GROUNDS FOR THIS INJUSTICE.
From examples of history the way is easy to an inquiry into the grounds on which this proscription is founded.
The true reason may be traced to the unhappy prejudices engendered by Slavery, and to the policy of sustaining this wrong. Indeed, it is hardly less essential to Slavery than the lash itself. An early statute of Virginia places the rule on the ground that none but Christians should be witnesses, and even among these “Popish recusants convict” were inadmissible.[94] But it is generally vindicated by dwelling on the degraded condition of the slave, and the interest he may have to conceal or deny the truth.[95] A careful examination will show that this apology is baseless as Slavery itself.
Of course, if a witness is too degraded to feel the sanction of an oath, his testimony should not be received. Such is the unquestionable suggestion of reason; nor can it make any difference that the witness is white or black. But the slave is not necessarily and universally so degraded as to merit exclusion, nor is his interest to conceal or deny the truth different materially from that of other persons,—although it is undoubtedly true, that, under the instinct of self-defence, and against the exactions of Slavery, he learns to deceive. But in every State except South Carolina the oath of the slave is received against colored persons, which could not be done, if he could not be trusted under oath. A judge of South Carolina has vindicated the capacity of the slave in this respect, and thus unintentionally repelled the rule of exclusion. “Negroes, slaves or free,” says Judge O’Neall, “will feel the sanction of an oath with as much force as any of the ignorant classes of white people in a Christian country. They ought, too, to be made to know, if they testify falsely, they are to be punished for it by human laws. The course pursued on the trial of negroes, in the abduction and obtaining testimony, leads to none of the certainties of truth. Falsehood is often the result, and innocence is thus often sacrificed on the shrine of prejudice.”[96] But this learned judge of South Carolina is not alone in vindicating the propriety of examining the slave on oath. Judge Clayton, of the High Court of Errors and Appeals in Mississippi, in delivering the opinion of the Court, thus expressed himself: “It is also objected, that there ought, in the case of slaves, to be some evidence of a sense of religious accountability, upon which the validity of all testimony rests, and that the same presumption of such religious belief cannot be indulged in reference to them as in regard to white persons. As to the latter, it is said the presumption is in favor of their proper religious culture and belief in revelation and a future state of rewards and punishments; as to slaves, it is contended the presumption does not arise, because of a defect of religious education. It is true, that, if the declarant had no sense of future responsibility, his declarations would not be admissible. But the absence of such belief must be shown. The simple elementary truths of Christianity, the immortality of the soul and a future accountability, are generally received and believed by this portion of our population. From the pulpit many, perhaps all, who attain maturity, hear these doctrines announced and enforced, and embrace them as articles of faith.”[97]
But if slaves generally have a sufficient amount of religious belief to supply the sanction of an oath, it is clear that they are not so degraded as to justify their exclusion as sworn witnesses. And the Slave States, while excluding them, have practically recognized their fitness. Not only is the oath of a slave received in all the Slave States except South Carolina, but he is liable to punishment for perjury,[98] and sometimes the punishment inflicted is diabolic. In Virginia,[99] and also in Maryland,[100] the punishment formerly was “cropping.” In Florida, the statute appoints that the offender “shall have his or her ears nailed to posts, and there to stand for one hour, and, moreover, receive thirty-nine lashes on his or her bare back.”[101] In Mississippi, if a colored person is found to have given false testimony, he is “to have one ear nailed to the pillory, and there to stand for the space of one hour, and then the said ear to be cut off, and thereafter the other ear nailed in like manner, and cut off at the expiration of one other hour; and, moreover, to receive thirty-nine lashes on his or her bare back, well laid on, at the public whipping-post, or such other punishment as the court shall think proper, not extending to life or limb.”[102] But every recognition of the oath of a slave on any occasion, and especially every punishment of a slave for perjury, testifies to his capacity as a witness. The barbarism of the punishment testifies also against Slavery. It is vain to say that a slave is incompetent, when, in certain cases, he is already accepted as witness, and visited with fiendish punishment, if he violates his oath.
The absurdity of this pretension is illustrated by a provision in the statutes of Kentucky, by which a slave in the penitentiary may be a competent witness against a white convict.[103] Such was early the law of Virginia, and even now he is competent for the white convict. Thus, so long as a slave commits no crime, his oath is not received in court to affect a white person even with the smallest pecuniary liability; but let him be sent to the penitentiary as a convict for crime, and forthwith his capacity as a witness is enlarged, and on his testimony a white convict may be deprived of life! But, obviously, the commission of a crime carrying with it the doom of the penitentiary must impair rather than increase confidence in the veracity of the criminal. Such is the absurd inconsistency in the application of this rule.
Although the rule may be properly traced to Slavery, of which it is an important ally, yet, from considerations already presented, it seems to follow that it is founded on a reason broader than Slavery, suggested, however, by Slavery. According to the logic of these considerations, the disqualification of the slave as a witness against white persons is not founded on the fact that he is a slave, because the disqualification, except in Delaware and Louisiana, attaches also to free colored persons; nor is it founded on want of that religious belief required in a sworn witness, nor on any actual disregard of his testimony under oath, because the slave in certain cases is sworn, and his testimony under oath is accepted in the administration of justice, and he is punished for perjury; but it is simply, in the last analysis, an incapacity attached by law to persons of color. Indeed, the obvious inference from the remarks of Judge O’Neall[104] is, that, in his opinion, it is not slavery, but color, which is the ground of exclusion. But the Committee have already shown the pernicious consequences of such proscription, and especially that the disfranchisement of the African race operates as a liberty to all white persons, not excepting, in most of the States, even white convicts, to do as they please, and commit any crime in the Decalogue, “unwhipped of justice,” if nobody but a colored person is present. It needs no argument to establish the unreasonableness of a disqualification which, according to the confession of its advocates, attaches to the shading of the human skin, especially in view of the fearful cruelty that is its natural consequence.
In Delaware and Louisiana the disqualification rests on the fact of Slavery. In many other States the free colored persons are so few in number that the fact of Slavery seems still to overshadow the whole race. Assuming, then, that the disqualification is traced not merely to the shading of the skin, but to the fact of Slavery, it is none the less to be rejected, not only as part of Slavery, but as essentially irrational and inhuman.
The slave feels the sanction of an oath hardly less than many white persons of inferior condition. On grounds of reason, therefore, and independently of prejudice, the two classes at the outset would be entitled to an equal degree of confidence,—modified, of course, and decreasing, as there was a manifest interest or temptation to testify falsely. But the slave is exposed to such corrupting power less than a white person. He can have no pecuniary interest, since he has no right of property. And, except where his master is a party or otherwise interested, he must be alike without hope of gain or fear of punishment to make him swerve from the truth. Accordingly, in all cases where his master stands indifferent, the reason for excluding the slave is not so strong as for excluding white persons of inferior condition, since the slave may feel the sanction of an oath as much as they, while he is less exposed to any disturbing influence. Such, certainly, is the conclusion justified by the facts.
The dependence of the slave upon his master must naturally subject him peculiarly to his influence, whether from hope of reward or fear of punishment; so that his testimony in favor of his master would always be viewed with suspicion. If, contrary to this active interest, the slave testifies against his master, his testimony would seem to be worthy of peculiar consideration. But even where he testifies for his master, there can be no more reason for excluding his testimony than for excluding that of a child for a father or a mother, or of excluding that of a father or a mother for a child. Unquestionably, in each of these cases the bias is stronger than any that can exist on the part of a slave, as love is stronger than fear. Therefore there is no valid reason why a slave should not be permitted to testify for or against his master. The same considerations which determine the value of other testimony will suffice with regard to him; and thus, in every respect, the rule of exclusion becomes irrational and arbitrary.
But this rule, whether applicable to slaves or free colored persons, is still more irrational and unwarranted when it is considered that the testimony is submitted to the scrutiny of a jury of white persons, under the watchful observation of a court of white persons likewise, and that it can have no effect whatever except through assent of their judgment. The motive which actuates the slave, whatever it may be, whether revenge or interest or fear, must be open to discovery. It is therefore preposterous to argue that any white person, at any time or anywhere, especially in a Slave State, can be prejudiced by colored testimony, or that he can be convicted by a white jury under the eye of a white court, unless that testimony is strictly worthy of belief. The rule of exclusion is not only an expression of tyranny and prejudice, but an insult to the understanding, and even to common sense.
If this rule were only irrational and eccentric, it might be pardoned to immeasurable madness, and handed over to the derision of mankind. But even its absurdity disappears in its appalling injustice. Two things are obvious to the most superficial observation: first, that under its influence the slave is left absolutely without legal protection of any kind, the victim of lawless outrage; and, secondly, that even crimes against white persons may escape unpunished: so that in these two important cases justice must fail. But this failure of justice becomes intolerable, when it is considered that it is not from accident or temporary weakness, but that it is absolutely organized by law. Nor is it confined to slaves. It embraces in its ban free colored persons also, without regard to intelligence, property, or relations in life.