OPINIONS OF WASHINGTON ON SLAVERY.
"He has nevertheless (must I say it?) a numerous crowd of slaves; but they are treated with the greatest humanity,—well fed, well clothed, and kept to moderate labor; they bless God without ceasing for having given them so good a master. It is a task worthy of a soul so elevated, so pure, and so disinterested, to begin the revolution in Virginia, to prepare the way for the emancipation of the negroes. This great man declared to me that he rejoiced at what was doing in other States on this subject, that he sincerely desired the extension of it in his own country; but he did not dissemble that there were still many obstacles to be overcome,—that it was dangerous to strike too vigorously at a prejudice which had begun to diminish,—that time, patience, and information would not fail to vanquish it. Almost all the Virginians, added he, believe that the liberty of the blacks cannot soon become general. This is the reason why they wish not to form a society, which may give dangerous ideas to their slaves. There is another obstacle: the great plantations, of which the State is composed, render it necessary for men to live so dispersed, that frequent meetings of a society would be difficult.
"I replied, that the Virginians were in an error,—that, evidently, sooner or later, the negroes would obtain their liberty everywhere. It is, then, for the interest of your countrymen to prepare the way to such a revolution, by endeavoring to reconcile the restitution of the rights of the blacks with the interest of the whites. The means necessary to be taken to this effect can only be the work of a SOCIETY; and it is worthy the Saviour of America to put himself at their head, and to open the door of liberty to three hundred thousand unhappy beings of his own State. He told me that he desired the formation of a SOCIETY, and that he would second it; but that he did not think the moment favorable."—Conversation with Washington, in the New Travels of Brissot de Warville in the United States in 1788, published in 1791, and translated in 1792.
"I can only say, that there is not a man living who wishes more sincerely than I do to see a plan adopted for the abolition of it [Slavery]; but there is only one proper and effectual mode by which it can be accomplished, and that is by legislative authority; and this, as far as my suffrage will go, shall never be wanting."—Letter of Washington to Robert Morris, April 12, 1786.
"The benevolence of your heart, my dear Marquis, is so conspicuous upon all occasions, that I never wonder at any fresh proofs of it; but your late purchase of an estate in the Colony of Cayenne, with a view of emancipating the slaves on it, is a generous and noble proof of your humanity. Would to God a like spirit might diffuse itself generally into the minds of the people of this country! But I despair of seeing it. Some petitions were presented to the Assembly, at its last session, for the abolition of Slavery; but they could scarcely obtain a reading. To set the slaves afloat at once would, I really believe, be productive of much inconvenience and mischief; but by degrees it certainly might and assuredly ought to be effected, and that, too, by legislative authority."—Letter of Washington to Lafayette, May 10, 1786.
"I never mean, unless some particular circumstances should compel me to it, to possess another slave by purchase, it being among my first wishes to see some plan adopted by which Slavery in this country may be abolished by law."—Letter of Washington to John F. Mercer, September 9, 1786.
"From what I have said, you will perceive that the present prices of lands in Pennsylvania are higher than they are in Maryland and Virginia, although they are not of superior quality, ... [among other reasons] because there are laws here for the gradual abolition of Slavery, which neither of the two States above mentioned have at present, but which nothing is more certain than that they must have, and at a period not remote."—Letter of Washington to Sir John Sinclair, December 11, 1796.
"Upon the decease of my wife, it is my will and desire that all the slaves whom I hold in my own right shall receive their freedom. To emancipate them during her life would, though earnestly wished by me, be attended with such insuperable difficulties, on account of their inter-mixture by marriage with the dower negroes, as to excite the most painful sensations, if not disagreeable consequences to the latter, while both descriptions are in the occupancy of the same proprietor; it not being in my power, under the tenure by which the dower negroes are held, to manumit them.... And I do, moreover, most pointedly and most solemnly enjoin it upon my executors hereafter named, or the survivors of them, to see that this clause respecting slaves, and every part thereof, be religiously fulfilled at the epoch at which it is directed to take place, without evasion, neglect, or delay, after the crops which may then be on the ground are harvested, particularly as it respects the aged and infirm; seeing that a regular and permanent fund be established for their support, as long as there are subjects requiring it; not trusting to the uncertain provision to be made by individuals."—Washington's Will, dated July 9, 1790 [1799].
[EQUALITY BEFORE THE LAW:]
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SEPARATE COLORED SCHOOLS IN MASSACHUSETTS.
Argument before the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in the Case of Sarah C. Roberts v. The City of Boston, December 4, 1849.
This argument, though addressed to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, is mainly national and universal in topics, so that it is applicable wherever, especially in our country, any discrimination in educational opportunities is founded on race or color. It is a vindication of Equal Rights in Common Schools. The term "Equality before the Law" was here for the first time introduced into our discussions. It is not found in the Common Law, nor until recently in the English language. It is a translation from the French, whence Mr. Sumner took it.
The Supreme Court heard the argument, and in their opinion complimented the advocate; but they did not take the responsibility of annulling the unjust discrimination. After stating the claim of Equality before the Law, Chief-Justice Shaw reduced it to very small proportions, when he said that it meant "only that the rights of all, as they are settled and regulated by law, are equally entitled to the paternal consideration and protection of the law for their maintenance and security."[11] This made it mean nothing; but such was the decision. The victrix causa was not less odious to Mr. Sumner, who never ceased to regret the opportunity lost by the Court of contributing an immortal precedent to the recognition and safeguard of human rights.
The error of the Court was repaired by the Legislature of Massachusetts, which in 1855 enacted as follows:—
"In determining the qualifications of scholars to be admitted into any Public School or any District School in this Commonwealth, no distinction shall be made on account of the race, color, or religious opinions of the applicant or scholar."[12]
By other sections, the child excluded on such account was entitled to "damages therefor in an action of tort," with a bill of discovery to obtain evidence. Then came this supplementary protection:—
"Every person belonging to the School Committee under whose rules or directions any child shall be excluded from such school, and every teacher of any such school, shall, on application by the parent or guardian of any such child, state in writing the grounds and reasons of such exclusion."
Since this legislation, Equal Rights have prevailed in the Common Schools of Massachusetts, and nobody would go back to the earlier system.
Associated with Mr. Sumner in this case was Robert Morris, Esq., a colored lawyer.
May it please your Honors:—
Can any discrimination on account of race or color be made among children entitled to the benefit of our Common Schools under the Constitution and Laws of Massachusetts? This is the question which the Court is now to hear, to consider, and to decide.
Or, stating the question with more detail, and with more particular application to the facts of the present case, are the Committee having superintendence of the Common Schools of Boston intrusted with power, under the Constitution and Laws of Massachusetts, to exclude colored children from the schools, and compel them to find education at separate schools, set apart for colored children only, at distances from their homes less convenient than schools open to white children?
This important question arises in an action by a colored child only five years old, who, by her next friend, sues the city of Boston for damages on account of a refusal to receive her into one of the Common Schools.
It would be difficult to imagine any case appealing more strongly to your best judgment, whether you regard the parties or the subject. On the one side is the City of Boston, strong in wealth, influence, character; on the other side is a little child, of degraded color, of humble parents, and still within the period of natural infancy, but strong from her very weakness, and from the irrepressible sympathies of good men, which, by a divine compensation, come to succor the weak. This little child asks at your hands her personal rights. So doing, she calls upon you to decide a question which concerns the personal rights of other colored children,—which concerns the Constitution and Laws of the Commonwealth,—which concerns that peculiar institution of New England, the Common Schools,—which concerns the fundamental principles of human rights,—which concerns the Christian character of this community. Such parties and such interests justly challenge your earnest attention.
Though this discussion is now for the first time brought before a judicial tribunal, it is no stranger to the public. In the School Committee of Boston for five years it has been the occasion of discord. No less than four different reports, two majority and two minority, forming pamphlets, of solid dimensions, devoted to this question, have been made to this Committee, and afterwards published. The opinions of learned counsel have been enlisted. The controversy, leaving these regular channels, overflowed the newspaper press, and numerous articles appeared, espousing opposite sides. At last it has reached this tribunal. It is in your power to make it subside forever.