement [pg 121] unless the two brothers (to remove all suspicion of unfair dealing) would consent to be buried alive in the place where they had met. They acquiesced with the proposal; and the Carthaginians erected, on that spot, two altars to their memories, and paid them divine honours in their city; and from that time the place was called the altars of the Philæni, Aræ Philænorum,[579] and served as the boundary of the Carthaginian empire, which extended from thence to the pillars of Hercules.

Conquests of the Carthaginians in Sardinia, &c.—History does not inform us exactly, either of the time when the Carthaginians entered Sardinia, or of the manner in which they got possession of it. This island was of great use to them; and during all their wars supplied them abundantly with provisions.[580] It is separated from Corsica only by a strait of about three leagues in breadth. The metropolis of the southern and most fertile part of it, was Caralis or Calaris, now called Cagliari. On the arrival of the Carthaginians, the natives withdrew to the mountains in the northern parts of the island, which are almost inaccessible, and whence the enemy could not dislodge them.

The Carthaginians seized likewise on the Balearic isles, now called Majorca and Minorca. Port Mahon, (Portus Magonis,) in the latter island, was so called from Mago, a Carthaginian general, who first made use of, and fortified it. It is not known who this Mago was; but it is very probable that he was Hannibal's brother.[581] This harbour is, at this day, one of the most considerable in the Mediterranean.

These isles furnished the Carthaginians with the most expert slingers in the world, who did them great service in battles and sieges.[582] They slang large stones of above a pound weight; and sometimes threw leaden bullets,[583] with so much violence, that they would pierce even the strongest helmets, shields, and cuirasses; and were so dexterous in their aim, [pg 122] that they scarce ever missed the mark. The inhabitants of these islands were accustomed, from their infancy, to handle the sling; for which purpose their mothers placed on the bough of a high tree, the piece of bread designed for their children's breakfast, who were not allowed a morsel till they had brought it down with their slings. From this practice, these islands were called Baleares and Gymnasiæ, by the Greeks,[584] because the inhabitants used to exercise themselves so early in slinging of stones.[585]

Conquests of the Carthaginians in Spain.—Before I enter on the relation of these conquests, I think it proper to give my readers some idea of Spain.

Spain is divided into three parts, Bœtica, Lusitania, Tarraconensis.[586]

Bœtica, so called from the river Bœtis,[587] was the southern division of it, and comprehended the present kingdom of Granada, Andalusia, part of New Castile, and Estremadura. Cadiz, called by the ancients Gades and Gadira, is a town situated in a small island of the same name, on the western coast of Andalusia, about nine leagues from Gibraltar. It is well known that Hercules, having extended his conquests to this place, halted, from the supposition that he was come to the extremity of the world.[588] He here erected two pillars, as monuments of his victories, pursuant to the custom of that age. The place has always retained the name, though time has quite [pg 123] destroyed these pillars. Authors are divided in opinion, with regard to the place where these pillars were erected. Bœtica was the most fruitful, the wealthiest, and most populous part of Spain.[589] It contained two hundred cities, and was inhabited by the Turdetani, or Turduli. On the banks of the Bœtis stood three large cities, Castulo towards the source, Corduba lower down, the native place of Lucan and the two Senecas, lastly, Hispalis.[590]

Lusitania is bounded on the west by the Ocean, on the north by the river Durius,[591] and on the south by the river Anas.[592] Between these two rivers is the Tagus. Lusitania was what is now called Portugal, with part of Old and New Castile.

Tarraconensis comprehended the rest of Spain, that is, the kingdoms of Murcia and Valentia, Catalonia, Arragon, Navarre, Biscay, the Asturias, Gallicia, the kingdom of Leon, and the greatest part of the two Castiles. Tarraco,[593] a very considerable city, gave its name to this part of Spain. Pretty near it lay Barcino.[594] Its name gives rise to the conjecture, that it was built by Hamilcar, surnamed Barca, father of the great Hannibal. The most renowned nations of Tarraconensis were the Celtiberi, beyond the river Iberus;[595] the Cantabri, where Biscay now lies; the Carpetani, whose capital was Toledo; the Oretani, &c.

Spain, abounding with mines of gold and silver, and peopled with a martial race of men, had sufficient to excite both the avarice and ambition of the Carthaginians, who were more of a mercantile than of a warlike disposition, from the very genius and constitution of their republic. They doubtless knew that their Phœnician ancestors, (as Diodorus relates,)[596] taking advantage of the happy ignorance of the Spaniards, with regard to the immense riches which were hid in the bowels of their lands, first took from them these precious treasures, in exchange for commodities of little value. They likewise foresaw, that if they could once subdue this country, it would furnish them abundantly with well-disciplined troops for the conquest of other nations, as actually happened.

The occasion of the Carthaginians first landing in Spain, was to assist the inhabitants of Cadiz, who were invaded by the Spaniards.[597] That city was a colony from Tyre, as well as Utica and Carthage, and even more ancient than either of them. The Tyrians having built it, established there the worship of Hercules, and erected, in his honour, a magnificent temple, which became famous in after ages. The success of this first expedition of the Carthaginians made them desirous of carrying their arms into Spain.

It is not exactly known in what period they entered Spain, nor how far they extended their first conquests. It is probable that these were slow in the beginning, as the Carthaginians had to do with very warlike nations, who defended themselves with great resolution and courage. Nor could they ever have accomplished their design, as Strabo observes,[598] had the Spaniards (united in a body) formed but one state, and mutually assisted one another. But as every district, every people, were entirely detached from their neighbours, and had not the least correspondence nor connection with them, the Carthaginians were forced to subdue them one after another. This circumstance occasioned, on one hand, the loss of Spain; but on the other, protracted the war, and made the conquest of the country much more difficult.[599] Accordingly it has been observed, that though Spain was the first province which the Romans invaded on the continent, it was the last they subdued;[600] and was not entirely subjected to their power, till after having made a vigorous opposition for upwards of 200 years.

It appears from the accounts given by Polybius and Livy, of the wars of Hamilcar, Asdrubal, and Hannibal in Spain, which will soon be mentioned, that the arms of the Carthaginians had not made any considerable progress in that country before that period, and that the greatest part of Spain was then unconquered. But in twenty years' time they completed the conquest of almost the whole country.

At the time that Hannibal set out for Italy, all the coast of Africa, from the Philænorum Aræ, by the great Syrtis, to the pillars of Hercules, was subject to the Carthaginians.[601] Passing through the straits, they had conquered all the western coast of Spain, along the ocean, as far as the Pyrenean hills. The coast, which lies on the Mediterranean, had been almost wholly subdued by them; and it was there they had built Carthagena; and they were masters of all the country, as far as the river Iberus, which bounded their dominions. Such was, at that time, the extent of their empire. In the centre of the country, some nations had indeed held out against all their efforts, and could not be subdued by them.

Conquests of the Carthaginians in Sicily.—The wars which the Carthaginians carried on in Sicily are more known. I shall here relate those which were waged from the reign of Xerxes, who first prompted the Carthaginians to carry their arms into Sicily, till the first Punic war. This period includes near two hundred and twenty years; viz. from the year of the world 3520 to 3738. At the breaking out of these wars, Syracuse, the most considerable as well as most powerful city of Sicily, had invested Gelon, Hiero, and Thrasybulus, (three brothers who succeeded one another,) with the sovereign power. After their deaths, a democracy or popular government was established in that city, and subsisted above sixty years. From this time, the two Dionysius's, Timoleon, and Agathocles, bore the sway in Syracuse. Pyrrhus was afterwards invited into Sicily, but he kept possession of it only a few years. Such was the government of Sicily during the wars of which I am going to treat. They will give us great light with regard to the power of the Carthaginians, at the time that they began to be engaged in war with the Romans.

Sicily is the largest and most considerable island in the Mediterranean. It is of a triangular form, and for that reason was called Trinacria and Triquetra. The eastern side, which faces the Ionian or Grecian sea, extends from Cape Pachynum[602] to Pelorum.[603] The most celebrated cities on this coast are Syracuse, Tauromenium, and Messana. The northern coast, which looks towards Italy, reaches from Cape Pelorum to Cape [pg 126] Lilybæum.[604] The most noted cities on this coast are Mylæ, Hymera, Panormus, Eryx, Motya, Lilybæum. The southern coast, which lies opposite to Africa, extends from Cape Lilybæum to Pachynum. The most remarkable cities on this coast are Selinus, Agrigentum, Gela, and Camarina. This island is separated from Italy by a strait, which is not more than a mile and a half over, and called the Faro or strait of Messina, from its contiguity to that city. The passage from Lilybæum to Africa is but 1500 furlongs,[605] that is, about seventy-five leagues.[606]

A.M. 3501. A. Carth. 343. Rome, 245. Ant. J.C. 503.

The period in which the Carthaginians first carried their arms into Sicily is not exactly known.[607] All we are certain of is, that they were already possessed of some part of it, at the time that they entered into a treaty with the Romans; the same year that the kings were expelled, and consuls appointed in their room, viz. twenty-eight years before Xerxes invaded Greece. This treaty, which is the first we find mentioned to have been made between these two nations, speaks of Africa and Sardinia as possessed by the Carthaginians; whereas the conventions with regard to Sicily, relate only to those parts of the island which were subject to them. By this treaty it is expressly stipulated, that neither the Romans nor their allies shall sail beyond the Fair Promontory,[608] which was very near Carthage; and that such merchants, as shall resort to this city for traffic, shall pay only certain duties which are settled in it.[609]

It appears by the same treaty, that the Carthaginians were particularly careful to exclude the Romans from all the countries subject to them; as well as from the knowledge of what was transacting in them; as though the Carthaginians, even [pg 127] at that time, had taken umbrage at the rising power of the Romans; and already harboured in their breasts the secret seeds of that jealousy and distrust, that were one day to burst out in long and cruel wars, and a mutual hatred and animosity, which nothing could extinguish but the ruin of one of the contending powers.

A.M. 3520. Ant. J.C. 484.

Some years after the conclusion of this first treaty, the Carthaginians made an alliance with Xerxes king of Persia.[610] This prince, who aimed at nothing less than the total extirpation of the Greeks, whom he considered as his irreconcilable enemies, thought it would be impossible for him to succeed in his enterprise without the assistance of Carthage, whose power was formidable even at that time. The Carthaginians, who always kept in view the design they entertained of seizing upon the remainder of Sicily, greedily snatched the favourable opportunity which now presented itself for their completing the reduction of it. A treaty was therefore concluded; wherein it was agreed that the Carthaginians were to invade, with all their forces, those Greeks who were settled in Sicily and Italy, while Xerxes should march in person against Greece itself.

The preparations for this war lasted three years. The land army amounted to no less than three hundred thousand men. The fleet consisted of two thousand ships of war, and upwards of three thousand small vessels of burden. Hamilcar, the most experienced captain of his age, sailed from Carthage with this formidable army. He landed at Palermo;[611] and, after refreshing his troops, he marched against Hymera, a city not far distant from Palermo, and laid siege to it. Theron, who commanded in it, seeing himself very much straitened, sent to Gelon, who had possessed himself of Syracuse. He flew immediately to his relief, with fifty thousand foot, and five thousand horse. His arrival infused new courage into the besieged, who, from that time, made a very vigorous defence.

Gelon was an able warrior, and excelled in stratagems. A courier was brought to him, who had been despatched from Selinus, a city of Sicily, with a letter for Hamilcar, to inform [pg 128] him of the day when he might expect the cavalry which he had demanded of them. Gelon drew out an equal number of his own troops, and sent them from his camp about the time agreed on. These being admitted into the enemy's camp, as coming from Selinus, rushed upon Hamilcar, killed him, and set fire to his ships. In this critical conjuncture, Gelon attacked, with all his forces, the Carthaginians, who at first made a gallant resistance. But when the news of their general's death was brought them, and they saw their fleet in a blaze, their courage failed them, and they fled. And now a dreadful slaughter ensued; upwards of a hundred and fifty thousand being slain. The rest of the army, having retired to a place where they were in want of every thing, could not make a long defence, and were forced to surrender at discretion. This battle was fought the very day of the famous action of Thermopylæ, in which three hundred Spartans,[612] with the sacrifice of their lives, disputed Xerxes's entrance into Greece.

When the sad news was brought to Carthage of the entire defeat of the army, consternation, grief, and despair, threw the whole city into such a confusion and alarm as are not to be expressed. It was imagined that the enemy was already at the gates. The Carthaginians, in great reverses of fortune, always lost their courage, and sunk into the opposite extreme. Immediately they sent a deputation to Gelon, by which they desired peace upon any terms. He heard their envoys with great humanity. The complete victory he had gained, so far from making him haughty and untractable, had only increased his modesty and clemency even towards the enemy. He therefore granted them a peace, without any other condition, than their paying two thousand[613] talents towards the expense of the war. He likewise required them to build two temples, where the treaty of this peace should be deposited, and exposed at all times to public view. The Carthaginians did not think this a dear purchase of a peace, that was so absolutely necessary to their affairs, and which they hardly durst hope [pg 129] for. Gisgo, the son of Hamilcar, pursuant to the unjust custom of the Carthaginians, of ascribing to the general the ill success of a war, and making him bear the blame of it, was punished for his father's misfortune, and sent into banishment. He passed the remainder of his days at Selinus, a city of Sicily.

Gelon, on his return to Syracuse, convened the people, and invited all the citizens to appear under arms. He himself entered the assembly, unarmed and without his guards, and there gave an account of the whole conduct of his life. His speech met with no other interruption, than the public testimonies which were given him of gratitude and admiration. So far from being treated as a tyrant, and the oppressor of his country's liberty, he was considered as its benefactor and deliverer; all, with an unanimous voice, proclaimed him king; and the crown was bestowed, after his death, on his two brothers.

A.M. 3592. A. Carth. 434. A. Rom. 336. Ant. J.C. 412.

After the memorable defeat of the Athenians before Syracuse, where Nicias perished with his whole fleet;[614] the Segestans, who had declared in favour of the Athenians against the Syracusans, fearing the resentment of their enemies, and being attacked by the inhabitants of Selinus, implored the aid of the Carthaginians, and put themselves and city under their protection. At Carthage the people debated some time, what course it would be proper for them to take, the affair meeting with great difficulties. On one hand, the Carthaginians were very desirous to possess themselves of a city which lay so convenient for them; on the other, they dreaded the power and forces of Syracuse, which had so lately cut to pieces a numerous army of the Athenians; and become, by so shining a victory, more formidable than ever. At last, the lust of empire prevailed, and the Segestans were promised succours.

The conduct of this war was committed to Hannibal, who at that time was invested with the highest dignity of the state, being one of the Suffetes. He was grandson to Hamilcar, who had been defeated by Gelon, and killed before Himera; and son to Gisgo, who had been condemned to exile. He left Carthage, animated with an ardent desire of revenging his [pg 130] family and country, and of wiping away the disgrace of the last defeat. He had a very great army as well as fleet under his command. He landed at a place called the Well of Lilybæum, which gave its name to a city afterwards built on the same spot. His first enterprise was the siege of Selinus. The attack and defence were equally vigorous, the very women showing a resolution and bravery above their sex. The city, after making a long resistance, was taken by storm, and the plunder of it abandoned to the soldiers. The victor exercised the most horrid cruelties, without showing the least regard to either age or sex. He permitted such inhabitants as had fled, to continue in the city after it had been dismantled; and to till the lands, on condition of their paying a tribute to the Carthaginians. This city had been built two hundred and forty-two years.

Himera, which he next besieged and took likewise by storm, after being more cruelly treated than Selinus, was entirely razed, two hundred and forty years after its foundation. He forced three thousand prisoners to undergo every kind of ignominious punishments; and at last murdered them all on the very spot where his grandfather had been killed by Gelon's cavalry, to appease and satisfy his manes by the blood of these unhappy victims.

These expeditions being ended, Hannibal returned to Carthage, on which occasion the whole city came out to meet him, and received him amidst the most joyful acclamations.

These successes reinflamed the desire, and revived the design, which the Carthaginians had ever entertained, of making themselves masters of the whole of Sicily.[615] Three years after, they appointed Hannibal their general a second time; and on his pleading his great age, and refusing the command of this war, they gave him for lieutenant, Imilcon, son of Hanno, of the same family. The preparations for this war were proportioned to the great design which the Carthaginians had formed. The fleet and army were soon ready, and set out for Sicily. The number of their forces, according to Timæus, amounted to above six-score thousand; and, according to Ephorus, to three hundred thousand men. The enemy, on their side, [pg 131] were prepared to give the Carthaginians a warm reception. The Syracusans had sent to all their allies, in order to levy forces among them; and to all the cities of Sicily, to exhort them to exert themselves vigorously in defence of their liberties.

Agrigentum expected to feel the first fury of the enemy. This city was prodigiously rich,[616] and strongly fortified. It was situated, as was also Selinus, on that coast of Sicily which faces Africa. Accordingly, Hannibal opened the campaign with the siege of this city. Imagining that it was impregnable except on one side, he directed his whole force to that quarter. He threw up banks and terraces as high as the walls: and made use, on this occasion, of the rubbish and fragments of the tombs standing round the city, which he had demolished for that purpose. Soon after, the plague infected the army, and swept away a great number of the soldiers, and the general himself. The Carthaginians interpreted this disaster as a punishment inflicted by the gods, who revenged in this manner the injuries done to the dead, whose ghosts many fancied they had seen stalking before them in the night. No more tombs were therefore demolished, prayers were ordered to be made according to the practice of Carthage; a child was sacrificed to Saturn, in compliance with a most inhuman superstitious custom; and many victims were thrown into the sea in honour of Neptune.

The besieged, who at first had gained several advantages, were at last so pressed by famine, that all hopes of relief seeming desperate, they resolved to abandon the city. The following night was fixed on for this purpose. The reader will naturally image to himself the grief with which these miserable [pg 132] people must be seized, on their being forced to leave their houses, their rich possessions, and their country; but life was still dearer to them than all these. Never was a more melancholy spectacle seen. To omit the rest, a crowd of women, bathed in tears, were seen dragging after them their helpless infants, in order to secure them from the brutal fury of the victor. But the most grievous circumstance was, the necessity they were under of leaving behind them the aged and sick, who were unable either to fly or to make the least resistance. The unhappy exiles arrived at Gela, which was the nearest city, and there received all the comforts they could expect in the deplorable condition to which they were reduced.

In the mean time, Imilcon entered the city, and murdered all who were found in it. The plunder was immensely rich, and such as might be expected from one of the most opulent cities of Sicily, which contained two hundred thousand inhabitants, and had never been besieged, nor consequently plundered, before. A numberless multitude of pictures, vases, and statues of all kinds, were found here; the citizens having an exquisite taste for the polite arts. Among other curiosities was the famous bull[617] of Phalaris, which was sent to Carthage.

The siege of Agrigentum had lasted eight months. Imilcon made his forces take up their winter-quarters in it, to give them the necessary refreshment; and left this city (after laying it entirely in ruins) in the beginning of the spring. He afterwards besieged Gela, and took it, notwithstanding the succours which were brought by Dionysius the Tyrant, who had seized upon the government of Syracuse. Imilcon ended the war by a treaty with Dionysius. The conditions of it were, that the Carthaginians, besides their ancient acquisitions in Sicily, should still possess the country of the Sicanians,[618] Selinus, Agrigentum, and Himera; as likewise that of Gela and Camarina, with leave for the inhabitants to reside in their respective dismantled cities, on condition of their paying a tribute to Carthage; that the Leontines, the Messenians, and all the Sicilians, should retain their own laws, and preserve their [pg 133] liberty and independence: lastly, that the Syracusans should still continue subject to Dionysius. After this treaty was concluded, Imilcon returned to Carthage, where the plague still made dreadful havoc.

A.M. 3600. A. Carth. 412. A. Rom. 344. Ant. J.C. 404.

Dionysius had concluded the late peace with the Carthaginians with no other view than to get time to establish his new authority, and make the necessary preparations for the war which he meditated against them.[619] As he was very sensible how formidable the power of this state was, he used his utmost endeavours to enable himself to invade them with success; and his design was wonderfully well seconded by the zeal of his subjects. The fame of this prince, the strong desire he had to distinguish himself, the charms of gain, and the prospect of the rewards which he promised those who should show the greatest industry; invited, from all quarters, into Sicily, the most able artists and workmen at that time in the world. All Syracuse now became in a manner an immense workshop, in every part of which men were seen making swords, helmets, shields, and military engines; and preparing all things necessary for building ships and fitting out fleets. The invention of vessels with five benches of oars (or Quinqueremes) was at that time very recent; for, till then, those with three alone[620] had been used. Dionysius animated the workmen by his presence, and by the applauses he gave, and the bounty which he bestowed seasonably; but chiefly by his popular and engaging behaviour, which excited, more strongly than any other conduct, the industry and ardour of the workmen;[621] and he frequently allowed those of them who most excelled in their respective arts the honour to dine with him.

When all things were ready, and a great number of forces had been levied in different countries, he called the Syracusans together, laid his design before them, and represented to them that the Carthaginians were the professed enemies to the Greeks; that they had no less in view than the invasion of all Sicily; the subjecting all the Grecian cities; and that, in case their progress was not checked, the Syracusans themselves would soon be attacked: that the reason why the Carthaginians [pg 134] did not attempt any enterprise, and continued unactive, was owing entirely to the dreadful havoc made by the plague among them; which (he observed) was a favourable opportunity, of which the Syracusans ought to take advantage. Though the tyranny and the tyrant were equally odious to Syracuse, yet the hatred the people bore to the Carthaginians prevailed over all other considerations; and every one, guided more by the views of an interested policy than by the dictates of justice, received the speech with applause. Upon this, without the least complaint made, or any declaration of war, Dionysius gave up to the fury of the populace the persons and possessions of the Carthaginians. Great numbers of them resided at that time in Syracuse, and traded there on the faith of treaties. The common people ran to their houses, plundered their effects, and pretended they were sufficiently authorized to exercise every ignominy, and inflict every kind of punishment on them, for the cruelties they had exercised against the natives of the country. And this horrid example of perfidy and inhumanity was followed throughout the whole island of Sicily. This was the bloody signal of the war which was declared against them. Dionysius having thus begun to do himself justice, (in his way,) sent deputies to Carthage, to require them to restore all the Sicilian cities to their liberties; and that otherwise, all the Carthaginians found in them should be treated as enemies. This news spread a general alarm in Carthage, especially when they reflected on the sad condition to which they were reduced.

Dionysius opened the campaign with the siege of Motya, which was the magazine of the Carthaginians in Sicily; and he pushed on the siege with so much vigour, that it was impossible for Imilcon, the Carthaginian admiral, to relieve it. He brought forward his engines, battered the place with his battering-rams, advanced to the wall towers, six stories high (rolled upon wheels,) and of an equal height with their houses; and from these he greatly annoyed the besieged, with his Catapultæ, an engine[622] then recently invented, which hurled, with great violence, numerous volleys of arrows and stones against the enemy. At last, the city, after a long and vigorous defence, [pg 135] was taken by storm, and all the inhabitants of it put to the sword, those excepted who took sanctuary in the temples. The plunder of it was abandoned to the soldiers, and Dionysius, leaving a strong garrison and a trusty governor in it, returned to Syracuse.

The following year Imilcon being appointed one of the Suffetes, returned to Sicily with a far greater army than before.[623] He landed at Palermo,[624] recovered Motya by force, and took several other cities. Animated by these successes, he advanced towards Syracuse, with design to besiege it; marching his infantry by land, whilst his fleet, under the command of Mago, sailed along the coast.

The arrival of Imilcon threw the Syracusans into great consternation. Above two hundred ships laden with the spoils of the enemy, and advancing in good order, entered in a kind of triumph the great harbour, being followed by five hundred barks. At the same time, the land army, consisting, according to some authors, of three hundred thousand foot,[625] and three thousand horse, was seen marching forward on the other side of the city. Imilcon pitched his tent in the very temple of Jupiter; and the rest of the army encamped at twelve furlongs, or about a mile and a half from the city. Marching up to it, Imilcon offered battle to the inhabitants, who did not care to accept the challenge. Imilcon, satisfied at his having extorted from the Syracusans this confession of their own weakness and his superiority, returned to his camp; not doubting but he should soon be master of the city, considering it already as a certain prey which could not possibly escape him. For thirty days together, he laid waste the neighbourhood about Syracuse, and ruined the whole country. He possessed himself of the suburb of Acradina, and plundered the temples of Ceres and Proserpine. To fortify his camp, he beat down the tombs which stood round the city; and, among others, that of Gelon and his wife Demarata, which was prodigiously magnificent.

But these successes were not lasting. All the splendour of this anticipated triumph vanished in a moment, and taught [pg 136] mankind, says the historian,[626] that the proudest mortal, blasted sooner or later by a superior power, shall be forced to confess his own weakness. Whilst Imilcon, now master of almost all the cities of Sicily, expected to crown his conquests by the reduction of Syracuse, a contagious distemper seized his army, and made dreadful havoc in it. It was now the midst of summer, and the heat that year was excessive. The infection began among the Africans, multitudes of whom died, without any possibility of their being relieved. At first, care was taken to inter the dead; but the number increasing daily, and the infection spreading very fast, the dead lay unburied, and the sick could have no assistance. This plague was attended with very uncommon symptoms, such as violent dysenteries, raging fevers, burning entrails, acute pains in every part of the body. The infected were even seized with madness and fury, so that they would fall upon any persons that came in their way, and tear them to pieces.

Dionysius did not suffer to escape so favourable an opportunity for attacking the enemy. Being more than half conquered by the plague, they made but a feeble resistance. The Carthaginian ships were almost all either taken or burnt. The inhabitants in general of Syracuse, old men, women, and children, came pouring out of the city to behold an event which to them appeared miraculous. With hands lifted up to heaven, they thanked the tutelar gods of their city, for having avenged the sanctity of the temples and tombs, which had been so brutally violated by these barbarians. Night coming on, both parties retired; when Imilcon, taking the opportunity of this short suspension of hostilities, sent to Dionysius, requesting leave to carry back with him the small remains of his shattered army, with an offer of three hundred talents,[627] which was all the specie he had then left. But this permission could only be obtained for the Carthaginians, with whom Imilcon stole away in the night, and left the rest to the mercy of the conqueror.

Such was the condition in which this Carthaginian general, who a few days before had been so proud and haughty, retired [pg 137] from Syracuse. Bitterly bewailing his own fate, and still more that of his country, he, with the most insolent fury, accused the gods as the sole authors of his misfortunes. “The enemy,” continued he, “may indeed rejoice at our misery, but have no reason to glory in it. We return victorious over the Syracusans, and are defeated by the plague alone.” His greatest subject of grief, and that which most keenly distressed him, was his having survived so many gallant soldiers, who had died in arms. “But,” added he, “the sequel shall make it appear, whether it is through fear of death, or from the desire of leading back to their native country the miserable remains of my fellow-citizens, that I have survived the loss of so many brave comrades.” And in fact, on his arrival at Carthage, which he found overwhelmed with grief and despair, he entered his house, shut his doors against the citizens, and even his own children; and then gave himself the fatal stroke, in compliance with a practice to which the heathens falsely gave the name of courage, though it was, in reality, no other than a cowardly despair.

But the calamities of this unhappy city did not stop here; for the Africans, who had ever borne an implacable hatred to the Carthaginians, but were now exasperated to fury, because their countrymen had been left behind, and exposed to the murdering sword of the Syracusans, assemble in the most frantic manner, sound the alarm, take up arms, and, after seizing upon Tunis, march directly to Carthage, to the number of more than two hundred thousand men. The citizens now gave themselves up for lost. This new incident was considered by them as the sad effect of the wrath of the gods, which pursued the guilty wretches even to Carthage. As its inhabitants, especially in all public calamities, carried their superstition to the greatest excess, their first care was to appease the offended gods. Ceres and Proserpine were deities who, till that time, had never been heard of in Africa. But now, to atone for the outrage which had been done them in the plundering of their temples, magnificent statues were erected to their honour; priests were selected from among the most distinguished families of the city; sacrifices and victims, according to the Greek ritual, (if I may use that expression,) were offered up to them; in a word, nothing was omitted which could be thought [pg 138] conducive in any manner to appease and propitiate the angry goddesses. After this, the defence of the city was the next object of their care. Happily for the Carthaginians, this numerous army had no leader, but was like a body uninformed with a soul; no provisions nor military engines; no discipline nor subordination, was seen among them: every man setting himself up for a general, or claiming an independence on the rest. Divisions therefore arising in this rabble of an army, and the famine increasing daily, the individuals of it withdrew to their respective homes, and delivered Carthage from a dreadful alarm.

The Carthaginians were not discouraged by their late disaster, but continued their enterprises on Sicily. Mago, their general, and one of the Suffetes, lost a great battle, in which he was slain. The Carthaginian chiefs demanded a peace, which was granted, on condition of their evacuating all Sicily, and defraying the expenses of the war. They pretended to accept the terms; but representing that it was not in their power to deliver up the cities, without first obtaining an order from their republic, they obtained so long a truce, as gave them time sufficient for sending to Carthage. They took advantage of this interval, to raise and discipline new troops, over which Mago, son of him who had been lately killed, was appointed general. He was very young, but of great abilities and reputation. As soon as he arrived in Sicily, at the expiration of the truce, he gave Dionysius battle; in which Leptines,[628] one of the generals of the latter, was killed, and upwards of fourteen thousand Syracusans left dead in the field. By this victory the Carthaginians obtained an honourable peace, which left them in the possession of all they had in Sicily, with even the addition of some strong-holds; besides a thousand talents,[629] which were paid to them towards defraying the expenses of the war.

About this time a law was enacted at Carthage, by which its inhabitants were forbid to learn to write or speak the Greek language;[630] in order to deprive them of the means of corresponding [pg 139] with the enemy, either by word of mouth, or in writing. This was occasioned by the treachery of a Carthaginian, who had written in Greek to Dionysius, to give him advice of the departure of the army from Carthage.

Carthage had, soon after, another calamity to struggle with.[631] The plague spread in the city, and made terrible havoc. Panic terrors, and violent fits of frenzy, seized on a sudden the unhappy sufferers; who sallying, sword in hand, out of their houses, as if the enemy had taken the city, killed or wounded all who came in their way. The Africans and Sardinians would very willingly have taken this opportunity to shake off a yoke which was so hateful to them; but both were subjected, and reduced to their allegiance. Dionysius formed at this time an enterprise, in Sicily, with the same views, which was equally unsuccessful. He died[632] some time after, and was succeeded by his son of the same name.

We have already taken notice of the first treaty which the Carthaginians concluded with the Romans. There was another, which, according to Orosius, was concluded in the 402d year of the foundation of Rome, and consequently about the time we are now speaking of. This second treaty was very near the same with the first, except that the inhabitants of Tyre and Utica were expressly comprehended in it, and joined with the Carthaginians.

A.M. 3656. A. Carth. 498. A. Rom. 400. Ant. J.C. 348.

After the death of the elder Dionysius, Syracuse was involved in great troubles.[633] Dionysius the younger, who had been expelled, restored himself by force of arms, and exercised great cruelties there. One part of the citizens implored the aid of Icetes, tyrant of the Leontines, and by descent a Syracusan. This seemed a [pg 140] very favourable opportunity for the Carthaginians to seize upon all Sicily, and accordingly they sent a mighty fleet thither. In this extremity, such of the Syracusans as loved their country best, had recourse to the Corinthians, who had often assisted them in their dangers; and were, besides, of all the Grecian nations, the most professed enemies of tyranny, and the most avowed and most generous assertors of liberty. Accordingly, the Corinthians sent over Timoleon, a man of great merit, who had signalized his zeal for the public welfare, by freeing his country from tyranny, at the expense of his own family. He set sail with only ten ships, and arriving at Rhegium, he eluded, by a happy stratagem, the vigilance of the Carthaginians; who having been informed, by Icetes, of his voyage and design, wanted to intercept him in his passage to Sicily.

Timoleon had scarce above a thousand soldiers under his command; and yet, with this handful of men, he marched boldly to the relief of Syracuse. His small army increased in proportion as he advanced. The Syracusans were now in a desperate condition, and quite hopeless. They saw the Carthaginians masters of the port; Icetes of the city; and Dionysius of the citadel. Happily, on Timoleon's arrival, Dionysius having no refuge left, put the citadel into his hands, with all the forces, arms, and ammunition in it, and escaped, by his assistance, to Corinth.[634] Timoleon had, by his emissaries, artfully represented to the foreign soldiers, who (by that error in the constitution of Carthage, which we have before taken notice of) formed the principal strength of Mago's army, and the greatest part of whom were Greeks; that it was astonishing to see Greeks using their endeavours to make barbarians masters of Sicily, from whence they, in a very little time, would pass over into Greece. For could they imagine, that the Carthaginians [pg 141] were come so far, with no other view than to establish Icetes tyrant of Syracuse? Such discourses being spread among Mago's soldiers, gave this general very great uneasiness; and, as he wanted only a pretence to retire, he was glad to have it believed, that his forces were going to betray and desert him; and upon this, he sailed with his fleet out of the harbour, and steered for Carthage. Icetes, after his departure, could not hold out long against the Corinthians; so that they now got entire possession of the whole city.

Mago, on his arrival at Carthage, was impeached, but he prevented the execution of the sentence passed upon him, by a voluntary death. His body was hung upon a gallows, and exposed as a public spectacle to the people. New forces were levied at Carthage, and a greater and more powerful fleet than the former was sent to Sicily.[635] It consisted of two hundred ships of war, besides a thousand transports; and the army amounted to upwards of seventy thousand men. They landed at Lilybæum, under the command of Hamilcar and Hannibal, and resolved to attack the Corinthians first. Timoleon did not wait for, but marched out to meet them. But such was the consternation of Syracuse, that, of all the forces which were in that city, only three thousand Syracusans and four thousand mercenaries followed him; and even of these latter a thousand deserted upon the march, through fear of the danger they were going to encounter. Timoleon, however, was not discouraged; but exhorting the remainder of his forces to exert themselves courageously for the safety and liberties of their allies, he led them against the enemy, whose rendezvous he had been informed was on the banks of the little river Crimisus. It appeared, at the first reflection, madness to attack an army so numerous as that of the enemy, with only four or five thousand foot, and a thousand horse; but Timoleon, who knew that bravery, conducted by prudence, is superior to number, relied on the courage of his soldiers, who seemed resolved to die rather than yield, and with ardour demanded to be led against the enemy. The event justified his views and hopes. A battle was fought; the Carthaginians were routed, and upwards of ten thousand of them slain, full three thousand of [pg 142] whom were Carthaginian citizens, which filled their city with mourning and the greatest consternation. Their camp was taken, and with it immense riches, and a great number of prisoners.

Timoleon, at the same time that he despatched the news of this victory to Corinth, sent thither the finest arms found among the plunder.[636] For he was desirous of having his city applauded and admired by all men, when they should see that Corinth alone, among all the Grecian cities, adorned its finest temples, not with the spoils of Greece, and offerings dyed in the blood of its citizens, the sight of which could tend only to preserve the sad remembrance of their losses, but with those of barbarians, which, by fine inscriptions, displayed at once the courage and religious gratitude of those who had won them. For these inscriptions imported, “That the Corinthians, and Timoleon their general, after having freed the Greeks, settled in Sicily, from the Carthaginian yoke, had hung up these arms in their temples, as an eternal acknowledgment of the favour and goodness of the gods.”

After this, Timoleon, leaving the mercenary troops in the Carthaginian territories to waste and destroy them, returned to Syracuse. On his arrival there, he banished the thousand soldiers who had deserted him; and took no other revenge than the commanding them to leave Syracuse before sun-set.

This victory gained by the Corinthians was followed by the capture of a great many cities, which obliged the Carthaginians to sue for peace.

In proportion as the appearance of success made the Carthaginians vigorously exert themselves to raise powerful armies both by land and sea, and prosperity led them to make an insolent and cruel use of victory; so their courage would sink in unforeseen adversities, their hopes of new resources vanish, and their grovelling souls condescend to ask quarter of the most inconsiderable enemy, and without sense of shame accept the hardest and most mortifying conditions. Those now imposed were, that they should possess only the lands lying beyond the river Halycus;[637] that they should give all the natives [pg 143] free liberty to retire to Syracuse with their families and effects; and that they should neither continue in the alliance, nor hold any correspondence with the tyrants of that city.

About this time, in all probability, there happened at Carthage a memorable incident, related by Justin.[638] Hanno, one of its most powerful citizens, formed a design of seizing upon the republic, by destroying the whole senate. He chose, for the execution of this bloody plan, the day on which his daughter was to be married, on which occasion he designed to invite the senators to an entertainment, and there poison them all. The conspiracy was discovered; but Hanno had such influence, that the government did not dare to punish so execrable a crime; the magistrates contented themselves with only preventing it, by an order which forbade, in general, too great a magnificence at weddings, and limited the expense on those occasions. Hanno, seeing his stratagem defeated, resolved to employ open force, and for that purpose armed all the slaves. However, he was again discovered; and, to escape punishment, retired, with twenty thousand armed slaves, to a castle that was very strongly fortified, and there endeavoured, but without success, to engage in his rebellion the Africans and the king of Mauritania. He afterwards was taken prisoner, and carried to Carthage; where, after being whipped, his eyes were put out, his arms and thighs broken; he was put to death in presence of the people, and his body, all torn with stripes, was hung on a gibbet. His children and all his relations, though they had not joined in his guilt, shared in his punishment. They were all sentenced to die, in order that not a single person of his family might be left, either to imitate his crime, or revenge his death. Such was the temper of the Carthaginians; ever severe and violent in their punishments, they carried them to the extremes of rigour, and made them extend even to the innocent, without showing the least regard to equity, moderation, or gratitude.

I come now to the wars sustained by the Carthaginians, in Africa itself as well as in Sicily, against Agathocles, which exercised their arms during several years.[639]

A.M. 3685. A. Carth. 527. A. Rom. 429. Ant. J.C. 319.

This Agathocles was a Sicilian, of obscure birth and low fortune.[640] Supported at first by the forces of the Carthaginians, he had invaded the sovereignty of Syracuse, and made himself tyrant over it. In the infancy of his power, the Carthaginians kept him within bounds; and Hamilcar, their chief, forced him to agree to a treaty, which restored tranquillity to Sicily. But he soon infringed the articles of it, and declared war against the Carthaginians themselves; who, under the conduct of Hamilcar, obtained a signal victory over him,[641] and forced him to shut himself up in Syracuse. The Carthaginians pursued him thither, and laid siege to that important city, the capture of which would have given them possession of all Sicily.

Agathocles, whose forces were greatly inferior to theirs, and who moreover saw himself deserted by all his allies, from their detestation of his horrid cruelties, meditated a design of so daring, and, to all appearance, so impracticable a nature, that, even after being happily carried into execution, it yet appears almost incredible. This design was no less than to make Africa the seat of war, and to besiege Carthage, at a time when he could neither defend himself in Sicily, nor sustain the siege of Syracuse. His profound secresy in the execution is as astonishing as the design itself. He communicated his thoughts on this affair to no person whatsoever, but contented himself with declaring, that he had found out an infallible way to free the Syracusans from the danger that surrounded them; that they had only to endure with patience, for a short time, the inconveniences of a siege; but that those who could not bring themselves to this resolution, might freely depart the city. Only sixteen hundred persons quitted it. He left his brother Antander there, with forces and provisions sufficient for him to make a stout defence. He set at liberty all slaves who were [pg 145] of age to bear arms, and, after obliging them to take an oath, joined them to his forces. He carried with him only fifty talents,[642] to supply his present wants, well assured that he should find in the enemy's country whatever was necessary to his subsistence. He therefore set sail with two of his sons, Archagathus and Heraclides, without letting any one person know whither he intended to direct his course. All who were on board his fleet believed that they were to be conducted either to Italy or Sardinia, in order to plunder those countries, or to lay waste those coasts of Sicily which belonged to the enemy. The Carthaginians, surprised at so unexpected a departure, endeavoured to prevent it; but Agathocles eluded their pursuit, and made for the main ocean.

He did not discover his design till he had landed in Africa. There, assembling his troops, he told them, in few words, the motives which had prompted him to this expedition. He represented, that the only way to free their country, was to carry the war into the territories of their enemies: that he led them who were enured to war, and of intrepid dispositions, against a parcel of enemies who were softened and enervated by ease and luxury: that the natives of the country, oppressed with the yoke of a servitude equally cruel and ignominious, would run in crowds to join them on the first news of their arrival: that the boldness of their attempt would alone disconcert the Carthaginians, who had no expectation of seeing an enemy at their gates: in short, that no enterprise could possibly be more advantageous or honourable than this; since the whole wealth of Carthage would become the prey of the victors, whose courage would be praised and admired by latest posterity. The soldiers fancied themselves already masters of Carthage, and received his speech with applauses and acclamations. One circumstance alone gave them uneasiness, and that was an eclipse of the sun, which happened just as they were setting sail. In these ages, even the most civilized nations understood very little the reason of these extraordinary phenomena of nature; and used to draw from them (by their soothsayers) superstitious and arbitrary conjectures, which frequently would either suspend or hasten the more important [pg 146] enterprises. However, Agathocles revived the drooping courage of his soldiers, by assuring them that these eclipses always foretold some instant change: that, therefore, good fortune was taking its leave of Carthage, and coming over to them.

Finding his soldiers in the good disposition he wished them, he executed, almost at the same time, a second enterprise, which was even more daring and hazardous than his first, of carrying them over into Africa; and this was the burning every ship in his fleet. Many reasons determined him to so desperate an action. He had not one good harbour in Africa where his ships could lie in safety. As the Carthaginians were masters of the sea, they would not have failed to possess themselves immediately of his fleet, which was incapable of making the least resistance. In case he had left as many hands as were necessary to defend it, he would have weakened his army, (which was inconsiderable at the best,) and put it out of his power to gain any advantage from this unexpected diversion, the success of which depended entirely on the swiftness and vigour of the execution. Lastly, he was desirous of putting his soldiers under a necessity of conquering, by leaving them no other refuge than victory. Much courage was necessary to adopt such a resolution. He had already prepared all his officers, who were entirely devoted to his service, and received every impression he gave them. He then came suddenly into the assembly with a crown upon his head, dressed in a magnificent habit, and with the air and behaviour of a man who was going to perform some religious ceremony, and addressing himself to the assembly: “When we,” says he, “left Syracuse, and were warmly pursued by the enemy; in this fatal necessity I addressed myself to Ceres and Proserpine, the tutelar divinities of Sicily; and promised, that if they would free us from this imminent danger, I would burn all our ships in their honour, at our first landing here. Aid me therefore, O soldiers, to discharge my vow; for the goddesses can easily make us amends for this sacrifice.” At the same time, taking a flambeau in his hand, he hastily led the way on board his own ship, and set it on fire. All the officers did the like, and were cheerfully followed by the soldiers. The trumpets sounded [pg 147] from every quarter, and the whole army echoed with joyful shouts and acclamations. The fleet was soon consumed. The soldiers had not been allowed time to reflect on the proposal made to them. They all had been hurried on by a blind and impetuous ardour; but when they had a little recovered their reason, and, surveying in their minds the vast extent of ocean which separated them from their own country, saw themselves in that of the enemy without the least resource, or any means of escaping out of it; a sad and melancholy silence succeeded the transport of joy and acclamations, which, but a moment before, had been so general in the army.

Here again Agathocles left no time for reflection. He marched his army towards a place called the Great City, which was part of the domain of Carthage. The country through which they marched to this place, afforded the most delicious and agreeable prospect in the world. On either side were seen large meads, watered by beautiful streams, and covered with innumerable flocks of all kinds of cattle; country seats built with extraordinary magnificence; delightful avenues planted with olive and all sorts of fruit trees; gardens of a prodigious extent, and kept with a care and elegance which delighted the eye. This prospect reanimated the soldiers. They marched full of courage to the Great City, which they took sword in hand, and enriched themselves with the plunder of it, which was entirely abandoned to them. Tunis made as little resistance; and this place was not far distant from Carthage.

The Carthaginians were in prodigious alarm when it was known that the enemy was in the country, advancing by hasty marches. This arrival of Agathocles made the Carthaginians conclude, that their army before Syracuse had been defeated, and their fleet lost. The people ran in disorder to the great square of the city, whilst the senate assembled in haste and in a tumultuous manner. Immediately they deliberated on the means for preserving the city. They had no army in readiness to oppose the enemy; and their imminent danger did not permit them to wait the arrival of those forces which might be raised in the country and among the allies. It was therefore resolved, after several different opinions had been heard, to arm the citizens. The number of the forces thus levied, [pg 148] amounted to forty thousand foot, a thousand horse, and two thousand armed chariots. Hanno and Bomilcar, though divided betwixt themselves by some family quarrels, were however joined in the command of these troops. They marched immediately to meet the enemy; and, on sight of them, drew up their forces in order of battle. Agathocles[643] had, at most, but thirteen or fourteen thousand men. The signal was given, and an obstinate fight ensued. Hanno, with his sacred cohort, (the flower of the Carthaginian forces,) long sustained the fury of the Greeks, and sometimes even broke their ranks; but at last, overwhelmed with a shower of stones, and covered with wounds, he fell dead on the field. Bomilcar might have changed the face of things; but he had private and personal reasons not to obtain a victory for his country. He therefore thought proper to retire with the forces under his command, and was followed by the whole army, which, by that means, was forced to leave the field to Agathocles. After pursuing the enemy some time, he returned, and plundered the Carthaginian camp. Twenty thousand pair of manacles were found in it, with which the Carthaginians had furnished themselves, in the firm persuasion of their taking many prisoners. The result of this victory was the capture of a great number of strong-holds, and the defection of many of the natives of the country, who joined the victor.

This descent of Agathocles into Africa, doubtless gave birth to Scipio's design of making a like attempt upon the same republic, and from the same place.[644] Wherefore, in his answer to Fabius, who ascribed to temerity his design of making Africa the seat of the war, he forgot not to mention the example of Agathocles, as an instance in favour of his enterprise; and to show, that frequently there is no other way to get rid of an enemy who presses too closely upon us, than by carrying the war into his own country; and that men are much more courageous when they act upon the offensive, than when they stand only upon the defensive.

While the Carthaginians were thus warmly attacked by their enemies, ambassadors arrived to them from Tyre.[645] They came to implore their succour against Alexander the Great, who was upon the point of taking their city, which he had long besieged. The extremity to which their countrymen (for so they called them) were reduced, touched the Carthaginians as sensibly as their own danger. Though they were unable to relieve, they at least thought it their duty to comfort them; and deputed thirty of their principal citizens to express their grief that they could not spare them any troops, because of the present melancholy situation of their own affairs. The Tyrians, though disappointed of the only hope they had left, did not however despond; they committed their wives, children,[646] and old men, to the care of these deputies; and thus, being delivered from all inquietude, with regard to persons who were dearer to them than any thing in the world, they thought alone of making a resolute defence, prepared for the worst that might happen. Carthage received this afflicted company with all possible marks of amity, and paid to guests who were so dear and worthy of compassion, all the services which they could have expected from the most affectionate and tender parents.

Quintus Curtius places this embassy from Tyre to the Carthaginians at the same time that the Syracusans were ravaging Africa, and had advanced to the very gates of Carthage. But the expedition of Agathocles against Africa cannot agree in time with the siege of Tyre, which was more than twenty years before it.

At the same time, Carthage was solicitous how to extricate itself from the difficulties with which it was surrounded. The present unhappy state of the republic was considered as the effect of the wrath of the gods: and it was acknowledged to be justly deserved, particularly with regard to two deities, towards whom the Carthaginians had been remiss in the discharge of certain duties prescribed by their religion, and which had once been observed with great exactness. It was a custom (coeval with the city itself) at Carthage, to send annually to Tyre (the [pg 150] mother city) the tenth of all the revenues of the republic, as an offering to Hercules, the patron and protector of both cities. The domain, and consequently the revenues of Carthage, having increased considerably, the portion, on the contrary, of the god, had been lessened; and they were far from remitting the whole tenth to him. They were seized with a scruple on this point: they made an open and public confession of their insincerity and sacrilegious avarice; and, to expiate their guilt, they sent to Tyre a great number of presents, and small shrines of their deities all of gold, which amounted to a prodigious value.

Another violation of religion, which to their inhuman superstition seemed as flagrant as the former, gave them no less uneasiness. Anciently, children of the best families in Carthage used to be sacrificed to Saturn. They now reproached themselves with having failed to pay to the god the honours which they thought were due to him; and with having used fraud and dishonest dealing towards him, by having substituted, in their sacrifices, children of slaves or beggars, bought for that purpose, in the room of those nobly born. To expiate the guilt of so horrid an impiety, a sacrifice was made to this blood-thirsty god, of two hundred children of the first rank; and upwards of three hundred persons, through a sense of this terrible neglect, offered themselves voluntarily as victims, to pacify, by the effusion of their blood, the wrath of the gods.

After these expiations, expresses were despatched to Hamilcar in Sicily, with the news of what had happened in Africa, and, at the same time, to request immediate succours. He commanded the deputies to observe the strictest silence on the subject of the victory of Agathocles; and spread a contrary report, that he had been entirely defeated, his forces all cut off, and his whole fleet taken by the Carthaginians; and, in confirmation of this report, he showed the irons of the vessels pretended to be taken, which had been carefully sent to him. The truth of this report was not at all doubted in Syracuse; the majority were for capitulating;[647] when a galley of thirty oars, [pg 151] built in haste by Agathocles, arrived in the port; and through great difficulties and dangers forced its way to the besieged. The news of Agathocles's victory immediately flew through the city, and restored alacrity and resolution to the inhabitants. Hamilcar made a last effort to storm the city, but was beaten off with loss. He then raised the siege, and sent five thousand men to the relief of his distressed country. Some time after,[648] having resumed the siege, and hoping to surprise the Syracusans by attacking them in the night, his design was discovered; and falling alive into the enemy's hands, he was put to death with the most exquisite tortures.[649] Hamilcar's head was sent immediately to Agathocles, who, advancing to the enemy's camp, threw it into a general consternation, by displaying to them the head of this general, which manifested the melancholy situation of their affairs in Sicily.

To these foreign enemies was joined a domestic one, which was more to be feared, as being more dangerous than the others;[650] this was Bomilcar their general, who was then in possession of the first post in Carthage. He had long meditated the establishment of himself as tyrant at Carthage, and attaining the sovereign authority there; and imagined that the present troubles offered him the wished-for opportunity. He therefore entered the city, and being seconded by a small number of citizens, who were the accomplices of his rebellion, and a body of foreign soldiers, he proclaimed himself tyrant; and showed himself literally such, by cutting the throats of all the citizens whom he met with in the streets. A tumult arising immediately in the city, it was at first thought that the enemy had taken it by some treachery; but when it was known that Bomilcar caused all this disturbance, the young men took up arms to repel the tyrant, and from the tops of the houses discharged whole volleys of darts and stones upon the heads of his soldiers. When he saw an army marching in order against him, he retired with his troops to an eminence, with design to [pg 152] make a vigorous defence, and to sell his life as dear as possible. To spare the blood of the citizens, a general pardon was proclaimed for all without exception who would lay down their arms. They surrendered upon this proclamation, and all enjoyed the benefit of it, Bomilcar their chief excepted: for the Carthaginians, without regarding their oath, condemned him to death, and fastened him to a cross, where he suffered the most exquisite torments. From the cross, as from a rostrum, he harangued the people; and thought himself justly entitled to reproach them for their injustice, their ingratitude, and perfidy, which he did by enumerating many illustrious generals, whose services they had rewarded with an ignominious death. He expired on the cross whilst uttering these reproaches.[651]

Agathocles had won over to his interest a powerful king of Cyrene,[652] named Ophellas, whose ambition he had flattered with the most splendid hopes, by leading him to understand, that, contenting himself with Sicily, he would leave to Ophellas the empire of Africa. But, as Agathocles did not scruple to commit the most horrid crimes when he thought them conducive to his interest, the credulous prince had no sooner put himself and his army in his power, than, by the blackest perfidy, he caused him to be murdered, in order that Ophellas's army might be entirely at his devotion. Many nations were now joined in alliance with Agathocles, and several strongholds were garrisoned by his forces. As he now saw the affairs of Africa in a flourishing condition, he thought it proper to look after those of Sicily; accordingly he sailed back thither, having left the command of the army to his son Archagathus. His renown, and the report of his victories, flew before him. On the news of his arrival in Sicily many towns revolted to him; but bad news soon recalled him to Africa. His absence had quite changed the face of things; and all his endeavours were incapable of restoring them to their former condition. All his strong-holds had surrendered to the enemy; the Africans [pg 153] had deserted him; some of his troops were lost, and the remainder were unable to make head against the Carthaginians; he had no way to transport them into Sicily, as he was destitute of ships, and the enemy were masters at sea: he could not hope for either peace or treaty with the barbarians, since he had insulted them in so outrageous a manner, by his being the first who had dared to make a descent in their country. In this extremity, he thought only of providing for his own safety. After many adventures, this base deserter of his army, and perfidious betrayer of his own children, who were left by him to the wild fury of his disappointed soldiers, stole away from the dangers which threatened him, and arrived at Syracuse with very few followers. His soldiers, seeing themselves thus betrayed, murdered his sons, and surrendered to the enemy. Himself died miserably soon after, and ended, by a cruel death,[653] a life that had been polluted with the blackest crimes.

In this period may be placed another incident related by Justin.[654] The fame of Alexander's conquests made the Carthaginians fear, that he might think of turning his arms towards Africa. The disastrous fate of Tyre, whence they drew their origin, and which he had so lately destroyed; the building of Alexandria upon the confines of Africa and Egypt, as if he intended it as a rival city to Carthage; the uninterrupted successes of that prince, whose ambition and good fortune were boundless; all this justly alarmed the Carthaginians. To sound his inclinations, Hamilcar, surnamed Rhodanus, pretending to have been driven from his country by the cabals of his enemies, went over to the camp of Alexander, to whom he was introduced by Parmenio, and offered him his services. The king received him graciously, and had several conferences with him. Hamilcar did not fail to transmit to his country whatever discoveries he made from time to time of Alexander's designs. Nevertheless, on his return to Carthage, after Alexander's [pg 154] death, he was considered as a betrayer of his country to that prince; and accordingly was put to death, by a sentence which displayed equally the ingratitude and cruelty of his countrymen.

A.M. 3727. A. Carth. 569. A. Rom. 471. Ant. J.C. 277.

I am now to speak of the wars of the Carthaginians in Sicily, in the time of Pyrrhus, king of Epirus.[655] The Romans, to whom the designs of that ambitious prince were not unknown, in order to strengthen themselves against any attempts he might make upon Italy, had renewed their treaties with the Carthaginians, who, on their side, were no less afraid of his crossing into Sicily. To the articles of the preceding treaties, there was added an engagement of mutual assistance, in case either of the contracting powers should be attacked by Pyrrhus.

The foresight of the Romans was well founded: Pyrrhus turned his arms against Italy, and gained many victories.[656] The Carthaginians, in consequence of the last treaty, thought themselves obliged to assist the Romans; and accordingly sent them a fleet of six-score sail, under the command of Mago. This general, in an audience before the senate, signified to them the interest which his superiors took in the war which they heard was carrying on against the Romans, and offered them their assistance. The senate returned thanks for the obliging offer of the Carthaginians, but at present thought fit to decline it.

Mago,[657] some days after, repaired to Pyrrhus, upon pretence of offering the mediation of Carthage for terminating his quarrel with the Romans; but in reality to sound him, and discover, if possible, his designs with regard to Sicily, which common fame reported he was going to invade. The Carthaginians were afraid that either Pyrrhus or the Romans would interfere in the affairs of that island, and transport forces thither for the conquest of it. And, indeed, the Syracusans, who had been besieged for some time by the Carthaginians, had sent pressingly for succour to Pyrrhus. This prince had a particular reason to espouse their interests, having married Lanassa, daughter of Agathocles, by whom he had a son named Alexander. He at last sailed from Tarentum, passed the Strait, [pg 155] and arrived in Sicily. His conquests at first were so rapid, that he left the Carthaginians, in the whole island, only the single town of Lilybæum. He laid siege to it, but meeting with a vigorous resistance, was obliged to raise the siege; not to mention that the urgent necessity of his affairs called him back to Italy, where his presence was absolutely necessary. Nor was it less so in Sicily, which, on his departure, returned to the obedience of its former masters. Thus he lost this island with the same rapidity that he had won it. As he was embarking, he turned his eyes back to Sicily, and exclaimed to those about him,[658] “What a fine field of battle[659] do we leave the Carthaginians and Romans!” His prediction was soon verified.

After his departure, the chief magistracy of Syracuse was conferred on Hiero, who afterwards obtained the name and dignity of king, by the united suffrages of the citizens; so greatly had his government pleased. He was appointed to carry on the war against the Carthaginians, and obtained several advantages over them. But now a common interest reunited them against a new enemy, who began to appear in Sicily, and justly alarmed both: these were the Romans, who, having crushed all the enemies which had hitherto exercised their arms in Italy itself, were now powerful enough to carry them out of it; and to lay the foundation of that vast power there to which they afterwards attained, and of which it was probable they had even then formed the design. Sicily lay too commodious for them, not to form a resolution of establishing themselves in it. They therefore eagerly snatched this opportunity for crossing into it, which caused the rupture between them and the Carthaginians, and gave rise to the first Punic war. This I shall treat of more at large, by relating the causes of that war.

[pg 156]

Chapter II. The History of Carthage from the first Punic War to its destruction.

The plan which I have laid down does not allow me to enter into an exact detail of the wars between Rome and Carthage; since that pertains rather to the Roman history, which I do not intend to touch upon, except transiently and occasionally. I shall therefore relate such facts only as may give the reader a just idea of the republic whose history lies before me; by confining myself to those particulars which relate chiefly to the Carthaginians, and to their most important transactions in Sicily, Spain, and Africa: a subject in itself sufficiently extensive.

I have already observed, that from the first Punic war to the ruin of Carthage, a hundred and eighteen years elapsed. This whole time may be divided into five parts or intervals.

I. The first Punic war lasted twenty-four years.

II. The interval betwixt the first and second Punic war is also twenty-four years.

III. The second Punic war took up seventeen years.

IV. The interval between the second and third is forty-nine years.

V. The third Punic war, terminated by the destruction of Carthage, continued but four years and some months.

Total: 118 years.

A.M. 3724. A. Carth. 566. A. Rom. 468. Ant. J.C. 280.

Article I. The first Punic War.—The first Punic war arose from the following cause. Some Campanian soldiers, in the service of Agathocles, the Sicilian tyrant, having entered as friends into Messina, soon after murdered part of the townsmen, drove out the rest, married their wives, seized their effects, and remained sole masters of that important city.[660] They then assumed the name of Mamertines. In imitation of them, and by their assistance, a Roman legion treated in the same cruel manner the city of Rhegium, lying directly opposite to Messina, on the other side of the strait. These two perfidious cities, supporting one another, rendered themselves at length formidable to their neighbours; and especially Messina, which became very powerful, [pg 157] and gave great umbrage and uneasiness both to the Syracusans and Carthaginians, who possessed one part of Sicily. As soon as the Romans had got rid of the enemies they had so long contended with, and particularly of Pyrrhus, they began to think of punishing the crime of their citizens, who had settled themselves at Rhegium, in so cruel and treacherous a manner, nearly ten years before. Accordingly, they took the city, and killed, in the attack, the greatest part of the inhabitants, who, instigated by despair, had fought to the last gasp: three hundred only were left, who were carried to Rome, whipped, and then publicly beheaded in the forum. The view which the Romans had in making this bloody execution, was, to prove to their allies their own sincerity and innocence. Rhegium was immediately restored to its lawful possessors. The Mamertines, who were considerably weakened, as well by the ruin of their confederate city, as by the losses which they had sustained from the Syracusans, who had lately placed Hiero at their head, thought it time to provide for their own safety. But divisions arising among them, one part surrendered the citadel to the Carthaginians, whilst the other called in the Romans to their assistance, and resolved to put them in possession of their city.

The affair was debated in the Roman senate, where, being considered in all its lights, it appeared to have some difficulties.[661] On one hand, it was thought base, and altogether unworthy of the Roman virtue, for them to undertake openly the defence of traitors, whose perfidy was exactly the same with that of the Rhegians, whom the Romans had recently punished with so exemplary a severity. On the other hand, it was of the utmost consequence to stop the progress of the Carthaginians, who, not satisfied with their conquests in Africa and Spain, had also made themselves masters of almost all the islands of the Sardinian and Hetrurian seas; and would certainly get all Sicily into their hands, if they should be suffered to possess themselves of Messina. From thence into Italy, the passage was very short; and it was in some manner to invite an enemy to come over, to leave the entrance open. These reasons, though [pg 158] so strong, could not prevail with the senate to declare in favour of the Mamertines; and accordingly, motives of honour and justice prevailed in this instance over those of interest and policy.

A.M. 3741. A. Carth. 583. A. Rom. 485. Ant. J.C. 263.

But the people were not so scrupulous; for, in an assembly held on this subject, it was resolved that the Mamertines should be assisted.[662] The consul Appius Claudius immediately set forward with his army, and boldly crossed the strait, after he had, by an ingenious stratagem, eluded the vigilance of the Carthaginian general. The Carthaginians, partly by art and partly by force, were driven out of the citadel; and the city was surrendered immediately to the consul. The Carthaginians hanged their general, for having given up the citadel in so cowardly a manner, and prepared to besiege the town with all their forces. Hiero joined them with his own. But the consul, having defeated them separately, raised the siege, and laid waste at pleasure the neighbouring country, the enemy not daring to face him. This was the first expedition which the Romans made out of Italy.

It is doubted[663] whether the motives which prompted the Romans to undertake this expedition, were very upright, and exactly conformable to the rules of strict justice. Be this as it may, their passage into Sicily, and the succour they gave to the inhabitants of Messina, may be said to have been the first step by which they ascended to that height of glory and grandeur which they afterwards attained.

A.M. 3743. A. Rom. 487.

Hiero, having reconciled himself to the Romans, and entered into an alliance with them, the Carthaginians bent all their thoughts on Sicily, and sent numerous armies thither.[664] Agrigentum was their place of arms; which, being attacked by the Romans, was won by them, after they had besieged it seven months, and gained one battle.

Notwithstanding the advantage of this victory, and the conquest of so important a city, the Romans were sensible, that whilst the Carthaginians should continue masters at sea, the maritime places in the island would always side with them, [pg 159] and put it out of their power ever to drive them out of Sicily.[665] Besides, they saw with reluctance Africa enjoy a profound tranquillity, at a time that Italy was infested by the frequent incursions of its enemies. They now first formed the design of having a fleet, and of disputing the empire of the sea with the Carthaginians. The undertaking was bold, and in outward appearance rash; but it evinces the courage and magnanimity of the Romans. They were not at that time possessed of a single vessel which they could call their own; and the ships which had transported their forces into Sicily had been borrowed of their neighbours. They were unexperienced in sea affairs, had no carpenters acquainted with the building of ships, and did not know even the shape of the Quinqueremes, or galleys with five benches of oars, in which the chief strength of fleets at that time consisted. But happily, the year before, one had been taken upon the coasts of Italy, which served them as a model. They therefore applied themselves with incredible industry and ardour to the building of ships in the same form; and in the mean time they got together a set of rowers, who were taught an exercise and discipline utterly unknown to them before, in the following manner. Benches were made, on the shore, in the same order and fashion with those of galleys. The rowers were seated on these benches, and taught, as if they had been furnished with oars, to throw themselves backwards with their arms drawn to their breasts; and then to throw their bodies and arms forward in one regular motion, the instant their commanding officer gave the signal. In two months, one hundred galleys of five benches of oars, and twenty of three benches, were built; and after some time had been spent in exercising the rowers on shipboard, the fleet put to sea, and went in quest of the enemy. The consul Duillius had the command of it.

A.M. 3745. A. Rom. 489.

The Romans coming up with the Carthaginians near the coast of Myle, they prepared for an engagement.[666] As the Roman galleys, by their being clumsily and hastily built, were neither very nimble nor easy to work; this inconvenience was supplied by a machine invented [pg 160] for this occasion, and afterwards known by the name of the Corvus,[667] (Crow, or Crane,) by the help of which they grappled the enemy's ships, boarded them, and immediately came to close engagement. The signal for fighting was given. The Carthaginian fleet consisted of a hundred and thirty sail, under the command of Hannibal.[668] He himself was on board a galley of seven benches of oars, which had once belonged to Pyrrhus. The Carthaginians, thoroughly despising enemies who were utterly unacquainted with sea affairs, imagined that their very appearance would put them to flight, and therefore came forward boldly, with little expectation of fighting; but firmly imagining they should reap the spoils, which they had already devoured with their eyes. They were nevertheless a little surprised at the sight of the above-mentioned engines, raised on the prow of every one of the enemy's ships, and which were entirely new to them. But their astonishment increased, when they saw these engines drop down at once; and being thrown forcibly into their vessels, grapple them in spite of all resistance. This changed the form of the engagement, and obliged the Carthaginians to come to close engagement with their enemies, as though they had fought them on land. They were unable to sustain the attack of the Romans: a horrible slaughter ensued, and the Carthaginians lost fourscore vessels, among which was the admiral's galley, he himself escaping with difficulty in a small boat.

So considerable and unexpected a victory raised the courage of the Romans, and seemed to redouble their vigour for the continuance of the war. Extraordinary honours were bestowed on the consul Duillius, who was the first Roman that had a naval triumph decreed him. A rostral pillar was erected in his honour, with a noble inscription; which pillar is yet standing in Rome.[669]

During the two following years, the Romans grew still stronger at sea, by their success in several engagements.[670] But these were considered by them only as essays preparatory to the great design they meditated of carrying the war into Africa, [pg 161] and of combating the Carthaginians in their own country. There was nothing the latter dreaded more; and to divert so dangerous a blow, they resolved to fight the enemy, whatever might be the consequence.

A.M. 3749. A. Rom. 493.

The Romans had elected M. Atilius Regulus, and L. Manlius, consuls for this year.[671] Their fleet consisted of three hundred and thirty vessels, on board of which were one hundred and forty thousand men, each vessel having three hundred rowers, and a hundred and twenty soldiers. That of the Carthaginians, commanded by Hanno and Hamilcar, had twenty vessels more than the Romans, and a greater number of men in proportion. The two fleets came in sight of each other near Ecnomus in Sicily. No man could behold two such formidable navies, or be a spectator of the extraordinary preparations they made for fighting, without being under some concern, on seeing the danger which menaced two of the most powerful states in the world. As the courage on both sides was equal, and no great disparity in the forces, the fight was obstinate, and the victory long doubtful; but at last the Carthaginians were overcome. More than sixty of their ships were taken by the enemy, and thirty sunk. The Romans lost twenty-four, not one of which fell into the enemy's hands.

The fruit of this victory, as the Romans had designed it, was their sailing to Africa, after having refitted their ships, and provided them with all necessaries for carrying on a long war in a foreign country.[672] They landed happily in Africa, and began the war by taking a town called Clypea, which had a commodious haven. From thence, after having sent an express to Rome, to give advice of their landing, and to receive orders from the senate, they overran the open country, in which they made terrible havoc; bringing away whole flocks of cattle, and twenty thousand prisoners.

A.M. 3750. A. Rom. 494.

The express returned in the mean time with the orders of the senate, who decreed, that Regulus should continue to command the armies in Africa, with the title of Proconsul; and that his colleague should [pg 162] return with a great part of the fleet and the forces; leaving Regulus only forty vessels, fifteen thousand foot, and five hundred horse. Their leaving the latter with so few ships and troops, was a visible renunciation of the advantages which might have been expected from this descent upon Africa.

The people at Rome depended greatly on the courage and abilities of Regulus; and the joy was universal, when it was known that he was continued in the command in Africa; he alone was afflicted on that account.[673] When news was brought him of it, he wrote to Rome, and desired, in the strongest terms, that he might be appointed a successor. His chief reason was, that the death of the farmer who rented his grounds, having given one of his hirelings an opportunity of carrying off all the implements of tillage, his presence was necessary for taking care of his little spot of ground, (but seven acres,) which was all his family subsisted upon. But the senate undertook to have his lands cultivated at the public expense; to maintain his wife and children; and to indemnify him for the loss he had sustained by the robbery of his hireling. Thrice happy age! in which poverty was thus had in honour, and was united with the most rare and uncommon merit, and the highest employments of the state! Regulus thus freed from his domestic cares, bent his whole thoughts on discharging the duty of a general.

After taking several castles, he laid siege to Adis one of the strongest fortresses of the country.[674] The Carthaginians, exasperated at seeing their enemies thus laying waste their lands at pleasure, at last took the field, and marched against them, to force them to raise the siege. With this view, they posted themselves on a hill, which overlooked the Roman camp, and was convenient for annoying the enemy; but, at the same time, by its situation, rendered one part of their army useless. For the strength of the Carthaginians lay chiefly in their horses and elephants, which are of no service but in plains. Regulus did not give them an opportunity of descending from the hill; but, in order to take advantage of this essential mistake of the Carthaginian generals, fell upon them in this post; and after meeting with a feeble resistance, [pg 163] put the enemy to flight, plundered their camp, and laid waste the adjacent country. Then, having taken Tunis,[675] an important city, and which brought him near Carthage, he made his army encamp there.

The enemy were in the utmost alarm. All things had succeeded ill with them, their forces had been defeated by sea and land, and upwards of two hundred towns had surrendered to the conqueror. Besides, the Numidians made greater havoc in their territories than even the Romans. They expected every moment to see their capital besieged. And their affliction was increased by the concourse of peasants with their wives and children, who flocked from all parts to Carthage for safety: which gave them melancholy apprehensions of a famine in case of a siege. Regulus, afraid of having the glory of his victories torn from him by a successor, made some proposal of an accommodation to the vanquished enemy; but the conditions appeared so hard, that they could not listen to them. As he did not doubt his being soon master of Carthage, he would not abate any thing in his demands; but, by an infatuation which is almost inseparable from great and unexpected success, he treated them with haughtiness; and pretended, that every thing he suffered them to possess, ought to be esteemed a favour; adding this farther insult, “That they ought either to overcome like brave men, or learn to submit to the victor.”[676] So harsh and disdainful a treatment only fired their resentment; [pg 164] and they resolved rather to die sword in hand, than to do any thing which might derogate from the dignity of Carthage.

Reduced to this fatal extremity, they received, in the happiest juncture, a reinforcement of auxiliary troops out of Greece, with Xanthippus the Lacedæmonian at their head, who had been educated in the discipline of Sparta, and learnt the art of war in that renowned and excellent school. When he had heard the circumstances of the last battle, which were told him at his request; had clearly discerned the occasion of its being lost; and perfectly informed himself in what the strength of Carthage consisted; he declared publicly, and repeated it often, in the hearing of the rest of the officers, that the misfortunes of the Carthaginians were owing entirely to the incapacity of their generals. These discourses came at last to the ear of the public council; the members of it were struck with them, and they requested him to attend them. He enforced his opinion with such strong and convincing reasons, that the oversights committed by the generals were visible to every one; and he proved as clearly, that, by a conduct opposite to the former, they would not only secure their dominions, but drive the enemy out of them. This speech revived the courage and hopes of the Carthaginians; and Xanthippus was entreated, and, in some measure, forced, to accept the command of the army. When the Carthaginians saw, in his exercising of their forces near the city, the manner in which he drew them up in order of battle, made them advance or retreat on the first signal, file off with order and expedition; in a word, perform all the evolutions and movements of the military art; they were struck with astonishment, and owned, that the ablest generals which Carthage had hitherto produced, knew nothing in comparison of Xanthippus.

The officers, soldiers, and every one, were lost in admiration; and, what is very uncommon, jealousy gave no alloy to it; the fear of the present danger, and the love of their country, stifling, without doubt, all other sentiments. The gloomy consternation, which had before seized the whole army, was succeeded by joy and alacrity. The soldiers were urgent to be led against the enemy, in the firm assurance (as they said) of [pg 165] being victorious under their new leader, and of obliterating the disgrace of former defeats. Xanthippus did not suffer their ardour to cool; and the sight of the enemy only inflamed it. When he had approached within little more than twelve hundred paces of them, he thought proper to call a council of war, in order to show respect to the Carthaginian generals, by consulting them. All unanimously deferred to his opinion; upon which it was resolved to give the enemy battle the following day.

The Carthaginian army was composed of twelve thousand foot, four thousand horse, and about a hundred elephants. That of the Romans, as near as may be guessed from what goes before, (for Polybius does not mention their numbers here,) consisted of fifteen thousand foot and three hundred horse.

It must be a noble sight to see two armies like these before us, not overcharged with numbers, but composed of brave soldiers, and commanded by very able generals, engaged in battle. In those tumultuous fights, where two or three hundred thousand are engaged on both sides, confusion is inevitable; and it is difficult, amidst a thousand events, where chance generally seems to have a greater share than counsel, to discover the true merit of commanders, and the real causes of victory. But in such engagements as this before us, nothing escapes the curiosity of the reader; for he clearly sees the disposition of the two armies; imagines he almost hears the orders given out by the generals; follows all the movements of the army; can point out the faults committed on both sides; and is thereby qualified to determine, with certainty, the causes to which the victory or defeat is owing. The success of this battle, however inconsiderable it may appear from the small number of the combatants, was nevertheless to decide the fate of Carthage.

The disposition of both armies was as follows. Xanthippus drew up all his elephants in front. Behind these, at some distance, he placed the Carthaginian infantry in one body or phalanx. The foreign troops in the Carthaginian service were posted, one part of them on the right, between the phalanx and the horse; and the other, composed of light-armed soldiers, in platoons, at the head of the two wings of the cavalry.

On the side of the Romans, as they apprehended the elephants most, Regulus, to provide against them, posted his light-armed soldiers, on a line, in the front of the legions. In the rear of these, he placed the cohorts one behind another, and the horse on the wings. In thus straitening the front of his main battle, to give it more depth, he indeed took a just precaution, says Polybius, against the elephants; but he did not provide for the inequality of his cavalry, which was much inferior in numbers to that of the enemy.

The two armies being thus drawn up, waited only for the signal. Xanthippus orders the elephants to advance, to break the ranks of the enemy; and commands the two wings of the cavalry to charge the Romans in flank. At the same time, the latter, clashing their arms, and shouting after the manner of their country, advance against the enemy. Their cavalry did not stand the onset long, being so much inferior to that of the Carthaginians. The infantry in the left wing, to avoid the attack of the elephants, and show how little they feared the mercenaries who formed the enemies' right wing, attacks it, puts it to flight, and pursues it to the camp. Those in the first ranks, who were opposed to the elephants, were broken and trodden under foot, after fighting valiantly; and the rest of the main body stood firm for some time, by reason of its great depth. But when the rear, being attacked by the enemy's cavalry, was obliged to face about and receive it; and those who had broken through the elephants, met the phalanx of the Carthaginians, which had not yet engaged, and which received them in good order, the Romans were routed on all sides, and entirely defeated. The greatest part of them were crushed to death by the enormous weight of the elephants: and the remainder, standing in the ranks, were shot through and through with arrows from the enemy's horse. Only a small number fled; and as they were in an open country, the horse and elephants killed a great part of them. Five hundred, or thereabouts, who went off with Regulus, were taken prisoners with him. The Carthaginians lost in this battle eight hundred mercenaries, who were opposed to the left wing of the Romans; and of the latter only two thousand escaped, who, by their pursuing the enemy's right wing, had drawn themselves out of [pg 167] the engagement. All the rest, Regulus and those taken with him excepted, were left dead in the field. The two thousand, who had escaped the slaughter, retired to Clypea, and were saved in an almost miraculous manner.

The Carthaginians, after having stripped the dead, entered Carthage in triumph, dragging after them the unfortunate Regulus, and five hundred prisoners. Their joy was so much the greater, as, but a very few days before, they had seen themselves upon the brink of ruin. The men and women, old and young people, crowded the temples, to return thanks to the immortal gods; and several days were devoted wholly to festivities and rejoicings.

Xanthippus, who had contributed so much to this happy change, had the wisdom to withdraw shortly after, from the apprehension lest his glory, which had hitherto been unsullied, might, after this first blaze, insensibly fade away, and leave him exposed to the darts of envy and calumny, which are always dangerous, but most in a foreign country, when a man stands alone, unsustained by friends and relations, and destitute of all support.

Polybius tells us, that Xanthippus's departure was related in a different manner, and promises to take notice of it in another place: but that part of his history has not come down to us. We read in Appian,[677] that the Carthaginians, excited by a mean and detestable jealousy of Xanthippus's glory, and unable to bear the thoughts that they should stand indebted to Sparta for their safety; upon pretence of conducting him and his attendants back with honour to his own country, with a numerous convoy of ships, gave private orders to have them all put to death in their passage; as if with him they could have buried in the waves for ever the memory of his services, and their horrid ingratitude to him.[678]

“This battle,” says Polybius,[679] “though not so considerable as many others, may yet furnish very salutary instructions; which,” adds that author, “is the greatest benefit that can be reaped from the study of history.”

First, ought any man to put a great confidence in his good fortune, after he has considered the fate of Regulus? That general, insolent with victory, inexorable to the conquered, scarcely deigning to listen to them, saw himself a few days after vanquished by them, and made their prisoner. Hannibal suggested the same reflection to Scipio, when he exhorted him not to be dazzled with the success of his arms. Regulus, said he, would have been recorded as one of the most uncommon instances of valour and felicity, had he, after the victory obtained in this very country, granted our fathers the peace which they sued for. But putting no bounds to his ambition and the insolence of success, the greater his prosperity, the more ignominious was his fall.[680]

In the second place, the truth of the saying of Euripides is here seen in its full extent, “That one wise head is worth a great many hands.”[681] A single man here changes the whole face of affairs. On one hand, he defeats troops which were thought invincible; on the other, he revives the courage of a city and an army, whom he had found in consternation and despair.

Such, as Polybius observes, is the use which ought to be made of the study of history. For there being two ways of [pg 169] acquiring improvement and instruction, first by one's own experience, and secondly by that of other men; it is much more wise and useful to improve by other men's miscarriages than by our own.

I return to Regulus, that I may here finish what relates to him; Polybius, to our great disappointment, taking no further notice of that general.[682]

A.M. 3755. A. Rom. 499.

After being kept some years in prison, he was sent to Rome to propose an exchange of prisoners.[683] He had been obliged to take an oath, that he would return in case he proved unsuccessful. He then acquainted the senate with the subject of his voyage; and being invited by them to give his opinion freely, he answered, that he could no longer do it as a senator, having lost both this quality, and that of a Roman citizen, from the time that he had fallen into the hands of his enemies; but he did not refuse to offer his thoughts as a private person. This was a very delicate affair. Every one was touched with the misfortunes of so great a man. “He needed only,” says Cicero, “to have spoken one [pg 170] word, and it would have restored him to his liberty, his estate, his dignity, his wife, his children, and his country;” but that word appeared to him contrary to the honour and welfare of the state. He therefore plainly declared, that an exchange of prisoners ought not to be so much as thought of: that such an example would be of fatal consequence to the republic: that citizens who had so basely surrendered their arms to the enemy, were unworthy of the least compassion, and incapable of serving their country; that with regard to himself, as he was so far advanced in years, his death ought to be considered as nothing; whereas they had in their hands several Carthaginian generals, in the flower of their age, and capable of doing their country great services for many years. It was with difficulty that the senate complied with so generous and unexampled a counsel. The illustrious exile therefore left Rome, in order to return to Carthage, unmoved either with the deep affliction of his friends, or the tears of his wife and children, although he knew but too well the grievous torments which were prepared for him.[684] And indeed, the moment his enemies saw him returned without having obtained the exchange of prisoners, they put him to every kind of torture their barbarous cruelty could invent. They imprisoned him for a long time in a dismal dungeon, whence (after cutting off his eye-lids) they drew him at once into the sun, when its beams darted the strongest heat. They next put him into a kind of chest stuck full of nails, whose points wounding him did not allow him a moment's ease either day or night. Lastly, after having been long tormented by being kept for ever awake in this dreadful torture, his merciless enemies nailed him to a cross, their usual punishment, and left him to expire on it. Such was the end of this great man. His enemies, by depriving him of some days, perhaps years, of life, brought eternal infamy on themselves.

The blow which the Romans had received in Africa did not discourage them.[685] They made greater preparations than before, to retrieve their loss; and put to sea, the following campaign, three hundred and sixty vessels. The Carthaginians sailed out to meet them with two hundred; but were [pg 171] beaten in an engagement fought on the coasts of Sicily, and a hundred and fourteen of their ships were taken by the Romans. The latter sailed into Africa to take in the few soldiers who had escaped the pursuit of the enemy, after the defeat of Regulus; and had defended themselves vigorously in Clupea,[686] where they had been unsuccessfully besieged.

Here again we are astonished that the Romans, after so considerable a victory, and with so large a fleet, should sail into Africa, only to bring from thence a small garrison; whereas they might have attempted the conquest of it, since Regulus, with much fewer forces, had almost completed it.

The Romans, on their return, were overtaken by a storm, which almost destroyed their whole fleet.[687] The like misfortune befell them also the following year.[688] However, they consoled themselves for this double loss, by a victory which they gained over Asdrubal, from whom they took near a hundred and forty elephants. This news being brought to Rome, filled the whole city with joy; not only because the strength of the enemy's army was considerably diminished by the loss of their elephants, but chiefly because this victory had inspired the land forces with fresh courage; who, since the defeat of Regulus, had not dared to venture upon an engagement; so great was the terror with which those formidable animals had filled the minds of all the soldiers. It was therefore judged proper to make a greater effort than ever, in order to finish, if possible, a war which had continued fourteen years. The two consuls set sail with a fleet of two hundred ships, and arriving in Sicily, formed the bold design of besieging Lilybæum. This was the strongest town which the Carthaginians possessed, and the loss of it would be attended with that of every part of the island and open to the Romans a free passage into Africa.

The reader will suppose, that the utmost ardour was shown, both in the assault and defence of the place.[689] Imilcon was governor there, with ten thousand regular forces, exclusive of the inhabitants; and Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar, soon brought him as many more from Carthage; he having, with [pg 172] the most intrepid courage, forced his way through the enemy's fleet, and arrived happily in the port.

The Romans had not lost any time. Having brought forward their engines, they beat down several towers with their battering rams; and gaining ground daily, they made such progress, as gave the besieged, who now were closely pressed, some fears. The governor saw plainly that there was no other way left to save the city, but by firing the engines of the besiegers. Having therefore prepared his forces for this enterprise, he sent them out at daybreak with torches in their hands, tow, and all kind of combustible matters; and at the same time attacked all the engines. The Romans exerted their utmost efforts to repel them, and the engagement was very bloody. Every man, assailant as well as defendant, stood to his post, and chose to die rather than quit it. At last, after a long resistance and dreadful slaughter, the besieged sounded a retreat, and left the Romans in possession of their works. This conflict being over, Hannibal embarked in the night, and concealing his departure from the enemy, sailed for Drepanum, where Adherbal commanded for the Carthaginians. Drepanum was advantageously situated; having a commodious port, and lying about a hundred and twenty furlongs from Lilybæum; and the Carthaginians had been always very desirous of preserving it.

The Romans, animated by their late success, renewed the attack with greater vigour than ever; the besieged not daring to make a second attempt to burn their machines, so much were they disheartened by the ill success of the former. But a furious wind rising suddenly, some mercenary soldiers represented to the governor, that now was the favourable opportunity for them to fire the engines of the besiegers, especially as the wind blew full against them; and they offered themselves for the enterprise. The offer was accepted, and accordingly they were furnished with every thing necessary. In a moment the fire caught all the engines; and the Romans could not possibly extinguish it, because the flames being spread instantly every where, the wind carried the sparks and smoke full in their eyes, so that they could not see where to apply [pg 173] relief; whereas their enemies saw clearly where to aim their strokes, and throw their fire. This accident made the Romans lose all hopes of being ever able to carry the place by force. They therefore turned the siege into a blockade; raised a strong line of contravallation round the town; and, dispersing their army in every part of the neighbourhood, resolved to effect by time, what they found themselves absolutely unable to perform any other way.

When the transactions of the siege of Lilybæum, and the loss of part of the forces, were known at Rome, the citizens, so far from desponding at this ill news, seemed to be fired with new vigour.[690] Every man strove to be foremost in the muster roll; so that, in a very little time, an army of ten thousand men was raised, who, crossing the strait, marched by land to join the besiegers.

A.M. 3756. A. Rom. 500.

At the same time, P. Claudius Pulcher, the consul, formed a design of attacking Adherbal in Drepanum.[691] He thought himself sure of surprising him, because, after the loss lately sustained by the Romans at Lilybæum, the enemy could not imagine that they would venture out again at sea. Flushed with these hopes, he sailed out with his fleet in the night, the better to conceal his design. But he had to do with an active general, whose vigilance he could not elude, and who did not even give him time to draw up his ships in line of battle, but fell vigorously upon him whilst his fleet was in disorder and confusion. The Carthaginians gained a complete victory. Of the Roman fleet, only thirty vessels got off, which being in company with the consul, fled with him, and got away in the best manner they could along the coast. All the rest, amounting to fourscore and thirteen, with the men on board them, were taken by the Carthaginians; a few soldiers excepted, who had escaped from the wreck of their vessels. This victory displayed as much the prudence and valour of Adherbal, as it reflected shame and ignominy on the Roman consul.

Junius, his colleague, was neither more prudent nor more fortunate than himself, but lost his whole fleet by his ill conduct.[692] Endeavouring to atone for his misfortune by some [pg 174] considerable action, he held a secret correspondence with the inhabitants of Eryx,[693] and by that means got the city surrendered to him. On the summit of the mountain stood the temple of Venus Erycina, which was certainly the most beautiful as well as the richest of all the Sicilian temples. The city stood a little below the summit of this mountain, and the only access to it was by a road very long and very rugged. Junius posted one part of his troops upon the top, and the remainder at the foot of the mountain, imagining that he now had nothing to fear; but Hamilcar, surnamed Barca, father of the famous Hannibal, found means to get into the city, which lay between the two camps of the enemy, and there fortified himself. From this advantageous post he harassed the Romans incessantly for two years. One can scarce conceive how it was possible for the Carthaginians to defend themselves, when thus attacked from both the summit and foot of the mountain; and unable to get provisions, but from a little port, which was the only one open to them. By such enterprises as these, the abilities and prudent courage of a general, are as well, or perhaps better discovered, than by the winning of a battle.

For five years, nothing memorable was performed on either side.[694] The Romans had imagined that their land forces would alone be capable of finishing the siege of Lilybæum: but as they saw it protracted beyond their expectation, they returned to their first plan, and made extraordinary efforts to fit out a new fleet. The public treasury was at a low ebb; but this want was supplied by the zeal of individuals; so ardent was the love which the Romans bore their country. Every man, according to his circumstances, contributed to the common expense; and, upon public security, advanced money, without the least scruple, for an expedition on which the glory and safety of Rome depended. One man fitted out a ship at his own charge; another was equipped by the contributions of two or three; so that, in a very little time, two hundred were ready for sailing.

A.M. 3763. A. Rom. 507.

The command was given to Lutatius the consul, who immediately put to sea. [pg 175] The enemy's fleet had retired into Africa: the consul therefore easily seized upon all the advantageous posts in the neighbourhood of Lilybæum; and foreseeing that he should soon be forced to fight, he omitted no precautions to ensure success; and employed the interval in exercising his soldiers and seamen at sea.

He was soon informed that the Carthaginian fleet drew near, under the command of Hanno, who landed in a small island called Hiera, opposite to Drepanum. His design was to reach Eryx undiscovered by the Romans, in order to supply the army there; to reinforce his troops, and take Barca on board to assist him in the expected engagement. But the consul, suspecting his intention, was beforehand with him; and having assembled all his best forces, sailed for the small island Ægusa,[695] which lay near the other. He acquainted his officers with the design he had of attacking the enemy on the morrow. Accordingly, at daybreak, he prepared to engage: unfortunately the wind was favourable for the enemy, which made him hesitate whether he should give him battle. But considering that the Carthaginian fleet, when unloaded of its provisions, would become lighter and more fit for action; and, besides, would be considerably strengthened by the forces and presence of Barca he came to a resolution at once; and, notwithstanding the foul weather, made directly to the enemy. The consul had choice forces, able seamen, and excellent ships, built after the model of a galley that had been lately taken from the enemy; and which was the completest in its kind that had ever been seen. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, were destitute of all these advantages. As they had been the entire masters at sea for some years, and the Romans did not once dare to face them, they held them in the highest contempt, and looked upon themselves as invincible. On the first report of the enemy being in motion, the Carthaginians had put to sea a fleet fitted out in haste, as appeared from every circumstance of it: the soldiers and seamen being all mercenaries, newly levied, without the least experience, resolution, or zeal, since it was not for their own country they were going to fight. This soon appeared in the engagement. They could not sustain the first [pg 176] attack. Fifty of their vessels were sunk, and seventy taken, with their whole crews. The rest, favoured by a wind which rose very seasonably for them, made the best of their way to the little island from whence they had sailed. There were upwards of ten thousand taken prisoners. The consul sailed immediately for Lilybæum, and joined his forces to those of the besiegers.

When the news of this defeat arrived at Carthage, it occasioned so much the greater surprise and terror, as it was less expected. The senate, however, did not lose their courage, though they saw themselves quite unable to continue the war. As the Romans were now masters of the sea, it was not possible for the Carthaginians to send either provisions, or reinforcements, to the armies in Sicily. An express was therefore immediately despatched to Barca, the general there, empowering him to act as he should think proper. Barca, so long as he had room to entertain the least hopes, had done every thing that could be expected from the most intrepid courage and the most consummate wisdom. But having now no resource left, he sent a deputation to the consul, in order to treat about a peace. “Prudence,” says Polybius, “consists in knowing how to resist and yield at a seasonable juncture.” Lutatius was not insensible how tired the Romans were grown of a war, which had exhausted them both of men and money; and the dreadful consequences which had attended on Regulus's inexorable and imprudent obstinacy, were fresh in his memory. He therefore complied without difficulty, and dictated the following treaty.

There shall be peace between Rome and Carthage (in case the Roman people approve of it) on the following conditions: The Carthaginians shall evacuate all Sicily; shall no longer make war upon Hiero, the Syracusans, or their allies: They shall restore to the Romans, without ransom, all the prisoners which they have taken from them; and pay them, within twenty years, two thousand two hundred Euboic talents of silver.[696] It is worth the reader's [pg 177] remarking, by the way, the simple, exact, and clear terms in which this treaty is expressed; that, in so short a compass, adjusts the interests of two powerful republics and their allies, both by sea and land.

When these conditions were brought to Rome, the people, not approving of them, sent ten commissioners to Sicily, to terminate the affair. These made no alteration as to the substance of the treaty;[697] only shortening the time appointed for the payment, reducing it to ten years: a thousand talents were added to the sum that had been stipulated, which were to be paid immediately; and the Carthaginians were required to depart out of all the islands situated between Italy and Sicily. Sardinia was not comprehended in this treaty; but they gave it up by another treaty which was made some years afterwards.

A.M. 3763. A. Carth. 605. A. Rom. 507. Ant. J.C. 241.

Such was the conclusion of a war, one of the longest mentioned in history, since it continued twenty-four years without intermission. The obstinacy, in disputing for empire, was equal on either side: the same resolution, the same greatness of soul, in forming as well as in executing of projects, being conspicuous on both sides. The Carthaginians had the superiority in their acquaintance with naval affairs; in their skill in the construction of their vessels; the working of them; the experience and capacity of their pilots; the knowledge of coasts, shallows, roads, and winds; and in the inexhaustible fund of wealth, which furnished all the expenses of so long and obstinate a war. The Romans had none of these advantages; but their courage, zeal for the public good, love of their country, and a noble emulation of glory, supplied all other deficiencies. We are astonished to see a nation, so raw and inexperienced in naval affairs, not only making head against a people who were better skilled in them, and more powerful than any that had ever been before; but even gaining several victories over them at sea. No difficulties or calamities could discourage them. They certainly would not have thought of peace, in the circumstances under which the Carthaginians demanded it. One [pg 178] unfortunate campaign dispirits the latter; whereas the Romans are not shaken by a succession of them.

As to soldiers, there was no comparison between those of Rome and Carthage, the former being infinitely superior in point of courage. Among the generals who commanded in this war, Hamilcar, surnamed Barca, was, doubtless, the most conspicuous for his bravery and prudence.

The Libyan War; or against the Mercenaries.[698]—The war which the Carthaginians waged against the Romans, was succeeded immediately by another,[699] which, though of much shorter continuance, was infinitely more dangerous; as it was carried on in the very heart of the republic, and attended with such cruelty and barbarity, as is scarce to be paralleled in history; I mean the war which the Carthaginians were obliged to sustain against their mercenary troops, who had served under them in Sicily, and which is commonly called the African or Libyan war.[700] It continued only three years and a half, but was a very bloody one. The occasion of it was this:

As soon as the treaty was concluded with the Romans,[701] Hamilcar, having carried to Lilybæum the forces which were in Eryx, resigned his commission; and left to Gisgo, governor of the place, the care of transporting these forces into Africa. Gisgo, as though he had foreseen what would happen, did not ship them all off at once, but in small and separate parties, in order that those who came first might be paid off, and sent home, before the arrival of the rest. This conduct evinced great forecast and wisdom, but was not seconded equally at Carthage. As the republic had been exhausted by the expense of a long war, and the payment of near one hundred and thirty thousand pounds to the Romans on signing the peace, the forces were not paid off in proportion as they arrived; but it was thought proper to wait for the rest, in the hopes of obtaining from them (when they should be all together) a remission of some part of their arrears. This was the first oversight.

Here we discover the genius of a state composed of merchants, who know the full value of money, but are little [pg 179] acquainted with that of the services of soldiers; who bargain for blood, as though it were an article of trade, and always go to the cheapest market. In such a republic, when an exigency is once answered, the merit of services is no longer remembered.

These soldiers, most of whom came to Carthage, having been long accustomed to a licentious life, caused great disturbances in the city; to remedy which, it was proposed to their officers, to march them all to a little neighbouring town called Sicca, and there supply them with whatever was necessary for their subsistence, till the arrival of the rest of their companions; and that then they should all be paid off, and sent home. This was a second oversight.

A third was, the refusing to let them leave their baggage, their wives, and children in Carthage, as they desired; and the forcing them to remove these to Sicca; whereas, had they staid in Carthage, they would have been in a manner so many hostages.

Being all met together at Sicca, they began (having little else to do) to compute the arrears of their pay, which they made amount to much more than was really due to them. To this computation, they added the mighty promises which had been made them, at different times, as an encouragement for them to do their duty; and pretended that these likewise ought to be brought into the account. Hanno, who was then governor of Africa, and had been sent to them from the magistrates of Carthage, proposed to them to consent to some abatement of their arrears; and to content themselves with receiving a part, in consideration of the great distress to which the commonwealth was reduced, and its present unhappy circumstances. The reader will easily guess how such a proposal was received. Complaints, murmurs, seditious and insolent clamours, were every where heard. These troops being composed of different nations, who were strangers to one another's language, were incapable of hearing reason when they once mutinied. Spaniards, Gauls, Ligurians; inhabitants of the Balearic isles; Greeks, the greatest part of them slaves or deserters, and a very great number of Africans, composed these mercenary forces. Transported with rage, they immediately [pg 180] break up, march towards Carthage, (being upwards of twenty thousand,) and encamp at Tunis, not far from that metropolis.

The Carthaginians discovered too late their error. There was no compliance, how grovelling soever, to which they did not stoop, to soothe these exasperated soldiers: who, on their side, practised every knavish art which could be thought of, in order to extort money from them. When one point was gained, they immediately had recourse to a new artifice, on which to ground some new demand. Was their pay settled beyond the agreement made with them, they still would be reimbursed for the losses which they pretended to have sustained, either by the death of their horses, by the excessive price which, at certain times, they had paid for bread-corn; and still insisted on the recompense which had been promised them. As nothing could be fixed, the Carthaginians, with great difficulty, prevailed on them to refer themselves to the opinion of some general who had commanded in Sicily. Accordingly they pitched upon Gisgo, who had always been very acceptable to them. This general harangued them in a mild and insinuating manner; recalled to their memories the long time they had been in the Carthaginian service; the considerable sums they had received from the republic; and granted almost all their demands.

The treaty was upon the point of being concluded, when two mutineers occasioned a tumult in every part of the camp. One of those was Spendius a Capuan, who had been a slave at Rome, and had fled to the Carthaginians. He was tall and bold. The fear he was under, of falling into the hands of his former master, by whom he was sure to be hanged, (as was the custom,) prompted him to break off the agreement. He was seconded by one Matho,[702] who had been very active in forming the conspiracy. These two represented to the Africans, that the instant after their companions should be discharged and sent home, they, being thus left alone in their own country, [pg 181] would fall a sacrifice to the rage of the Carthaginians, who would take vengeance upon them for the common rebellion. This was sufficient to raise them to fury. They immediately made choice of Spendius and Matho for their chiefs. No remonstrances were heard; and whoever offered to make any, was immediately put to death. They ran to Gisgo's tent, plundered it of the money designed for the payment of the forces: dragged that general himself to prison, with all his attendants; after having treated them with the utmost indignities. All the cities of Africa, to whom they had sent deputies to exhort them to recover their liberty, came over to them, Utica and Hippacra excepted, which they therefore immediately besieged.

Carthage had never been before exposed to such imminent danger. The citizens individually drew each his subsistence from the rents or revenues of their lands, and the public expenses from the tribute paid by Africa. But all this was stopped at once; and (a much worse circumstance) was turned against them. They found themselves destitute of arms and forces, either for sea or land; of all necessary preparations either for the sustaining of a siege, or the equipping of a fleet; and, to complete their misfortunes, without any hopes of foreign assistance, either from their friends or allies.

They might, in some sense, impute to themselves the distress to which they were reduced. During the last war, they had treated the African nations with the utmost rigour, by imposing excessive tributes on them, in the exaction of which no allowance was made for poverty and extreme misery; and governors, such as Hanno, were treated with the greater respect, the more severe they had been in levying those tributes. So that no great efforts were necessary to prevail upon the Africans to engage in this rebellion. At the very first signal that was made, it broke out, and in a moment became general. The women, who had often, with the deepest affliction, seen their husbands and fathers dragged to prison for non-payment, were more exasperated than the men; and with pleasure gave up all their ornaments towards the expenses of the war; so that the chiefs of the rebels, after paying all they had promised the soldiers, found themselves still in the midst of plenty: an [pg 182] instructive lesson, says Polybius, to ministers, how a people should be treated; as it teaches them to look, not only to the present occasion, but to extend their views to futurity.

The Carthaginians, notwithstanding their present distress, did not despond, but made the most extraordinary efforts. The command of the army was given to Hanno. Troops were levied by land and sea; horse as well as foot. All citizens, capable of bearing arms, were mustered; mercenaries were invited from all parts; and all the ships which the republic had left were refitted.

The rebels discovered no less ardour. We related before, that they had formed the siege of the two only cities which refused to join them. Their army was now increased to seventy thousand men. After detachments had been drawn from it to carry on those sieges, they pitched their camp at Tunis; and thereby held Carthage in a kind of blockade, filling it with perpetual alarms, and frequently advancing up to its very walls by day as well as by night.

Hanno had marched to the relief of Utica, and gained a considerable advantage, which, had he made a proper use of it, might have proved decisive: but entering the city, and only diverting himself there, the mercenaries, who had retreated to a neighbouring hill covered with trees, hearing how careless the enemy were, poured down upon them; found the soldiers straggling in all parts; took and plundered the camp, and seized upon all the supplies that had been brought from Carthage for the relief of the besieged. Nor was this the only error committed by Hanno; and errors, in such critical junctures, are much the most fatal. Hamilcar, surnamed Barca, was therefore appointed to succeed him. This general answered the idea which had been entertained of him; and his first success was the obliging the rebels to raise the siege of Utica. He then marched against their army which was encamped near Carthage; defeated part of it, and seized almost all their advantageous posts. These successes revived the courage of the Carthaginians.

The arrival of a young Numidian nobleman, Naravasus by name, who, out of esteem for the person and merit of Barca, joined him with two thousand Numidians, was of great service [pg 183] to that general. Animated by this reinforcement, he fell upon the rebels, who had cooped him up in a valley; killed ten thousand of them, and took four thousand prisoners. The young Numidian distinguished himself greatly in this battle. Barca took into his troops as many of the prisoners as were desirous of being enlisted, and gave the rest free liberty to go wherever they pleased, on condition that they should never take up arms any more against the Carthaginians; otherwise, that every man of them, if taken, should be put to death. This conduct proves the wisdom of that general. He thought this a better expedient than extreme severity. And indeed where a multitude of mutineers are concerned, the greatest part of whom have been drawn in by the persuasions of the most hotheaded, or through fear of the most furious, clemency seldom fails of being successful.

Spendius, the chief of the rebels, fearing that this affected lenity of Barca might occasion a defection among his troops, thought the only expedient left him to prevent it, would be, to strike some signal blow, which would deprive them of all hopes of being ever reconciled to the enemy. With this view, after having read to them some fictitious letters, by which advice was given him, of a secret design concerted betwixt some of their comrades and Gisgo for rescuing him out of prison, where he had been so long detained; he brought them to the barbarous resolution of murdering him and all the rest of the prisoners; and any man, who durst offer any milder counsel, was immediately sacrificed to their fury. Accordingly, this unfortunate general, and seven hundred prisoners who were confined with him, were brought out to the front of the camp, where Gisgo fell the first sacrifice, and afterwards all the rest. Their hands were cut off, their thighs broken, and their bodies, still breathing, were thrown into a hole. The Carthaginians sent a herald to demand their remains, in order to pay them the last sad office, but were refused; and the herald was further told, that whoever presumed to come upon the like errand, should meet with Gisgo's fate. And, indeed, the rebels immediately came to the unanimous resolution, of treating all such Carthaginians as should fall into their hands in the same barbarous manner; and decreed farther, that if any of their allies [pg 184] were taken, they should, after their hands were cut off, be sent back to Carthage. This bloody resolution was but too punctually executed.

The Carthaginians were now just beginning to breathe, as it were, and recover their spirits, when a number of unlucky accidents plunged them again into fresh dangers. A division arose among their generals; and the provisions, of which they were in extreme necessity, coming to them by sea, were all cast away in a storm. But the misfortune which they most keenly felt, was, the sudden defection of the two only cities which till then had preserved their allegiance, and in all times adhered inviolably to the commonwealth. These were Utica and Hippacra. These cities, without the least reason, or even so much as a pretence, went over at once to the rebels; and, transported with the like rage and fury, murdered the governor, with the garrison sent to their relief; and carried their inhumanity so far, as to refuse their dead bodies to the Carthaginians, who demanded them back in order for burial.

The rebels, animated by so much success, laid siege to Carthage, but were obliged immediately to raise it. They nevertheless continued the war. Having drawn together, into one body, all their own troops and those of the allies, (making upwards of fifty thousand men in all,) they watched the motions of Hamilcar's army, but carefully kept their own on the hills; and avoided coming down into the plains, because the enemy would there have had too great an advantage over them, on account of their elephants and cavalry. Hamilcar, more skilful in the art of war than they, never exposed himself to any of their attacks; but taking advantage of their oversights, often dispossessed them of their posts, if their soldiers straggled but ever so little; and harassed them a thousand ways. Such of them as fell into his hands, were thrown to wild beasts. At last, he surprised them at a time when they least expected it, and shut them up in a post which was so situated, that it was impossible for them to get out of it. Not daring to venture a battle, and being unable to get off, they began to fortify their camp, and surrounded it with ditches and intrenchments. But an enemy among themselves, and which was much more formidable, had reduced them to the greatest extremity: this was [pg 185] hunger, which was so raging, that they at last ate one another; Divine Providence, says Polybius, thus revenging upon themselves the barbarous cruelty they had exercised on others. They now had no resource left; and knew but too well the punishments which would be inflicted on them, in case they should fall alive into the hands of the enemy. After such bloody scenes as had been acted by them, they did not so much as think of peace, or of coming to an accommodation. They had sent to their forces encamped at Tunis for assistance, but with no success. In the mean time the famine increased daily. They had first eaten their prisoners, then their slaves; and now their fellow-citizens only were left. Their chiefs, now no longer able to resist the complaints and cries of the multitude, who threatened to massacre them if they did not surrender, went themselves to Hamilcar, after having obtained a safe conduct from him. The conditions of the treaty were, that the Carthaginians should select any ten of the rebels, to treat them as they should think fit, and that the rest should be dismissed with only one suit of clothes for each. When the treaty was signed, the chiefs themselves were arrested and detained by the Carthaginians, who plainly showed, on this occasion, that they did not pride themselves upon their good faith and sincerity. The rebels, hearing that their chiefs were seized, and knowing nothing of the convention, suspected that they were betrayed, and thereupon immediately took up arms. But Hamilcar, having surrounded them, brought forward his elephants; and either trod them all under foot, or cut them to pieces, they being upwards of forty thousand.

The consequence of this victory was, the reduction of almost all the cities of Africa, which immediately returned to their allegiance. Hamilcar, without loss of time, marched against Tunis, which, ever since the beginning of the war, had been the asylum of the rebels, and their place of arms. He invested it on one side, whilst Hannibal, who was joined in the command with him, besieged it on the other. Then advancing near the walls, and ordering crosses to be set up, he hung Spendius on one of them, and his companions who had been seized with him on the rest, where they all expired. Matho, the other chief, who commanded in the city, saw plainly by [pg 186] this what he himself might expect; and for that reason was much more attentive to his own defence. Perceiving that Hannibal, as being confident of success, was very negligent in all his motions, he made a sally, attacked his quarters, killed many of his men, took several prisoners, among whom was Hannibal himself, and plundered his camp. Then taking Spendius from the cross, he put Hannibal in his place, after having made him suffer inexpressible torments; and sacrificed round the body of Spendius thirty citizens of the first quality in Carthage, as so many victims of his vengeance. One would conclude, that there had been a mutual emulation betwixt the contending parties, which of them should outdo the other in acts of the most barbarous cruelty.

Barca being at that time at a distance, it was long before the news of his colleague's misfortune reached him; and besides, the road lying betwixt the two camps being impassable, it was impossible for him to advance hastily to his assistance. This disastrous accident caused a great consternation in Carthage. The reader may have observed, in the course of this war, a continual vicissitude of prosperity and adversity, of security and fear, of joy and grief; so various and inconstant were the events on either side.

In Carthage it was thought advisable to make one bold effort. Accordingly, all the youth capable of bearing arms were pressed into the service. Hanno was sent to join Hamilcar; and thirty senators were deputed to conjure those generals, in the name of the republic, to forget past quarrels, and sacrifice their resentments to their country's welfare. This was immediately complied with; they mutually embraced, and were reconciled sincerely to one another.

From this time, the Carthaginians were successful in all things; and Matho, who in every attempt after this came off with disadvantage, at last thought himself obliged to hazard a battle; and this was just what the Carthaginians wanted. The leaders on both sides animated their troops, as going to fight a battle which would for ever decide their fate. An engagement ensued. Victory was not long in suspense; for the rebels every where giving ground, the Africans were almost all slain, and the rest surrendered. Matho was taken alive [pg 187] and carried to Carthage. All Africa returned immediately to its allegiance, except the two perfidious cities which had lately revolted; however, they were soon forced to surrender at discretion.

And now the victorious army returned to Carthage, and was there received with shouts of joy, and the congratulations of the whole city. Matho and his soldiers, after having adorned the public triumph, were led to execution; and finished, by a painful and ignominious death, a life that had been polluted with the blackest treasons and unparalleled barbarities. Such was the conclusion of the war against the mercenaries, after having lasted three years and four months. It furnished, says Polybius, an ever-memorable lesson to all nations, not to employ in their armies a greater number of mercenaries than citizens; nor to rely, for the defence of their state, on a body of men who are not attached to it either by interest or affection.

I have hitherto purposely deferred taking notice of such transactions in Sardinia, as passed at the time I have been speaking of, and which were, in some measure, dependent on, and resulting from, the war waged in Africa against the mercenaries. They exhibit the same violent methods to promote rebellion; the same excesses of cruelty; as if the wind had carried the same spirit of discord and fury from Africa into Sardinia.

When the news was brought there of what Spendius and Matho were doing in Africa, the mercenaries in that island also shook off the yoke, in imitation of these incendiaries. They began by the murder of Bostar their general, and of all the Carthaginians under him. A successor was sent; but all the forces which he carried with him went over to the rebels; hung the general on a cross; and, throughout the whole island, put all the Carthaginians to the sword, after having made them suffer inexpressible torments. They then besieged all the cities one after another, and soon got possession of the whole country. But feuds arising between them and the natives, the mercenaries were driven entirely out of the island, and took refuge in Italy. Thus the Carthaginians lost Sardinia, an island of great importance to them, on account of its extent, its fertility, and the great number of its inhabitants.

The Romans, ever since their treaty with the Carthaginians, had behaved towards them with great justice and moderation. A slight quarrel, on account of some Roman merchants who were seized at Carthage for having supplied the enemy with provisions, had embroiled them a little. But these merchants being restored on the first complaint made to the senate of Carthage; the Romans, who prided themselves upon their justice and generosity on all occasions, made the Carthaginians a return of their former friendship; served them to the utmost of their power; forbade their merchants to furnish any other nation with provisions; and even refused to listen to the proposals made by the Sardinian rebels, when invited by them to take possession of the island.

But these scruples and delicacy wore off by degrees; and Cæsar's advantageous testimony (in Sallust) of their honesty and plain-dealing, could not with any propriety be applied here:[703] “Although,” says he, “in all the Punic wars, the Carthaginians, both in peace and during truces, had committed a number of detestable actions, the Romans could never (how inviting soever the opportunity might be) be prevailed upon to retaliate such usage; being more attentive to their own glory, than to the revenge they might have justly taken on such perfidious enemies.”

A.M. 3767. A. Carth. 609. A. Rom. 511. Ant. J.C. 237.

The mercenaries, who, as was observed, had retired into Italy, brought the Romans at last to the resolution of sailing over into Sardinia, to render themselves masters of it. The Carthaginians were deeply afflicted at the news, upon pretence that they had a more just title to Sardinia than the Romans; they therefore put themselves in a posture to take a speedy and just revenge on those who had excited the people of that island to take up arms against them. But the Romans, pretending that these preparations were made not against Sardinia but their state, declared war against the Carthaginians. The latter, quite exhausted in every respect, and scarce beginning to breathe, were in no condition to sustain a war. The [pg 189] necessity of the times was therefore to be complied with, and they were forced to yield to a more powerful rival. A fresh treaty was thereupon made, by which they gave up Sardinia to the Romans; and obliged themselves to a new payment of twelve hundred talents, to keep off the war with which they were menaced. This injustice of the Romans was the true cause of the second Punic war, as will appear in the sequel.

The second Punic War.[704]—The second Punic war, which I am now going to relate, is one of the most memorable recorded in history, and most worthy the attention of an inquisitive reader; whether we consider the boldness of the enterprises; the wisdom employed in the execution; the obstinate efforts of two rival nations, and the ready resources they found in their lowest ebb of fortune; the variety of uncommon events, and the uncertain issue of so long and bloody a war; or lastly, the assemblage of the most perfect models in every kind of merit; and the most instructive lessons that occur in history, either with regard to war, policy, or government. Never did two more powerful, or at least more warlike, states or nations make war against each other; and never had these in question seen themselves raised to a more exalted pitch of power and glory. Rome and Carthage were, doubtless, at that time, the two first states of the world. Having already tried their strength in the first Punic war, and thereby made an essay of each other's power, they knew perfectly well what either could do. In this second war, the fate of arms was so equally balanced, and the success so intermixed with vicissitudes and varieties, that that party triumphed which had been most in danger of being ruined. Great as the forces of these two nations were, it may almost be said, that their mutual hatred was still greater. The Romans, on one side, could not without indignation see the vanquished presuming to attack them; and the Carthaginians, on the other, were exasperated at the equally rapacious and harsh treatment which they pretended to have received from the victor.

The plan which I have laid down does not permit me to enter into an exact detail of this war, whereof Italy, Sicily, [pg 190] Spain, and Africa, were the several seats; and which has a still closer connection with the Roman history than with that I am now writing. I shall confine myself therefore, principally, to such transactions as relate to the Carthaginians: and endeavour, as far as I am able, to give my reader an idea of the genius and character of Hannibal, who perhaps was the greatest warrior that antiquity has to boast of.

The remote and more immediate Causes of the second Punic War.—Before I come to speak of the declaration of war betwixt the Romans and Carthaginians, I think it necessary to explain the true causes of it; and to point out by what steps this rupture, betwixt these two nations, was so long preparing, before it openly broke out.

That man would be grossly mistaken, says Polybius,[705] who should look upon the taking of Saguntum by Hannibal as the true cause of the second Punic war. The regret of the Carthaginians for having so tamely given up Sicily, by the treaty which terminated the first Punic war; the injustice and violence of the Romans, who took advantage of the troubles excited in Africa, to dispossess the Carthaginians of Sardinia, and to impose a new tribute on them; and the success and conquests of the latter in Spain; these were the true causes of the violation of the treaty, as Livy[706] (agreeing here with Polybius) insinuates in few words, in the beginning of his history of the second Punic war.

And indeed Hamilcar, surnamed Barca, was highly exasperated on account of the last treaty, which the necessity of the times had compelled the Carthaginians to submit to; and he therefore meditated the design of taking just, though distant measures, for breaking it on the first favourable opportunity that should offer.

When the troubles of Africa were appeased, he was sent upon an expedition against the Numidians;[707] in which, giving fresh proofs of his courage and abilities, his merit raised him to the command of the army which was to act in Spain. Hannibal, [pg 191] his son, at that time but nine years of age, begged with the utmost importunity to attend him on this occasion;[708] and for that purpose employed all the soothing arts so common to children of his age, and which have so much power over a tender father. Hamilcar could not refuse him; and after having made him swear upon the altars, that he would declare himself an enemy to the Romans as soon as age would allow him to do it, he took his son with him.

Hamilcar possessed all the qualities which constitute the great general. To an invincible courage, and the most consummate prudence, he added a most engaging and insinuating behaviour. He subdued, in a very short time, the greatest part of the nations of Spain, either by the terror of his arms or his engaging conduct; and after enjoying the command there nine years, came to an end worthy his exalted character, dying gloriously in arms for the cause of his country.

A.M. 3776. A. Rom. 520.

The Carthaginians appointed Asdrubal, his son-in-law, to succeed him.[709] This general, to strengthen his footing in the country, built a city, which, by the advantage of its situation, the commodiousness of its harbour, its fortifications, and opulence occasioned by its great commerce, became one of the most considerable cities in the world. It was called New Carthage, and is at this day known by the name of Carthagena.

From the several steps of these two great generals, it was easy to perceive that they were meditating some mighty design which they had always in view, and laid their schemes at a great distance for the putting it in execution. The Romans were sensible of this, and reproached themselves for their indolence and torpor, which had thrown them into a kind of lethargy; at a time that the enemy were rapidly pursuing their victories in Spain, which might one day be turned against them. They would have been very well pleased to attack them by open force, and to wrest their conquests out of their hands; but the fear of another (not less formidable) enemy, the Gauls, whom they expected shortly to see at their very gates, kept them from showing their resentment. They therefore had recourse to negotiations; and concluded a treaty [pg 192] with Asdrubal, in which, without taking any notice of the rest of Spain, they contented themselves with introducing an article, by which the Carthaginians were not allowed to make any conquests beyond the Iberus.

Asdrubal, in the mean time, still pushed on his conquests;[710] still, however, taking care not to pass beyond the limits stipulated by the treaty; but by sparing no endeavours to win the chiefs of the several nations by a courteous and engaging behaviour, he furthered the interests of Carthage still more by persuasive methods than force of arms. But unhappily, after having governed Spain eight years, he was treacherously murdered by a Gaul, who took so barbarous a revenge for a private grudge he bore him.[711]

A.M. 3783. A. Rom. 530.

Three years before his death, he had written to Carthage, to desire that Hannibal, then twenty-two years of age, might be sent to him.[712] The proposal met with some difficulty, as the senate was divided betwixt two powerful factions, which, from Hamilcar's time, had began to follow opposite views in the administration and affairs of the state. One faction was headed by Hanno, whose birth, merit, and zeal for the public welfare, gave him great influence in the public deliberations. This faction proposed, on every occasion, the concluding of a safe peace, and the preserving the conquests in Spain, as being preferable to the uncertain events of an expensive war, which they foresaw would one day occasion the ruin of Carthage. The other, called the Barcinian faction, because it supported the interests of Barca and his family, had, to the credit and influence which it had long enjoyed in the city, added the reputation which the signal exploits of Hamilcar and Asdrubal had given it; and declared openly for war. When therefore Asdrubal's demand came to be debated in the senate, Hanno represented the danger of sending so early into the field a young man, who already possessed all the haughtiness and imperious temper of his father; [pg 193] and who ought, therefore, rather to be kept a long time, and very carefully, under the eye of the magistrates and the power of the laws, that he might learn obedience, and a modesty which should teach him not to think himself superior to all other men. He concluded with saying, that he feared this spark, which was then kindling, would one day rise to a conflagration. His remonstrances were not heard, so that the Barcinian faction had the superiority, and Hannibal set out for Spain.

The moment of his arrival there, he drew upon himself the eyes of the whole army, who fancied they saw Hamilcar his father revive in him. He seemed to dart the same fire from his eyes; the same martial vigour displayed itself in the air of his countenance, with the same features and engaging carriage. But his personal qualities endeared him still more. He possessed almost every talent that constitutes the great man. His patience in labour was invincible, his temperance was surprising, his courage in the greatest dangers intrepid, and his presence of mind in the heat of battle admirable; and, a still more wonderful circumstance, his disposition and cast of mind were so flexible, that nature had formed him equally for commanding or obeying; so that it was doubtful whether he was dearer to the soldiers or the generals. He served three campaigns under Asdrubal.

A.M. 3784. A. Carth. 626. A. Rom. 528.

Upon the death of that general, the suffrages of both the army and people concurred in raising Hannibal to the supreme command.[713] I know not whether it was not even then, or about that time, that the republic, to heighten his influence and authority, appointed him one of its Suffetes, the first dignity of the state, which was sometimes conferred upon generals. It is from Cornelius Nepos[714] that we have borrowed this circumstance of his life, who, speaking of the prætorship bestowed on Hannibal, upon his return to Carthage, and the conclusion of the peace, says, that this was twenty-two years after he had been nominated king.[715]

The moment he was created general, Hannibal, as if Italy [pg 194] had been allotted to him, and he had even then been appointed to make war upon the Romans, turned secretly his whole views on that side; and lost no time, for fear of being prevented by death, as his father and brother-in-law had been. In Spain he took several strong towns, and conquered many nations: and although the Spaniards greatly exceeded him in the number of forces, (their army amounting to upwards of a hundred thousand men,) yet he chose his time and posts so judiciously, that he entirely defeated them. After this victory, every thing submitted to his arms. But he still forbore laying siege to Saguntum,[716] carefully avoiding every occasion of a rupture with the Romans, till he should have taken every step which he judged necessary for so important an enterprise, pursuant to the advice given him by his father. He applied himself particularly to engage the affections of the citizens and allies, and to gain their confidence, by generously allotting them a large share of the plunder taken from the enemy, and by scrupulously paying them all their arrears:[717] a wise step, which never fails of producing its advantage at a proper season.

The Saguntines, on their side, sensible of the danger with which they were threatened, informed the Romans of the progress of Hannibal's conquests.[718] Upon this, deputies were nominated by the latter, and ordered to go and acquaint themselves with the state of affairs upon the spot; they commanded them also to lay their complaints before Hannibal, if it should be thought proper; and in case he should refuse to do justice, that then they should go directly to Carthage, and make the same complaints.

In the mean time Hannibal laid siege to Saguntum, foreseeing that great advantages would accrue from the taking of this city. He was persuaded, that this would deprive the Romans of all hopes of carrying on the war in Spain; that this new conquest would secure those he had already made; that as no enemy would be left behind him, his march would be more [pg 195] secure and unmolested; that he should find money enough in it for the execution of his designs; that the plunder of the city would inspire his soldiers with greater ardour, and make them follow him with greater cheerfulness; that, lastly, the spoils which he should send to Carthage, would gain him the favour of the citizens. Animated by these motives, he carried on the siege with the utmost vigour. He himself set an example to his troops, was present at all the works, and exposed himself to the greatest dangers.

News was soon carried to Rome that Saguntum was besieged. But the Romans, instead of flying to its relief, lost their time in fruitless debates, and in deputations equally fruitless. Hannibal sent word to the Roman deputies, that he was not at leisure to hear them; they therefore repaired to Carthage, but met with no better reception, the Barcinian faction having prevailed over the complaints of the Romans, and all the remonstrances of Hanno.

During all these voyages and negotiations, the siege was carried on with great vigour. The Saguntines were now reduced to the last extremity, and in want of all things. An accommodation was thereupon proposed; but the conditions on which it was offered appeared so harsh, that the Saguntines could not prevail upon themselves to accept them. Before they gave their final answer, the principal senators, bringing their gold and silver, and that of the public treasury, into the market-place, threw both into a fire lighted for that purpose, and afterwards rushed headlong into it themselves. At the same time, a tower, which had been long assaulted by the battering rams, falling with a dreadful noise, the Carthaginians entered the city by the breach, soon made themselves masters of it, and cut to pieces all the inhabitants who were of age to bear arms. But notwithstanding the fire, the Carthaginians got a very great booty. Hannibal did not reserve to himself any part of the spoils gained by his victories, but applied them solely to the carrying on his enterprises. Accordingly, Polybius remarks, that the taking of Saguntum was of service to him, as it awakened the ardour of his soldiers, by the sight of the rich booty which they had just obtained, and by the hopes of more; and it reconciled all the principal persons of Carthage [pg 196] to Hannibal, by the large presents he made to them out of the spoils.

Words could never express the grief and consternation with which the melancholy news of the capture and cruel fate of Saguntum was received at Rome.[719] Compassion for this unfortunate city, shame for having failed to succour such faithful allies, a just indignation against the Carthaginians, the authors of all these calamities; a strong alarm raised by the successes of Hannibal, whom the Romans fancied they saw already at their gates; all these sentiments caused so violent an emotion, that during the first moments of their agitation, the Romans were unable to come to any resolution, or do any thing but give way to the torrent of their passion, and sacrifice floods of tears to the memory of a city which fell the victim of its inviolable fidelity[720] to the Romans, and had been betrayed by their unaccountable indolence and imprudent delays. When they were a little recovered, an assembly of the people was called, and war was decreed unanimously against the Carthaginians.

War proclaimed.—That no ceremony might be wanting, deputies were sent to Carthage, to inquire whether Saguntum had been besieged by order of the republic, and if so, to declare war; or, in case this siege had been undertaken solely by the authority of Hannibal, to require that he should be delivered up to the Romans.[721] The deputies perceiving that the senate gave no direct answer to their demands, one of them taking up the folded lappet of his robe, “I bring here,” says he, in a haughty tone, “either peace or war; the choice is left to yourselves.” The senate answering, that they left the choice to him: “I give you war then,” says he, unfolding his robe. “And we,” replied the Carthaginians, with the same haughtiness, “as heartily accept it, and are resolved to prosecute it with the same cheerfulness.” Such was the beginning of the second Punic war.

If the cause of this war should be ascribed to the taking of Saguntum, the whole blame, says Polybius,[722] lies upon the [pg 197] Carthaginians, who could not, with any colourable pretence, besiege a city that was in alliance with Rome, and, as such, comprehended in the treaty, which forbade either party to make war upon the allies of the other. But, should the origin of this war be traced higher, and carried back to the time when the Carthaginians were dispossessed of Sardinia by the Romans, and a new tribute was so unreasonably imposed on them; it must be confessed, continues Polybius, that the conduct of the Romans is entirely unjustifiable on these two points, as being founded merely on violence and injustice; and that, had the Carthaginians, without having recourse to ambiguous and frivolous pretences, plainly demanded satisfaction upon these two grievances, and, upon their being refused it, had declared war against Rome, in that case, reason and justice had been entirely on their side.

The interval between the conclusion of the first, and the beginning of the second Punic war, was twenty-four years.

A.M. 3787. A. Carth. 629. A. Rom. 531. Ant. J.C. 217.

The Beginning of the Second Punic War.—When war was resolved upon, and proclaimed on both sides, Hannibal, who then was twenty-six or twenty-seven years of age, before he discovered his grand design, thought it incumbent on him to provide for the security of Spain and Africa.[723] With this view, he marched the forces out of the one into the other, so that the Africans served in Spain and the Spaniards in Africa. He was prompted to this from a persuasion, that these soldiers, being thus at a distance from their respective countries, would be fitter for service; and more firmly attached to him, as they would be a kind of hostages for each other's fidelity. The forces which he left in Africa amounted to about forty thousand men, twelve hundred whereof were cavalry. Those of Spain were something above fifteen thousand, of which two thousand five hundred and fifty were horse. He left the command of the Spanish forces to his brother Asdrubal, with a fleet of about sixty ships to guard the coasts; and, at the same time, gave him the wisest directions for his conduct, whether with regard to the Spaniards or the Romans, in case they should attack him.

Livy observes, that Hannibal, before he set forward on this [pg 198] expedition, went to Cadiz to discharge some vows which he had made to Hercules; and that he engaged himself by new ones, in order to obtain success in the war he was entering upon. Polybius gives us,[724] in few words, a very clear idea of the distance of the several places through which Hannibal was to march in his way to Italy. From New Carthage, whence he set out to the Iberus, were computed two thousand two hundred furlongs.[725][726] From the Iberus to Emporium, a small maritime town, which separates Spain from the Gauls, according to Strabo,[727] were sixteen hundred furlongs.[728] From Emporium to the pass of the Rhone, the like space of sixteen hundred furlongs.[729] From the pass of the Rhone to the Alps, fourteen hundred furlongs.[730] From the Alps to the plains of Italy, twelve hundred furlongs.[731] Thus from New Carthage to the plains of Italy, were eight thousand furlongs.[732]

Hannibal had long before taken the prudent precaution of acquainting himself with the nature and situation of the places through which he was to pass;[733] of sounding how the Gauls stood affected to the Romans; of winning over their chiefs, whom he knew to be very greedy of gold, by his bounty to them;[734] and of securing to himself the affection and fidelity of one part of the nations through whose country his march lay. He was not ignorant that the passage of the Alps would be attended with great difficulties; but he knew they were not unsurmountable, and that was enough for his purpose.

Hannibal began his march early in the spring, from New Carthage, where he had wintered.[735] His army then consisted of above a hundred thousand men, of which twelve thousand were cavalry, and he had near forty elephants. Having crossed the Iberus, he soon subdued the several nations which opposed him in his march; and lost a considerable part of his army in this expedition. He left Hanno to command all the country [pg 199] lying between the Iberus and the Pyrenean hills, with eleven thousand men, who were appointed to guard the baggage of those that were to follow him. He dismissed the like number, sending them back to their respective countries; thus securing to himself their affection when he should want recruits, and affording to the rest a sure hope that they should be allowed to return whenever they should desire it. He passed the Pyrenean hills, and advanced as far as the banks of the Rhone, at the head of fifty thousand foot, and nine thousand horse; a formidable army, but less so from the number than from the valour of the troops that composed it; troops who had served several years in Spain, and learned the art of war, under the ablest captains that Carthage could ever boast.

Passage of the Rhone.—Hannibal, being arrived within about four days' march from the mouth of the Rhone,[736] attempted to cross it, because the river in this place took up only the breadth of its channel.[737] He bought up all the ship-boats and little vessels he could meet with, of which the inhabitants had a great number, because of their commerce. He likewise built, with great diligence, a prodigious number of boats, little vessels, and rafts. On his arrival, he found the Gauls encamped on the opposite bank, and prepared to dispute the passage. There was no possibility of his attacking them in front. He therefore ordered a considerable detachment of his forces, under the command of Hanno, the son of Bomilcar, to pass the river higher up; and in order to conceal his march, and the design he had in view, from the enemy, he obliged them to set out in the night. All things succeeded as he had planned; and they passed the river[738] the next day without the least opposition.

They passed the rest of the day in refreshing themselves, and in the night they advanced silently towards the enemy. In the morning, when the signals agreed upon had been given, Hannibal prepared to attempt the passage. Part of his horses, completely harnessed, were put into boats, that their riders might, on landing, immediately charge the enemy. The rest [pg 200] of the horses swam over on both sides of the boats, from which one single man held the bridles of three or four. The infantry crossed the river, either on rafts, or in small boats, and in a kind of gondolas, which were only the trunks of trees, which they themselves had made hollow. The great boats were drawn up in a line at the top of the channel, in order to break the force of the waves, and facilitate the passage to the rest of the small fleet. When the Gauls saw it advancing on the river, they, according to their custom, uttered dreadful cries and howlings; and clashing their bucklers over their heads, one against the other, let fly a shower of darts. But they were prodigiously astonished, when they heard a great noise behind them, perceived their tents on fire, and saw themselves attacked both in front and rear. They now had no way left to save themselves but by flight, and accordingly retreated to their respective villages. After this, the rest of the troops crossed the river quietly, and without any opposition.

The elephants alone occasioned a great deal of trouble. They were wafted over the next day in the following manner. From the bank of the river was thrown a raft, two hundred feet in length, and fifty in breadth; this was fixed strongly to the banks by large ropes, and quite covered over with earth; so that the elephants, deceived by its appearance, thought themselves upon firm ground. From this first raft they proceeded to a second, which was built in the same form, but only a hundred feet long, and fastened to the former by chains that were easily loosened. The female elephants were put upon the first raft, and the males followed after; and when they were got upon the second raft, it was loosened from the first, and, by the help of small boats, towed to the opposite shore. After this, it was sent back to fetch those which were behind. Some fell into the water, but they at last got safe to shore, and not a single elephant was drowned.

The March after the Battle of the Rhone.—The two Roman consuls had, in the beginning of the spring, set out for their respective provinces;[739] P. Scipio for Spain with sixty ships, two Roman legions, fourteen thousand foot, and twelve hundred horse of the allies; Tiberius Sempronius for Sicily, with a [pg 201] hundred and sixty ships, two legions, sixteen thousand foot, and eighteen hundred horse of the allies. The Roman legion consisted, at that time, of four thousand foot and three hundred horse. Sempronius had made extraordinary preparations at Lilybæum, a seaport town in Sicily, with the design of crossing over directly into Africa. Scipio was equally confident that he should find Hannibal still in Spain, and make that country the seat of war. But he was greatly astonished, when, on his arrival at Marseilles, advice was brought him, that Hannibal was upon the banks of the Rhone, and preparing to cross it. He then detached three hundred horse, to view the posture of the enemy; and Hannibal detached five hundred Numidian horse for the same purpose; during which, some of his soldiers were employed in wafting over the elephants.

At the same time he gave audience, in the presence of his whole army, to one of the princes of that part of Gaul which is situated near the Po, who assured him, by an interpreter, in the name of his subjects, that his arrival was impatiently expected; that the Gauls were ready to join him, and march against the Romans, and he himself offered to conduct his army through places where they should meet with a plentiful supply of provisions. When the prince was withdrawn, Hannibal, in a speech to his troops, magnified extremely this deputation from the Gauls; extolled, with just praises, the bravery which his forces had shown hitherto; and exhorted them to sustain, to the last, their reputation and glory. The soldiers inspired with fresh ardour and courage, all at once raised their hands, and declared their readiness to follow whithersoever he should lead the way. Accordingly, he appointed the next day for his march; and, after offering up vows, and making supplications to the gods for the safety of his troops, he dismissed them; desiring, at the same time, that they would take the necessary refreshments.

Whilst this was doing, the Numidians returned. They had met with, and charged, the Roman detachment: the conflict was very obstinate, and the slaughter great, considering the small number of the combatants. A hundred and sixty of the Romans were left dead upon the spot, and more than two hundred of their enemies. But the honour of this skirmish fell to [pg 202] the Romans; the Numidians having retired and left them the field of battle. This first action was interpreted as an omen[740] of the fate of the whole war, and seemed to promise success to the Romans, but which, at the same time, would be dearly bought, and strongly contested. On both sides, those who had survived this engagement, and who had been engaged in reconnoitring, returned to inform their respective generals of what they had discovered.

Hannibal, as he had declared, decamped the next day, and crossed through the midst of Gaul, advancing northward; not that this was the shortest way to the Alps, but only, as by leading him from the sea, it prevented his meeting Scipio; and, by that means, favoured the design he had, of marching all his forces into Italy, without having weakened them by a battle.

Though Scipio marched with the utmost expedition, he did not reach the place where Hannibal had passed the Rhone, till three days after he had set out from it. Despairing therefore to overtake him, he returned to his fleet, and reimbarked, fully resolved to wait for Hannibal at the foot of the Alps. But, in order that he might not leave Spain defenceless, he sent his brother Cneius thither, with the greatest part of his army, to make head against Asdrubal; and himself set forward immediately for Genoa, with intention to oppose the army which was in Gaul, near the Po, to that of Hannibal.

The latter, after four days' march, arrived at a kind of island, formed by the conflux[741] of two rivers, which unite their streams in this place. Here he was chosen umpire between two brothers, who disputed their right to the kingdom. He to whom Hannibal decreed it, furnished his whole army with provisions, clothes, and arms. This was the country of the [pg 203] Allobroges, by which name the people were called, who now inhabit the district of Geneva,[742] Vienne, and Grenoble. His march was not much interrupted till he arrived at the Durance, and from thence he reached the foot of the Alps without any opposition.

The Passage of the Alps.—The sight of these mountains, whose tops seemed to touch the skies, and were covered with snow, and where nothing appeared to the eye but a few pitiful cottages, scattered here and there, on the sharp tops of inaccessible rocks; nothing but meagre flocks, almost perished with cold, and hairy men of a savage and fierce aspect; this spectacle, I say, renewed the terror which the distant prospect had raised, and chilled with fear the hearts of the soldiers.[743] When they began to climb up, they perceived the mountaineers, who had seized upon the highest cliffs, and were prepared to oppose their passage. They therefore were forced to halt. Had the mountaineers, says Polybius, only lain in ambuscade, and after having suffered Hannibal's troops to entangle themselves in some difficult passage, had then charged them on a sudden, the Carthaginian army would have been irrecoverably lost. Hannibal, being informed that they kept those posts only in the daytime, and quitted them in the evening, possessed himself of them by night. The Gauls returning early in the morning, were very much surprised to find their posts in the enemy's hand: but still they were not disheartened. Being used to climb up those rocks, they attacked the Carthaginians who were upon their march, and harassed them on all sides. The latter were obliged, at one and the same time, to engage with the enemy, and struggle with the ruggedness of the paths of the mountains, where they could hardly stand. But the greatest disorder was caused by the horses and beasts of burden laden with the baggage; who being frighted by the cries and howling of the Gauls, which echoed dreadfully among the mountains, and being sometimes wounded by the mountaineers, came tumbling on the soldiers, and dragged them headlong with them down the precipices which skirted the road. Hannibal, being sensible that the [pg 204] loss of his baggage alone was enough to destroy his army, ran to the assistance of his troops, who were thus embarrassed; and having put the enemy to flight, continued his march without molestation or danger, and came to a castle, which was the most important fortress in the whole country. He possessed himself of it, and of all the neighbouring villages, in which he found a large quantity of corn, and cattle sufficient to subsist his army three days.

After a pretty quiet march, the Carthaginians were to encounter a new danger. The Gauls, feigning to take advantage of the misfortunes of their neighbours, who had suffered for opposing the passage of Hannibal's troops, came to pay their respects to that general, brought him provisions, offered to be his guides; and left him hostages, as pledges of their fidelity. However, Hannibal placed no great confidence in them. The elephants and horses marched in the front, whilst himself followed with the main body of his foot, keeping a vigilant eye over all. They came at length to a very narrow and rugged pass, which was commanded by an eminence where the Gauls had placed an ambuscade. These rushing out on a sudden, assailed the Carthaginians on every side, rolling down stones upon them of a prodigious size. The army would have been entirely routed, had not Hannibal exerted himself in an extraordinary manner to extricate them out of this difficulty.

At last, on the ninth day, they reached the summit of the Alps. Here the army halted two days, to rest and refresh themselves after their fatigue, after which they continued their march. As it was now autumn, a great quantity of snow had lately fallen, and covered all the roads, which caused a consternation among the troops, and disheartened them very much. Hannibal perceived it, and halting on a hill from whence there was a prospect of all Italy, he showed them the fruitful plains[744] watered by the river Po, to which they were almost come; adding, that they had but one effort more to make, before they arrived at them. He represented to them, that a battle or two would put a glorious period to their toils, and enrich them for ever, by giving them possession of the capital of the Roman empire. This speech, filled with such [pg 205] pleasing hopes, and enforced by the sight of Italy, inspired the dejected soldiers with fresh vigour and alacrity. They therefore pursued their march. But still the road was more craggy and troublesome than ever; and as they were now on a descent, the difficulty and danger increased. For the ways were narrow, steep, and slippery, in most places; so that the soldiers could neither keep upon their feet as they marched, nor recover themselves when they made a false step, but stumbled, and beat down one another.

They were now come to a worse place than any they had yet met with. This was a path naturally very rugged and craggy, which having been made more so by the late falling in of the earth, terminated in a frightful precipice above a thousand feet deep. Here the cavalry stopped short. Hannibal, wondering at this sudden halt, ran to the place, and saw that it really would be impossible for the troops to advance. He therefore was for making a circuitous route, but this also was found impracticable. As, upon the old snow, which was grown hard by lying, there was some newly fallen that was of no great depth, the feet, at first, by their sinking into it, found a firm support; but this snow being soon dissolved, by the treading of the foremost troops and beasts of burden, the soldiers marched on nothing but ice, which was so slippery, that they had no firm footing; and where, if they made the least false step, or endeavoured to save themselves with their hands or knees, there were no boughs or roots to catch hold of. Besides this difficulty, the horses, striking their feet forcibly into the ice to keep themselves from falling, could not draw them out again, but were caught as in a gin. They therefore were forced to seek some other expedient.

Hannibal resolved to pitch his camp, and to give his troops some days' rest on the summit of this hill, which was of a considerable extent; after they should have cleared the ground, and removed all the old as well as the new fallen snow, which was a work of immense labour. He afterwards ordered a path to be cut into the rock itself, and this was carried on with amazing patience and ardour. To open and enlarge this path, all the trees thereabouts were cut down, and piled round the rock; after which fire was set to them. The wind, by [pg 206] good fortune, blowing hard, a fierce flame soon broke out, so that the rock glowed like the very coals with which it was surrounded. Then Hannibal, if Livy may be credited, (for Polybius says nothing of this matter,) caused a great quantity of vinegar to be poured on the rock,[745] which piercing into the veins of it, that were now cracked by the intense heat of the fire, calcined and softened it. In this manner, taking a large compass about, in order that the descent might be easier, they cut away along the rock, which opened a free passage to the forces, the baggage, and even to the elephants. Four days were employed in this work, during which the beasts of burden were dying with hunger; there being no food for them on these mountains buried under eternal snows. At last they came into cultivated and fruitful spots, which yielded plenty of forage for the horses, and all kinds of food for the soldiers.

Hannibal enters Italy.—When Hannibal entered into Italy, his army was not near so numerous as when he left Spain, where we have seen it amounted to near sixty thousand men.[746] It had sustained great losses during the march, either in the battles it was forced to fight, or in the passage of rivers. At his departure from the Rhone, it still consisted of thirty-eight thousand foot, and above eight thousand horse. The march over the Alps destroyed near half this number; so that Hannibal had now remaining only twelve thousand Africans, eight thousand Spanish foot, and six thousand horse. This account he himself caused to be engraved on a pillar near the promontory called Lacinium. It was five months and a half since his first setting out from New Carthage, including the fortnight he employed in marching over the Alps, when he set up his standards in the plains of the Po, at the entrance of Piedmont. It might then be September.

His first care was to give his troops some rest, which they very much wanted. When he perceived that they were fit for [pg 207] action, the inhabitants of the territories of Turin[747] refusing to conclude an alliance with him, he marched and encamped before their chief city; carried it in three days, and put all who had opposed him to the sword. This expedition struck the barbarians with so much dread, that they all came voluntarily, and surrendered at discretion. The rest of the Gauls would have done the same, had they not been awed by the terror of the Roman arms, which were now approaching. Hannibal thought therefore that he had no time to lose; that it was his interest to march up into the country, and attempt some great exploit; such as might inspire those who should have an inclination to join him with confidence.

The rapid progress which Hannibal had made, greatly alarmed Rome, and caused the utmost consternation throughout the city. Sempronius was ordered to leave Sicily, and hasten to the relief of his country; and P. Scipio, the other consul, advanced by forced marches towards the enemy, crossed the Po, and pitched his camp near the Ticinus.[748]

Battle of the Cavalry near the Ticinus.—The armies being now in sight, the generals on each side made a speech to their soldiers before they engaged.[749] Scipio, after having represented to his forces the glory of their country, the achievements of their ancestors, observed to them, that victory was in their hands, since they were to combat only with Carthaginians, a people who had been so often defeated by them, as well as forced to be their tributaries for twenty years, and long accustomed to be almost their slaves: that the advantage they had gained over the flower of the Carthaginian horse, was a sure omen of their success during the rest of the war: that Hannibal, in his march over the Alps, had just before lost the best part of his army; and that those who survived were exhausted by hunger, cold, and fatigue: that the bare sight of the Romans was sufficient to put to flight a parcel of soldiers, who had the aspects of ghosts rather than of men: in a word, that victory was become necessary, not only to secure Italy, [pg 208] but to save Rome itself, whose fate the present battle would decide, as that city had no other army wherewith to oppose the enemy.

Hannibal, that his words might make the stronger impression on the rude minds of his soldiers, speaks to their eyes, before he addresses their ears; and does not attempt to persuade them by arguments, till he has first moved them by the following spectacle. He arms some of the prisoners whom he had taken in the mountains, and obliges them to fight, two and two, in sight of his army; promising to reward the conquerors with their liberty and rich presents. The alacrity wherewith these barbarians engaged upon these motives, gives Hannibal an occasion of exhibiting to his soldiers a lively image of their present condition; which, by depriving them of all means of returning back, puts them under an absolute necessity either of conquering or dying, in order to avoid the endless evils prepared for those that should be so base and cowardly as to submit to the Romans. He displays to them the greatness of their reward, viz. the conquest of all Italy; the plunder of the rich and wealthy city of Rome; an illustrious victory, and immortal glory. He speaks contemptibly of the Roman power, the false lustre of which (he observed) ought not to dazzle such warriors as themselves, who had marched from the pillars of Hercules, through the fiercest nations, into the very centre of Italy. As for his own part, he scorns to compare himself with Scipio, a general of but six months' standing: himself, who was almost born, at least brought up, in the tent of Hamilcar his father; the conqueror of Spain, of Gaul, of the inhabitants of the Alps, and what is still more, conqueror of the Alps themselves. He rouses their indignation against the insolence of the Romans, who had dared to demand that himself, and the rest who had taken Saguntum, should be delivered up to them; and excites their jealousy against the intolerable pride of those imperious masters, who imagined that all things ought to obey them, and that they had a right to give laws to the whole world.

After these speeches, both sides prepare for battle. Scipio, having thrown a bridge across the Ticinus, marched his troops [pg 209] over it. Two ill omens[750] had filled his army with consternation and dread. As for the Carthaginians, they were inspired with the boldest courage. Hannibal animates them with fresh promises; and cleaving with a stone the skull of the lamb he was sacrificing, he prays Jupiter to dash to pieces his head in like manner, in case he did not give his soldiers the rewards he had promised them.

Scipio posts, in the first line, the troops armed with missive weapons, and the Gaulish horse; and forming his second line of the flower of the confederate cavalry, he advances slowly. Hannibal advanced with his whole cavalry, in the centre of which he had posted the troopers who rid with bridles, and the Numidian horsemen on[751] the wings, in order to surround the enemy. The officers and cavalry being eager to engage, a charge ensues. At the first onset, Scipio's light-armed soldiers had scarcely discharged their darts, when, frighted at the Carthaginian cavalry, which came pouring upon them, and fearing lest they should be trampled under the horses' feet, they gave way, and retired through the intervals of the squadrons. The fight continued a long time with equal success. Many troopers on both sides dismounted, so that the battle was carried on between infantry as well as cavalry. In the mean time, the Numidians surround the enemy, and charge the rear of the light-armed troops, who at first had escaped the attack of the cavalry, and tread them under their horses' feet. The centre of the Roman forces had hitherto fought with great bravery. Many were killed on both sides, and even more on that of the Carthaginians. But the Roman troops were put into disorder by the Numidians, who attacked them in the rear; and especially by a wound the consul received, which disabled him from continuing the combat. However, this general was rescued out of the enemy's hands by the bravery of his son, then but seventeen years old; and who afterwards was honoured with the surname of Africanus, for having put a glorious period to this war.

The consul, though dangerously wounded, retreated in good order, and was conveyed to his camp by a body of horse, who covered him with their arms and bodies: the rest of the army followed him thither. He hastened to the Po, which he crossed with his army, and then broke down the bridge, whereby he prevented Hannibal from overtaking him.

It is agreed, that Hannibal owed this first victory to his cavalry; and it was judged from thenceforth that the main strength of his army consisted in his horse; and therefore, that it would be proper for the Romans to avoid large open plains, such as are those between the Po and the Alps.

Immediately after the battle of the Ticinus, all the neighbouring Gauls seemed to contend who should submit themselves first to Hannibal, furnish him with ammunition, and enlist in his army. And this, as Polybius has observed, was what chiefly induced that wise and skilful general, notwithstanding the small number and weakness of his troops, to hazard a battle; which he indeed was now obliged to venture, from the impossibility of marching back whenever he should desire to do it; because nothing but a battle would oblige the Gauls to declare for him, whose assistance was the only refuge he then had left.

Battle of the Trebia.—Sempronius the consul, upon the orders he had received from the senate, was returned from Sicily to Ariminum.[752] From thence he marched towards the Trebia, a small river of Lombardy, which falls into the Po a little above Placentia, where he joined his forces to those of Scipio. Hannibal advanced towards the camp of the Romans, from which he was separated only by that small river. The armies lying so near one another, gave occasion to frequent skirmishes, in one of which Sempronius, at the head of a body of horse, gained some advantage over a party of Carthaginians, very trifling indeed, but which nevertheless very much increased the good opinion this general naturally entertained of his own merit.

This inconsiderable success seemed to him a complete victory. He boasted his having vanquished the enemy in the same kind of fight in which his colleague had been defeated, [pg 211] and that he thereby had revived the courage of the dejected Romans. Being now resolutely bent to come, as soon as possible, to a decisive battle, he thought it proper, for decency's sake, to consult Scipio, whom he found of a quite different opinion from himself. Scipio represented, that in case time should be allowed for disciplining the new levies during the winter, they would be much fitter for service in the ensuing campaign; that the Gauls, who were naturally fickle and inconstant, would disengage themselves insensibly from Hannibal; that as soon as his wounds should be healed, his presence might be of some use in an affair of such general concern: in a word, he besought him earnestly not to proceed any further.

These reasons, though so just, made no impression upon Sempronius. He saw himself at the head of sixteen thousand Romans, and twenty thousand allies, exclusive of cavalry, (a number which, in those ages, formed a complete army,) when both consuls joined their forces. The troops of the enemy amounted to near the same number. He thought the juncture extremely favourable for him. He declared publicly, that all the officers and soldiers were desirous of a battle, except his colleague, whose mind (he observed) being more affected by his wound than his body, could not, for that reason, bear to hear of an engagement. But still, continued Sempronius, is it just to let the whole army droop and languish with him? What could Scipio expect more? Did he flatter himself with the hopes that a third consul, and a new army, would come to his assistance? Such were the expressions he employed both among the soldiers, and even about Scipio's tent. The time for the election of new generals drawing near, Sempronius was afraid a successor would be sent before he had put an end to the war; and therefore it was his opinion, that he ought to take advantage of his colleague's illness, to secure the whole honour of the victory to himself. As he had no regard, says Polybius, to the time proper for action, and only to that which he thought suited his own interest, he could not fail of taking wrong measures. He therefore ordered his army to prepare for battle.

This was the very thing Hannibal desired; as he held it for a maxim, that a general who has entered a foreign country, or [pg 212] one possessed by the enemy, and has formed some great design, has no other refuge left, than continually to raise the expectations of his allies by some fresh exploits. Besides, knowing that he should have to deal only with new-levied and unexperienced troops, he was desirous of taking advantage of the ardour of the Gauls, who were extremely desirous of fighting; and of Scipio's absence, who, by reason of his wound, could not be present in the battle. Mago was therefore ordered to lie in ambush with two thousand men, consisting of horse and foot, on the steep banks of a small rivulet which ran between the two camps, and to conceal himself among the bushes that were very thick there. An ambuscade is often safer in a smooth open country, but full of thickets, as this was, than in woods, because such a spot is less apt to be suspected. He afterwards caused a detachment of Numidian cavalry to cross the Trebia with orders to advance at break of day as far as the very barriers of the enemy's camp, in order to provoke them to fight; and then to retreat and repass the river, in order to draw the Romans after them. What he had foreseen, came directly to pass. The fiery Sempronius immediately detached his whole cavalry against the Numidians, and then six thousand light-armed troops, who were soon followed by all the rest of the army. The Numidians fled designedly; upon which the Romans pursued them with great eagerness, and crossed the Trebia without resistance, but not without great difficulty, being forced to wade up to their very arm-pits through the rivulet, which was swoln with the torrents that had fallen in the night from the neighbouring mountains. It was then about the winter-solstice, that is, in December. It happened to snow that day, and the cold was excessively piercing. The Romans had left their camp fasting, and without having taken the least precaution; whereas the Carthaginians had, by Hannibal's order, eaten and drunk plentifully in their tents; had got their horses in readiness, rubbed themselves with oil, and put on their armour by the fire-side.

They were thus prepared when the fight began. The Romans defended themselves valiantly for a considerable time, though they were half spent with hunger, fatigue, and cold; but their cavalry was at last broken and put to flight by that [pg 213] of the Carthaginians, which much exceeded theirs in numbers and strength. The infantry also were soon in great disorder. The soldiers in ambuscade sallying out at a proper time, rushed on a sudden upon their rear, and completed the overthrow. A body of above ten thousand men resolutely fought their way through the Gauls and Africans, of whom they made a dreadful slaughter; but as they could neither assist their friends, nor return to the camp, the way to it being cut off by the Numidian horse, the river, and the rain, they retreated in good order to Placentia. Most of the rest lost their lives on the banks of the river, being trampled to pieces by the elephants and horses. Those who escaped, went and joined the body above mentioned. The next night Scipio retired also to Placentia. The Carthaginians gained a complete victory, and their loss was inconsiderable, except that a great number of their horses were destroyed by the cold, the rain, and the snow; and that, of all their elephants, they saved but one only.

In Spain, the Romans had better success in this and the following campaign;[753] for Cn. Scipio extended his conquests as far as the river Iberus,[754] defeated Hanno, and took him prisoner.

Hannibal took the opportunity, whilst he was in winter quarters, to refresh his troops, and gain the affection of the natives.[755] For this purpose, after having declared to the prisoners whom he had taken from the allies of the Romans, that he was not come with the view of making war upon them, but of restoring the Italians to their liberty, and protecting them against the Romans, he sent them all home to their own countries, without requiring the least ransom.

The winter was no sooner over, than he set out towards Tuscany,[756] whither he hastened his march for two important reasons: first, to avoid the ill effects which would arise from the ill will of the Gauls, who were tired with the long stay of the Carthaginian army in their territories; and were impatient of bearing the whole burden of a war, in which they had engaged with no other view than to carry it into the country of their common enemy: secondly, that he might increase, by some bold exploit, the reputation of his arms in the minds of [pg 214] all the inhabitants of Italy, by carrying the war to the very gates of Rome; and at the same time reanimate his troops, and the Gauls his allies, by the plunder of the enemy's lands. But in his march over the Apennines, he was overtaken by a dreadful storm, which destroyed great numbers of his men. The cold, the rain, the wind and hail, seemed to conspire his ruin; so that the fatigues which the Carthaginians had undergone in crossing the Alps, seemed less dreadful than those they now suffered. He therefore marched back to Placentia, where he again fought Sempronius, who was returned from Rome. The loss on both sides was very nearly equal.

Whilst Hannibal was in these winter quarters, he hit upon a true Carthaginian stratagem.[757] He was surrounded with fickle and inconstant nations: the friendship he had contracted with them was but of recent date. He had reason to apprehend a change in their disposition, and, consequently, that attempts would be made upon his life. To secure himself, therefore, he got perukes made, and clothes suited to every age. Of these he sometimes wore one, sometimes another; and disguised himself so often, that not merely such as saw him only transiently, but even his intimate acquaintance, could scarce know him.

A.M. 3788. A. Rom. 532.

At Rome, Cn. Servilius and C. Flaminius had been appointed consuls.[758] Hannibal having advice that the latter was advanced already as far as Arretium, a town of Tuscany, resolved to go and engage him as soon as possible. Two ways being shown him, he chose the shortest, though the most troublesome, nay, almost impassable, by reason of a fen which he was forced to go through. Here the army suffered incredible hardships. During four days and three nights they marched halfway up the leg in water, and, consequently, could not get a moment's sleep. Hannibal himself, who rode upon the only elephant he had left, could hardly get through. His long want of sleep, and the thick vapours which exhaled from that marshy place, together with the unhealthiness of the season, cost him one of his eyes.

Battle of Thrasymenus.[759]—Hannibal being thus got, almost [pg 215] unexpectedly, out of this dangerous situation, and having refreshed his troops, marched and pitched his camp between Arretium and Fesulæ, in the richest and most fruitful part of Tuscany. His first endeavours were, to discover the disposition of Flaminius, in order that he might take advantage of his weak side, which, according to Polybius, ought to be the chief study of a general. He was told, that Flaminius was greatly conceited of his own merit, bold, enterprising, rash, and fond of glory. To plunge him the deeper into these excesses, to which he was naturally prone,[760] he inflamed his impetuous spirit, by laying waste and burning the whole country in his sight.

Flaminius was not of a temper to continue inactive in his camp, even if Hannibal had lain still. But when he saw the territories of his allies laid waste before his eyes, he thought it would reflect dishonour upon him, should he suffer Hannibal to ransack Italy without control, and even advance to the very walls of Rome without meeting any resistance. He rejected with scorn the prudent counsels of those who advised him to wait the arrival of his colleague, and to be satisfied, for the present, with putting a stop to the devastation of the enemy.

In the mean time, Hannibal was still advancing towards Rome, having Cortona on the left hand, and the lake Thrasymenus on his right. When he saw that the consul followed close after him, with design to give him battle, in order to stop him in his march; having observed that the ground was convenient for an engagement, he thought only of making preparations for it. The lake Thrasymenus and the mountains of Cortona form a very narrow defile, which leads into a large valley, lined on both sides with hills of a considerable height, and closed, at the outlet, by a steep hill of difficult access. On this hill, Hannibal, after having crossed the valley, came and encamped with the main body of his army; posting his light-armed infantry in ambuscade upon the hills on the right, and part of his cavalry behind those on the left, as far almost as the entrance of the defile, through which Flaminius was obliged to pass. Accordingly, this general, who followed him very eagerly with the resolution to fight him, being come to [pg 216] the defile near the lake, was forced to halt, because night was coming on; but he entered it the next morning at daybreak.

Hannibal having permitted him to advance, with all his forces, above half way through the valley, and seeing the Roman van-guard pretty near him, gave the signal for the battle, and commanded his troops to come out of their ambuscade, in order that he might attack the enemy at the same time from all quarters. The reader may guess at the consternation with which the Romans were seized.

They were not yet drawn up in order of battle, neither had they got their arms in readiness, when they found themselves attacked in front, in rear, and in flank. In a moment, all the ranks were put into disorder. Flaminius, alone undaunted in so universal a consternation, animates his soldiers both with his hand and voice, and exhorts them to cut themselves a passage with their swords through the midst of the enemy. But the tumult which reigned every where, the dreadful shouts of the enemy, and a fog that was risen, prevented his being seen or heard. However, when the Romans saw themselves surrounded on all sides, either by the enemy or the lake, the impossibility of saving their lives by flight roused their courage, and both parties began the fight with astonishing animosity. Their fury was so great, that not a soldier in either army perceived an earthquake which happened in that country, and buried whole cities in ruins. In this confusion, Flaminius being slain by one of the Insubrian Gauls, the Romans began to give ground, and at last fairly fled. Great numbers, endeavouring to save themselves, leaped into the lake; whilst others, directing their course towards the mountains, fell into the enemy's hands whom they strove to avoid. Six thousand only cut their way through the conquerors, and retreated to a place of safety; but the next day they were taken prisoners. In this battle fifteen thousand Romans were killed, and about ten thousand escaped to Rome by different roads. Hannibal sent back the Latins, who were allies of the Romans, into their own country, without demanding the least ransom. He commanded search to be made for the body of Flaminius, in order to give it burial; but it could not be found. He afterwards put his troops into quarters of refreshment, and solemnized the [pg 217] funerals of thirty of his chief officers who were killed in the battle. He lost in all but fifteen hundred men, most of whom were Gauls.

Immediately after, Hannibal despatched a courier to Carthage, with the news of his good success hitherto in Italy. This caused the greatest joy for the present, gave birth to the most promising hopes with regard to the future, and revived the courage of all the citizens. They now prepared, with incredible ardour, to send into Italy and Spain all necessary succours.

Rome, on the contrary, was filled with universal grief and alarm, as soon as the prætor had pronounced from the rostra the following words, “We have lost a great battle.” The senate, studious of nothing but the public welfare, thought that in so great a calamity and so imminent a danger, recourse must be had to extraordinary remedies. They therefore appointed Quintus Fabius dictator, a person as conspicuous for his wisdom as his birth. It was the custom at Rome, that the moment a dictator was nominated, all authority ceased, that of the tribunes of the people excepted. M. Minucius was appointed his general of horse. We are now in the second year of the war.

Hannibal's Conduct with respect to Fabius.[761]—Hannibal, after the battle of Thrasymenus, not thinking it yet proper to march directly to Rome, contented himself, in the mean time, with laying waste the country. He crossed Umbria and Picenum; and after ten days' march, arrived in the territory of Adria.[762] He got a very considerable booty in this march. Out of his implacable enmity to the Romans, he commanded, that all who were able to bear arms, should be put to the sword; and meeting no obstacle any where, he advanced as far as Apulia; plundering the countries which lay in his way, and carrying desolation wherever he came, in order to compel the nations to disengage themselves from their alliance with the Romans; and to show all Italy, that Rome itself, now quite dispirited, yielded him the victory.

Fabius, followed by Minucius and four legions, had marched from Rome in quest of the enemy, but with a firm resolution [pg 218] not to let him take the least advantage, nor to advance one step till he had first reconnoitred every place; nor hazard a battle till he should be sure of success.

As soon as both armies were in sight, Hannibal, to terrify the Roman forces, offered them battle, by advancing almost to the very entrenchments of their camp. But finding every thing quiet there, he retired; blaming, in appearance, the cowardice of the enemy, whom he upbraided with having at last lost that valour so natural to their ancestors; but fretted inwardly, to find he had to do with a general of so different a disposition from Sempronius and Flaminius; and that the Romans, instructed by their defeat, had at last made choice of a commander capable of opposing Hannibal.

From this moment he perceived that the dictator would not be formidable to him by the boldness of his attacks, but by the prudence and regularity of his conduct, which might perplex and embarrass him very much. The only circumstance he now wanted to know, was, whether the new general had firmness enough to pursue steadily the plan he seemed to have laid down. He endeavoured, therefore, to shake his resolution by the different movements which he made, by laying waste the lands, plundering the cities, and burning the villages and towns. He, at one time, would raise his camp with the utmost precipitation; and, at another, stop short in some valley out of the common route, to try whether he could not surprise him in the plain. However, Fabius still kept his troops on the hills, but without losing sight of Hannibal; never approaching near enough to come to an engagement; nor yet keeping at such a distance, as might give him an opportunity of escaping him. He never suffered his soldiers to stir out of the camp, except to forage, nor ever on those occasions without a numerous convoy. If ever he engaged, it was only in slight skirmishes, and so very cautiously, that his troops had always the advantage. By this conduct he revived, by insensible degrees, the courage of the soldiers, which the loss of three battles had entirely damped; and enabled them to rely, as they had formerly done, on their valour and good fortune.

Hannibal, having got an immense booty in Campania, where he had resided a considerable time, left that country, in order [pg 219] that he might not consume the provisions he had laid up, and which he reserved for the winter season. Besides, he could no longer continue in a country of gardens and vineyards, which were more agreeable to the eye than useful for the subsistence of an army; a country where he would have been forced to take up his winter quarters among marshes, rocks, and sands; while the Romans would have drawn plentiful supplies from Capua, and the richest parts of Italy. He therefore resolved to settle elsewhere.

Fabius naturally supposed, that Hannibal would be obliged to return the same way he came, and that he might easily annoy him during his march. He began by throwing a considerable body of troops into Casilinum, and thereby securing that small town, situated on the Vulturnus, which separated the territories of Falernum from those of Capua: he afterwards detached four thousand men, to seize the only pass through which Hannibal could come out; and then, according to his usual custom, posted himself with the remainder of the army on the hills adjoining to the road.

The Carthaginians arrive, and encamp in the plain at the foot of the mountains. And now the crafty Carthaginian falls into the same snare he had laid for Flaminius at the defile of Thrasymenus; and it seemed impossible for him ever to extricate himself out of this difficulty, there being but one outlet, of which the Romans were possessed. Fabius, fancying himself sure of his prey, was only contriving how to seize it. He flattered himself, and not without the appearance of probability, with the hopes of putting an end to the war by this single battle. Nevertheless, he thought fit to defer the attack till the next day.

Hannibal perceived, that his own artifices were now employed against him.[763] It is in such junctures as these, that a general has need of unusual presence of mind and fortitude, to view danger in its utmost extent, without being dismayed; and to find out sure and instant expedients without deliberating. Immediately, the Carthaginian general caused two thousand oxen to be got together, and ordered small bundles of vine-branches to be tied to their horns. Towards the dead of night, having commanded the branches to be set on fire, he caused [pg 220] the oxen to be driven with violence to the top of the hills where the Romans were encamped. As soon as these creatures felt the flame, the pain rendering them furious, they flew up and down on all sides, and set fire to the shrubs and bushes they met in their way. This squadron, of a new kind, was sustained by a good number of light-armed soldiers, who had orders to seize upon the summit of the mountain, and to charge the enemy, in case they should meet them. All things happened as Hannibal had foreseen. The Romans who guarded the defile, seeing the fires spread over the hills which were above them, and imagining that it was Hannibal making his escape by torch-light, quit their post, and run up to the mountains to oppose his passage. The main body of the army not knowing what to think of all this tumult, and Fabius himself not daring to stir, while it was dark, for fear of a surprise, wait for the return of the day. Hannibal seizes this opportunity, marches his troops and the spoils through the defile, which was now unguarded, and rescues his army out of a snare in which, had Fabius been but a little more vigorous, it would either have been destroyed, or at least very much weakened. It is glorious for a man to turn his very errors to his advantage, and make them subservient to his reputation.

The Carthaginian army returned to Apulia, still pursued and harassed by the Romans. The dictator, being obliged to take a journey to Rome on account of some religious ceremonies, earnestly entreated his general of horse, before his departure, not to fight during his absence. However, Minucius did not regard either his advice or his entreaties; but the very first opportunity he had, whilst part of Hannibal's troops were foraging, he charged the rest, and gained some advantage. He immediately sent advice of this to Rome, as if he had obtained a considerable victory. The news of this, with what had just before happened at the passage of the defile, raised complaints and murmurs against the slow and timorous circumspection of Fabius. In a word, matters were carried so far, that the Roman people gave his general of horse an equal authority with him; a thing unheard-of before. The dictator was upon the road when he received advice of this: for he had left Rome, in order that he might not be an eye-witness of what was contriving [pg 221] against him. His constancy, however, was not shaken. He was very sensible, that though his authority in the command was divided, yet his skill in the art of war was not so.[764] This soon became manifest.

Minucius, grown arrogant at the advantage he had gained over his colleague, proposed that each should command a day alternately, or even a longer time. But Fabius rejected this proposal, as it would have exposed the whole army to danger whilst under the command of Minucius. He therefore chose to divide the troops, in order that it might be in his power to preserve, at least, that part which should fall to his share.

Hannibal, fully informed of all that passed in the Roman camp, was overjoyed to hear of this dissension between the two commanders. He therefore laid a snare for the rash Minucius, who accordingly plunged headlong into it; and engaged the enemy on an eminence, in which an ambuscade was concealed. But his troops being soon put into disorder, were just upon the point of being cut to pieces, when Fabius, alarmed by the sudden outcries of the wounded, called aloud to his soldiers: “Let us hasten to the assistance of Minucius: let us fly and snatch the victory from the enemy, and extort from our fellow-citizens a confession of their fault.” This succour was very seasonable, and compelled Hannibal to sound a retreat. The latter, as he was retiring, said, “That the cloud which had been long hovering on the summit of the mountain, had at last burst with a loud crack, and caused a mighty storm.” So important and seasonable a service done by the dictator, opened the eyes of Minucius. He accordingly acknowledged his error, returned immediately to his duty and obedience, and showed, that it is sometimes more glorious to know how to atone for a fault, than not to have committed it.

The state of Affairs in Spain.[765]—In the beginning of this campaign, Cn. Scipio, having suddenly attacked the Carthaginian fleet, commanded by Hamilcar, defeated it, and took twenty-five ships, with a great quantity of rich spoils. This victory made the Romans sensible, that they ought to be particularly attentive [pg 222] to the affairs of Spain, because Hannibal could draw considerable supplies both of men and money from that country. Accordingly, they sent a fleet thither, the command whereof was given to P. Scipio, who, after his arrival in Spain, having joined his brother, did the commonwealth very great service. Till that time the Romans had never ventured beyond the Ebro. They had been satisfied with having gained the friendship of the nations situated between that river and Italy, and confirming it by alliances: but under Publius, they crossed the Ebro, and carried their arms much further up into the country.

The circumstance which contributed most to promote their affairs, was, the treachery of a Spaniard in Saguntum. Hannibal had left there the children of the most distinguished families in Spain, whom he had taken as hostages. Abelox, for so this Spaniard was called, persuaded Bostar, the governor of the city, to send back these young men into their country, in order, by that means, to attach the inhabitants more firmly to the Carthaginian interest. He himself was charged with this commission. But he carried them to the Romans, who afterwards delivered them to their relations, and, by so acceptable a present, acquired their amity.

A.M. 3789. A. Rom. 533.

The Battle of Cannæ.[766]—The next spring, C. Terentius Varro and L. Æmilius Paulus were chosen consuls at Rome. In this campaign, which was the third of the second Punic war, the Romans did what had never been practised before, that is, they composed the army of eight legions, each consisting of five thousand men, exclusive of the allies. For, as we have already observed, the Romans never raised but four legions, each of which consisted of about four thousand foot, and three hundred horse.[767] They never, except on the most important occasions, made them consist of five thousand of the one, and four hundred of the other. As for the troops of the allies, their infantry was equal to that of the legions, but they had three times as many horse. Each of the consuls had commonly half the troops of the allies, with two legions, in order for them to act separately; and it was very seldom that all [pg 223] these forces were used at the same time, and in the same expedition. Here the Romans had not only four, but eight legions, so important did the affair appear to them. The senate even thought fit, that the two consuls of the foregoing year, Servilius and Attilius, should serve in the army as proconsuls; but the latter could not go into the field, by reason of his great age.

Varro, at his setting out from Rome, had declared openly, that he would fall upon the enemy the very first opportunity, and put an end to the war; adding, that it would never be terminated, so long as men such as Fabius should be at the head of the Roman armies. An advantage which he gained over the Carthaginians, of whom near seventeen hundred were killed, greatly increased his boldness and arrogance. As for Hannibal, he considered this loss as a real advantage; being persuaded that it would serve as a bait to the consul's rashness, and prompt him on to a battles which he wanted extremely. It was afterwards known, that Hannibal was reduced to such a scarcity of provisions, that he could not possibly have subsisted ten days longer. The Spaniards were already meditating to leave him. So that there would have been an end of Hannibal and his army, if his good fortune had not thrown a Varro in in his way.

Both armies, having often removed from place to place, came in sight of each other near Cannæ, a little town in Apulia, situated on the river Aufidus. As Hannibal was encamped in a level open country, and his cavalry much superior to that of the Romans, Æmilius did not think proper to engage in such a place. He wished to draw the enemy into a spot, where the infantry might have the greatest share in the action. But his colleague, who was unexperienced, was of a contrary opinion. Such is the inconveniency of a divided command; jealousy, a disparity of tempers, or a diversity of views, seldom failing to create a dissension between the two generals.

The troops on each side were, for some time, contented with slight skirmishes. But, at last, one day, when Varro had the command, (for the two consuls took it by turns,) preparations were made on both sides for battle. Æmilius had not been consulted; yet, though he extremely disapproved the conduct [pg 224] of his colleague, as it was not in his power to prevent it, he seconded him to the utmost.

Hannibal, after having made his soldiers observe, that, being superior in cavalry, they could not possibly have pitched upon a better spot for fighting, had it been left to their choice: “Return, then,” says he, “thanks to the gods for having brought the enemy hither, that you may triumph over them; and thank me also, for having reduced the Romans to a necessity of coming to an engagement. After three great successive victories, is not the remembrance of your own actions sufficient to inspire you with courage? By the former battles, you are become masters of the open country; but this will put you in possession of all the cities, and, I presume to say it, of all the riches and power of the Romans. It is not words that we want, but action. I trust in the gods, that you shall soon see my promises verified.”

The two armies were very unequal in number. That of the Romans, including the allies, amounted to fourscore thousand foot, and a little above six thousand horse; and that of the Carthaginians consisted but of forty thousand foot, all well disciplined, and of ten thousand horse. Æmilius commanded the right wing of the Romans, Varro the left, and Servilius, one of the consuls of the last year, was posted in the centre. Hannibal, who had the art of turning every incident to advantage, had posted himself, so as that the wind Vulturnus,[768] which rises at certain stated times, should blow directly in the faces of the Romans during the fight, and cover them with dust; then keeping the river Aufidus on his left, and posting his cavalry in the wings, he formed his main body of the Spanish and Gaulish infantry, which he posted in the centre, with half the African heavy-armed foot on their right, and half on their left, on the same line with the cavalry. His army being thus drawn up, he put himself at the head of the Spanish and Gaulish infantry; and having drawn them out of the line, advanced to give battle, rounding his front as he drew nearer the enemy; and extending his flanks in the shape of a half moon, in order that he might leave no interval between his main body and the [pg 225] rest of the line, which consisted of the heavy-armed infantry, who had not moved from their posts.

The fight soon began, and the Roman legions that were in the wings, seeing their centre warmly attacked, advanced to charge the enemy in flank. Hannibal's main body, after a brave resistance, finding themselves furiously attacked on all sides, gave way, being overpowered by numbers; and retired through the interval they had left in the centre of the line. The Romans having pursued them thither with eager confusion, the two wings of the African infantry, which were fresh, well armed, and in good order, wheeled about on a sudden towards that void space in which the Romans, who were already fatigued, had thrown themselves in disorder; and attacked them vigorously on both sides, without allowing them time to recover themselves, or leaving them ground to draw up. In the mean time, the two wings of the cavalry, having defeated those of the Romans, which were much inferior to them, and having left in the pursuit of the broken and scattered squadrons, only as many forces as were necessary to keep them from rallying, advanced and charged the rear of the Roman infantry, which being surrounded at once on every side by the enemy's horse and foot was all cut to pieces, after having fought with unparalleled bravery. Æmilius being covered with the wounds he had received in the fight, was afterwards killed by a body of the enemy to whom he was not known; and with him two quæstors; one and twenty military tribunes; many who had been either consuls or prætors; Servilius, one of the last year's consuls; Minucius, the late general of horse to Fabius; and fourscore senators. Above seventy thousand men fell in this battle;[769] and the Carthaginians, so great was their fury,[770] did not give over the slaughter, till Hannibal, in the very heat of it, called out to them several times; “Stop, soldiers, spare the vanquished.” Ten thousand men, who had been left to guard the camp, surrendered themselves prisoners of war after the battle. Varro the consul retired to Venusia, with only seventy horse; and about four thousand men escaped into the [pg 226] neighbouring cities. Thus Hannibal remained master of the field, he being chiefly indebted for this, as well as for his former victories, to the superiority of his cavalry over that of the Romans. He lost four thousand Gauls, fifteen hundred Spaniards and Africans, and two hundred horse.

Maharbal, one of the Carthaginian generals, advised Hannibal to march without loss of time directly to Rome, promising him, that within five days they should sup in the Capitol. Hannibal answering, that it was an affair which required mature deliberation; “I see,” replies Maharbal, “that the gods have not endowed the same man with all talents. You, Hannibal, know how to conquer, but not to make the best use of a victory.”[771]

It is pretended that this delay saved Rome and the empire. Many authors, and among the rest Livy, charge Hannibal, on this occasion, as being guilty of a capital error. But others, more reserved, are not for condemning, without evident proofs, so renowned a general, who in the rest of his conduct was never wanting, either in prudence to make choice of the best expedients, or in readiness to put his designs in execution. They, besides, are inclined to judge favourably of him, from the authority, or at least the silence, of Polybius, who, speaking of the memorable consequences of this celebrated battle, says, that the Carthaginians were firmly persuaded, that they should possess themselves of Rome at the first assault; but then he does not mention how this could possibly have been effected, as that city was very populous, warlike, strongly fortified, and defended with a garrison of two legions; nor does he any where give the least hint that such a project was feasible, or that Hannibal did wrong in not attempting to put it in execution.

And indeed, if we examine matters more narrowly, we shall find, that according to the common maxims of war it could not be undertaken. It is certain, that Hannibal's whole infantry, before the battle, amounted but to forty thousand men; and, as six thousand of these had been slain in the action, and doubtless, many more wounded and disabled, there could [pg 227] remain but six or seven and twenty thousand foot fit for service; now this number was not sufficient to invest so large a city as Rome, which had a river running through it; nor to attack it in form, because they had neither engines, ammunition, nor any other things necessary for carrying on a siege. For want of these, Hannibal, even after his victory at Thrasymenus, miscarried in his attempt upon Spoletum;[772] and soon after the battle of Cannæ, was forced to raise the siege of a little city,[773] of no note, and of no great strength. It cannot be denied, but that had he miscarried on the present occasion, nothing less could have been expected but that he must have been irrecoverably lost. However, to form a just judgment of this matter, a man ought to be a soldier, and a soldier, perhaps, of those times. This is an old dispute, on which none but those who are perfectly well skilled in the art of war should pretend to give their opinion.

Soon after the battle of Cannæ, Hannibal had despatched his brother Mago to Carthage, with the news of his victory, and at the same time to demand succours, in order that he might be enabled to put an end to the war.[774] Mago, on his arrival, made, in full senate, a lofty speech, in which he extolled his brother's exploits, and displayed the great advantages he had gained over the Romans. And, to give a more lively idea of the greatness of the victory, by speaking in some measure to the eye, he poured out, in the middle of the senate, a bushel[775] of gold rings, which had been taken from the fingers of such of the Roman nobility as had fallen in the battle of Cannæ. He concluded with demanding money, provisions, and fresh troops. All the spectators were struck with an extraordinary joy; upon which Imilcon, a great stickler for Hannibal, fancying he had now a fair opportunity to insult Hanno, the chief of the contrary faction, asked him, whether he was still dissatisfied with the war they were carrying on against the Romans, and was for having Hannibal delivered [pg 228] up to them? Hanno, without discovering the least emotion, replied, that he was still of the same mind; and that the victories of which they so much boasted (supposing them real) could not give him joy, but only in proportion as they should be made subservient to an advantageous peace: he then undertook to prove, that the mighty exploits, on which they insisted so much, were wholly chimerical and imaginary. “I have cut to pieces,” says he (continuing Mago's speech,) “the Roman armies: send me some troops.—What more could you ask had you been conquered? I have twice seized upon the enemy's camp, full (no doubt) of provisions of every kind.—Send me provisions and money.—Could you have talked otherwise had you lost your camp?” He then asked Mago, whether any of the Latin nations had come over to Hannibal, and whether the Romans had made him any proposals of peace? To this Mago answering in the negative: “I then perceive,” replied Hanno, “that we are no farther advanced, than when Hannibal first landed in Italy.” The inference he drew from hence was, that neither men nor money ought to be sent. But Hannibal's faction prevailing at that time, no regard was paid to Hanno's remonstrances, which were considered merely as the effect of prejudice and jealousy; and, accordingly, orders were given for levying, without delay, the supplies of men and money which Hannibal required. Mago set out immediately for Spain, to raise twenty-four thousand foot, and four thousand horse in that country; but these levies were afterwards stopped, and sent to another quarter; so eager was the contrary faction to oppose the designs of a general whom they utterly abhorred. While in Rome, a consul,[776] who had fled, was thanked because he had not despaired of the commonwealth; at Carthage, people were almost angry with Hannibal, for being victorious. But Hanno could never forgive him the advantages he had gained in this war, because he had undertaken it in opposition to his counsel. Thus being more jealous for the honour of his own opinions than for the good of his country, and a greater enemy to the Carthaginian general than to the Romans, he did all that lay in his power to prevent future success, and to render of no avail that which had been already gained.

Hannibal takes up his Winter Quarters in Capua.[777]—The battle of Cannæ subjected the most powerful nations of Italy to Hannibal, drew over to his interest Græcia Magna,[778] with the city of Tarentum; and thus wrested from the Romans their most ancient allies, among whom the Capuans held the first rank. This city, by the fertility of its soil, its advantageous situation, and the blessings of a long peace, had risen to great wealth and power. Luxury, and a fondness for pleasure, (the usual attendants on wealth,) had corrupted the minds of all its citizens, who, from their natural inclination, were but too much inclined to voluptuousness and excess.

Hannibal[779] made choice of this city for his winter quarters. Here it was that those soldiers, who had sustained the most grievous toils, and braved the most formidable dangers, were overthrown by abundance and a profusion of luxuries, into which they plunged with the greater eagerness, as they, till then, had been strangers to them. Their courage was so greatly enervated in this bewitching retirement, that all their after efforts were owing rather to the fame and splendour of their former victories than to their present strength. When Hannibal marched his forces out of the city, one would have taken them for other men, and the reverse of those who had so lately marched into it. Accustomed, during the winter season, to commodious lodgings, to ease and plenty, they were no longer able to bear hunger, thirst, long marches, watchings, and the other toils of war; not to mention that all obedience, all discipline, were entirely laid aside.

I only transcribe on this occasion from Livy. If we are to adopt his opinion on this subject, Hannibal's stay at Capua was a capital blemish in his conduct; and he pretends, that this general was guilty of an infinitely greater error, than when he neglected to march directly to Rome after the battle of [pg 230] Cannæ. For this delay,[780] says Livy, might seem only to have retarded his victory; whereas this last misconduct rendered him absolutely incapable of ever defeating the enemy. In a word, as Marcellus observed judiciously afterwards, Capua was to the Carthaginians and their general, what Cannæ[781] had been to the Romans. There their martial genius, their love of discipline, were lost: there their former fame, and their almost certain hopes of future glory, vanished at once. And, indeed, from thenceforth the affairs of Hannibal advanced to their decline by swift steps; fortune declared in favour of prudence, and victory seemed now reconciled to the Romans.

I know not whether Livy has just ground to impute all these fatal consequences to the delicious abode of Capua. If we examine carefully all the circumstances of this history, we shall scarce be able to persuade ourselves, that the little progress which was afterwards made by the arms of Hannibal, ought to be ascribed to his wintering at Capua. It might, indeed, have been one cause, but a very inconsiderable one: and the bravery with which the forces of Hannibal afterwards defeated the armies of consuls and prætors; the towns they took even in sight of the Romans; their maintaining their conquests so vigorously, and staying fourteen years after this in Italy, in spite of the Romans: all these circumstances may induce us to believe, that Livy lays too great a stress on the delights of Capua.

The real cause of the decline of Hannibal's affairs, was owing to his want of necessary recruits and succours from Carthage. After Mago's speech, the Carthaginian senate had judged it necessary,[782] in order for the carrying on the conquests in Italy, to send thither a considerable reinforcement of Numidian horse, forty elephants, and a thousand talents; and to hire, in Spain, twenty thousand foot, and four thousand horse, to reinforce their armies in Spain and Italy. Nevertheless, Mago could obtain an order but for twelve thousand foot, and two thousand five hundred horse:[783] and even when he [pg 231] was just going to march to Italy with this reinforcement, so much inferior to that which had been promised him, he was countermanded and sent to Spain. So that Hannibal, after these mighty promises, had neither infantry, cavalry, elephants, nor money sent him; but was left to depend upon his own personal resources. His army was now reduced to twenty-six thousand foot, and nine thousand horse. How could it be possible for him, with so inconsiderable an army, to seize, in an enemy's country, on all the advantageous posts; to awe his new allies; to preserve his old conquests and form new ones; and to keep the field, with advantage, against two armies of the Romans which were recruited every year? This was the true cause of the declension of Hannibal's affairs, and of the ruin of those of Carthage. Was the part where Polybius treated this subject extant, we doubtless should find, that he lays a greater stress on this cause, than on the luxurious delights of Capua.

A.M. 3790. A. Rom. 534.

Transactions relating to Spain and Sardinia.[784]—The two Scipios still continued in the command of Spain, and their arms were making a considerable progress there, when Asdrubal, who alone seemed able to cope with them, received orders from Carthage to march into Italy to the relief of his brother. Before he left Spain, he writ to the senate, to convince them of the absolute necessity of their sending a general in his stead, who was capable of making head against the Romans. Imilcon was therefore sent thither with an army; and Asdrubal set out upon his march with his, in order to go and join his brother. The news of his departure was no sooner known, than the greatest part of Spain was subjected by the Scipios. These two generals, animated by such signal success, resolved to prevent him, if possible, from leaving Spain. They considered the danger to which the Romans would be exposed, if, being scarce able to resist Hannibal alone, they should be attacked by the two brothers, at the head of two powerful armies. They therefore pursued Asdrubal, and, coming up with that general, forced him to fight against his inclination. Asdrubal was overcome; and, so far from being able to continue his march for Italy, he [pg 232] found that it would be impossible for him to continue with any safety in Spain.

The Carthaginians had no better success in Sardinia. Designing to take advantage of some rebellions which they had fomented in that country, they lost twelve thousand men in a battle fought against the Romans, who took a still greater number of prisoners, among whom were Asdrubal, surnamed Calvus, Hanno, and Mago,[785] who were distinguished by their birth as well as military exploits.

A.M. 3791. A. Rom. 535.

The ill Success of Hannibal. The Sieges of Capua and Rome.[786]—From the time of Hannibal's abode in Capua, the Carthaginian affairs in Italy no longer supported their former reputation. M. Marcellus, first as prætor, and afterwards as consul, had contributed very much to this revolution. He harassed Hannibal's army on every occasion, seized upon his quarters, forced him to raise sieges, and even defeated him in several engagements; so that he was called the Sword of Rome, as Fabius had before been named its Buckler.

A.M. 3793. A. Rom 537.

But what most affected the Carthaginian general, was, to see Capua besieged by the Romans. In order, therefore, to preserve his reputation among his allies, by a vigorous support of those who held the chief rank as such, he flew to the relief of that city, brought forward his forces, attacked the Romans, and fought several battles to oblige them to raise the siege.

A.M. 3794. A. Rom. 538.

At last, seeing all his measures defeated, he marched hastily towards Rome, in order to make a powerful diversion. He was not without hope of being able, in case he could have an opportunity, in the first consternation, to storm some part of the city, of drawing the Roman generals with all their forces from the siege of Capua, to the relief of their capital; at least he flattered himself, that if, for the sake of continuing the siege, they should divide their forces, their weakness might then offer an occasion, either to the Capuans or himself, of engaging and defeating them. Rome was surprised, but not confounded. A proposal being made by one of the [pg 233] senators, to recall all the armies to succour Rome; Fabius[787] declared, that it would be shameful in them to be terrified, and forced to change their measures upon every motion of Hannibal. They therefore contented themselves with only recalling part of the army, and one of the generals, Q. Fulvius the proconsul, from the siege. Hannibal, after making some devastations, drew up his army in order of battle before the city, and the consul did the same. Both sides were preparing to signalize themselves in a battle, of which Rome was to be the recompense, when a violent storm obliged them to separate. They were no sooner returned to their respective camps, than the face of the heavens grew calm and serene. The same incident happened frequently afterwards; insomuch that Hannibal, believing that there was something supernatural in the event, said, according to Livy, that sometimes[788] his own will, and sometimes fortune, would not suffer him to take Rome.

But the circumstance which most surprised and intimidated him, was the news, that, whilst he lay encamped at one of the gates of Rome, the Romans had sent out recruits for the army in Spain at another gate; and that the ground, whereon his camp was pitched, had been sold, notwithstanding that circumstance, for its full value. So barefaced a contempt stung Hannibal to the quick; he, therefore, on the other side, put up to auction the shops of the goldsmiths round the Forum. After this bravado he retired, and, in his march, plundered the rich temple of the goddess Feronia.[789]

Capua, thus left to itself, held out but very little longer. After that such of its senators as had the chief hand in the revolt, and consequently could not expect any quarter from the Romans, had put themselves to a truly tragical death,[790] the [pg 234] city surrendered at discretion. The success of this siege, which, by the happy consequences wherewith it was attended, proved decisive, and fully restored to the Romans their superiority over the Carthaginians; displayed, at the same time, how formidable the power of the Romans was,[791] when they undertook to punish their perfidious allies; and the feeble protection which Hannibal could afford his friends at a time when they most wanted it.

A.M. 3793. A. Rom. 537.

The Defeat and Death of the two Scipios in Spain.[792]—The face of affairs was very much changed in Spain. The Carthaginians had three armies in that country; one commanded by Asdrubal, the son of Gisgo; the second by Asdrubal, son of Hamilcar; and a third under Mago, who had joined the first Asdrubal. The two Scipios, Cneus and Publius, were for dividing their forces, and attacking the enemy separately, which was the cause of their ruin. They agreed that Cneus, with a small number of Romans, and thirty thousand Celtiberians, should march against Asdrubal, the son of Hamilcar; whilst Publius, with the remainder of the forces, composed of Romans and the Italian allies, should advance against the other two generals.

Publius was vanquished first. To the two leaders whom he had to oppose, Masinissa, elate with the victories he had lately gained over Syphax, joined himself; and was to be soon followed by Indibilis, a powerful Spanish prince. The armies came to an engagement. The Romans, being thus attacked on all sides at once, made a brave resistance as long as they had their general at their head; but the moment he fell, the few troops which had escaped the slaughter, secured themselves by flight.

The three victorious armies marched immediately in quest of Cneus, in order to put an end to the war by his defeat. He [pg 235] was already more than half vanquished by the desertion of his allies, who all forsook him; and left to the Roman generals this important instruction;[793] viz. never to let their own forces be exceeded in number by those of foreigners. He guessed that his brother was slain, and his army defeated, upon seeing such great bodies of the enemy arrive. He survived him but a short time, being killed in the engagement. These two great men were equally lamented by their citizens and allies; and Spain deeply felt their loss, because of the justice and moderation of their conduct.

These extensive countries seemed now inevitably lost; but the valour of L. Marcius,[794] a private officer of the equestrian order, preserved them to the Romans. Shortly after this, the younger Scipio was sent thither, who severely revenged the death of his father and uncle, and restored the affairs of the Romans in Spain to their former flourishing condition.

A.M. 3798. A. Rom. 542.

The Defeat and Death of Asdrubal.[795]—One unforeseen defeat ruined all the measures, and blasted all the hopes of Hannibal with regard to Italy. The consuls of this year, which was the eleventh of the second Punic war, (for I pass over several events for brevity's sake,) were C. Claudius Nero, and M. Livius. The latter had, for his province, the Cisalpine Gaul, where he was to oppose Asdrubal, who, it was reported, was preparing to pass the Alps. The former commanded in the country of the Brutians, and in Lucania, that is, in the opposite extremity of Italy, and was there making head against Hannibal.

The passage of the Alps gave Asdrubal very little trouble, because his brother had cleared the way for him, and all the nations were disposed to receive him. Some time after this, he despatched couriers to Hannibal, but they were intercepted. Nero found by their letters, that Asdrubal was hastening to join his brother in Umbria. In a conjuncture of so important a [pg 236] nature as this, when the safety of Rome lay at stake, he thought himself at liberty to dispense with the established rules[796] of his duty, for the welfare of his country. In consequence of this, it was his opinion, that such a bold and unexpected blow ought to be struck, as might be capable of striking terror into the enemy; by marching to join his colleague, in order that they might charge Asdrubal unexpectedly with their united forces. This design, if the several circumstances of it are thoroughly examined, should not be hastily charged with imprudence. To prevent the two brothers from joining their armies, was to save the state. Very little would be hazarded, even though Hannibal should be informed of the absence of the consul. From his army, which consisted of forty-two thousand men, he drew out but seven thousand for his own detachment, which indeed were the flower of his troops, but, at the same time, a very inconsiderable part of them. The rest remained in the camp, which was advantageously situated, and strongly fortified. Now could it be supposed that Hannibal would attack, and force a strong camp defended by thirty-five thousand men?

Nero set out without giving his soldiers the least notice of his design. When he had advanced so far, as that it might be communicated without any danger, he told them, that he was leading them to certain victory: that, in war, all things depended upon reputation; that the bare rumour of their arrival would disconcert all the measures of the Carthaginians; and that the whole honour of this battle would fall to them.

They marched with extraordinary diligence, and joined the other consul in the night, but did not pitch separate camps, the better to impose upon the enemy. The troops which were newly arrived joined those of Livius. The army of Porcius the prætor was encamped near that of the consul, and in the morning a council of war was held. Livius was of opinion, that it would be better to allow the troops some days to refresh themselves; but Nero besought him not to ruin, by delay, an enterprise to which despatch only could give success; and to take advantage of the error of the enemy, as well absent as present. This advice was complied with, and accordingly the signal for [pg 237] battle was given. Asdrubal, advancing to his foremost ranks, discovered, by several circumstances, that fresh troops were arrived; and he did not doubt but that they belonged to the other consul. This made him conjecture, that his brother had sustained a considerable loss, and, at the same time, fear, that he was come too late to his assistance.

After making these reflections, he caused a retreat to be sounded, and his army began to march in great disorder. Night overtaking him, and his guides deserting, he was uncertain what way to go. He marched at random, along the banks of the river Metaurus,[797] and was preparing to cross it, when the three armies of the enemy came up with him. In this extremity, he saw it would be impossible for him to avoid coming to an engagement; and therefore did every thing which could be expected from the presence of mind and valour of a great captain. He seized an advantageous post, and drew up his forces on a narrow spot, which gave him an opportunity of posting his left wing (the weakest part of his army) in such a manner, that it could neither be attacked in front, nor charged in flank; and of giving to his main battle and right wing a greater depth than front. After this hasty disposition of his forces, he posted himself in the centre, and was the first to march to attack the enemy's left wing; well knowing that all was at stake, and that he must either conquer or die. The battle lasted a long time, and was obstinately disputed by both parties. Asdrubal, especially, signalized himself in this engagement, and added new glory to that he had already acquired by a series of shining actions. He led on his soldiers, trembling and quite dispirited, against an enemy superior to them both in numbers and resolution. He animated them by his words, supported them by his example, and, with entreaties and menaces, endeavoured to bring back those who fled; till, at last, seeing that victory declared for the Romans, and being unable to survive the loss of so many thousand men, who had quitted their country to follow his fortune, he rushed at once into the midst of a Roman cohort, and there died in a manner worthy the son of Hamilcar, and the brother of Hannibal.

This was the most bloody battle the Carthaginians had [pg 238] fought during this war: and, whether we consider the death of the general, or the slaughter made of the Carthaginian forces, it may be looked upon as a reprisal for the battle of Cannæ. The Carthaginians lost fifty-five thousand men,[798] and six thousand were taken prisoners. The Romans lost eight thousand. These were so weary of killing, that some person telling Livius, that he might very easily cut to pieces a body of the enemy who were flying: “It is fit,” says he, “that some should survive, in order that they may carry the news of this defeat to the Carthaginians.”

Nero set out upon his march, on the very night which followed the engagement. Through every place where he passed, in his return, shouts of joy and loud acclamations welcomed him, instead of those fears and uneasiness which his coming had occasioned. He arrived in his camp the sixth day. Asdrubal's head being thrown into the camp of the Carthaginians, informed Hannibal of his brother's unhappy fate. Hannibal perceived, by this cruel stroke, the fortune of Carthage: “All is over,” says he,[799] “I shall no longer send triumphant messages to Carthage. In losing Asdrubal, I have lost at once all my hope, all my good fortune.” He afterwards retired to the extremities of the country of the Brutians, where he assembled all his forces, who found it a very difficult matter to subsist there, as no provisions were sent them from Carthage.

A.M. 3799. A. Rom. 543.

Scipio conquers all Spain. Is appointed Consul, and sails into Africa. Hannibal is recalled.[800]—The fate of arms was not more propitious to the Carthaginians in Spain. The prudent vivacity of young Scipio had restored the Roman affairs in that country to their former flourishing state, as the courageous slowness of Fabius had before done in Italy. The three Carthaginian generals in Spain, Asdrubal son of Gisco, Hanno, and Mago, having been [pg 239] defeated with their numerous armies by the Romans in several engagements, Scipio at last possessed himself of Spain, and subjected it entirely to the Roman power. It was at this time that Masinissa, a very powerful African prince, went over to the Romans, and Syphax, on the contrary, to the Carthaginians.

A.M. 3800. A. Rom. 544.

Scipio, at his return to Rome, was declared consul, being then thirty years of age. He had P. Licinius Crassus for his colleague. Sicily was allotted to Scipio, with permission for him to cross into Africa, if he found it convenient. He set out with all imaginable expedition for his province; whilst his colleague was to command in the country whither Hannibal was retired.

The taking of New Carthage, where Scipio had displayed all the prudence, the courage, and capacity which could have been expected from the greatest generals, and the conquest of all Spain, were more than sufficient to immortalize his name: but he had considered these only as so many steps by which he was to climb to a nobler enterprise: this was the conquest of Africa. Accordingly, he crossed over thither, and made it the seat of the war.

The devastation of the country, the siege of Utica, one of the strongest cities of Africa; the entire defeat of the two armies under Syphax and Asdrubal, whose camp was burnt by Scipio; and afterwards the taking Syphax himself prisoner, who was the most powerful resource the Carthaginians had left; all these things forced them at last to turn their thoughts to peace. For this purpose they deputed thirty of their principal senators, who were selected from that powerful body at Carthage, called the council of the hundred. Being introduced into the Roman general's tent, they all threw themselves prostrate on the earth, (such was the custom of their country,) spoke to him in terms of great submission, accusing Hannibal as the author of all their calamities, and promising, in the name of the senate, an implicit obedience to whatever the Romans should please to ordain. Scipio answered, that though he was come into Africa not for peace, but conquest, he would however grant them a peace, upon condition that they should deliver up all the prisoners and deserters to the Romans; that they should recall their armies out of Italy and Gaul; should [pg 240] never set foot again in Spain; should retire out of all the islands between Italy and Africa; should deliver up all their ships, twenty excepted, to the victor; should give to the Romans five hundred thousand bushels of wheat, three hundred thousand of barley, and pay fifteen thousand talents: that in case they were pleased with these conditions, they then, he said, might send ambassadors to the senate. The Carthaginians feigned a compliance, but this was only to gain time, till Hannibal should be returned. A truce was then granted to the Carthaginians, who immediately sent deputies to Rome, and at the same time an express to Hannibal, to order his return into Africa.

A.M. 3802. A. Rom. 516.

He was then, as was observed before, in the extremity of Italy. Here he received the orders from Carthage, which he could not listen to without groans, and almost shedding tears; and was exasperated almost to madness, to see himself thus forced to quit his prey. Never banished man[801] showed so much regret at leaving his native country, as Hannibal did in going out of that of an enemy. He often turned his eyes wishfully to Italy, accusing gods and men of his misfortunes, and calling down a thousand curses, says[802] Livy, upon himself, for not having marched his soldiers directly to Rome, after the battle of Cannæ, whilst they were still reeking with the blood of its citizens.

At Rome, the senate, greatly dissatisfied with the excuses made by the Carthaginian deputies, in justification of their republic, and the ridiculous offer which they made, in its name, of adhering to the treaty of Lutatius; thought proper to refer the decision of the whole to Scipio, who, being on the spot, could best judge what conditions the welfare of the state required.

About the same time, Octavius the prætor sailing from Sicily into Africa with two hundred vessels of burden, was attacked near Carthage by a furious storm, which dispersed all his fleet. The citizens, not bearing to see so rich a prey escape them, [pg 241] demanded importunately that the Carthaginian fleet might sail out and seize it. The senate, after a faint resistance, complied. Asdrubal, sailing out of the harbour, seized the greatest part of the Roman ships, and brought them to Carthage, although the truce was still subsisting.

Scipio sent deputies to the Carthaginian senate, to complain of this, but they were little regarded. Hannibal's approach had revived their courage, and filled them with great hopes. The deputies were even in great danger of being ill treated by the populace. They therefore demanded a convoy, which was granted, and accordingly two ships of the republic attended them. But the magistrates, who were absolutely against peace, and determined to renew the war, gave private orders to Asdrubal, (who was with the fleet near Utica,) to attack the Roman galley when it should arrive in the river Bagrada near the Roman camp, where the convoy was ordered to leave them. He obeyed the order, and sent out two galleys against the ambassadors, who nevertheless made their escape, but with difficulty and danger.

This was a fresh subject for a war between the two nations, who now were more animated, or rather more exasperated, one against the other, than ever: the Romans, from a desire of taking vengeance for so black a perfidy; and the Carthaginians, from a persuasion that they were not now to expect a peace.

At the same time, Lælius and Fulvius, who carried the full powers with which the senate and people of Rome had invested Scipio, arrived in the camp, accompanied by the deputies of Carthage. As the Carthaginians had not only infringed the truce, but violated the law of nations, in the person of the Roman ambassadors, it might naturally be expected that they should order the Carthaginian deputies to be seized by way of reprisal. However, Scipio,[803] more attentive to what was required by the Roman generosity, than by the perfidy of the Carthaginians, in order not to deviate from the principles and [pg 242] maxims of his own countrymen, nor his own character, dismissed the deputies, without offering them the least injury. So astonishing an instance of moderation, and at such a juncture, terrified the Carthaginians, and even put them to the blush; and made Hannibal himself entertain a still higher idea of a general, who, to the dishonourable practices of his enemies, opposed only a rectitude and greatness of soul, that was still more worthy of admiration than all his military virtues.

In the mean time, Hannibal, being strongly importuned by his fellow-citizens, advanced forward into the country; and arriving at Zama, which is five days' march from Carthage, he there pitched his camp. He thence sent out spies to observe the position of the Romans. Scipio having seized these, so far from punishing them, only commanded them to be led about the Roman camp, in order that they might take an exact survey of it, and then sent them back to Hannibal. The latter knew very well whence so noble an assurance flowed. After the strange reverses he had met with, he no longer expected that fortune would again be propitious. Whilst every one was exciting him to give battle, himself only meditated a peace. He flattered himself that the conditions of it would be more honourable, as he was at the head of an army, and as the fate of arms might still appear uncertain. He, therefore, sent to desire an interview with Scipio, which accordingly was agreed to, and the time and place fixed.

A.M. 3803. A. Rom. 547.

The Interview between Hannibal and Scipio in Africa, followed by a Battle.[804]—These two generals, who were not only the most illustrious of their own age, but worthy of being ranked with the most renowned princes and warriors that had ever lived, having met at the place appointed, continued for some time in a deep silence, as though they were astonished, and struck with a mutual admiration at the sight of each other. At last Hannibal spoke, and after having praised Scipio in the most artful and delicate manner, he gave a very lively description of the ravages of the war, and the calamities in which it had involved both the victors and the vanquished. He conjured him not to suffer himself to be dazzled by the splendour of his victories. He [pg 243] represented to him, that how successful soever he might have hitherto been, he ought, however, to be aware of the inconstancy of fortune: that without going far back for examples, he himself, who was then speaking to him, was a glaring proof of this: that Scipio was at that time what Hannibal had been at Thrasymenus and Cannæ: that he ought to make a better use of opportunity than himself had done, by consenting to a peace, now it was in his power to propose the conditions of it. He concluded with declaring, that the Carthaginians would willingly resign Sicily, Sardinia, Spain, and all the islands between Africa and Italy, to the Romans: that they must be forced, since such was the will of the gods, to confine themselves to Africa; whilst they should see the Romans extending their conquests to the most remote regions, and obliging all nations to pay obedience to their laws.

Scipio answered in few words, but not with less dignity. He reproached the Carthaginians for their perfidy, in plundering the Roman galleys before the truce was expired. He imputed to them alone, and to their injustice, all the calamities with which the two wars had been attended. After thanking Hannibal for the admonition he had given him, with regard to the uncertainty of human events, he concluded with desiring him to prepare for battle, unless he chose rather to accept of the conditions that had been already proposed; to which (he observed) some others would be added, in order to punish the Carthaginians for their having violated the truce.

Hannibal could not prevail with himself to accept these conditions, and the generals left one another, with the resolution to decide the fate of Carthage by a general battle. Each commander exhorted his troops to fight valiantly. Hannibal enumerated the victories he had gained over the Romans, the generals he had slain, the armies he had cut to pieces. Scipio represented to his soldiers, the conquest of both the Spains, his successes in Africa, and the confession the enemies themselves made of their weakness, by thus coming to sue for peace. All this he spoke[805] with the tone and air of a conqueror. Never were motives more powerful to prompt troops to behave gallantly. [pg 244] This day was to complete the glory of the one or the other of the generals; and to decide whether Rome or Carthage was to prescribe laws to all other nations.

I shall not undertake to describe the order of the battle, nor the valour of the forces on both sides. The reader will naturally suppose, that two such experienced generals did not forget any circumstance which could contribute to the victory. The Carthaginians, after a very obstinate fight, were obliged to fly, leaving twenty thousand men on the field of battle, and the like number of prisoners were taken by the Romans. Hannibal escaped in the tumult, and entering Carthage, owned that he was irrecoverably overthrown, and that the citizens had no other choice left than to accept of peace on any conditions. Scipio bestowed great eulogiums on Hannibal, chiefly with regard to his ability in taking advantages, his manner of drawing up his army, and giving out his orders in the engagement; and he affirmed, that Hannibal had this day surpassed himself, although the success had not answered his valour and conduct.

With regard to himself, he well knew how to make a proper advantage of the victory, and the consternation with which he had filled the enemy. He commanded one of his lieutenants to march his land army to Carthage, whilst himself prepared to conduct the fleet thither.

He was not far from the city, when he met a vessel covered with streamers and olive-branches, bringing ten of the most considerable persons of the state, as ambassadors to implore his clemency. However, he dismissed them without making any answer, and bade them come to him at Tunis, where he should halt. The deputies of Carthage, thirty in number, came to him at the place appointed, and sued for peace in the most submissive terms. He then called a council there, the majority of which were for rasing Carthage, and treating the inhabitants with the utmost severity. But the consideration of the time which must necessarily be employed before so strongly fortified a city could be taken; and Scipio's fear lest a successor might be appointed him whilst he should be employed in the siege, made him incline to clemency.

A Peace concluded between the Carthaginians and the [pg 245] Romans. The End of the Second Punic War.[806]—The conditions of the peace dictated by Scipio to the Carthaginians were, “That the Carthaginians should continue free, and preserve their laws, their territories, and the cities they possessed in Africa before the war—That they should deliver up to the Romans all deserters, slaves, and prisoners belonging to them; all their ships, except ten triremes; all the elephants which they then had, and that they should not train up any more for war—That they should not make war out of Africa, nor even in that country, without first obtaining leave for that purpose from the Roman people—Should restore to Masinissa every thing of which they had dispossessed either him or his ancestors—Should furnish money and corn to the Roman auxiliaries, till their ambassadors should be returned from Rome—Should pay to the Romans ten thousand Euboic talents[807] of silver in fifty annual payments; and give a hundred hostages, who should be nominated by Scipio. And in order that they might have time to send to Rome, he agreed to grant them a truce, upon condition that they should restore the ships taken during the former, without which they were not to expect either a truce or peace.”

When the deputies were returned to Carthage, they laid before the senate the conditions dictated by Scipio. But they appeared so intolerable to Gisgo, that rising up, he made a speech, in order to dissuade his citizens from accepting a peace on such shameful terms. Hannibal, provoked at the calmness with which such an orator was heard, took Gisgo by the arm, and dragged him from his seat. A behaviour so outrageous, and so remote from the manners of a free city like Carthage, raised an universal murmur. Hannibal himself was vexed when he reflected on what he had done, and immediately [pg 246] made an apology for it. “As I left,” says he, “your city at nine years of age, and did not return to it till after thirty-six years' absence, I had full leisure to learn the arts of war, and flatter myself that I have made some improvement in them. As for your laws and customs, it is no wonder I am ignorant of them, and I therefore desire you to instruct me in them.” He then expatiated on the indispensable necessity they were under of concluding a peace. He added, that they ought to thank the gods for having prompted the Romans to grant them a peace even on these conditions. He pointed out to them the great importance of their uniting in opinion; and of not giving an opportunity, by their divisions, for the people to take an affair of this nature under their cognizance. The whole city came over to his opinion; and accordingly the peace was accepted. The senate made Scipio satisfaction with regard to the ships reclaimed by him; and, after obtaining a truce for three months, they sent ambassadors to Rome.

These Carthaginians, who were all venerable for their years and dignity, were admitted immediately to an audience. Asdrubal, surnamed Hœdus, who was still an irreconcileable enemy to Hannibal and his faction, spoke first; and after having excused, to the best of his power, the people of Carthage, by imputing the rupture to the ambition of some particular persons, he added, that had the Carthaginians listened to his counsels and those of Hanno, they would have been able to grant the Romans the peace for which they now were obliged to sue. “But,”[808] continued he, “wisdom and prosperity are very rarely found together. The Romans are invincible, because they never suffer themselves to be blinded by good fortune. And it would be surprising should they act otherwise. Success dazzles those only to whom it is new and unusual; whereas the Romans are so much accustomed to conquer, that they are almost insensible to the charms of victory; and it may be said to their glory, that they have extended [pg 247] their empire, in some measure, more by the humanity they have shown to the conquered, than by the conquest itself.” The other ambassadors spoke with a more plaintive tone of voice, and represented the calamitous state to which Carthage was going to be reduced, and the grandeur and power from which it was fallen.

The senate and people being equally inclined to peace, sent full power to Scipio to conclude it; left the conditions to that general, and permitted him to march back his army, after the treaty should be concluded.

The ambassadors desired leave to enter the city, to redeem some of their prisoners, and they found about two hundred whom they desired to ransom. But the senate sent them to Scipio, with orders that they should be restored without any pecuniary consideration, in case a peace should be concluded.

The Carthaginians, on the return of their ambassadors, concluded a peace with Scipio, on the terms he himself had prescribed. They then delivered up to him more than five hundred ships, all which he burnt in sight of Carthage; a lamentable spectacle to the inhabitants of that ill-fated city! He struck off the heads of the allies of the Latin name, and hanged all the Roman citizens who were surrendered up to him, as deserters.

When the time for the payment of the first tribute imposed by the treaty was expired, as the funds of the government were exhausted by this long and expensive war; the difficulty of levying so great a sum, threw the senate into deep affliction, and many could not refrain even from tears. Hannibal on this occasion is said to have laughed; and when he was reproached by Asdrubal Hœdus, for thus insulting his country in the affliction which he had brought upon it, “Were it possible,” says Hannibal, “for my heart to be seen, and that as clearly as my countenance; you would then find that this laughter which offends so much, flows not from an intemperate joy, but from a mind almost distracted with the public calamities. But is this laughter more unseasonable than your unbecoming tears? Then, then, ought you to have wept, when your arms were ingloriously taken from you, your ships burnt, and you were forbidden to engage in any foreign wars. [pg 248] This was the mortal blow which laid us prostrate.—We are sensible of the public calamity, so far only as we have a personal concern in it; and the loss of our money gives us the most pungent sorrow. Hence it was, that when our city was made the spoil of the victor; when it was left disarmed and defenceless amidst so many powerful nations of Africa, who had at that time taken the field, not a groan, not a sigh was heard. But now, when you are called on to contribute individually to the tax imposed upon the state, you bewail and lament as if all were lost. Alas! I only wish that the subject of this day's grief does not soon appear to you the least of your misfortunes.”

Scipio, after all things were concluded, embarked, in order to return to Italy. He arrived at Rome, through crowds of people, whom curiosity had drawn together to behold his march. The most magnificent triumph that Rome had ever seen was decreed him, and the surname of Africanus was bestowed upon this great man; an honour till then unknown, no person before him having assumed the name of a vanquished nation. Such was the conclusion of the second Punic war, after having lasted seventeen years.

A.M. 3804. A. Carth. 646. A. Rom. 548. Ant. J.C. 200.

A short Reflection on the Government of Carthage in the time of the Second Punic War.—I shall conclude the particulars which relate to the second Punic war, with a reflection of Polybius,[809] which will show the difference between the two commonwealths of Rome and Carthage. It may be affirmed, in some measure, that at the beginning of the second Punic war, and in Hannibal's time, Carthage was in its decline. The flower of its youth, and its sprightly vigour were already diminished. It had begun to fall from its exalted pitch of power, and was inclining towards its ruin; whereas Rome was then, as it were, in its bloom and prime of life, and swiftly advancing to the conquest of the universe. The reason of the declension of the one, and the rise of the other, is deduced, by Polybius, from the different form of government established in these commonwealths, at the time we are now speaking of. At Carthage, the common people had seized upon the sovereign [pg 249] authority with regard to public affairs, and the advice of their ancient men or magistrates was no longer listened to; all affairs were transacted by intrigue and cabal. To take no notice of the artifices which the faction adverse to Hannibal employed, during the whole time of his command, to perplex him; the single instance of burning the Roman vessels during a truce, a perfidious action to which the common people compelled the senate to lend their name and assistance, is a proof of Polybius's assertion. On the contrary, at this very time, the Romans paid the highest regard to their senate, that is, to a body composed of the greatest sages; and their old men were listened to and revered as oracles. It is well known that the Roman people were exceedingly jealous of their authority, and especially in whatever related to the election of magistrates. A century of young men, who by lot were to give the first vote, which generally directed all the rest, had nominated two consuls.[810] On the bare remonstrance of Fabius,[811] who represented to the people, that in a tempest, like that with which Rome was then struggling, the ablest pilots ought to be chosen to steer the vessel of the state, the century returned to their suffrages, and nominated other consuls. Polybius infers, that a people, thus guided by the prudence of old men, could not fail of prevailing over a state which was governed wholly by the giddy multitude. And indeed, the Romans, under the guidance of the wise counsels of their senate, gained at last the superiority with regard to the war considered in general, though they were defeated in several particular engagements; and established their power and grandeur on the ruin of their rivals.

The interval between the Second and Third Punic War.—This interval, though considerable enough with regard to its duration, since it took up above fifty years, is very little remarkable as to the events which relate to Carthage. They may be reduced to two heads; of which the one relates to the person of Hannibal, and the other to some particular differences [pg 250] between the Carthaginians and Masinissa king of the Numidians. We shall treat both separately, but at no great length.

Sect. I. Continuation of the History of Hannibal.—When the second Punic war was ended, by the treaty of peace concluded with Scipio, Hannibal, as he himself observed in the Carthaginian senate, was forty-five years of age. What we have farther to say of this great man, includes the space of twenty-five years.

Hannibal undertakes and completes the Reformation of the Courts of Justice, and the Treasury of Carthage.—After the conclusion of the peace, Hannibal, at least at first, was greatly respected at Carthage, where he filled the first employments of the state with honour and applause. He headed the Carthaginian forces in some wars against the Africans:[812] but the Romans, to whom the very name of Hannibal gave uneasiness, not being able to see him in arms without displeasure, made complaints on that account, and accordingly he was recalled to Carthage.

On his return he was appointed prætor, which seems to have been a very considerable employment, and to have conferred great authority. Carthage is therefore going to be, with regard to him, a new theatre, as it were, on which he will display virtues and qualities of a quite different nature from those we have hitherto admired in him, and which will finish the picture of this illustrious man.

Eagerly desirous of restoring the affairs of his afflicted country to their former happy condition, he was persuaded, that the two most powerful methods to make a state flourish, were, an exact and equal distribution of justice to all its subjects in general, and a scrupulous fidelity in the management of the public finances. The former, by preserving an equality among the citizens, and making them enjoy such a delightful, undisturbed liberty under the protection of the laws, as fully secures their honour, their lives, and properties; unites the individuals of the commonwealth more closely together, and attaches them more firmly to the state, to which they owe the preservation of all that is most dear and valuable to them. The latter, by a [pg 251] faithful administration of the public revenues, supplies punctually the several wants and necessities of the state; keeps in reserve a never failing resource for sudden emergencies, and prevents the people from being burthened with new taxes, which are rendered necessary by extravagant profusion, and which chiefly contribute to make men harbour an aversion for the government.

Hannibal saw, with great concern, the irregularities which had crept equally into the administration of justice, and the management of the finances. Upon his being nominated prætor, as his love for regularity and order made him uneasy at every deviation from it, and prompted him to use his utmost endeavours to restore it; he had the courage to attempt the reformation of this double abuse, which drew after it a numberless multitude of others, without dreading, either the animosity of the old faction that opposed him, or the new enmity which his zeal for the republic must necessarily draw upon him.

The judges exercised the most flagrant extortion with impunity.[813] They were so many petty tyrants, who disposed, in an arbitrary manner, of the lives and fortunes of the citizens; without there being the least possibility of putting a stop to their injustice, because they held their commissions for life, and mutually supported one another. Hannibal, as prætor, summoned before his tribunal an officer belonging to the bench of judges, who openly abused his power. Livy tells us that he was a questor. This officer, who was of the opposite faction to Hannibal, and had already assumed all the pride and haughtiness of the judges, among whom he was to be admitted at the expiration of his present office, insolently refused to obey the summons. Hannibal was not of a disposition to suffer an affront of this nature tamely. Accordingly, he caused him to be seized by a lictor, and brought him before an assembly of the people. There, not satisfied with directing his resentment against this single officer, he impeached the whole bench of judges; whose insupportable and tyrannical pride was not restrained, either by the fear of the laws, or a reverence for the magistrates. And, as Hannibal perceived [pg 252] that he was heard with pleasure, and that the lowest and most inconsiderable of the people discovered, on this occasion, that they were no longer able to bear the insolent pride of these judges, who seemed to have a design upon their liberties; he proposed a law, (which accordingly passed,) by which it was enacted, that new judges should be chosen annually; with a clause, that none should continue in office beyond that term. This law, at the same time that it acquired him the friendship and esteem of the people, drew upon him, proportionably, the hatred of the greatest part of the grandees and nobility.

He attempted another reformation, which created him new enemies, but gained him great honour.[814] The public revenues were either squandered away by the negligence of those who had the management of them, or were plundered by the chief men of the city and the magistrates; so that, money being wanting to pay the annual tribute due to the Romans, the Carthaginians were going to levy it upon the people in general. Hannibal, entering into a large detail of the public revenues, ordered an exact estimate of them to be laid before him; inquired in what manner they had been applied; the employments and ordinary expenses of the state; and having discovered, by this inquiry, that the public funds had been in a great measure embezzled by the fraud of the officers who had the management of them, he declared and promised, in a full assembly of the people, that, without laying any new taxes upon private men, the republic should hereafter be enabled to pay the tribute to the Romans; and he was as good as his word. The farmers of the revenues, whose plunder and rapine he had publicly detected, having accustomed themselves hitherto to fatten upon the spoils of their country, exclaimed[815] vehemently against these regulations, as if their own property had been forced out of their hands, and not the sums they had plundered from the public.

The Retreat and Death of Hannibal.[816]—This double reformation of abuses raised great clamours against Hannibal. His enemies were writing incessantly to the chief men, or their [pg 253] friends, at Rome, to inform them, that he was carrying on a secret intelligence with Antiochus king of Syria; that he frequently received couriers from him; and that this prince had privately despatched agents to Hannibal, to concert with him the measures for carrying on the war he was meditating: that as some animals are so extremely fierce, that it is impossible ever to tame them; in like manner this man was of so turbulent and implacable a spirit, that he could not brook ease, and therefore would, sooner or later, break out again. These informations were listened to at Rome; and as the transactions of the preceding war had been begun and carried on almost solely by Hannibal, they appeared more probable. However, Scipio strongly opposed the violent measures which the senate were going to take on their receiving this intelligence, by representing it as derogatory to the dignity of the Roman people, to countenance the hatred and accusations of Hannibal's enemies; to support, with their authority, their unjust passions; and obstinately to persecute him even in the very heart of his country; as though the Romans had not humbled him sufficiently, in driving him out of the field, and forcing him to lay down his arms.

But notwithstanding these prudent remonstrances, the senate appointed three commissioners to go and make their complaints to Carthage, and to demand that Hannibal should be delivered up to them. On their arrival in that city, though other motives were speciously pretended, yet Hannibal was perfectly sensible that himself only was aimed at. The evening being come, he conveyed himself on board a ship, which he had secretly provided for that purpose; on which occasion he bewailed his country's fate more than his own. Sæpiùs patriæ quàm suorum[817] eventus miseratus. This was the eighth year after the conclusion of the peace. The first place he landed at was Tyre, where he was received as in his second country, and had all the honours paid him which were due to his exalted merit.

A.M. 3812. A. Rom. 556.

After staying some days here, he set out for Antioch, which the king had lately left, and from thence waited upon him at Ephesus. The arrival of so renowned a general gave great pleasure to the [pg 254] king; and did not a little contribute to determine him to engage in war against Rome; for hitherto he had appeared wavering and uncertain on that head. In this city, a philosopher, who was looked upon as the greatest orator of Asia, had the imprudence to make a long harangue before Hannibal, on the duties of a general, and the rules of the art-military.[818] The speech charmed the whole audience. But Hannibal being asked his opinion of it, “I have seen,” says he, “many old dotards in my life, but this exceeds them all.”[819]

The Carthaginians, justly fearing that Hannibal's escape would certainly draw upon them the arms of the Romans, sent them advice that Hannibal was withdrawn to Antiochus.[820] The Romans were very much disturbed at this news; and the king might have turned it extremely to his advantage, had he known how to make a proper use of it.

The first advice that Hannibal gave him at this time, and which he frequently repeated afterwards, was, to make Italy the seat of the war.[821] He required an hundred ships, eleven or twelve thousand land forces, and offered to take upon himself the command of the fleet; to cross into Africa, in order to engage the Carthaginians in the war; and afterwards to make a descent upon Italy, during which the king himself should remain in Greece with his army, holding himself constantly in readiness to cross over into Italy, whenever it should be thought convenient. This was the only thing proper to be done, and the king very much approved the proposal at first.

Hannibal thought it would be expedient to prepare his friends at Carthage, in order to engage them the more strongly in his views.[822] The transmitting of information by letters, is not only unsafe, but they can give only an imperfect idea of things, [pg 255] and are never sufficiently particular. He therefore despatched a trusty person with ample instructions to Carthage. This man was scarce arrived in the city, but his business was suspected. Accordingly, he was watched and followed: and, at last, orders were issued for his being seized. However, he prevented the vigilance of his enemies, and escaped in the night; after having fixed, in several public places, papers, which fully declared the occasion of his journey. The senate immediately sent advice of this to the Romans.

A.M. 3813. A. Rom. 557.

Villius, one of the deputies who had been sent into Asia, to inquire into the state of affairs there, and, if possible, to discover the real designs of Antiochus, found Hannibal in Ephesus.[823] He had many conferences with him, paid him several visits, and speciously affected to show a particular esteem for him on all occasions. But his chief aim, by all this designing behaviour, was to make him be suspected, and to lessen his credit with the king, in which he succeeded but too well.[824]

Some authors affirm, that Scipio was joined in this embassy;[825] and they even relate the conversation which that general had with Hannibal. They tell us, that the Roman having asked him, who, in his opinion, was the greatest captain that had ever lived; he answered, Alexander the Great, because, with a handful of Macedonians, he had defeated numberless armies, and carried his conquests into countries so very remote, that it seemed scarce possible for any man only to travel so far. Being afterwards asked, to whom he gave the second rank; he answered, to Pyrrhus: Because this king was the first who understood the art of pitching a camp to advantage; no commander ever made a more judicious choice of his posts, was better skilled in drawing up his forces, or was more dexterous in winning the affection of foreign soldiers; insomuch that even the people of Italy were more desirous to have him [pg 256] for their governor, though a foreigner, than the Romans themselves, who had so long been settled in their country. Scipio proceeding, asked him next, whom he looked upon as the third: on which Hannibal made no scruple to assign that rank to himself. Here Scipio could not forbear laughing: “But what would you have said,” continued Scipio, “had you conquered me?” “I would,” replied Hannibal, “have ranked myself above Alexander, Pyrrhus, and all the generals the world ever produced.” Scipio was not insensible of so refined and delicate a flattery, which he no ways expected; and which, by giving him no rival, seemed to insinuate, that no captain was worthy of being put in comparison with him.

The answer, as told by Plutarch,[826] is less witty, and not so probable. In this author, Hannibal gives Pyrrhus the first place, Scipio the second, and himself the third.

Hannibal, sensible of the coldness with which Antiochus received him, ever since his conferences with Villius or Scipio, took no notice of it for some time, and seemed insensible of it.[827] But at last he thought it advisable to come to an explanation with the king, and to open his mind freely to him. “The hatred (says he) which I bear to the Romans, is known to the whole world. I bound myself to it by an oath, from my most tender infancy. It is this hatred that made me draw the sword against Rome during thirty-six years. It is that, which, even in times of peace, has caused me to be driven from my native country, and forced me to seek an asylum in your dominions. For ever guided and fired by the same passion, should my hopes be frustrated here, I will fly to every part of the globe, and rouse up all nations against the Romans. I hate them, and will hate them eternally; and know that they bear me no less animosity. So long as you shall continue in the resolution to take up arms against them, you may rank Hannibal in the number of your best friends. But if other counsels incline you to peace, I declare to you, once for all, address yourself to others for advice, and not to me.” Such a speech, which came from his heart, and expressed the greatest sincerity, struck the king, and seemed to remove all his suspicions; so that he now resolved to give Hannibal the command of part of his fleet.

But what havoc is not flattery capable of making in courts and in the minds of princes![828] Antiochus was told, “that it was imprudent in him to put so much confidence in Hannibal, an exile, a Carthaginian, whose fortune or genius might suggest to him, in one day, a thousand different projects: that besides, this very fame which Hannibal had acquired in war, and which he considered as his peculiar inheritance, was too great for a man who fought only under the ensigns of another: that none but the king ought to be the general and conductor of the war, and that it was incumbent on him to draw upon himself alone the eyes and attention of all men; whereas, should Hannibal be employed, he (a foreigner) would have the glory of all the successes ascribed to him.” “No minds,”[829] says Livy, on this occasion, “are more susceptible of envy, than those whose merit is below their birth and dignity; such persons always abhorring virtue and worth in others, for this reason alone, because they are strange and foreign to themselves.” This observation was fully verified on this occasion. Antiochus had been taken on his weak side; a low and sordid jealousy, which is the defect and characteristic of little minds, extinguished every generous sentiment in that monarch. Hannibal was now slighted and laid aside: however, he was greatly revenged on Antiochus, by the ill success this prince met with; and showed how unfortunate that king is whose soul is accessible to envy, and his ears open to the poisonous insinuation of flatterers.

In a council held some time after, to which Hannibal, for form sake, was admitted, he, when it came to his turn to speak, endeavoured chiefly to prove, that Philip of Macedon ought, on any terms, to be engaged to form an alliance with Antiochus, which was not so difficult as might be imagined.[830] “With regard,” says Hannibal, “to the operations of the war, I adhere immovably to my first opinion; and had my counsels been listened to before, Tuscany and Liguria would now be all in a flame: and Hannibal (a name that strikes terror into the Romans) in Italy. Though I should not be very well skilled as to other matters, yet the good and ill success I have met with must [pg 258] necessarily have taught me sufficiently how to carry on a war against the Romans. I have nothing now in my power, but to give you my counsel, and offer you my service. May the gods give success to all your undertakings!” Hannibal's speech was received with applause, but not one of his counsels was put in execution.

Antiochus, imposed upon and lulled asleep by his flatterers, remained quiet at Ephesus, after the Romans had driven him out of Greece;[831] not once imagining that they would ever invade his dominions. Hannibal, who was now restored to favour, was for ever assuring him, that the war would soon be removed into Asia, and that he would soon see the enemy at his gates: that he must resolve, either to abdicate his throne, or oppose vigorously a people who grasped at the empire of the world. This discourse awakened, in some little measure, the king out of his lethargy, and prompted him to make some weak efforts. But, as his conduct was unsteady, after sustaining a great many considerable losses, he was forced to terminate the war by an ignominious peace; one of the articles of which was, that he should deliver up Hannibal to the Romans. However, the latter did not give him opportunity to put it in execution, but retired to the island of Crete, to consider there what course it would be best for him to take.

The riches he had brought along with him, of which the people of the island got some notice, had like to have proved his ruin.[832] Hannibal was never wanting in stratagems, and he had occasion to employ them now, to save both himself and his treasure. He filled several vessels with molten lead, the tops of which he just covered over with gold and silver. These he deposited in the temple of Diana, in presence of several Cretans, to whose honesty, he said, he confided all his treasure. A strong guard was then posted round the temple, and Hannibal left at full liberty, from a supposition that his riches were secured.

A.M. 3820. A. Rom. 564.

But he had concealed them in hollow statues of brass,[833] which he always carried along with him. And then, embracing a favourable opportunity to [pg 259] make his escape, he fled to the court of Prusias, king of Bithynia.[834]

It appears from history, that he made some stay in the court of this prince, who soon engaged in war with Eumenes, king of Pergamus, a professed friend to the Romans. By means of Hannibal, the troops of Prusias gained several victories both by land and sea.

He employed a stratagem of an extraordinary kind, in a sea-fight.[835] As the enemy's fleet consisted of more ships than his, he had recourse to artifice. He put into earthen vessels all kinds of serpents, and ordered these vessels to be thrown into the enemy's ships. His chief aim was to destroy Eumenes; and for that purpose it was necessary for him to find out which ship he was on board of. This Hannibal discovered by sending out a boat, upon pretence of conveying a letter to him. Having gained his point thus far, he ordered the commanders of the respective vessels to direct their attack principally against Eumenes's ship. They obeyed, and would have taken it, had he not outsailed his pursuers. The rest of the ships of Pergamus sustained the fight with great vigour, till the earthen vessels had been thrown into them. At first they only laughed at this, and were very much surprised to find such weapons employed against them. But when they saw themselves surrounded with the serpents, which darted out of these vessels when they flew to pieces, they were seized with dread, retired in disorder, and yielded the victory to the enemy.

A.M. 3882. A. Rom. 566.

Services of so important a nature seemed to secure for ever to Hannibal an undisturbed asylum at that prince's court.[836] However, the Romans would not suffer him to be easy there, but deputed Q. Flamininus to Prusias, to complain of the protection he gave Hannibal. The latter easily guessed the motive of this embassy, and therefore did not wait till his enemies had an opportunity of delivering him up. At first he attempted to secure himself by flight; but perceiving that the seven secret outlets, which he had contrived in his palace, were all seized by the soldiers of Prusias, who, by perfidiously betraying his guest, was desirous of making [pg 260] his court to the Romans; he ordered the poison, which he had long kept for this melancholy occasion, to be brought him; and taking it in his hand, “Let us,” said he, “free the Romans from the disquiet with which they have so long been tortured, since they have not patience to wait for an old man's death. The victory which Flamininus gains over a man disarmed and betrayed will not do him much honour. This single day will be a lasting testimony of the great degeneracy of the Romans. Their fathers sent notice to Pyrrhus, to desire he would beware of a traitor who intended to poison him, and that at a time when this prince was at war with them in the very centre of Italy; but their sons have deputed a person of consular dignity to spirit up Prusias, impiously to murder one who is not only his friend, but his guest.” After calling down curses upon Prusias, and having invoked the gods, the protectors and avengers of the sacred rights of hospitality, he swallowed the poison,[837] and died at seventy years of age.

This year was remarkable for the death of three great men, Hannibal, Philopœmen, and Scipio, who had this in common, that they all died out of their native countries, by a death little correspondent to the glory of their actions. The two first died by poison: Hannibal being betrayed by his host; and Philopœmen being taken prisoner in a battle against the Messenians, and thrown into a dungeon, was forced to swallow poison. As to Scipio, he banished himself, to avoid an unjust prosecution which was carrying on against him at Rome, and ended his days in a kind of obscurity.

The Character and Eulogium of Hannibal.—This would be the proper place for representing the excellent qualities of Hannibal, who reflected so much glory on Carthage. But as I have attempted to draw his character elsewhere,[838] and to give a just idea of him, by making a comparison between him and [pg 261] Scipio, I think myself dispensed from giving his eulogium at large in this place.

Persons who devote themselves to the profession of arms, cannot spend too much time in the study of this great man, who is looked upon, by the best judges, as the most complete general, in almost every respect, that ever the world produced.

During the whole seventeen years that the war lasted, two errors only are objected to him: first, his not marching, immediately after the battle of Cannæ, his victorious army to Rome, in order to besiege that city: secondly, his suffering their courage to be softened and enervated during their winter-quarters in Capua: errors, which only show that great men are not so in all things;[839] summi enim sunt, homine tamen; and which, perhaps, may be partly excused.

But then, for these two errors, what a multitude of shining qualities appear in Hannibal! How extensive were his views and designs, even in his most tender years! What greatness of soul! What intrepidity! What presence of mind must he have possessed, to be able, even in the fire and heat of action, to turn every thing to advantage! With what surprising address must he have managed the minds of men, that, amidst so great a variety of nations which composed his army, who often were in want both of money and provisions, his camp was not once disturbed with any insurrection, either against himself or any of his generals! With what equity, what moderation must he have behaved towards his new allies, to have prevailed so far as to attach them inviolably to his service, though he was reduced to the necessity of making them sustain almost the whole burthen of the war, by quartering his army upon them, and levying contributions in their several countries! In short, how fruitful must he have been in expedients, to be able to carry on, for so many years, a war in a remote country, in spite of the violent opposition made by a powerful faction at home, which refused him supplies of every kind, and thwarted him on all occasions; it may be affirmed, that Hannibal, during the whole series of this war, seemed the only prop of the state, and the soul of every part of the empire of the [pg 262] Carthaginians, who could never believe themselves conquered, till Hannibal confessed that he himself was so.

But our acquaintance with Hannibal will be very imperfect, if we consider him only at the head of armies. The particulars we learn from history, concerning the secret intelligence he held with Philip of Macedon; the wise counsels he gave to Antiochus, king of Syria; the double reformation he introduced in Carthage, with regard to the management of the public revenues and the administration of justice, prove, that he was a great statesman in every respect. So superior and universal was his genius, that it took in all parts of government; and so great were his natural abilities, that he was capable of acquitting himself in all the various functions of it with glory. Hannibal shone as conspicuously in the cabinet as in the field; equally able to fill the civil as the military employments. In a word, he united in his own person the different talents and merits of all professions, the sword, the gown, and the finances.

He had some learning, and though he was so much employed in military labours, and engaged in so many wars, he, however, found some leisure to devote to literature.[840] Several smart repartees of Hannibal, which have been transmitted to us, show that he had a great fund of natural wit; and this he improved by the most polite education that could be bestowed at that time, and in such a republic as Carthage. He spoke Greek tolerably well, and even wrote some books in that language. His preceptor was a Lacedæmonian, named Sosilus, who, with Philenius, another Lacedæmonian, accompanied him in all his expeditions. Both these undertook to write the history of this renowned warrior.

With regard to his religion and moral conduct, he was not altogether so profligate and wicked as he is represented by Livy:[841] “cruel even to inhumanity, more perfidious than a Carthaginian; regardless of truth, of probity, of the sacred ties of oaths; fearless of the gods, and utterly void of religion.” Inhumana crudelitas, perfida plusquam Punica; nihil veri, nihil sancti, nullus deúm metus, nullum jusjurandum, nulla [pg 263] religio. According to Polybius,[842] he rejected a barbarous proposal that was made him before he entered Italy, which was, to eat human flesh, at a time when his army was in absolute want of provisions. Some years after, so far from treating with barbarity, as he was advised to do, the dead body of Sempronius Gracchus, which Mago had sent him, he caused his funeral obsequies to be solemnized in presence of the whole army.[843] We have seen him, on many occasions, evince the highest reverence for the gods; and Justin,[844] who copied Trogus Pompeius, an author worthy of credit, observes, that he always showed uncommon moderation and continence, with regard to the great number of women taken by him during the course of so long a war; insomuch that no one would have imagined he had been born in Africa, where incontinence is the predominant vice of the country. Pudicitiamque eum tantam inter tot captivas habuisse, ut in Africa natum quivis negaret.

His disregard of wealth, at a time when he had so many opportunities to enrich himself by the plunder of the cities he stormed, and the nations he subdued, shows that he knew the true and genuine use which a general ought to make of riches, viz. to gain the affection of his soldiers, and to attach his allies to his interest, by diffusing his beneficence on proper occasions, and not being sparing in his rewards: a quality very essential, and at the same time as uncommon, in a commander. The only use Hannibal made of money was to purchase success; firmly persuaded, that a man who is at the head of affairs is sufficiently recompensed by the glory derived from victory.

He always led a very regular, austere life;[845] and even in times of peace, and in the midst of Carthage, when he was invested with the first dignity of the city, we are told that he never used to recline himself on a bed at meals, as was the custom in those ages, and that he drank but very little wine. So regular and uniform a life may serve as an illustrious [pg 264] example to our commanders, who often include, among the privileges of war and the duty of officers, the keeping of splendid tables, and living luxuriously.

I do not, however, pretend altogether to exculpate Hannibal from all the errors with which he is charged. Though he possessed an assemblage of the most exalted qualities, it cannot be denied but that he had some little tincture of the vices of his country; and that it would be difficult to excuse some actions and circumstances of his life. Polybius observes,[846] that Hannibal was accused of avarice in Carthage, and of cruelty in Rome. He adds, on the same occasion, that people were very much divided in opinion concerning him; and it would be no wonder, as he had made himself so many enemies in both cities, that they should have drawn him in disadvantageous colours. But Polybius is of opinion, that though it should be taken for granted, that all the defects with which he is charged are true; yet that they were not so much owing to his nature and disposition, as to the difficulties with which he was surrounded, in the course of so long and laborious a war; and to the complacency he was obliged to show to the general officers, whose assistance he absolutely wanted, for the execution of his various enterprises; and whom he was not always able to restrain, any more than he could the soldiers who fought under them.

Sect. II. Dissensions between the Carthaginians and Masinissa, King of Numidia.—Among the conditions of the peace granted to the Carthaginians, there was one which enacted, that they should restore to Masinissa all the territories and cities he possessed before the war; and further, Scipio, to reward the zeal and fidelity which that monarch had shown towards the Romans, had added to his dominions those of Syphax. This present afterwards gave rise to disputes and quarrels between the Carthaginians and Numidians.

These two princes, Syphax and Masinissa, were both kings in Numidia, but reigned over different nations. The subjects of Syphax were called Masæsuli, and their capital was Cirtha. Those of Masinissa were the Massyli: but they are better [pg 265] known by the name of Numidians, which was common to them both. Their principal strength consisted in their cavalry. They always rode without saddles, and some even without bridles, whence Virgil[847] calls them Numidæ infræni.

In the beginning of the second Punic war,[848] Syphax siding with the Romans, Gala, the father of Masinissa, to check the career of so powerful a neighbour, thought it his interest to join the Carthaginians, and accordingly sent out against Syphax a powerful army under the conduct of his son, at that time but seventeen years of age. Syphax, being overcome in a battle, in which it is said he lost thirty thousand men, escaped into Mauritania. However, the face of things was afterwards greatly changed.

Masinissa, after his father's death, was often reduced to the brink of ruin;[849] being driven from his kingdom by an usurper; pursued warmly by Syphax; in danger every instant of falling into the hands of his enemies; destitute of forces, money, and of every resource. He was at that time in alliance with the Romans, and the friend of Scipio, with whom he had had an interview in Spain. His misfortunes would not permit him to bring great succours to that general. When Lælius arrived in Africa, Masinissa joined him with a few horse, and from that time continued inviolably attached to the Roman interest. Syphax, on the contrary, having married the famous Sophonisba, daughter of Asdrubal, went over to the Carthaginians.[850]

The fate of these two princes again changed, but the change was now final.[851] Syphax lost a great battle, and was taken alive by the enemy. Masinissa, the victor, besieged Cirtha, his capital, and took it. But he met with a greater danger in that city than he had faced in the field, and this was Sophonisba, whose charms and endearments he was unable to resist. To secure this princess to himself, he married her, but a few days after, he was obliged to send her a dose of poison, as her nuptial present; this being the only way that he could devise to keep his promise with his queen, and preserve her from the power of the Romans.

This was a considerable error in itself, and one that could not fail to disoblige a nation that was so jealous of its authority: but this young prince gloriously made amends for his fault, by the signal services he afterwards rendered to Scipio. We observed, that after the defeat and capture of Syphax, the dominions of this prince were bestowed upon him;[852] and that the Carthaginians were forced to restore all he possessed before. This gave rise to the divisions which we are now going to relate.

A territory situated towards the sea-side, near the lesser Syrtis, was the subject of the dispute.[853] The country was very rich, and the soil extremely fruitful; a proof of which is, that the city of Leptis alone, which belonged to that territory, paid daily a talent to the Carthaginians, by way of tribute. Masinissa had seized part of this territory. Each side despatched deputies to Rome, to plead the cause of their respective superiors before the senate. This assembly thought proper to send Scipio Africanus, with two other commissioners, to examine the controversy upon the spot. However, they returned without coming to any decision, and left the business in the same uncertain state in which they had found it. Possibly they acted in this manner by order of the senate, and had received private instructions to favour Masinissa, who was then possessed of the district in question.

A.M. 3823. A. Rom. 567.

Ten years after, new commissioners having been appointed to examine the same affair, they acted as the former had done, and left the whole undetermined.[854]

A.M. 3833. A. Rom. 577.

After the like distance of time, the Carthaginians again brought their complaint before the senate, but with greater importunity than before.[855] They represented, that besides the lands at first contested, Masinissa had, during the two preceding years, dispossessed them of upwards of seventy towns and castles: their hands were bound up by that article of the last treaty, which forbade their making war upon any of the allies of the Romans: that they could no longer bear the insolence, the avarice, and cruelty of that prince: that they were deputed to Rome with three requests, [pg 267] (one of which they desired might be immediately complied with,) viz. either that the affair might be examined and decided by the senate; or, secondly, that they might be permitted to repel force by force, and defend themselves by arms; or, lastly, that, if favour was to prevail over justice, they then entreated the Romans to specify once for all, which of the Carthaginian lands they were desirous should be given up to Masinissa, that they, by this means, might hereafter know what they had to depend on, and that the Roman people would show some moderation in their behalf, at a time that this prince set no other bounds to his pretensions, than his insatiable avarice. The deputies concluded with beseeching the Romans, that if they had any cause of complaint against the Carthaginians since the conclusion of the last peace, that they themselves would punish them; and not to give them up to the wild caprice of a prince, by whom their liberties were made precarious, and their lives insupportable. After ending their speech, being pierced with grief, shedding floods of tears, they fell prostrate upon the earth; a spectacle that moved all who were present to compassion, and raised a violent hatred against Masinissa. Gulussa, his son, who was then present, being asked what he had to reply, he answered, that his father had not given him any instructions, not knowing that any thing would be laid to his charge. He only desired the senate to reflect, that the circumstance which drew all this hatred upon him from the Carthaginians, was, the inviolable fidelity with which he had always been attached to the side of the Romans. The senate, after hearing both sides, answered, that they were inclined to do justice to either party to whom it might be due: that Gulussa should set out immediately with their orders to his father, who was thereby commanded to send immediately deputies with those of Carthage; that they would do all that lay in their power to serve him, but not to the prejudice of the Carthaginians: that it was but just the ancient limits should be preserved; and that it was far from being the intention of the Romans, to have the Carthaginians dispossessed, during the peace, of those territories and cities which had been left them by the treaty. The deputies of both powers were then dismissed with the usual presents.

But all these assurances were but mere words.[856] It is plain that the Romans did not once endeavour to satisfy the Carthaginians, or do them the least justice; and that they protracted the business, on purpose to give Masinissa time to establish himself in his usurpation, and weaken his enemies.

A.M. 3848. A. Rom. 592.

A new deputation was sent to examine the affair upon the spot, and Cato was one of the commissioners.[857] On their arrival, they asked the parties if they were willing to abide by their determination. Masinissa readily complied. The Carthaginians answered, that they had fixed a rule to which they adhered, and that this was the treaty which had been concluded by Scipio, and desired that their cause might be examined with all possible rigour. They therefore could not come to any decision. The deputies visited all the country, and found it in a very good condition, especially the city of Carthage: and they were surprised to see it, after having been involved in such a calamity, so soon again raised to so exalted a pitch of power and grandeur. The deputies, on their return, did not fail to acquaint the senate with this circumstance; and declared, Rome could never be in safety, so long as Carthage should subsist. From this time, whatever affair was debated in the senate, Cato always added the following words to his opinion, “and I conclude that Carthage ought to be destroyed.” This grave senator did not give himself the trouble to prove, that bare jealousy of the growing power of a neighbouring state, is a warrant sufficient for destroying a city, contrary to the faith of treaties. Scipio Nasica on the other hand, was of opinion, that the ruin of this city would draw after it that of their commonwealth; because that the Romans, having then no rival to fear, would quit the ancient severity of their manners, and abandon themselves to luxury and pleasures, the never-failing subverters of the most flourishing empires.

In the mean time, divisions broke out in Carthage.[858] The popular faction, being now become superior to that of the grandees and senators, sent forty citizens into banishment; and bound the people by an oath, never to suffer the least mention to be made of recalling those exiles. They withdrew to the [pg 269] court of Masinissa, who despatched Gulussa and Micipsa, his two sons, to Carthage, to solicit their recall. However, the gates of the city were shut against them, and one of them was closely pursued by Hamilcar, one of the generals of the republic. This gave occasion to a new war, and accordingly armies were levied on both sides. A battle was fought; and the younger Scipio, who afterwards ruined Carthage, was spectator of it. He had been sent from Lucullus, who was then carrying on war in Spain, and under whom Scipio then served, to Masinissa, to desire some elephants from that monarch. During the whole engagement, he stood upon a neighbouring hill; and was surprised to see Masinissa, then upwards of eighty years of age, mounted (agreeably to the custom of his country) on a horse without a saddle; flying from rank to rank like a young officer, and sustaining the most arduous toils. The fight was very obstinate, and continued from morning till night, but at last the Carthaginians gave way. Scipio used to say afterwards, that he had been present at many battles, but at none with so much pleasure as at this; having never before beheld so formidable an army engage, without any danger or trouble to himself. And being very conversant in the writings of Homer, he added, that till his time, there were but two more who had had the pleasure of being spectators of such an action, viz. Jupiter from mount Ida, and Neptune from Samothrace, when the Greeks and Trojans fought before Troy. I know not whether the sight of a hundred thousand men (for so many there were) butchering one another, can administer a real pleasure; or whether such a pleasure is consistent with the sentiments of humanity, so natural to mankind.

The Carthaginians, after the battle was over, entreated Scipio to terminate their contests with Masinissa.[859] Accordingly, he heard both parties, and the Carthaginians consented to yield up the territory of Emporium,[860] which had been the [pg 270] first cause of the dispute, to pay Masinissa two hundred talents of silver down, and eight hundred more, at such times as should be agreed. But Masinissa insisting on the return of the exiles, and the Carthaginians being unwilling to agree to this proposition, they did not come to any decision. Scipio, after having paid his compliments, and returned thanks to Masinissa, set out with the elephants for which he had been sent.

The king, immediately after the battle was over, had blocked up the enemy's camp, which was pitched upon a hill, whither neither troops nor provisions could come to them.[861] During this interval, there arrived deputies from Rome, with orders from the senate to decide the quarrel, in case the king should be defeated; otherwise, to leave it undetermined, and to give the king the strongest assurances of the continuation of their friendship; and they complied with the latter injunction. In the mean time, the famine daily increased in the enemy's camp; and to add to their calamity, it was followed by a plague, which made dreadful havoc. Being now reduced to the last extremity, they surrendered to Masinissa, promising to deliver up the deserters, to pay him five thousand talents of silver in fifty years, and restore the exiles, notwithstanding their oaths to the contrary. They all submitted to the ignominious ceremony of passing under the yoke,[862] and were dismissed, with only one suit of clothes for each. Gulussa, to satiate his vengeance for the ill treatment which, as we before observed, he had met with, sent out against them a body of cavalry, whom, from their great weakness, they could neither escape nor resist. So that of fifty-eight thousand men, very few returned to Carthage.

A.M. 3855. A. Carth. 697. A. Rom. 599. Ant. J.C. 149.

The Third Punic War.—The third Punic war, which was less considerable than either of the two former, with regard to the number and greatness of the battles, and its continuance, which was only four years, was still more remarkable with respect to the success and event of it, as it ended in the total ruin and destruction of Carthage.

The inhabitants of this city, from their last defeat, knew what they had to fear from the Romans, who had uniformly displayed great ill-will towards them, as often as they had addressed them upon their disputes with Masinissa.[863] To prevent the consequences of it, the Carthaginians, by a decree of the senate, impeached Asdrubal, general of the army, and Carthalo, commander of the auxiliary[864] forces, as guilty of high treason, for being the authors of the war against the king of Numidia. They then sent a deputation to Rome, to inquire what opinion that republic entertained of their late proceedings, and what was desired of them. The deputies were coldly answered, that it was the business of the senate and people of Carthage to know what satisfaction was due to the Romans. A second deputation bringing them no clearer answer, they fell into the greatest dejection; and being seized with the strongest terrors, from the recollection of their past sufferings, they fancied the enemy was already at their gates, and imagined to themselves all the dismal consequences of a long siege, and of a city taken sword in hand.

In the mean time, the senate debated at Rome on the measures it would be proper for them to take; and the disputes between Cato the elder and Scipio Nasica, who entertained totally different opinions on this subject, were renewed.[865] The former, on his return from Africa, had declared, in the strongest terms, that he had found Carthage, not as the Romans supposed it to be, exhausted of men or money, or in a weak and humble state; but, on the contrary, that it was crowded with vigorous young men, abounded with immense quantities of gold and silver, and prodigious magazines of arms and all warlike stores; and was so haughty and confident on account of this force, that their hopes and ambition had no bounds. It is farther said, that after he had ended his speech, he threw, out of the lappet of his robe, in the midst of the senate, some African figs; and, as the senators admired their beauty and size, “Know,” says he, “that it is but three days [pg 272] since these figs were gathered. Such is the distance between the enemy and us.”[866]

Cato and Nasica had each of them their reasons for voting as they did.[867] Nasica, observing that the people had risen to such a height of insolence, as led them into excesses of every kind; that their prosperity had swelled them with a pride which the senate itself was not able to check; and that their power was become so enormous, that they were able to draw the city, by force, into every mad design they might undertake; Nasica, I say, observing this, was desirous that they should continue in fear of Carthage, in order that this might serve as a curb to restrain and check their audacious conduct. For it was his opinion, that the Carthaginians were too weak to subdue the Romans; and at the same time too strong to be considered by them in a contemptible light. With regard to Cato, he thought that as his countrymen were become haughty and insolent by success, and plunged headlong into profligacy of every kind; nothing could be more dangerous, than for them to have for a rival and an enemy, a city that till now had been powerful, but was become, even by its misfortunes, more wise and provident than ever; and not to remove the fears of the inhabitants entirely with regard to a foreign power; since they had, within their own walls, all the opportunities of indulging themselves in excesses of every kind.

To lay aside, for one instant, the laws of equity, I leave the reader to determine which of these two great men reasoned most justly, according to the maxims of sound policy, and the true interest of a state. One undoubted circumstance is, that all historians have observed that there was a sensible change in the conduct and government of the Romans, immediately after the ruin of Carthage:[868] that vice no longer made its way into Rome with a timorous pace, and as it were by stealth, but appeared barefaced, and seized, with astonishing rapidity, upon [pg 273] all orders of the republic: that the senators, plebeians, in a word, all conditions, abandoned themselves to luxury and voluptuousness, without moderation or sense of decency, which occasioned, as it must necessarily, the ruin of the state. “The first Scipio,”[869] says Paterculus, speaking of the Romans, “had laid the foundations of their future grandeur; and the last, by his conquests, opened a door to all manner of luxury and dissoluteness. For, after Carthage, which obliged Rome to stand for ever on its guard, by disputing empire with that city, had been totally destroyed, the depravity of manners was no longer slow in its progress, but swelled at once into the utmost excess of corruption.”

Be this as it may, the senate resolved to declare war against the Carthaginians; and the reasons or pretences urged for it were, their having maintained ships contrary to the tenour of the treaty; their having sent an army out of their territories, against a prince who was in alliance with Rome, and whose son they had treated ill, at the time that he was accompanied by a Roman ambassador.[870]

A.M. 3856. A. Rom. 600.

An event, that chance occasioned to happen very fortunately, at the time that the senate of Rome was debating on the affair of Carthage, doubtless contributed very much to make them take that resolution.[871] This was the arrival of deputies from Utica, who came to surrender up themselves, their effects, their lands, and their city, into the hands of the Romans. Nothing could have happened more seasonably. Utica was the second city of Africa, vastly rich, and had a port equally spacious and commodious; it stood within sixty furlongs of Carthage, so that it might serve as a place of arms in the attack of that city. The Romans now hesitated no longer, but formally proclaimed war. M. Manilius, and L. Marcius Censorinus, the two consuls, were desired to set out as soon as possible. They had secret orders from the senate, not to end the war but by the destruction of Carthage. The consuls immediately left Rome, and stopped at Lilybæum in Sicily. They had a considerable [pg 274] fleet, on board of which were fourscore thousand foot, and about four thousand horse.

The Carthaginians were not yet acquainted with the resolutions which had been taken at Rome.[872] The answer brought back by their deputies, had only increased their fears, viz. “It was the business of the Carthaginians to consider what satisfaction was due to them.”[873] This made them not know what course to take. At last they sent new deputies, whom they invested with full powers to act as they should see fitting; and even (what the former wars could never make them stoop to) to declare, that the Carthaginians gave up themselves, and all they possessed, to the will and pleasure of the Romans. This, according to the import of the clause, se suaque eorum arbitrio permittere, was submitting themselves, without reserve, to the power of the Romans, and acknowledging themselves their vassals. Nevertheless, they did not expect any great success from this condescension, though so very mortifying; because, as the Uticans had been beforehand with them on that occasion, this circumstance had deprived them of the merit of a ready and voluntary submission.

The deputies, on their arrival at Rome, were informed that war had been proclaimed, and that the army was set out. The Romans had despatched a courier to Carthage, with the decree of the senate; and to inform that city, that the Roman fleet had sailed. The deputies had therefore no time for deliberation, but delivered up themselves, and all they possessed, to the Romans. In consequence of this behaviour, they were answered, that since they had at last taken a right step, the senate granted them their liberty, the enjoyment of their laws, and all their territories and other possessions, whether public or private, provided that, within the space of thirty days, they should send, as hostages, to Lilybæum, three hundred young Carthaginians of the first distinction, and comply with the orders of the consuls. This last condition filled them with inexpressible anxiety: but the concern they were under would not allow them to make the least reply, or to demand an explanation; nor, indeed, would it have been to any purpose. [pg 275] They therefore set out for Carthage, and there gave an account of their embassy.

All the articles of the treaty were extremely severe with regard to the Carthaginians; but the silence of the Romans, with respect to the cities of which no notice was taken in the concessions which that people was willing to make, perplexed them exceedingly.[874] But all they had to do was to obey. After the many former and recent losses which the Carthaginians had sustained, they were by no means in a condition to resist such an enemy, since they had not been able to oppose Masinissa. Troops, provisions, ships, allies, in a word, every thing was wanting, and hope and vigour more than all the rest.

They did not think it proper to wait till the thirty days, which had been allowed them, were expired, but immediately sent their hostages, in hopes of softening the enemy by the readiness of their obedience, though they dared not flatter themselves with the expectation of meeting with favour on this occasion. These hostages were the flower, and the only hopes, of the noblest families of Carthage. Never was any spectacle more moving; nothing was now heard but cries, nothing seen but tears, and all places echoed with groans and lamentations. But above all, the disconsolate mothers, bathed in tears, tore their dishevelled hair, beat their breasts, and, as if grief and despair had distracted them, they yelled in such a manner as might have moved the most savage breasts to compassion. But the scene was much more mournful, when the fatal moment of their separation was come; when, after having accompanied their dear children to the ship, they bid them a long last farewell, persuaded that they should never see them more; bathed them with their tears; embraced them with the utmost fondness; clasped them eagerly in their arms; could not be prevailed upon to part with them, till they were forced away, which was more grievous and afflicting than if their hearts had been torn out of their breasts. The hostages being arrived in Sicily, were carried from thence to Rome; and the consuls told the deputies, that when they should arrive at Utica, they would acquaint them with the orders of the republic.

In such a situation of affairs, nothing can be more grievous [pg 276] than a state of uncertainty, which, without descending to particulars, gives occasion to the mind to image to itself every misery.[875] As soon as it was known that the fleet was arrived at Utica, the deputies repaired to the Roman camp; signifying, that they were come in the name of their republic, in order to receive their commands, which they were ready to obey. The consul, after praising their good disposition and compliance, commanded them to deliver up to him, without fraud or delay, all their arms. This they consented to, but besought him to reflect on the sad condition to which he was reducing them, at a time when Asdrubal, whose quarrel against them was owing to no other cause than their perfect submission to the orders of the Romans, was advanced almost to their gates, with an army of twenty thousand men. The answer returned them was, that the Romans would set that matter right.

This order was immediately put in execution.[876] There arrived in the camp a long train of waggons, loaded with all the preparations of war, taken out of Carthage: two hundred thousand complete sets of armour, a numberless multitude of darts and javelins, with two thousand engines for shooting darts and stones.[877] Then followed the deputies of Carthage, accompanied by the most venerable senators and priests, who came purposely to try to move the Romans to compassion in this critical moment, when their sentence was going to be pronounced, and their fate would be irreversible. Censorinus, the consul, for it was he who had all along spoken, rose up for a moment at their coming, and expressed some kindness and affection for them; but suddenly assuming a grave and severe countenance: “I cannot,” says he, “but commend the readiness with which you execute the orders of the senate. They have commanded me to tell you, that it is their absolute will and pleasure that you depart out of Carthage, which they have resolved to destroy; and that you remove into any other part of your dominions which you shall think proper, provided it be at the distance of eighty stadia[878] from the sea.”

The instant the consul had pronounced this fulminating decree, nothing was heard among the Carthaginians but [pg 277] lamentable shrieks and howlings.[879] Being now in a manner thunderstruck, they neither knew where they were, nor what they did; but rolled themselves in the dust, tearing their clothes, and unable to vent their grief any otherwise, than by broken sighs and deep groans. Being afterwards a little recovered, they lifted up their hands with the air of suppliants one moment towards the gods, and the next towards the Romans, imploring their mercy and justice towards a people, who would soon be reduced to the extremes of despair. But as both the gods and men were deaf to their fervent prayers, they soon changed them into reproaches and imprecations; bidding the Romans call to mind, that there were such beings as avenging deities, whose severe eyes were for ever open on guilt and treachery. The Romans themselves could not refrain from tears at so moving a spectacle, but their resolution was fixed. The deputies could not even prevail so far, as to get the execution of this order suspended, till they should have an opportunity of presenting themselves again before the senate, to attempt, if possible, to get it revoked. They were forced to set out immediately, and carry the answer to Carthage.

The people waited for their return with such an impatience and terror, as words could never express.[880] It was scarce possible for them to break through the crowd that flocked round them, to hear the answer, which was but too strongly painted in their faces. When they were come into the senate, and had declared the barbarous orders of the Romans, a general shriek informed the people of their fate; and from that instant, nothing was seen and heard in every part of the city, but howling and despair, madness and fury.

The reader will here give me leave to interrupt the course of the history for a moment, to reflect on the conduct of the Romans. It is great pity that the fragment of Polybius, where an account is given of this deputation, should end exactly in the most interesting part of this narrative. I should set a much higher value on one short reflection of so judicious an author, than on the long harangues which Appian ascribes to the deputies and the consul. I can never believe, [pg 278] that so rational, judicious, and just a man as Polybius, could have approved the proceedings of the Romans on the present occasion. We do not here discover, in my opinion, any of the characteristics which distinguished them anciently; that greatness of soul, that rectitude, that utter abhorrence of all mean artifices, frauds, and impostures, which, as is somewhere said, formed no part of the Roman disposition; Minimè Romanis artibus. Why did not the Romans attack the Carthaginians by open force? Why should they declare expressly in a treaty (a most solemn and sacred thing) that they allowed them the full enjoyment of their liberties and laws; and understand, at the same time, certain private conditions, which proved the entire ruin of both? Why should they conceal, under the scandalous omission of the word city in this treaty, the perfidious design of destroying Carthage? as if, beneath the cover of such an equivocation, they might destroy it with justice. In short, why did the Romans not make their last declaration, till after they had extorted from the Carthaginians, at different times, their hostages and arms, that is, till they had absolutely rendered them incapable of disobeying their most arbitrary commands? Is it not manifest, that Carthage, notwithstanding all its defeats and losses, though it was weakened and almost exhausted, was still a terror to the Romans, and that they were persuaded they were not able to conquer it by force of arms? It is very dangerous to be possessed of so much power, as to be able to commit injustice with impunity, and with a prospect of being a gainer by it. The experience of all ages shows, that states seldom scruple to commit injustice, when they think it will conduce to their advantage.

The noble character which Polybius gives of the Achæans, differs widely from what was practised here.[881] That people, says he, far from using artifice and deceit towards their allies, in order to enlarge their power, did not think themselves allowed to employ them even against their enemies, considering only those victories as solid and glorious, which were obtained sword in hand, by dint of courage and bravery. He owns, in the same place, that there then remained among the Romans but very faint traces of the ancient generosity of their ancestors; [pg 279] and he thinks it incumbent on him (as he declares) to make this remark, in opposition to a maxim which was grown very common in his time among persons in the administration of the government, who imagined, that sincerity is inconsistent with good policy; and that it is impossible to succeed in the administration of state affairs, either in war or peace, without using fraud and deceit on some occasions.

I now return to my subject.[882] The consuls made no great haste to march against Carthage, not suspecting they had any thing to fear from that city, as it was now disarmed. The inhabitants took the opportunity of this delay to put themselves in a posture of defence, being all unanimously resolved not to quit the city. They appointed as general, without the walls, Asdrubal, who was at the head of twenty thousand men; and to whom deputies were sent accordingly, to entreat him to forget, for his country's sake, the injustice which had been done him, from the dread they were under of the Romans. The command of the troops, within the walls, was given to another Asdrubal, grandson of Masinissa. They then applied themselves to the making arms with incredible expedition. The temples, the palaces, the open markets and squares, were all changed into so many arsenals, where men and women worked day and night. Every day were made a hundred and and forty shields, three hundred swords, five hundred pikes or javelins, a thousand arrows, and a great number of engines to discharge them; and because they wanted materials to make ropes, the women cut off their hair, and abundantly supplied their wants on this occasion.

Masinissa was very much disgusted at the Romans, because, after he had extremely weakened the Carthaginians, they came and reaped the fruits of his victory, without acquainting him in any manner with their design, which circumstance caused some coldness between them.[883]

During this interval, the consuls were advancing towards the city, in order to besiege it.[884] As they expected nothing less than a vigorous resistance, the incredible resolution and courage of the besieged filled them with the utmost astonishment.

The Carthaginians were for ever making the boldest sallies, [pg 280] in order to repulse the besiegers, to burn their engines, and harass their foragers. Censorinus attacked the city on one side, and Manilius on the other. Scipio, afterwards surnamed Africanus, served then as tribune in the army; and distinguished himself above the rest of the officers, no less by his prudence than by his bravery. The consul, under whom he fought, committed many oversights, by having refused to follow his advice. This young officer extricated the troops from several dangers, into which the imprudence of their leaders had plunged them. A renowned officer, Phamæas by name, who was general of the enemy's cavalry, and continually harassed the foragers, did not dare ever to keep the field, when it was Scipio's turn to support them; so capable was he of keeping his troops in good order, and posting himself to advantage. So great and universal a reputation excited some envy against him at first; but as he behaved, in all respects, with the utmost modesty and reserve, that envy was soon changed into admiration; so that when the senate sent deputies to the camp, to inquire into the state of the siege, the whole army gave him unanimously the highest commendations; the soldiers, as well as officers, nay, the very generals, with one voice extolled the merit of young Scipio: so necessary is it for a man to deaden, if I may be allowed the expression, the splendour of his rising glory, by a sweet and modest carriage; and not to excite jealousy, by haughty and self-sufficient behaviour, as this naturally awakens pride in others, and makes even virtue itself odious!

A.M. 3857. A. Rom. 601.

About the same time, Masinissa, finding his end approach, sent to desire a visit from Scipio, in order that he might invest him with full powers to dispose, as he should see proper, of his kingdom and property, in behalf of his children.[885] But, on Scipio's arrival, he found that monarch dead. Masinissa had commanded them, with his dying breath, to follow implicitly the directions of Scipio, whom he appointed to be a kind of father and guardian to them. I shall give no farther account here of the family and posterity of Masinissa, because that would interrupt too much the history of Carthage.

The high esteem which Phamæas had entertained for Scipio induced him to forsake the Carthaginians, and go over to the Romans.[886] Accordingly, he joined them with above two thousand horse, and was afterwards of great service at the siege.

Calpurnius Piso, the consul, and L. Mancinus, his lieutenant, arrived in Africa in the beginning of the spring.[887] Nothing remarkable was transacted during this campaign. The Romans were even defeated on several occasions, and carried on the siege of Carthage but slowly. The besieged, on the contrary, had recovered their spirits. Their troops were considerably increased; they daily got new allies; and even sent an express as far as Macedonia, to the counterfeit Philip,[888] who pretended to be the son of Perseus, and was then engaged in a war with the Romans; to exhort him to carry it on with vigour, and promising to furnish him with money and ships.

This news occasioned some uneasiness at Rome.[889] The people began to doubt the success of a war, which grew daily more uncertain, and was more important, than had at first been imagined. As much as they were dissatisfied with the dilatoriness of the generals, and exclaimed against their conduct, so much did they unanimously agree in applauding young Scipio, and extolling his rare and uncommon virtues. He was come to Rome, in order to stand candidate for the edileship. The instant he appeared in the assembly, his name, his countenance, his reputation, a general persuasion that he was designed by the gods to end the third Punic war, as the first Scipio, his grandfather by adoption, had terminated the second; these several circumstances made a very strong impression on the people, and though it was contrary to law, and therefore opposed by the ancient men, instead of the edileship which

A.M. 3858. A. Rom. 602.

he sued for, the people, disregarding for once the laws, conferred the consulship upon him, and assigned him Africa for his province, without casting lots for the provinces, as usual, and as Drusus his colleague demanded.

As soon as Scipio had completed his recruits, he set out for Sicily, and arrived soon after in Utica.[890] He came very seasonably for Mancinus, Piso's lieutenant, who had rashly fixed himself in a post where he was surrounded by the enemy; and would have been cut to pieces that very morning, had not the new consul, who, on his arrival, heard of the danger he was in, reembarked his troops in the night, and sailed with the utmost speed to his assistance.

Scipio's first care, after his arrival, was to revive discipline among the troops, which he found had been entirely neglected.[891] There was not the least regularity, subordination, or obedience. Nothing was attended to but rapine, feasting, and diversions. He drove from the camp all useless persons, settled the quality of the provisions he would have brought in by the sutlers, and allowed of none but what were plain and fit for soldiers, studiously banishing all dainties and luxuries.

After he had made these regulations, which cost him but little time and pains, because he himself first set the example, he was persuaded that those under him were soldiers, and thereupon he prepared to carry on the siege with vigour. Having ordered his troops to provide themselves with axes, levers, and scaling-ladders, he led them in the dead of the night, and without the least noise, to a district of the city, called Megara; when ordering them to give a sudden and general shout, he attacked it with great vigour. The enemy, who did not expect to be attacked in the night, were at first in the utmost terror; however, they defended themselves so courageously, that Scipio could not scale the walls. But perceiving a tower that was forsaken, and which stood without the city, very near the walls, he detached thither a party of intrepid and resolute soldiers, who, by the help of pontons,[892] got from the tower on the walls, and from thence into Megara, the gates of which they broke down. Scipio entered it immediately after, and drove the enemies out of that post; who, terrified at this unexpected assault, and imagining that the whole city was taken, fled into the citadel, whither they were followed even by those forces that were encamped without the [pg 283] city, who abandoned their camp to the Romans, and thought it necessary for them to fly to a place of security.

Before I proceed further, it will be proper to give some account of the situation and dimensions of Carthage, which, in the beginning of the war against the Romans, contained seven hundred thousand inhabitants.[893] It stood at the bottom of a gulf, surrounded by the sea, and in the form of a peninsula, whose neck, that is, the isthmus which joined it to the continent, was twenty-five stadia, or a league and a quarter in breadth. The peninsula was three hundred and sixty stadia, or eighteen leagues round. On the west side there projected from it a long neck of land, half a stadium, or twelve fathoms broad; which, advancing into the sea, divided it from a morass, and was fenced on all sides with rocks and a single wall. On the south side, towards the continent, where stood the citadel called Byrsa, the city was surrounded with a triple wall, thirty cubits high, exclusive of the parapets and towers, with which it was flanked all round at equal distances, each interval being fourscore fathoms. Every tower was four stories high, and the stalls but two; they were arched, and in the lower part were walls to hold three hundred elephants with their fodder, and over these were stables for four thousand horses, and lofts for their food. There likewise was room enough to lodge twenty thousand foot, and four thousand horse. All these were contained within the walls alone. In one place only the walls were weak and low; and that was a neglected angle, which began at the neck of land above-mentioned, and extended as far as the harbours, which were on the west side. Of these there were two, which communicated with each other, but had only one entrance, seventy feet broad, shut up with chains. The first was appropriated for the merchants, and had several distinct habitations for the seamen. The second, or inner harbour, was for the ships of war, in the midst of which stood an island called Cothon, lined, as the harbour was, with large quays, in which were distinct receptacles[894] for sheltering from the weather two hundred and twenty ships; over these were magazines or storehouses, wherein was lodged whatever [pg 284] is necessary for arming and equipping fleets. The entrance into each of these receptacles was adorned with two marble pillars of the Ionic order. So that both the harbour and the island represented on each side two magnificent galleries. In this island was the admiral's palace; and, as it stood opposite to the mouth of the harbour, he could from thence discover whatever was doing at sea, though no one, from thence, could see what was transacting in the inward part of the harbour. The merchants, in like manner, had no prospect of the men of war; the two ports being separated by a double wall, each having its particular gate, that led to the city, without passing through the other harbour. So that Carthage may be divided into three parts:[895] the harbour, which was double, and called sometimes Cothon, from the little island of that name: the citadel, named Byrsa: the city properly so called, where the inhabitants dwelt, which lay round the citadel, and was called Megara.

At daybreak,[896] Asdrubal[897] perceiving the ignominious defeat of his troops, in order that he might be revenged on the Romans, and, at the same time, deprive the inhabitants of all hopes of accommodation and pardon, brought all the Roman prisoners he had taken, upon the walls, in sight of the whole army. There he put them to the most exquisite torture; putting out their eyes, cutting off their noses, ears, and fingers; tearing their skin from their body with iron rakes or harrows, and then threw them headlong from the top of the battlements. So inhuman a treatment filled the Carthaginians with horror: however, he did not spare even them; but murdered many senators who had ventured to oppose his tyranny.

Scipio,[898] finding himself absolute master of the isthmus, burnt the camp, which the enemy had deserted, and built a new one for his troops. It was of a square form, surrounded with large and deep intrenchments, and fenced with strong palisades. On the side which faced the Carthaginians, he built a wall twelve feet high, flanked at proper distances with towers and redoubts; and on the middle tower, he erected a [pg 285] very high wooden fort, from whence could be seen whatever was doing in the city. This wall was equal to the whole breadth of the isthmus, that is, twenty-five stadia.[899] The enemy, who were within bow-shot of it, employed their utmost efforts to put a stop to this work; but, as the whole army were employed upon it day and night, without intermission, it was finished in twenty-four days. Scipio reaped a double advantage from this work: first, his forces were lodged more safely and commodiously than before: secondly, he cut off all provisions from the besieged, to whom none could now be brought but by sea; which was attended with many difficulties, both because the sea is frequently very tempestuous in that place, and because the Roman fleet kept a strict guard. This proved one of the chief causes of the famine which raged soon after in the city. Besides, Asdrubal distributed the corn that was brought, only among the thirty thousand men who served under him, caring very little what became of the rest of the inhabitants.

To distress them still more by the want of provisions, Scipio attempted to stop up the mouth of the haven by a mole, beginning at the above-mentioned neck of land, which was near the harbour.[900] The besieged, at first, looked upon this attempt as ridiculous, and accordingly they insulted the workmen: but, at last, seeing them make an astonishing progress every day, they began to be afraid; and to take such measures as might, if possible, render the attempt unsuccessful. Every one, to the women and children, fell to work, but so privately, that all that Scipio could learn from the prisoners, was, that they had heard a great noise in the harbour, but did not know the occasion of it. At last, all things being ready, the Carthaginians opened, on a sudden, a new outlet on the other side of the haven; and appeared at sea with a numerous fleet, which they had just then built with the old materials found in their magazines. It is generally allowed, that had they attacked the Roman fleet directly, they must infallibly have taken it; because, as no such attempt was expected, and every man was elsewhere employed, the Carthaginians [pg 286] would have found it without rowers, soldiers, or officers. But the ruin of Carthage, says the historian, was decreed. Having therefore only offered a kind of insult or bravado to the Romans, they returned into the harbour.

Two days after, they brought forward their ships, with a resolution to fight in good earnest, and found the enemy ready for them.[901] This battle was to determine the fate of both parties. The conflict was long and obstinate, each exerting themselves to the utmost; the one to save their country, now reduced to the last extremity, and the other to complete their victory. During the fight, the Carthaginian brigantines running along under the large Roman ships, broke to pieces sometimes their sterns, and at other times their rudders and oars; and, when briskly attacked, retreated with surprising swiftness, and returned immediately to the charge. At last, after the two armies had fought with equal success till sunset, the Carthaginians thought proper to retire; not that they believed themselves overcome, but in order to begin the fight again on the morrow. Part of their ships, not being able to run swiftly enough into the harbour, because the mouth of it was too narrow, took shelter under a very spacious terrace, which had been thrown up against the walls to unload goods, on the side of which a small rampart had been raised during this war, to prevent the enemy from possessing themselves of it. Here the fight was again renewed with more vigour than ever, and lasted till late at night. The Carthaginians suffered very much, and the few ships which got off, sailed for refuge to the city. Morning being come, Scipio attacked the terrace, and carried it, though with great difficulty; after which he made a lodgement there, and fortified himself on it, and built a brick-wall close to those of the city, and of the same height. When it was finished, he commanded four thousand men to get on the top of it, and to discharge from it a perpetual shower of darts and arrows upon the enemy, which did great execution; because, as the two walls were of equal height, almost every dart took effect. Thus ended this campaign.

During the winter quarters, Scipio endeavoured to overpower the enemy's troops without the city,[902] who very much [pg 287] harassed the convoys that brought his provisions, and protected such as were sent to the besieged. For this purpose he attacked a neighbouring fort, called Nepheris, where they used to shelter themselves. In the last action, above seventy thousand of the enemy, as well soldiers as peasants, who had been enlisted, were cut to pieces; and the fort was carried with great difficulty, after sustaining a siege of two and twenty days. The seizure of this fort was followed by the surrender of almost all the strong-holds in Africa; and contributed very much to the taking of Carthage itself, into which, from that time, it was almost impossible to bring any provisions.

A.M. 3859. A. Rom. 603.

Early in the spring, Scipio attacked, at one and the same time, the harbour called Cothon, and the citadel.[903] Having possessed himself of the wall which surrounded this port, he threw himself into the great square of the city that was near it, from whence was an ascent to the citadel, up three streets, on each side of which were houses, from the tops whereof a shower of darts was discharged upon the Romans, who were obliged, before they could advance farther, to force the houses they came first to, and post themselves in them, in order to dislodge from thence the enemy who fought from the neighbouring houses. The combat, which was carried on from the tops, and in every part of the houses, continued six days, during which a dreadful slaughter was made. To clear the streets, and make way for the troops, the Romans dragged aside, with hooks, the bodies of such of the inhabitants as had been slain, or precipitated headlong from the houses, and threw them into pits, the greatest part of them being still alive and panting. In this toil, which lasted six days and as many nights, the soldiers were relieved from time to time by fresh ones, without which they would have been quite spent. Scipio was the only person who did not take a wink of sleep all this time; giving orders in all places, and scarce allowing himself leisure to take the least refreshment.

There was every reason to believe, that the siege would last much longer, and occasion a great effusion of blood.[904] But on the seventh day, there appeared a company of men in the [pg 288] posture and habit of suppliants, who desired no other conditions, than that the Romans would please to spare the lives of all those who should be willing to leave the citadel: which request was granted them, only the deserters were excepted. Accordingly, there came out fifty thousand men and women, who were sent into the fields under a strong guard. The deserters, who were about nine hundred, finding they would not be allowed quarter, fortified themselves in the temple of Æsculapius, with Asdrubal, his wife, and two children; where, though their number was but small, they might have held out a long time, because the temple stood on a very high hill, upon rocks, the ascent to which was by sixty steps. But at last, exhausted by hunger and watching, oppressed with fear, and seeing their destruction at hand, they lost all patience; and abandoning the lower part of the temple, they retired to the uppermost story, resolved not to quit it but with their lives.

In the mean time, Asdrubal, being desirous of saving his own life, came down privately to Scipio, carrying an olive branch in his hand, and threw himself at his feet. Scipio showed him immediately to the deserters, who, transported with rage and fury at the sight, vented millions of imprecations against him, and set fire to the temple. Whilst it was kindling, we are told, that Asdrubal's wife, dressing herself as splendidly as possible, and placing herself with her two children in sight of Scipio, addressed him with a loud voice: “I call not down,” says she, “curses upon thy head, O Roman; for thou only takest the privilege allowed by the laws of war: but may the gods of Carthage, and thou in concert with them, punish, according to his deserts, the false wretch, who has betrayed his country, his gods, his wife, his children!” Then directing herself to Asdrubal, “Perfidious wretch,” says she, “thou basest of men! this fire will presently consume both me and my children; but as to thee, unworthy general of Carthage, go—adorn the gay triumph of thy conqueror—suffer, in the sight of all Rome, the tortures thou so justly deservest!” She had no sooner pronounced these words, than, seizing her children, she cut their throats, threw them into the flames, and afterwards rushed into them herself; in which she was imitated by all the deserters.

With regard to Scipio,[905] when he saw this famous city, which had been so flourishing for seven hundred years, and might have been compared to the greatest empires, on account of the extent of its dominions both by sea and land; its mighty armies; its fleets, elephants, and riches; while the Carthaginians were even superior to other nations, by their courage and greatness of soul; as, notwithstanding their being deprived of arms and ships, they had sustained, for three whole years, all the hardships and calamities of a long siege; seeing, I say, this city entirely ruined, historians relate, that he could not refuse his tears to the unhappy fate of Carthage. He reflected, that cities, nations, and empires, are liable to revolutions no less than private men; that the like sad fate had befallen Troy anciently so powerful; and, in later times, the Assyrians, Medes, and Persians, whose dominions were once of so great an extent; and very recently, the Macedonians, whose empire had been so glorious throughout the world. Full of these mournful ideas, he repeated the following verses of Homer:

Ἔσσεται ἦμαρ, ὄταν ποτ᾽ ὀλώλη Ἴλιος ἱρὴ,

Καὶ Πρίαμος, καὶ λαὸς εὐμμελίω Πριάμοιο.

Il. δ. 164, 165.

The day shall come, that great avenging day.

Which Troy's proud glories in the dust shall lay,

When Priam's pow'rs and Priam's self shall fall,

And one prodigious ruin swallow all.

Pope.

thereby denouncing the future destiny of Rome, as he himself confessed to Polybius, who desired Scipio to explain himself on that occasion.

Had the truth enlightened his soul, he would have discovered what we are taught in the Scriptures, that “because of unrighteous dealings, injuries, and riches got by deceit, a kingdom is translated from one people to another.”[906] Carthage is destroyed, because its avarice, perfidiousness, and cruelty, have attained their utmost height. The like fate will attend Rome, when its luxury, ambition, pride, and unjust usurpations, concealed beneath a specious and delusive show of justice and virtue, shall have compelled the sovereign Lord, the disposer of empires, to give the universe an important lesson in its fall.

A.M. 3859. A. Carth. 701. A. Rom. 603. Ant. J.C. 145.

Carthage being taken in this manner, Scipio gave the plunder of it (the gold, silver, statues, and other offerings which should be found in the temples, excepted) to his soldiers for some days.[907] He afterwards bestowed several military rewards on them, as well as on the officers, two of whom had particularly distinguished themselves, viz. Tib. Gracchus, and Caius Fannius, who first scaled the walls. After this, adorning a small ship (an excellent sailer) with the enemy's spoils, he sent it to Rome with the news of the victory.

At the same time he invited the inhabitants of Sicily to come and take possession of the pictures and statues which the Carthaginians had plundered them of in the former wars.[908] When he restored to the citizens of Agrigentum, Phalaris's famous bull,[909] he told them that this bull, which was, at one and the same time, a monument of the cruelty of their ancient kings, and of the lenity of their present sovereigns, ought to make them sensible which would be most advantageous for them, to live under the yoke of Sicilians, or the government of the Romans.

Having exposed to sale part of the spoils of Carthage, he commanded, on the most severe penalties, his family not to take or even buy any of them; so careful was he to remove from himself, and all belonging to him, the least suspicion of avarice.

When the news of the taking of Carthage was brought to Rome, the people abandoned themselves to the most immoderate transports of joy, as if the public tranquillity had not been secured till that instant.[910] They revolved in their minds, all the calamities which the Carthaginians had brought upon them, in Sicily, in Spain, and even in Italy, for sixteen years together; during which, Hannibal had plundered four hundred towns, destroyed, in different engagements, three hundred thousand men, and reduced Rome itself to the utmost extremity. Amidst the remembrance of these past evils, the people in [pg 291] Rome would ask one another, whether it were really true that Carthage was in ashes. All ranks and degrees of men emulously strove who should show the greatest gratitude towards the gods; and the citizens were, for many days, employed wholly in solemn sacrifices, in public prayers, games, and spectacles.

After these religious duties were ended, the senate sent ten commissioners into Africa, to regulate, in conjunction with Scipio, the fate and condition of that country for the time to come.[911] Their first care was, to demolish whatever was still remaining of Carthage.[912] Rome,[913] though mistress of almost the whole world, could not believe herself safe as long as even the name of Carthage was in being. So true it is, that an inveterate hatred, fomented by long and bloody wars, lasts even beyond the time when all cause of fear is removed; and does not cease, till the object that occasions it is no more. Orders were given, in the name of the Romans, that it should never be inhabited again; and dreadful imprecations were denounced against those, who, contrary to this prohibition, should attempt to rebuild any parts of it, especially those called Byrsa and Megara. In the mean time, every one who desired it, was admitted to see Carthage: Scipio being well pleased, to have people view the sad ruins of a city which had dared to contend with Rome for empire.[914] The commissioners decreed farther, that those cities which, during this war, had joined with the enemy, should all be rased, and their territories be given to the Roman allies; they particularly made a grant to the citizens of Utica, of the whole country lying between Carthage and Hippo. All the rest they made tributary, and reduced it into a Roman province, whither a prætor was sent annually.

All matters being thus settled, Scipio returned to Rome, where he made his entry in triumph.[915] So magnificent a one [pg 292] had never been seen before; the whole exhibiting nothing but statues, rare, invaluable pictures, and other curiosities, which the Carthaginians had, for many years, been collecting in other countries; not to mention the money carried into the public treasury, which amounted to immense sums.

Notwithstanding the great precautions which were taken to hinder Carthage from being ever rebuilt, in less than thirty years after, and even in Scipio's lifetime, one of the Gracchi, to ingratiate himself with the people, undertook to found it anew, and conducted thither a colony consisting of six thousand citizens for that purpose.[916] The senate, hearing that the workmen had been terrified by many unlucky omens, at the time they were tracing the limits, and laying the foundations of the new city, would have suspended the attempt; but the tribune, not being over scrupulous in religious matters, carried on the work, notwithstanding all these bad presages, and finished it in a few days. This was the first Roman colony that was ever sent out of Italy.

It is probable, that only a kind of huts were built there, since we are told,[917] that when Marius retired hither, in his flight to Africa, he lived in a mean and poor condition amid the ruins of Carthage, consoling himself by the sight of so astonishing a spectacle; himself serving, in some measure, as a consolation to that ill-fated city.

Appian relates,[918] that Julius Cæsar, after the death of Pompey, having crossed into Africa, saw, in a dream, an army composed of a prodigious number of soldiers, who, with tears in their eyes, called him; and that, struck with the vision, he writ down in his pocket-book the design which he formed on this occasion, of rebuilding Carthage and Corinth: but that having been murdered soon after by the conspirators, Augustus Cæsar, his adopted son, who found this memorandum among his papers, rebuilt Carthage near the spot where it stood formerly, in order that the imprecations which had been vented, at the time of its destruction, against those who should presume to rebuild it, might not fall upon him.

I know not what foundation Appian has for this story; but we read in Strabo,[919] that Carthage and Corinth were rebuilt at the same time by Cæsar, to whom he gives the name of god, by which title, a little before, he had plainly intended Julius Cæsar;[920] and Plutarch,[921] in the life of that emperor, ascribes expressly to him the establishment of these two colonies; and observes, that one remarkable circumstance in these two cities is, that as both had been taken and destroyed at the same time, they likewise were at the same time rebuilt and repeopled. However this be, Strabo affirms, that in his time Carthage was as populous as any city in Africa; and it rose to be the capital of Africa, under the succeeding emperors. It existed for about seven hundred years after, in splendour, but at last was so completely destroyed by the Saracens, in the beginning of the seventh century, that neither its name, nor the least footsteps of it, are known at this time in the country.

A Digression on the Manners and Character of the second Scipio Africanus.—Scipio, the destroyer of Carthage, was son to the famous Paulus Æmilius, who conquered Perseus, the last king of Macedon; and consequently grandson to that Paulus Æmilius who lost his life in the battle of Cannæ. He was adopted by the son of the great Scipio Africanus, and called Scipio Æmilianus; the names of the two families being so united, pursuant to the law of adoptions. He supported, with equal lustre, the dignity of both houses, by all the qualities that can confer honour on the sword and gown.[922] The whole tenour of his life, says an historian, whether with regard to his actions, his thoughts, or words, was deserving of the highest praise. He distinguished himself particularly (an eulogium that, at present, can seldom be applied to persons of the military profession) by his exquisite taste for polite literature, and all the sciences, as well as by the uncommon regard he showed to learned men. It is universally known, that he was reported to be the author of Terence's comedies, the most polite and elegant writings which the Romans could boast. We [pg 294] are told of Scipio,[923] that no man could blend more happily repose and action, nor employ his leisure hours with greater delicacy and taste: thus was he divided between arms and books, between the military labours of the camp, and the peaceful employment of the cabinet; in which he either exercised his body in toils of war, or his mind in the study of the sciences. By this he showed, that nothing does greater honour to a person of distinction, of what quality or profession soever he be, than the adorning his mind with knowledge. Cicero, speaking of Scipio, says,[924] that he always had Xenophon's works in his hands, which are so famous for the solid and excellent instructions they contain, both in regard to war and policy.

He owed this exquisite taste for polite learning and the sciences, to the excellent education which Paulus Æmilius bestowed on his children.[925] He had put them under the ablest masters in every art; and did not spare any expense on that occasion, though his circumstances were very narrow: P. Æmilius himself was present at all their lessons, as often as the affairs of the state would permit; becoming, by this means, their chief preceptor.

The intimate union between Polybius and Scipio put the finishing stroke to the exalted qualities which, by the superiority of his genius and disposition, and the excellency of his education, were already the subject of admiration.[926] Polybius, with a great number of Achæans, whose fidelity the Romans suspected during the war with Perseus, was detained in Rome, where his merit soon caused his company to be coveted by all persons of the highest quality in that city. Scipio, when scarce eighteen, devoted himself entirely to Polybius: and considered as the greatest felicity of his life, the opportunity he had of being instructed by so great a master, whose society he preferred to all the vain and idle amusements which are generally so alluring to young persons.

Polybius's first care was to inspire Scipio with an aversion [pg 295] for those equally dangerous and ignominious pleasures, to which the Roman youth were so strongly addicted; the greatest part of them being already depraved and corrupted by the luxury and licentiousness which riches and new conquests had introduced in Rome. Scipio, during the first five years that he continued in so excellent a school, made the greatest improvement in it; and, despising the ridicule, as well as the pernicious examples, of persons of the same age with himself, he was looked upon, even at that time, as a model of discretion and wisdom.

From hence, the transition was easy and natural to generosity, to a noble disregard of riches, and to a laudable use of them; all virtues so requisite in persons of illustrious birth, and which Scipio carried to the most exalted pitch, as appears from some instances of this kind related by Polybius, which are highly worthy our admiration.

Æmilia,[927] wife of the first Scipio Africanus, and mother of him who had adopted the Scipio mentioned here by Polybius, had bequeathed, at her death, a great estate to the latter. This lady, besides the diamonds and jewels which are worn by women of her high rank, possessed a great number of gold and silver vessels used in sacrifices, together with several splendid equipages, and a considerable number of slaves of both sexes; the whole suited to the opulence of the august house into which she had married. At her death, Scipio made over all those rich possessions to Papiria his mother, who, having been divorced a considerable time before by Paulus Æmilius, and not being in circumstances to support the dignity of her birth, lived in great obscurity, and never appeared in the assemblies or public ceremonies. But when she again frequented them with a magnificent train, this noble generosity of Scipio did him great honour, especially in the minds of the ladies, who expatiated on it in all their conversations, and in a city whose inhabitants, says Polybius, were not easily prevailed upon to part with their money.

Scipio was no less admired on another occasion. He was bound, in consequence of the estate that had fallen to him by the death of his grandmother, to pay, at three different times, to the two daughters of Scipio, his grandfather by adoption, [pg 296] half their portions, which amounted to 50,000 French crowns.[928] The time for the payment of the first sum being expired, Scipio put the whole money into the hands of a banker. Tiberius Gracchus, and Scipio Nasica, who had married the two sisters, imagining that Scipio had made a mistake, went to him, and observed, that the laws allowed him three years to pay this sum in, and at three different times. Young Scipio answered, that he knew very well what the laws directed on this occasion; that they might indeed be executed in their greatest rigour towards strangers, but that friends and relations ought to treat one another with a more generous simplicity; and therefore desired them to receive the whole sum. They were struck with such admiration at the generosity of their kinsman, that in their return home, they reproached[929] themselves for their narrow way of thinking, at a time when they made the greatest figure, and had the highest regard paid to them, of any family in Rome. This generous action, says Polybius, was the more admired, because no person in Rome, so far from consenting to pay 50,000 crowns before they were due, would pay even a thousand before the time for payment was elapsed.

It was from the same noble spirit that, two years after, Paulus Æmilius his father being dead, he made over to his brother Fabius, who was not so wealthy as himself, the part of their father's estate, which was his (Scipio's) due, (amounting to above threescore thousand crowns,[930]) in order that there might not be so great a disparity between his fortune and that of his brother.

This Fabius being desirous to exhibit a show of gladiators after his father's decease, in honour of his memory, (as was the custom in that age,) and not being able to defray the expenses on this occasion, which amounted to a very heavy sum, Scipio made him a present of fifteen thousand[931] crowns, in order to defray at least half the charges of it.

The splendid presents which Scipio had made his mother Papiria, reverted to him, by law as well as equity, after her demise; and his sisters, according to the custom of those times [pg 297] had not the least claim to them. Nevertheless, Scipio thought it would have been dishonourable in him, had he taken them back again. He therefore made over to his sisters whatever he had presented to their mother, which amounted to a very considerable sum; and by this fresh proof of his glorious disregard of wealth, and the tender friendship he had for his family, acquired the applause of the whole city.

These different benefactions, which amounted all together to a prodigious sum, seem to have received a brighter lustre from the age in which he bestowed them, he being still very young; and yet more from the circumstances of the time when they were presented, as well as the kind and obliging carriage he assumed on those occasions.

The incidents I have here related are so repugnant to the maxims of this age, that there might be reason to fear the reader would consider them merely as the rhetorical flourishes of an historian who was prejudiced in favour of his hero; if it was not well known, that the predominant characteristic of Polybius, by whom they are related, is a sincere love for truth, and an utter aversion to adulation of every kind. In the very passage whence this relation is extracted, he has thought it necessary for him to be a little guarded, where he expatiates on the virtuous actions and rare qualities of Scipio; and he observes, that as his writings were to be perused by the Romans, who were perfectly well acquainted with all the particulars of this great man's life, he could not fail of being convicted by them, should he venture to advance any falsehood; an affront, to which it is not probable that an author, who has ever so little regard for his reputation, would expose himself, especially if no advantage was to accrue to him from it.

We have already observed, that Scipio had never given into the fashionable debaucheries and excesses to which the young people at Rome so generally abandoned themselves. But he was sufficiently compensated for this self-denial of all destructive pleasures, by the vigorous health he enjoyed all the rest of his life, which enabled him to taste pleasure of a much purer and more exalted kind, and to perform the great actions that reflected so much glory upon him.

Hunting, which was his darling exercise, contributed also [pg 298] very much to invigorate his constitution, and enabled him also to endure the hardest toils. Macedonia, whither he followed his father, gave him an opportunity of indulging to the utmost of his desire his passion in this respect; for the chase, which was the usual diversion of the Macedonian monarchs, having been laid aside for some years on account of the wars, Scipio found there an incredible quantity of game of every kind. Paulus Æmilius, studious of procuring his son virtuous pleasures of every kind, in order to divert his mind from those which reason prohibits, gave him full liberty to indulge himself in his favourite sport, during all the time that the Roman forces continued in that country, after the victory he had gained over Perseus. The illustrious youth employed his leisure hours in an exercise which suited so well his age and inclination; and was as successful in this innocent war against the beasts of Macedonia, as his father had been in that which he had carried on against the inhabitants of the country.

It was at Scipio's return from Macedon, that he met with Polybius in Rome; and contracted the strict friendship with him, which was afterwards so beneficial to our young Roman, and did him almost as much honour in after-ages as all his conquests. We find, from history, that Polybius lived with the two brothers. One day, when himself and Scipio were alone, the latter unbosomed himself freely to him, and complained, but in the mildest and most gentle terms, that he, in their conversations at table, always directed himself to his brother Fabius, and never to him. “I am sensible,” says he, “that this indifference arises from your supposing, with all our citizens, that I am a heedless young man, and wholly averse to the taste which now prevails in Rome, because I do not devote myself to the studies of the bar, nor cultivate the graces of elocution. But how should I do this? I am told perpetually, that the Romans expect a general, and not an orator, from the house of the Scipios. I will confess to you, (pardon the sincerity with which I reveal my thoughts,) that your coldness and indifference grieve me exceedingly.” Polybius, surprised at this unexpected address, made Scipio the kindest answer; and assured the illustrious youth, that though he generally directed himself to his brother, yet this was not [pg 299] out of disrespect to him, but only because Fabius was the elder; not to mention (continued Polybius) that, knowing you possessed but one soul, I conceived that I addressed both when I spoke to either of you. He then assured Scipio, that he was entirely at his command: that with regard to the sciences, for which he discovered the happiest genius, he would have opportunities sufficient to improve himself in them, from the great number of learned Grecians who resorted daily to Rome; but that, as to the art of war, which was properly his profession, and his favourite study, he (Polybius) might be of some little service to him. He had no sooner spoke these words, than Scipio, grasping his hand in a kind of rapture: “Oh! when,” says he, “shall I see the happy day, when, disengaged from all other avocations, and living with me, you will be so much my friend, as to direct your endeavours to improve my understanding and regulate my affections? It is then I shall think myself worthy of my illustrious ancestors.” From that time Polybius, overjoyed to see so young a man breathe such noble sentiments, devoted himself particularly to our Scipio, who ever after paid him as much reverence as if he had been his father.

However, Scipio did not esteem Polybius only as an excellent historian, but valued him much more, and reaped much greater advantages from him, as an able warrior and a profound politician. Accordingly, he consulted him on every occasion, and always took his advice even when he was at the head of his army; concerting in private with Polybius all the operations of the campaign, all the movements of the forces, all enterprises against the enemy, and the several measures proper for rendering them successful.

In a word, it was the common report,[932] that our illustrious Roman did not perform any great or good action without being under some obligation to Polybius; nor even commit an error, except when he acted without consulting him.

I request the reader to excuse this long digression, which may be thought foreign to my subject, as I am not writing the Roman history. However, it appeared to me so well adapted to the general design I propose to myself, in this work, viz. [pg 300] the cultivating and improving the minds of youth, that I could not forbear introducing it here, though I was sensible this is not directly its proper place. And indeed, these examples show, how important it is that young people should receive a liberal and virtuous education; and the great benefit they reap, by frequenting and corresponding early with persons of merit; for these were the foundations whereon were built the fame and glory which have rendered Scipio immortal. But above all, how noble a model for our age (in which the most inconsiderable and even trifling concerns often create feuds and animosities between brothers and sisters, and disturb the peace of families,) is the generous disinterestedness of Scipio; who, whenever he had an opportunity of serving his relations, thought lightly of bestowing the largest sums upon them! This excellent passage of Polybius had escaped me, by its not being inserted in the folio edition of his works. It belongs indeed naturally to that book, where, treating of the taste for solid glory, I mentioned the contempt in which the ancients held riches, and the excellent use they made of them. I therefore thought myself indispensably obliged to restore, on this occasion, to young students, what I could not but blame myself for omitting elsewhere.

The History of the Family and Posterity of Masinissa.—I promised, after finishing what related to the republic of Carthage, to return to the family and posterity of Masinissa. This piece of history forms a considerable part of that of Africa, and therefore is not quite foreign to my subject.

A.M. 3857. A. Rom. 601.

From the time that Masinissa had declared for the Romans under the first Scipio, he had always adhered to that honourable alliance, with an almost unparalleled zeal and fidelity.[933] Finding his end approaching, he wrote to the proconsul of Africa, under whose standards the younger Scipio then fought, to desire that Roman might be sent to him; adding, that he should die with satisfaction, if he could but expire in his arms, after having made him executor to his will. But believing that he should be dead, before it could be possible for him to receive this consolation, he sent for his wife and children, and spoke to them as follows: “I know no [pg 301] other nation but the Romans, and, among this nation, no other family but that of the Scipios. I now, in my expiring moments, empower Scipio Æmilianus to dispose, in an absolute manner, of all my possessions, and to divide my kingdom among my children. I require, that whatever Scipio may decree, shall be executed as punctually as if I myself had appointed it by my will.” After saying these words, he breathed his last, being upwards of ninety years of age.

This prince, during his youth, had met with strange reverses of fortune, having been dispossessed of his kingdom, obliged to fly from province to province, and a thousand times in danger of his life.[934] Being supported, says the historian, by the divine protection, he was afterwards favoured, till his death, with a perpetual series of prosperity, unruffled by any sinister accident: for he not only recovered his own kingdom, but added to it that of Syphax his enemy; and extending his dominions from Mauritania, as far as Cyrene, he became the most powerful prince of all Africa. He was blessed, till he left the world, with the greatest health and vigour, which doubtless was owing to his extreme temperance, and the care he had taken to inure himself to fatigue. Though ninety years of age, he performed all the exercises used by young men,[935] and always rode without a saddle; and Polybius observes, (a circumstance preserved by Plutarch,[936]) that the day after a great victory over the Carthaginians, Masinissa was seen, sitting at the door of his tent, eating a piece of brown bread.

He left fifty-four sons, of whom three only were legitimate, viz. Micipsa, Gulussa, and Mastanabal.[937] Scipio divided the kingdom between these three, and gave considerable possessions to the rest: but the two last dying soon after, Micipsa became sole possessor of these extensive dominions. He had two sons, Adherbal and Hiempsal, and with them he educated in his palace Jugurtha his nephew, Mastanabal's son, and took [pg 302] as much care of him as he did of his own children.[938] This last-mentioned prince possessed several eminent qualities, which gained him universal esteem. Jugurtha, who was finely shaped, and very handsome, of the most delicate wit, and the most solid judgment, did not devote himself, as young men commonly do, to a life of luxury and pleasure. He used to exercise himself with persons of his own age, in running, riding, and throwing the javelin; and though he surpassed all his companions, there was not one of them but loved him. The chase was his only delight; but it was that of lions and other savage beasts. To finish his character, he excelled in all things, and spoke very little of himself: Plurimum facere, et mininum ipse de se loqui.

Merit so conspicuous, and so generally acknowledged, began to excite some anxiety in Micipsa. He saw himself in the decline of life, and his children very young. He knew the prodigious lengths which ambition is capable of going, when a crown is in view: and that a man, with talents much inferior to those of Jugurtha, might be dazzled by so glittering a temptation, especially when united with such favourable circumstances.[939] In order therefore to remove a competitor so dangerous with regard to his children, he gave Jugurtha the command of the forces which he sent to the assistance of the Romans, who, at that time, were besieging Numantia, under the conduct of Scipio. Knowing Jugurtha was actuated by the most heroic bravery, he flattered himself, that he probably would rush upon danger, and lose his life. However, he was mistaken. This young prince joined to an undaunted courage, the utmost presence of mind; and, a circumstance very rarely found in persons of his age, he preserved a just medium between a timorous foresight and an impetuous rashness.[940] In this campaign, he won the esteem and friendship of the whole army. Scipio sent him back to his uncle with letters of recommendation, and the most advantageous testimonials [pg 303] of his conduct, after having given him very prudent advice with regard to the course which he ought to pursue; for knowing mankind so well, he, in all probability, had discovered certain sparks of ambition in that prince, which he feared would one day break out into a flame.

Micipsa, pleased with the high character that was sent him of his nephew, changed his behaviour towards him, and resolved, if possible, to win his affection by kindness. Accordingly he adopted him; and by his will, made him joint-heir with his two sons. When he found his end approaching, he sent for all three, and bid them draw near his bed, where, in presence of the whole court he put Jugurtha in mind of all his kindness to him; conjuring him, in the name of the gods, to defend and protect, on all occasions, his children; who, being before related to him by the ties of blood, were now become his brethren, by his (Micipsa's) bounty. He told him,[941] that neither arms nor treasure constitute the strength of a kingdom, but friends, who are not won by arms nor gold, but by real services and inviolable fidelity. Now where (says he) can we find better friends than our brothers? And how can that man, who becomes an enemy to his relations, repose any confidence in, or depend on, strangers? He exhorted his sons to pay the highest reverence to Jugurtha; and to dispute no otherwise with him, than by their endeavour to equal, and, if possible, to surpass his exalted merit. He concluded with entreating them to observe for ever an inviolable attachment towards the Romans; and to consider them as their benefactor, their patron, and master. A few days after this, Micipsa expired.

A.M. 3887. A. Rom. 631.

Jugurtha soon threw off the mask, and began by ridding himself of Hiempsal, who had expressed himself to him with great freedom, and therefore he caused him to be murdered. This bloody action proved but too evidently to Adherbal what he himself might naturally fear.

A.M. 3888. A. Rom. 632.

Numidia is now divided, and sides severally with the two brothers. Mighty armies are raised by each party. Adherbal, after losing the greatest part [pg 304] of his fortresses, is vanquished in battle, and forced to make Rome his asylum. However, this gave Jugurtha no very great uneasiness, as he knew that money was all-powerful in that city. He therefore sent deputies thither, with orders for them to bribe the chief senators. In the first audience to which they were introduced, Adherbal represented the unhappy condition to which he was reduced, the injustice and barbarity of Jugurtha, the murder of his brother, the loss of almost all his fortresses; but the circumstance on which he laid the greatest stress was, the commands of his dying father, viz. to put his whole confidence in the Romans; declaring, that the friendship of this people would be a stronger support both to himself and his kingdom, than all the troops and treasures in the universe. His speech was of a great length, and extremely pathetic. Jugurtha's deputies made only the following answer: that Hiempsal had been killed by the Numidians, because of his great cruelty; that Adherbal was the aggressor, and yet, after having been vanquished, was come to make complaints, because he had not committed all the excesses he desired; that their sovereign entreated the senate to form a judgment of his behaviour and conduct in Africa, from that he had shown at Numantia; and to lay a greater stress on his actions, than on the accusations of his enemies. But these ambassadors had secretly employed an eloquence much more prevalent than that of words, which had not proved ineffectual. The whole assembly was for Jugurtha, a few senators excepted, who were not so void of honour as to be corrupted by money. The senate came to this resolution, that commissioners should be sent from Rome, to divide the provinces equally upon the spot between the two brothers. The reader will naturally suppose, that Jugurtha was not sparing of his treasure on this occasion; the division was made to his advantage; and yet a specious appearance of equity was preserved.

This first success of Jugurtha augmented his courage, and increased his boldness. Accordingly, he attacked his brother by open force; and whilst the latter loses his time in sending deputations to the Romans, he storms several fortresses, carries on his conquests; and, after defeating Adherbal, besieges him in Cirtha, the capital of his kingdom. During this interval [pg 305] ambassadors arrived from Rome, with orders, in the name of the senate and people, to the two kings, to lay down their arms, and cease all hostilities. Jugurtha, after protesting that he would obey, with the most profound reverence and submission, the commands of the Roman people, added, that he did not believe it was their intention to hinder him from defending his own life against the treacherous snares which his brother had laid for it. He concluded with saying, that he would send ambassadors forthwith to Rome, to inform the senate of his conduct. By this vague answer he eluded their orders, and would not even permit the deputies to wait upon Adherbal.

Though the latter was so closely blocked up in his capital, he yet[942] found means to send to Rome, to implore the assistance of the Romans against his brother, who had besieged him five months, and intended to take away his life. Some senators were of opinion, that war ought to be proclaimed immediately against Jugurtha; but still his influence prevailed, and the Romans only ordered an embassy to be sent, composed of senators of the highest distinction, among whom was Æmilius Scaurus, a factious man, who had a great ascendant over the nobility, and concealed the blackest vices under the specious appearance of virtue. Jugurtha was terrified at first; but he again found an opportunity to elude their demands, and accordingly sent them back without coming to any conclusion. Upon this, Adherbal, who had lost all hopes, surrendered upon condition of having his life spared; nevertheless, he was immediately murdered with a great number of Numidians.

But though the greatest part of the people at Rome were struck with horror at this news, Jugurtha's money again obtained him defenders in the senate. However, C. Memmius, the tribune of the people, an active man, and one who hated the nobility, prevailed with the people not to suffer so horrid [pg 306]

A.M. 3894. A. Rom. 683. Ant. J.C. 110.

a crime to go unpunished; and, accordingly, war being proclaimed against Jugurtha, Calpurnius Bestia, the consul, was appointed to carry it on.[943] He was endued with excellent qualities, but they were all depraved and rendered useless by his avarice. Scaurus set out with him. They at first took several towns; but Jugurtha's bribes checked the progress of these conquests; and Scaurus[944] himself, who till now had expressed the strongest animosity against this prince, could not resist so powerful an attack. A treaty was therefore concluded; Jugurtha feigned to submit to the Romans, and thirty elephants, some horses, with a very inconsiderable sum of money, were delivered to the quæstor.

But now the indignation of the people in general at Rome displayed itself in the strongest manner. Memmius the tribune inflamed them by his speeches. He caused Cassius, who was prætor, to be appointed to attend Jugurtha; and to engage him to come to Rome, under the guarantee of the Romans, in order that an inquiry might be made in his presence, who those persons were that had taken bribes. Accordingly, Jugurtha was forced to come to Rome. The sight of him raised the anger of the people still higher; but a tribune having been bribed, he prolonged the session, and at last dissolved it. A Numidian prince, grandson of Masinissa, called Massiva, being at that time in the city, was advised to solicit for Jugurtha's kingdom; which coming to the ears of the latter, he caused him to be assassinated in the midst of Rome. The murderer was seized, and delivered up to the civil magistrate, and Jugurtha was commanded to depart Italy. Upon leaving the city, he cast back his eyes several times towards it, and said, “Rome would sell itself could it meet with a purchaser; and were one to be found, it were inevitably ruined.”[945]

And now the war broke out anew. At first the indolence, or perhaps connivance, of Albinus the consul, made it go on very slowly; but afterwards, when he returned to Rome to hold [pg 307] the public assemblies,[946] the Roman army, by the unskilfulness of his brother Aulus, having marched into a defile from whence there was no getting out, surrendered ignominiously to the enemy, who forced the Romans to submit to the ceremony of passing under the yoke, and made them engage to leave Numidia in ten days.

The reader will naturally imagine in what light so shameful a peace, concluded without the authority of the people, was considered at Rome. They could not flatter themselves with the hope of being successful in this war, till the conduct of it was given to L. Metellus the consul.[947] To all the rest of the virtues which constitute the great captain, he added a perfect disregard of wealth; a quality most essentially requisite against such an enemy as Jugurtha, who hitherto had always been victorious, rather by money than his sword. But the African monarch found Metellus as invincible in this, as in all other respects. He therefore was forced to venture his life, and exert his utmost bravery, through the defect of an expedient which now began to fail him. Accordingly, he signalized himself in a surprising manner; and showed in this campaign, all that could be expected from the courage, abilities, and attention of an illustrious general, to whom despair adds new vigour, and suggests new lights: he was, however, unsuccessful, because opposed by a consul, who did not suffer the most inconsiderable error to escape him, nor ever let slip an opportunity of taking advantage of the enemy.

Jugurtha's greatest concern was, how to secure himself from traitors. From the time he had been told that Bomilcar, in whom he reposed the utmost confidence, had a design upon his life, he enjoyed no peace. He did not believe himself safe any where; but all things, by day as well as by night, the citizen as well as the foreigner, were suspected by him; and the blackest terrors sat for ever brooding over his mind. He never got a wink of sleep, except by stealth; and often changed his bed in a manner unbecoming his rank. Starting sometimes [pg 308] from his slumbers, he would snatch his sword, and utter loud cries; so strongly was he haunted by fear, which almost drove him to frenzy.

Marius was Metellus's lieutenant. His boundless ambition induced him to endeavour to lessen his general's character secretly in the minds of his soldiers; and becoming soon his professed enemy and slanderer, he at last, by the most grovelling and perfidious arts, prevailed so far as to supplant Metellus, and get himself nominated in his room, to carry on the war against Jugurtha.[948] With what strength of mind soever Metellus might be endued on other occasions, he was totally dejected by this unforeseen blow, which even forced tears from his eyes, and compelled him to utter such expressions as were altogether unworthy so great a man. There was something very dark and vile in Marius's conduct, that displays ambition in its native and genuine colours, and shows that it extinguishes, in those who abandon themselves to it, all sense of honour and integrity.

A.M. 3898. A. Rom. 642.

Metellus, having anxiously endeavoured to avoid a man whose sight he could not bear, arrived in Rome, and was received there with universal acclamations. A triumph was decreed him, and the surname of Numidicus conferred upon him.

I thought it would be proper to reserve for the Roman history, a particular account of the events that happened in Africa, under Metellus and Marius, all which are very circumstantially described by Sallust, in his admirable history of Jugurtha. I therefore hasten to the conclusion of this war.

Jugurtha being greatly distressed in his affairs, had recourse to Bocchus king of Mauritania, whose daughter he had married. This country extends from Numidia, as far as beyond the shores of the Mediterranean opposite to Spain.[949] The Roman name was scarce known in it, and the people were absolutely unknown to the Romans. Jugurtha insinuated to his father-in-law, that should he suffer Numidia to be conquered, his kingdom would doubtless be involved in its ruin; especially as the Romans, who were sworn enemies to monarchy, [pg 309] seemed to have vowed the destruction of all the thrones in the universe. He, therefore, prevailed with Bocchus to enter into a league with him; and accordingly received, on different occasions, very considerable succours from that king.

This confederacy, which was cemented on either side by no other tie than that of interest, had never been strong; and a last defeat which Jugurtha met with, broke at once all the bands of it. Bocchus now meditated the dark design of delivering up his son-in-law to the Romans. For this purpose he had desired Marius to send him a trusty person. Sylla, who was an officer of uncommon merit, and served under him as quæstor, was thought every way qualified for this negotiation. He was not afraid to put himself into the hands of the barbarian king; and accordingly set out for his court. Being arrived, Bocchus, who, like the rest of his countrymen, did not pride himself on sincerity, and was for ever projecting new designs, debated within himself, whether it would not be his interest to deliver up Sylla to Jugurtha. He was a long time fluctuating in this uncertainty, and conflicting with a contrariety of sentiments: and the sudden changes which displayed themselves in his countenance, in his air, and in his whole person, showed evidently how strongly his mind was affected. At length, returning to his first design, he made his terms with Sylla, and delivered up Jugurtha into his hands, who was sent immediately to Marius.

Sylla, says Plutarch,[950][951] acted, on this occasion, like a young man fired with a strong thirst of glory, the sweets of which he had just begun to taste. Instead of ascribing to the general under whom he fought all the honour of this event, as his duty required, and which ought to be an inviolable maxim, he reserved the greatest part of it to himself, and had a ring made, which he always wore, wherein he was represented receiving Jugurtha from the hands of Bocchus; and this ring he used ever after as his signet. But Marius was so highly exasperated at this kind of insult, that he could never forgive him; and this circumstance gave rise to the implacable hatred between [pg 310] these two Romans, which afterwards broke out with so much fury, and cost the republic so much blood.

A.M. 3901. A. Rom. 615. Ant. J.C. 103.

Marius entered Rome in triumph,[952] exhibiting such a spectacle to the Romans, as they could scarce believe they saw, when it passed before their eyes; I mean, Jugurtha in chains; that so formidable an enemy, during whose life they had not dared to flatter themselves with the hopes of being able to put an end to this war; so well was his courage sustained by stratagem and artifice, and his genius so fruitful in finding new expedients, even when his affairs were most desperate. We are told, that Jugurtha ran distracted, as he was walking in the triumph; that after the ceremony was ended, he was thrown into prison; and that the lictors were so eager to seize his robe, that they rent it in several pieces, and tore away the tips of his ears, to get the rich jewels with which they were adorned. In this condition he was cast, quite naked, and in the utmost terrors, into a deep dungeon, where he spent six days in struggling with hunger and the fear of death, retaining a strong desire of life to his last gasp; an end, continues Plutarch, worthy of his wicked deeds, Jugurtha having been always of opinion, that the greatest crimes might be committed to satiate his ambition; ingratitude, perfidy, black treachery, and inhuman barbarity.

Juba, king of Mauritania, reflected so much honour on polite literature and the sciences, that I could not, without impropriety, omit him in the history of the family of Masinissa, to whom his father, who also was named Juba, was great grandson, and grandson of Gulussa. The elder Juba signalized himself in the war between Cæsar and Pompey, by his inviolable attachment to the party of the latter.

A.M. 3959. A. Rom. 703.

He slew himself after the battle of Thapsus, in which his forces and those of Scipio were entirely defeated. Juba, his son, then a child, was delivered up to the conqueror, and was one of the most conspicuous ornaments of his triumph. It appears from history, that a noble education was bestowed upon Juba in Rome, where he imbibed such a variety of knowledge, as afterwards equalled him to the most learned [pg 311] among

A.M. 3974. A. Rom. 719. Ant. J.C. 30.

the Grecians. He did not leave that city till he went to take possession of his father's dominions. Augustus restored them to him, when, by the death of Mark Antony, the provinces of the empire were absolutely at his disposal. Juba, by the lenity of his government, gained the hearts of all his subjects; who, out of a grateful sense of the felicity they had enjoyed during his reign, ranked him in the number of their gods. Pausanias speaks of a statue which the Athenians erected in his honour. It was, indeed just, that a city, which had been consecrated in all ages to the Muses, should give public testimonies of its esteem for a king who made so bright a figure among the learned. Suidas ascribes[953] several works to this prince, of which only the fragments are now extant. He had written the history of Arabia; the antiquities of Assyria, and those of the Romans; the history of theatres, of painting and painters; of the nature and properties of different animals, of grammar, and similar subjects; a catalogue of all which is given in Abbé Sevin's short dissertation on the life and works of the younger Juba,[954] whence I have extracted these few particulars.

[pg 312]

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