Charles Sumner: his complete works, volume 11 (of 20)

by Charles Sumner

VALUE OF ADVANTAGES TO THE UNITED STATES.

It is impossible to estimate in money the advantages to the United States. Beyond the great boon of assured peace, under which our commerce, no longer exposed to spoliation, put forth at once more than its original life, two specific objects were gained: first, exemption from all outstanding engagements and liabilities of every nature under the early treaties with France; and, secondly, the establishment of a new Convention, which, while rejecting much-debated claims and counter-claims, provided positive advantages to the United States, among which was that payment of “debts” subsequently assured by the Louisiana Convention.

If the United States could be held responsible to France for the treasure lavished on national independence, in pursuance of these original treaties, there would be an item of fourteen hundred and forty millions of francs, or about two hundred and eighty millions of dollars.[249] The brave lives sacrificed for us cannot be estimated in any account; but France did not forget them. Even amidst the congratulations at Morfontaine in honor of the Convention, the First Consul reminded the joyous company of the sacrifice. Beyond the toast he proposed in honor of those who fell in battle for the independence of the New World, there is no record of what was said by the successful general of France; but old Homer, in one of his most touching passages, had already spoken for him:—

“Life is not to be bought with heaps of gold;

Not all Apollo’s Pythian treasures hold,

Or Troy once held in peace and pride of sway,

Can bribe the poor possession of a day.

Lost herds and treasures we by arms regain,

And steeds unrivalled on the dusty plain;

But from our lips the vital spirit fled

Returns no more to wake the silent dead.”[250]

Under the sod of America, and under the waves of the Atlantic, Frenchmen were sleeping whose lives had been given to the support of our cause. If France did not forget them, let it be spoken in her honor; but we cannot forget them, as we try to state the great account between our two countries. Their swords, if flung into the scales, whatever “heaps of gold” we might bring, would forever turn the balance against us.

But how estimate the value of release from the “guaranty” retrospectively and prospectively, as well for past failures as future liabilities? It was often urged that the guaranty bound the United States to the support of France only in the event of a defensive war, and that the war in which she had been engaged was not of this character. But it is more than doubtful if either proposition can be maintained. The guaranty on its face has no limitation. And even if it had such limitation, who will venture to say that the war in which France drove back her multitudinous assailants, reinforced by the navies of England, was not defensive? If France did not at once require the execution of the guaranty, it was none the less a vital obligation.

That our Government appreciated the embarrassments, if not the obligations, which the guaranty entailed, has already been shown by the Committee. But there are certain words that may be fitly quoted again. In the instructions of our Secretary of State to the first triumvirate of plenipotentiaries at Paris, under date of July 15, 1797, it is admitted that “our guaranty of the possessions of France in America will perpetually expose us to the risk and expense of war, or to disputes and questions concerning our national faith.” On this account the plenipotentiaries were instructed to obtain its release, and “on the part of the United States, instead of troops or ships of war, to stipulate for a moderate sum of money or quantity of provisions, at the option of France, … not to exceed two hundred thousand dollars a year.”[251] This was moderate; but it was a recognition of the guaranty, and of its practical value. The next triumvirate, at the negotiation of 1800, offered more. They proposed to buy out the guaranty by a payment of five millions of francs, or one million of dollars.[252] It is needless to say that both these offers were rejected.

It would be as difficult to measure in money the value of that guaranty, retrospectively and prospectively, as to measure in money our obligations to France in the assurance of national independence. The liabilities for failure prior to 1800, if pressed, would not have been inconsiderable. But had the guaranty continued so as to constrain the United States throughout the long war that followed, ending at Waterloo, what arithmetic can calculate the damage? Nay, more,—if, at the present moment, any such guaranty bound us to France, who would not feel that it was an obligation from which we must be released at any price?

Besides the obligations of “guaranty,” were other engagements with regard to French armed ships in our ports which had proved most onerous. Here, also, was alleged failure on our part; and there was the prospect of infinite embarrassment, if not of open war, unless these obligations were cancelled. To keep them would cause collision with England; not to keep them would cause collision with France. Our plenipotentiaries offered, in the negotiation of 1800, three millions of francs for release from these obligations.[253] This moderate offer was rejected also.

France continued stubborn, insisting upon the ancient treaties, with all consequent indemnities. At last, by the propositions of the 4th of September, 1800, already exhibited by your Committee, a measure of value was affixed to our engagements and liabilities. France undertook to release us from all these on condition that we would pay the indemnities due to our citizens, thus treating claims and counter-claims as equivalent in value. It was required positively that “the indemnities which shall be due by France to the citizens of the United States shall be paid for by the United States.”[254] In consideration of release from the treaties, the United States were to assume the obligations of France to American claimants. How this proposition, rejected at first, eventually prevailed in the Convention and its successive amendments has been already explained. It is mentioned now only to show the value of these engagements and liabilities.