CONTENTS OF VOLUME XVIII.
ADMISSION OF MISSISSIPPI TO REPRESENTATION IN CONGRESS.
Speech in the Senate, February 17, 1870.
February 8, 1870, Mr. Trumbull, from the Committee on the Judiciary, to whom had been referred a bill from the House for the admission of Mississippi to representation in Congress, with conditions the same as in the case of Virginia, reported it back with an amendment striking out all these, and admitting the State unconditionally.
In a speech, February 17th, in reference to the proposed amendment, Mr. Sumner said:—
MR. PRESIDENT,—Throughout the long struggle anterior to the Rebellion, and then throughout the Rebellion itself, Slavery had two voices by which it was heard in this Chamber and in the country. The first was that by which its continued existence was vindicated, or, if you please, the right of Slavery; the other was that of State Rights. By these two voices was Slavery heard. Happily, the first is silenced; but the other is still sounding among us, crying out against those generous efforts by which Human Rights are assured.
I am not wrong in this statement. From the beginning it has been the same. How often in times past have we heard the cry of State Rights! At every proposition concerning Slavery, at the presentation of every petition against this tyrannical wrong, at every allusion to it, the cry was heard. And when the Rebellion broke forth, the same cry was raised against those great measures of self-defence by which Slavery, our real enemy, was assailed; and then at each stage of Reconstruction it was the same. Not a measure of Reconstruction which has not encountered this pretension of State Rights. It broke forth in the Virginia debate. It breaks forth on the present occasion. Again we hear the voice of Slavery.
This pretension, which is so constantly manifest, finds partisans naturally on the other side of the Chamber. It is easy for Senators who have upheld Slavery to uphold that interpretation of the Constitution which was the constant ally of Slavery; but it is incomprehensible how Senators fresh from the great battle with Slavery should continue in dalliance with the constant ally.
The argument for State Rights proceeds on a misapprehension. Nobody doubts the right of a State to local self-government, through which are supplied the opportunities of political education, and also of local administration adapted precisely to local wants. This is the peculiarity of our national system, wherein it differs especially from the centralized imperialism of France. But while recognizing the State as the agency for all matters properly local, it must not be allowed to interfere with those other matters, being rights and duties, which are not local, but universal.
Now, Sir, nothing can be clearer than that the Equal Rights of All must be placed under the safeguard of one uniform law which shall be the same in all parts of the nation,—the same in Charleston and New Orleans as in Boston and Chicago. It is absurd to suppose that the rights of the citizen can differ in different States. They must be the same in all the States; but this can be consummated only by the national authority. Therefore, on grounds of reason, I repel that pretension of State Rights which would take this just prerogative from the nation. Understand me, Sir, I do not seek to centralize, but to nationalize. The partisans of State Rights, in their efforts to decentralize, would denationalize. In the name of local self-government they would overthrow the nation.
If I am asked where I find these national powers, I answer, that they are in those two great title-deeds of the Republic, the Declaration of Independence and the National Constitution. Whether viewed apart or together, these two are one and the same; but the two reinforce each other. The Declaration of Independence finds proper machinery for its great purposes in the National Constitution, while the National Constitution is explained, invigorated, and elevated by the Declaration of Independence. By the National Constitution the nation is bound to assure a republican government to all the States, thus giving to Congress the plenary power to fix the definition of such a government; but by the Declaration of Independence the fundamental elements of this very definition are supplied in terms from which there can be no appeal. By this Declaration it is solemnly announced, first, that all men are equal in rights, and, secondly, that just government stands only on the consent of the governed. Other things may fail, but these cannot. Whenever Congress is called to maintain a republican government, it must be according to these universal, irreversible principles. The power to maintain necessarily implies all ancillary powers of prevention and precaution, so that republican government may be assured. All these powers are essentially national, and not local; they belong to the nation, and not to the State.
So long as Slavery existed, this definition was impossible. State Rights were set up against Human Rights; but with the death of Slavery, followed by the extinction of the Rebellion, this definition takes its just place in our national system. Therefore whatever tends to maintain a republican government and to place it beyond assault, whatever tends to maintain the great principles declared at our birth as a nation,—all this is constitutional. As well deny that the sun shines,—as well with puny arm attempt to drag the sun from the sky; still it shines. God be praised! the day has passed when State Rights can be exalted above Human Rights.
It is for Congress to determine, in its discretion, how republican government shall be maintained. Whatever it does in this regard, whether by general law, or by condition or limitation on States, is plainly constitutional beyond all question. All is in the discretion of Congress, which may select the “means” by which this great guaranty shall be performed. It is a guaranty by the express text of the Constitution, and it must be performed. In selecting the means, Congress cannot hesitate at any requirement calculated to secure the beneficent result. By condition-precedent, by condition-subsequent, by prohibitory legislation, by legislation acting directly on the States or the people, by each and all of these Congress may act, bearing in mind always the great definition supplied by our fathers, which must be maintained at all hazards.
It is vain to say that our fathers did not intend this great power and foresee its exercise. There it is in the Constitution, clear and commanding; and there is the great definition in the Declaration of Independence, clear and commanding. If our fathers did not fully appreciate their mighty act, neither did the barons at Runnymede, when they obtained Magna Charta, the perpetual landmark of English rights. The words of the poet are again fulfilled: “They builded better than they knew.” But they did build. They built this vast temple of Republican Liberty, and enjoined upon Congress its perpetual safeguard, “anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding”; and, Sir, by the oath which you have taken to support the Constitution, are you bound to watch and protect this vast temple.
The recent war has had its losses, terrible and afflicting. It has had its gains also. First among these gains is that interpretation of the Constitution which makes us a nation, and places the equal rights of all under the protection of the national power,—being nothing less than the fulfilment of the early promises of the Fathers. Too slowly has this been accomplished; but it is accomplished at last; and it is our duty to see that these promises are in no respect neglected, and that the Republic, One and Indivisible, dedicated to Human Rights, and an example to mankind, is upheld in every part of our wide-spread country.
The amendment striking out the conditions of admission was rejected, and the bill passed in the form in which it came from the House,—Yeas 50, Nays 11.
THE FIRST COLORED SENATOR.
Speech in the Senate, on the Admission of Hon. Hiram R. Revels, a Colored Person, as Senator of Mississippi, February 25, 1870.
MR. PRESIDENT,—The time has passed for argument. Nothing more need be said. I doubt if anything more can be said in the way of argument.
For a long time it has been clear that colored persons must be Senators, and I have often so declared. This was only according to the irresistible logic of the situation, to say nothing of inherent right.
If I do not discuss the question, it is partly because it is now so plain, and partly because on other occasions I have considered it at length. There is not a point in the case which I have not argued long ago. Nearly a generation has intervened since I insisted at home, in Massachusetts, that all must be equal before the law, without any distinction of color.[1] Several years have intervened since here in this Chamber I insisted on the same truth, and at the same time showed how, at the adoption of the National Constitution, colored persons were citizens according to the terms of all the State Constitutions, except that of South Carolina, and perhaps Virginia and Georgia.[2] These arguments and authorities were not answered then. They cannot be answered. It is useless to interpose ancient pretensions. They are dead beyond resurrection. It is useless to interpose the Dred Scott decision. Born a putrid corpse, this decision became at once a stench in the nostrils and a scandal to the Court itself, which made haste to turn away from its offensive offspring. By the subsequent admission of a colored lawyer to practise at its bar this decision was buried out of sight, to be remembered only as a warning and a shame.[3]
The vote on this question will be an historic event, marking the triumph of a great cause. From this time there can be no backward step. After prolonged and hard-fought battle, beginning with the Republic, convulsing Congress, and breaking out in blood, the primal truths declared by our fathers are practically recognized. “All men are created equal,” says the great Declaration; and now a great act attests this verity. To-day we make the Declaration a reality. For a long time a word only, it now becomes a deed. For a long time a promise only, it now becomes a consummated achievement. The Declaration was only half established by Independence. The greater duty remained behind. In assuring the Equal Rights of All we complete the work.
No man acts for himself alone. What he does, whether for good or evil, is felt in widening circles, according to the measure of his influence. This is true of the Senate, whose influence is coextensive with the Republic, and reaches even beyond its enlarging confines. What the Senate does now will be followed by other bodies and associations. As the greater contains the less, so does the Senate contain all these everywhere throughout the land. In other places there may be a brief struggle, but the end is certain. Doors will open, exclusions will give way, intolerance will cease, and the great truth will be manifest in a thousand examples. Liberty and Equality were the two express promises of our fathers. Both are now assured. And this is the glory of the Republic, before whose mighty presence, radiant with justice, kings and nobles must disappear as the ghosts of night at the morning sun, while the people, with new-found power and majesty, take their place.
What we do to-day is not alone for ourselves, not alone for that African race now lifted up. It is for all everywhere who suffer from tyranny and wrong,—for all everywhere who bend beneath the yoke,—for all everywhere who feel the blight of unjust power; it is for all mankind; it is for God Himself, whose sublime Fatherhood we most truly confess when we recognize the Brotherhood of Man.
A motion by Mr. Stockton, of New Jersey, to refer the credentials of Mr. Revels to the Committee on the Judiciary was, after a debate of three days, defeated by a vote of 8 Yeas to 48 Nays; and on motion of Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, Mr. Revels was thereupon, by the corresponding vote of Yeas 48, Nays 8, admitted to a seat.
CONSIDERATION OF TREATIES IN OPEN SENATE.
Remarks in the Senate, March 17, 1870.
On a resolution submitted by Mr. Ferry, of Connecticut, providing that “any treaty for the annexation to the United States of the entire dominion of any foreign power shall be considered and the question of its ratification decided in open session of the Senate,” Mr. Sumner said:—
From the beginning I have always held that the Senate erred in the establishment of secrecy, particularly with reference to treaties. I think the first year that I had the honor of a seat in the Senate the question of a change of our rule in that regard was presented, and I voted in its favor. I have seen nothing from that day to this to change my judgment upon that particular point materially. I think that the rule of secrecy was a traditional policy which we derived from the diplomatic usages of the Old World. We came to it naturally, and it has continued with us down to this day. Now, personally, I incline to change it; but I have two suggestions to present, applicable to the pending question. The first is, whether it is advisable to change it while it is known that an important treaty is actually pending; whether the change, if such change should be adopted by the Senate, should not be applicable to the future rather than to any pending question. I merely present that, without undertaking to determine it. The other point is, whether a change so important, not to say so radical, whatever may be the judgment of individual Senators, like the Senator from Connecticut, or like myself, should not be referred to the committee having charge of such questions. I would therefore suggest that the proposition be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. That committee will meet next Tuesday, and I have no doubt will take it at once into consideration.
The resolution was referred accordingly, and, upon the report of the Committee, was indefinitely postponed.
ELIGIBILITY TO THE SENATE: QUESTION OF INHABITANCY.
Remarks in the Senate, on the Admission of General Adelbert Ames as a Senator of Mississippi, April 1, 1870.
MR. PRESIDENT,—I hesitate to say a word in this debate. The question has been exhausted on both sides, and to me, I must be pardoned for saying, it is infinitely plain. It is plain in law; it is plain in fact. When I say it is plain in law, I believe all the Senate on both sides will concur,—for, indeed, the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Thurman] stated the law precisely as I understand it.
We all know that in topography there are what are called water-sheds, sometimes high, sometimes low, and from these elevations flow in opposite directions the currents which there find their fountains. Sir, the water-shed of this debate is found in the intent; and this water-shed may be high or low. Suffice it that it is a water-shed; this is enough. Suffice it that the intent appears; and this is all that is required, in order to determine the character of the residence. Show me a citizen actually in a State, then the intent to remain fixes his inhabitancy.
The Senator from Illinois [Mr. Trumbull] substantially admitted this rule of law. I agree with him that there are but two things to be shown: first, what the old books call the factum, and, secondly, what the same old books call the animus. What is the factum? It is residence. What is the animus? It is intent to stay. Now in point of law you can add nothing to these. You may argue till doomsday, you may cite authorities without number, but you can add nothing to these two simple requirements, residence and intent.
Mr. Thurman. Will the Senator allow me to interrupt him?
Mr. Sumner. Certainly.
Mr. Thurman. As he has referred to my statement of the law, I will say that I did state that those were the two things necessary, residence and intention,—that you want to find out what is residence that creates inhabitancy, and what is intention that creates inhabitancy; and what I said was, and I maintain yet, that a residence which is enforced is no residence, and an intention that the party has no power to execute so long as he remains in the Army is no intention at all: an intention that the party has no power to execute has no virtue whatever.
Mr. Sumner. Very well,—I will come to that. The Senator and myself agree that in point of law there are two things to be established, and only two,—residence and intent. The question that remains is one of evidence; it is not a question of law. If the Senator were on the bench, which he once adorned, he would be obliged to charge the jury in this way. The rule of law is positive. All that remains comes under the head of evidence. Now I say by law you must show those two things, residence and intent, and you cannot add to either a tittle.
On this occasion, the most important requirement is that of intent. This is the requirement that has been most argued. And here I go back to that original Latin phrase which dominates this case, and which is in itself an all-sufficient rule: I mean the animus manendi. Why is this phrase, so often repeated, handed down for successive centuries? Simply because, like maxims of law, or like proverbs, it contains in one short phrase a rule. You have there a chapter of jurisprudence, if you please, or a volume. It is the mind, or the intent to remain, which governs. This is all that the law says. The law does not go forward and require, as the Senator from Illinois has argued to-day, that there must be an act. You find no such requirement in the rule. The rule is explicit, precise; and here I challenge contradiction. It is simply the intent to remain, the animus manendi. Step beyond that and you are lost, if you undertake to state the law. There is no rule of law outside of this simple sum-total.
I come, then, to the point that we have before us, simply a question of intent. I might cite authorities here. I have some of them before me. I will read one. For instance, here is Vattel, quoted by Judge Story in his article on Domicile in the “Encyclopædia Americana,” which Senators familiar with this subject know is of authority:—
“Vattel seems to define it to be a fixed residence in any place with an intention of always staying there.”[4]
On this Judge Story very properly remarks:—
“This is not quite accurate. It would be more correct to say that that place is the home or domicile of a person in which his habitation is fixed, without any present intention of removing therefrom.”
Here are words completely applicable to the case now before us. The learned author then proceeds to say:—
“It is often a mere question of intention.”
And then adds:—
“The mere dwelling or residence in a place is not of itself sufficient to make it the domicile of the party. He must be there with the intention of remaining, animo manendi.”
Mark the old recurring phrase, with its light and limitation. Here again I say is the rule. You cannot go outside of it. If you go outside of it, you are lost. I am speaking of the rule of law. I know that there can be no addition to that, because, if you do undertake to add to it or to take from it, you must depart from the jurisprudence of every civilized country,—not only of our own country, not only of England, but of every civilized nation on the continent of Europe. In the jurisprudence of every one of those countries you will find this same distinct, precise, simple rule.
Now, Sir, allow me to say,—I say it with entire respect,—the confusion in this debate has arisen from confounding the rule of law with the evidence under that rule. The rule, I say, is precise, that there must be intent. But how shall the intent be proved? Sometimes in one way, sometimes in another; sometimes by long-continued residence,—by purchase of property,—by the establishment of a home,—by the establishment of a place of business,—by all those circumstances and incidents which show fixity of purpose. All this comes under the head of evidence. It does not touch the rule of law behind.
The Senator from Illinois says there must be an act. Allow me to say that words are sometimes acts, and especially if associated with important events. It is a familiar phrase of law that language enters into what we call the res gestæ; language is welded into the transaction and becomes a part of it. Words then become things; and when were words more things than when the commanding general in Mississippi distinctly declared his purpose to resign his commission in the Army of the United States and accept a nomination as Senator? Here was a declaration constituting part of the res gestæ, and in itself an act.
I am not speaking merely on theory. I have in my hand a case, which I think, when I read it, you will see is applicable: I refer to Metcalf’s Reports, volume three, page 200, the case of Kilburn v. Bennett. In the statement of facts is the following passage:—
“For the purpose of showing with what intent the defendant went to Tyngsborough on the 27th of April, he offered to prove that about three weeks before that day he told S. Shattuck, in whose house he then resided, that he should leave Groton before the 1st of May, and remove with his family to Tyngsborough, to reside at his brother’s, and make his house a home, until he should go to Illinois. But the judge ruled that the evidence was inadmissible, and rejected it.”
The case was carried before the full bench, when the ruling of the judge below was set aside, and the Court observed as follows:—
“The Court held that this, being the mere declaration of the defendant, was not competent evidence in his favor, and it was rejected. The general rule undoubtedly is, that a party cannot give in evidence his own declarations in his favor, unless they accompany some act, and are a part of the res gestæ. But it appears to us that the declarations offered to be proved are within the qualification of the rule. They were made in the ordinary course of business, and in relation to the defendant’s removal, and they were made to the owner of the house in which he was at the time residing. This giving notice of his intended removal is to be considered an act which he might prove in any case in which it became material; and if so, all that he said explanatory of his intention in relation to his removal seems to us to be admissible in evidence.”
Now on the authority of this case it seems to me that the declaration of General Ames, accompanied by the acceptance of candidacy as a Senator, is clearly an act. But I do not argue that the Senate is now bound by any technical rule of this kind. It is enough if the Senate is satisfied with regard to his intent on the evidence adduced. No rule of limitation or exclusion can prevail. If the Senate believes that he had at the time the animus manendi, it must act accordingly.
Is the Senate, on the evidence before it,—without the application of any technical rule of evidence, without recognizing his declaration as part of the res gestæ,—is the Senate satisfied that at the time named he intended to reside in Mississippi? This is the whole case. On this question of fact each Senator will judge for himself, on the evidence before him. This evidence I will read in the Report of the Committee, being the language of General Ames in a written statement to them, as follows:—
“A number of persons in Mississippi visited this city to find arguments by which I might be influenced to become a candidate. I hesitated, because it would necessitate the abandonment of my whole military life. Finally, for personal and public reasons, I decided to become a candidate and leave the Army. My intentions were publicly declared and sincere.”
On which the Committee remark:—
“The intentions thus declared were not only to become a candidate for the Senate, but to remain and reside in Mississippi.”[5]
Sir, what more can you ask? On the report of your own Committee you have explicit evidence of the intent of General Ames to reside in Mississippi; and where intent is enough, you need add nothing to it. There is no necessity for any act beyond this declaration, which, as I have already said, is in itself an act, as the Senator from Michigan [Mr. Howard] says, taken in connection with his personal presence on the spot,—and I would add, taken in connection with all the necessary implications from his position, and from his acceptance of the candidacy. This is not a case in a justice’s court, or even in a county court. This is the Senate of the United States; and we are considering the evidence with regard to the declarations of a gentleman already chosen by a State of this Union to take his seat among us. We cannot apply to these declarations any technical rule which possibly might be applied in an inferior tribunal. We are to look at the case in its essence, and, if satisfied of the intent, we cannot go further. The Senate does not sit in chains. It may act according to its conscience on the evidence, without any constraint, except from the rule of law requiring intent.
Much stress has been laid upon the fact that General Ames held a commission in the Army of the United States, and was actually the military commander and provisional governor of Mississippi. What then? Does this affect his position now? Is a soldier or officer in the Army, is the commander of an army, shut out from the same privileges that belong to you, Sir, and to me? Each of us may change his domicile as he pleases, and to-morrow or next week transfer his home to another State of the Union, and nobody can say, No. Has the soldier or the officer fewer rights than you and I have? I think not; and I am sure that both reason and authority sustain my conclusion. I have in my hands a volume of the California Reports,—the twenty-eighth volume. I call attention to the case of The People v. William Holden, and I will not trouble you with anything more than one clause from the marginal note, as follows:—
“Residence while in the service of the United States.—The clause in the Constitution of this State, which declares that ‘no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence by reason of his presence or absence while employed in the service of the United States,’ does not prevent a person who removes to a county while in the service of the United States from acquiring a residence in that county while in the said service, if it is his intention so to do.”
“If it is his intention so to do.” These words are strictly applicable to the case of General Ames. There was nothing in his service in Mississippi, nothing in his high military command, to prevent him from establishing an inhabitancy in that State, if it was his intention so to do.
Thus at every point are we brought back to the single rule of law and the evidence under it,—the rule being that there must be an intent to remain, and the evidence being open to the judgment of the tribunal before which the question is raised. Especially must this be the case with the Senate, which will look through all technicalities, all cobwebs, to find the truth. Nor can the Senate be so unjust to any class of citizens as to say that a military commander may not acquire inhabitancy in a State where he is fixed by military duties, provided he so intends. All the adverse presumptions from military residency will be overcome at once by the animus manendi, so soon as this is proved.
Do you remember, Sir, a pointed remark made by Lafayette in the French Chamber, shortly after Louis Philippe was crowned King? Astonishment was expressed that the great defender of Liberty should espouse the cause of a Bourbon and help him to the throne. Lafayette, with remarkable condensation of phrase, replied, that he was in favor of Louis Philippe, not because, but notwithstanding he was a Bourbon,—“not because, but notwithstanding.” And in this famous saying of the great French-American you have terms strictly applicable to this case. General Ames, soldier, officer, military commander in Mississippi, became an inhabitant thereof, not because, but notwithstanding he was soldier, officer, and military commander.
A resolution of the Committee on the Judiciary, declaring General Ames “not eligible,” was on motion of Mr. Sumner amended by striking out the word “not,”—Yeas 40, Nays 12,—and thus amended was agreed to without a division.
RATIFICATION OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT.
Speech at a Serenade before Mr. Sumner’s House in Washington, April 1, 1870.
The occasion was the promulgation by the Secretary of State of the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution. A large number of citizens, after calling upon the President and Vice-President, by whom they were addressed, proceeded to the house of Mr. Sumner, who appeared with his friend, Mr. James Wormley, and spoke as follows:—
FELLOW-CITIZENS,—I congratulate you upon the great result that has been accomplished. For years my hope and object have been to see the great promise of the Declaration of Independence changed into performance,—to see that that Declaration became a reality. [Cheers.] This at last is nearly consummated. I do not say entirely consummated, for it is not.
It is my nature, fellow-citizens, to think more of what remains to be done than of what has been done,—to think more of our duties than of our triumphs; and only to-day I have heard from Philadelphia of a decision in a court of justice that a person of foreign birth could not be naturalized in this country because of color. This is in pursuance of one of those old statutes of the days of Slavery, before the word “white” was stricken from the laws. Repeatedly, from my seat in the Senate, I have made appeals for the expunging of that word from the laws. I have now a bill before the Judiciary Committee to strike this word from our naturalization laws. What the Committee will do remains to be seen. I need not say that I shall try to impress upon the Senate the importance of passing this bill. It remains also, that equal rights should be secured in all the public conveyances and on all the railroads in the United States, so that no one shall be excluded by reason of color.
It further remains that you here in Washington shall complete this equality of rights in your common schools. You all go together to vote, and any person may find a seat in the Senate of the United States; but the child is shut out of the common school on account of color. This discrimination must be abolished. All schools must be open to all, without distinction of color. In laboring for this, you will not only work for yourselves, but will set an example for all the land, and most especially for the South. Only in this way can your school system be extended for the equal good of all. And now, as you have at heart the education of your children, that they may grow up in that knowledge of equal rights so essential to their protection in the world, it is your bounden duty here in Washington to see that this is accomplished.
Your school system must be founded on Equal Rights, so that no one shall be excluded on account of color. In this way Human Rights will be best established. And I would remind you, although this has not been effected, the victories already gained are the assurance that all that should be done will be done.
You have progressed, step by step, until you have reached your present position; and now it only remains that you should continue to the end earnest, faithful, and determined; then will the work be completed.
Returning you my sincere thanks, and offering my felicitations on this occasion, I bid you good night.
ADMISSION OF GEORGIA TO REPRESENTATION IN CONGRESS.
Speech in the Senate, April 5, 1870.
Representatives from Georgia had been admitted to seats in Congress in July, 1868, under the Act of June 25th of that year; but the subsequent action of her Legislature in expelling its colored members and filling their places with whites, and the continued outrages upon loyalists, had the effect of preventing the admission of her Senators, and in the next Congress of excluding her from representation altogether,—involving the necessity of measures for her reconstruction and admission anew. The first of these was the Act of December 22, 1869, providing, among other things, for the reorganization of the State Legislature, by reinstating its colored members in their seats and purging it of its disloyal elements. To this succeeded a bill in the same terms with the Acts for the admission of Virginia and Mississippi, which was passed in the House with the following amendment, moved by Mr. Bingham, of Ohio:—
“Provided, That nothing in this Act contained shall be construed to vacate any of the offices now filled in the State of Georgia, either by the election of the people or by the appointment of the Governor thereof by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of said State; neither shall this Act be construed to extend the official term of any officer of said State beyond the term limited by the Constitution thereof, dating from the election or appointment of such officer, nor to deprive the people of Georgia of the right under their Constitution to elect Senators and Representatives of the State of Georgia in the year 1870; but said election shall be held in the year 1870, either on the day named in the Constitution of said State or such other day as the present Legislature may designate by law.”
In the Senate, after several days’ discussion of this proviso, as in Committee of the Whole, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, moved a substitute of opposite character, as follows:—
“Provided, That, in consequence of the failure of the General Assembly of Georgia to perfect a legal organization for a period of over eighteen months, it be, and hereby is, declared that the term of service of the said General Assembly shall date from the 26th of January, 1870, and shall continue until the persons to be chosen on the Tuesday after the first Monday of November, 1872, as members of the General Assembly of said State, are qualified: Provided, That the last clause of the second subdivision of the first section of the third article of the Constitution of Georgia, in the following words, ‘The General Assembly may by law change the time of election, and the members shall hold until their successors are elected and qualified,’ shall never be by any Legislature exercised so as to extend the term of any office beyond the regular period named in the said Constitution; and the said General Assembly shall by joint resolution consent to this fundamental condition before this Act shall take effect.”
April 5th, Mr. Sumner spoke on the pending question as follows:—
MR. PRESIDENT,—Whatever its result, this debate will be ever memorable. For the first time the African has pleaded in this Chamber.[6] But the curious observer cannot fail to note that he was obliged to plead still for his long-oppressed race. The Senator from Mississippi sits among us, and speaks; but the battle is not yet won. Slavery still asserts her ancient predominance, finding strange voices. No longer is the claim made directly. Nothing is said of Slavery, but the old cause is defended under an alias. It is now State Rights which are invoked, or it may be alleged irregularities,—as if State Rights or any irregularities could prevail against the sovereign duty of Congress to see that Georgia is so organized that good people shall be protected in their rights. To this end all else must be tributary, while every pretext of State Rights and every allegation of irregularity are of less consequence than the breath with which they are urged.
It is sad that the Senator from Mississippi should be doomed to encounter this spirit. As he entered the Chamber, the evil genius should have departed; but it is not so. And strange to say, the voices by which it has spoken have been the voices of friends. But so it has been always. How often in other days have the opponents of Slavery been saddened by encountering the voices of friends! The argument of technicality is always at hand, as the well-seasoned weapon of the lawyer,—and this debate is no exception.
I had hoped that this question would be decided without debate, at least on our side,—in short, that all would appreciate the exigency, and unite harmoniously in applying the remedy. I am disappointed. But I shall say very little. Feeling as strongly as I do, and seeing the way as clearly as I do, I cannot be entirely silent.
The case is very simple. From unquestionable evidence it appears that Georgia, while still in transition from the old to the new, while still in process of Reconstruction, and before the work is completed, has lapsed into a condition of insecurity and uncertainty, so that, without the intervention of Congress, the people cannot be assured in the enjoyment of their rights.
This is the broad statement, which is confirmed by the present as well as the past. By an unparalleled audacity colored citizens were expelled from the Legislature simply on account of color, while the orgies of the Ku-Klux-Klan prevailed throughout the State. And now this same Ku-Klux-Klan continues its terrors, while former Rebels threaten to regain their pernicious power. The State is in peril. I do not use too strong language. All evidence is at fault, if it be not as I say. To allow these Rebels to prevail is to sacrifice Reconstruction, and to offer up the Unionists, white and black. It is to do a deed of shame and desertion. Are you ready for this degradation? Shall Congress descend to this vileness?
Again I use strong language; but only in this way can I picture the enormity which is now proposed. Among national obligations which cannot be declined or postponed, and which rest primarily on Congress, is the duty of protecting Reconstruction. Show that Reconstruction is in peril, and you must act. Now that it is in peril there can be no question. Concurring testimony from opposite quarters, public acts, and open menace, all attest the condition of Georgia. Others in this debate have entered into details. I give you the irresistible, unanswerable conclusion.
And here occurs the Bingham Amendment, which, however intended, is only an engine of Rebel power. This is its true character, and nothing else. Howsoever it may seem, it must be regarded in its consequences. We must look from the word to the thing. It is not enough to see how it reads; we must see how it works. According to its text, the present Legislature, whose natural existence has been changed by wrongful addition and wrongful subtraction proceeding directly from the old Rebellion, is terminated at a specified day in the coming autumn, and a new election is ordered, without taking into consideration the past or the future,—without considering that thus far it has sat as a provisional Legislature only, although chosen to sit under the State Constitution,—without considering how it has been despoiled of its legislative character and just rights by hostile influence, and how a new election will be a direct appeal to this same hostile influence, giving to it a letter of license and unloosing the Ku-Klux-Klan. The Bingham Amendment is in few words, but they are words of despair to the loyal men of Georgia, and words of cheer to the disloyal.
I have listened to the arguments in its favor. Do I mistake, when I say that they all resolve themselves into technicality? At one moment we have allegations of “irregularity,” and at another of “estoppel”; and such technicalities play their part, while the good people of Georgia are sacrificed. We are estopped, so it is said, by the Act of December 22, 1869, which, failing to provide for the re-performance of certain conditions-precedent, recognized the validity of the legislative acts by which they had been performed. Very well,—suppose the legislative acts are recognized as valid, what then? Because the ratification of the Constitutional Amendments is recognized, does it follow that Congress is thereby “estopped”—such is the word—in completing the work of Reconstruction? I cannot comprehend this reasoning. It would be of value in a county court, but it is out of place in the Senate of the United States, on a question of Reconstruction. To my mind, all this is a matter of supreme indifference. The powers of Congress are above any such incident, and nothing has occurred to impair them in any way. They exist now as at the beginning, awaiting the discretion of Congress.
Do you ask where these powers are found? Of course, in the two Constitutional Amendments already proclaimed,—being ample sources, if none others existed. Out of these Congress is authorized to do all that is needed to enforce Emancipation and to protect the rights of the citizen. This is plain, very plain.
But there are three other sources, each of which is overflowing. The first is from the necessity of the case, ex necessitate rei. This is one of the grounds on which Chief-Justice Marshall asserted the power of Congress over the Territories;[7] but it is equally applicable in the work of Reconstruction. From the necessity of the case this power must be in Congress, as without it Reconstruction could not be completed. You must renounce Reconstruction or recognize this power.
Then comes the “guaranty” clause, which is another bountiful, all-sufficient fountain. The United States are to guaranty a republican form of government to the States. But this guaranty can be executed only through Congress. This clause is at once old and new. It is old as the Constitution itself, but it is new in its practical exercise. And the reason is obvious. So long as Slavery prevailed, this mighty power slept; but it was the sleep of a giant. At last it has awaked, never again to sleep or slumber. From this time forward the duty of the nation to guaranty a republican government to all its parts will be constant and ever-present; and this duty is reinforced by all needful powers. The guaranty is continuing and perpetual, and it must be executed at all hazards. In its execution Congress must fix the definition of a republican government. How often have I said this!—but I shall not fail to repeat it so long as the occasion requires. To Congress belongs the duty of determining what is a republican government, and then it must see that such a government prevails in every State.
If in any State the existing government fails according to the just standard, or if it is in any way menaced, then must Congress interfere to execute the sleepless guaranty. And in this interference it may act according to its discretion, determining the occasion and the “means” to be employed. It may act by repression or by precaution, and it may select any “means” proper for the purpose. To say that it may not act by precaution as well as by repression is contrary to reason, and I may say to common sense. Whatever may be done by repression may be done by precaution also. Such is the experience of life in other things, and this obligation of guaranty is subject to the universal law. In the selection of “means” the whole field and the whole arsenal are at its command. Not an instrument, not a weapon, proper for the purpose, which it may not grasp. Here the language of Chief-Justice Marshall, so often quoted, harmonizes with the claim of power which I now make:—
“The Government which has a right to do an act, and has imposed on it the duty of performing that act, must, according to the dictates of reason, be allowed to select the means; and those who contend that it may not select any appropriate means, that one particular mode of effecting the object is excepted, take upon themselves the burden of establishing that exception.”[8]
In our recent debates able Senators have denied everything. They will not concede the “means”; and they even ignore this great clause, which, as Cicero said of the ancient Senatusconsultum, has rested so long like a sword in its scabbard.[9] But there it is. Senators may ignore it; they may not see it; but there it is in the Constitution. In attempting to belittle this clause Senators only show how little they appreciate the lofty unity of the Republic. Other clauses are important in the machinery of government; but this guaranty makes the Republic one and indivisible, being One out of Many, and places the rights of all under the protecting power of the nation.
Before the extinction of Slavery, State Rights were successful against this guaranty. To invoke this tyrannical pretension was enough. How often was it heard on this floor! How completely did it dominate the Constitution itself! But the habit still continues, and we are still compelled to hear this same pretension, under which States played the turtle, drawing head, legs, and tail all within an impenetrable shell. With the overthrow of the Rebellion on the bloody field this pretension should have been abandoned and forgotten. A State is not a turtle, which can shut itself within its shell, and enjoy its own separate animal existence; but it is a component part of this great Republic, with which it is interlaced and interlocked so as to share with every other State a common life, subject to one and the same prevailing law. To insist that a State can play the turtle now, as in the days when Slavery ruled, is to dishonor the Constitution, and to abandon the crowning victory over the Rebellion.
Do you ask for the power in the Constitution to enter into a State and establish republican government? I give it to you in an immortal text. To question it is to show an ignorance of language which in this case is clear beyond criticism, and an ignorance also of the true genius of American institutions, where unity of rights is the Alpha and the Omega. The national motto, E Pluribus Unum, is another expression of that great unity by which the States are lost in the Nation. And this guaranty I now invoke for the protection of the good people of Georgia, and for the protection hereafter of Human Rights, when imperilled anywhere within the limits of the Republic.
But there are other and exceptional reasons why Georgia is still within the control of Congress. The process of Reconstruction in this State is not yet completed; so that the government there is simply provisional, and nothing else. This is only according to the Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867, where it is provided,—
“That, until the people of said Rebel States shall be by law admitted to representation in the Congress of the United States, any civil governments which may exist therein shall be deemed provisional only, and in all respects subject to the paramount authority of the United States at any time to abolish, modify, control, or supersede the same.”[10]
Nothing can be more explicit. Until the people of the Rebel States are “by law” admitted to representation, they are under the power of Congress. Everything done is inchoate, and nothing more. But Georgia is not yet “by law” admitted to representation, and we are now considering when and how such admission shall take place. Meanwhile, according to express language of the Act, the government is “provisional only.” Nor is this all; for the Act proceeds to declare further that this government is “in all respects subject to the paramount authority of the United States at any time to abolish, modify, control, or supersede the same.” Words cannot be stronger. “Abolish,” “modify,” “control,” “supersede.” To argue against their plain meaning is simply ridiculous. To insist that the existing government is beyond the reach of Congress, to be extended or abridged, to be recognized or superseded in its discretion, is preposterous. The power is reserved in terms almost excessive in fulness. Therefore do I say there can be no question of power on the present occasion. As well question that the sun shines or the river flows.
There being no question of power, there arises, then, the obligation of duty. Congress has the power to protect republican institutions in Georgia, and to protect the good people there; and it has the further power to superintend the work of Reconstruction to the end. All this it must do. It cannot abandon the appointed work. Of course it will ascertain the exact condition of things, and will then apply the remedy. No excuse of State Rights, no fine-spun technicality, no plea of irregularity, no argument of “estoppel” can be heard. All these are trivial and unworthy against the commanding duty. Georgia must be saved to herself and to the Union, and Congress must supply the means.
Several courses are open to Congress, and all equally within its powers; for all are derived from the same fountains.
1. Georgia may be remanded for an indefinite period to a condition like that of the Territories, subordinate in all respects to the jurisdiction of Congress, which may meanwhile mould it into loyalty and order.
2. Or the State may be subjected to a military government, until such time as it is fit in every respect for self-government.
3. Or the existing provisional government may be invested with the powers of the State, in such form and way and for such term as Congress in its discretion shall think best.
I doubt not that there are other modes within the jurisdiction of Congress; but these are all contained substantially in the three I have named.
It is not now proposed to remand Georgia to a territorial condition, or to subject the State to a military government. But it is proposed to place it in charge of the existing provisional government, which is to continue for a full constitutional term; and this is done as the best way of guarding against disturbing forces from the late Rebellion. It is said that this will be sufficient. I hope that it may be. I am satisfied that it is the least Congress can do in the exigency. Anything short of this will be the betrayal of those who have a right to our protection.
Against this simple and moderate proposition is interposed the Bingham Amendment, which, however plausible in form, is destructive in consequence. It is enough that it hands over the State to misrule and violence. Senators, how can you do this thing? How can you hesitate to take every heed and precaution against even the possibility of such an occurrence? You have the power. Then must you exercise it. In the recent history of Georgia nothing can be adduced to make you hesitate. On the contrary, all things, when properly understood, conspire to constrain the exercise of this power.
How feeble is the argument, that, because Governor Bullock was chosen Governor and the Legislature commenced its session at a given date now past, therefore in this process of Reconstruction the constitutional term of the Governor and of the Legislature must be limited to two years from that date! Besides ignoring all the controlling powers of Congress, this assumption ignores also the conduct of this very Legislature by which its organization was for a while defeated. Nothing is clearer than that the termination of the provisional government in Georgia was contingent on the performance of certain covenants, express and implied. These covenants have been outrageously violated. The very form of government underwent a change when persons clearly ineligible from disloyalty were allowed to take part in it, while citizens entitled to equal rights, and especially protected by the Reconstruction Laws, were tyrannically ejected from the Legislature. There was for the time being a usurpation. Had this violation of underlying covenants been anticipated, Reconstruction would have been postponed. No Senator will pretend the contrary. But Congress, in view of what has occurred, may justly do what it would have done, had it anticipated the result. It may postpone Reconstruction,—treating the Legislature meanwhile as provisional, and recognizing its acts only so far as in the judgment of Congress they are fit to be recognized.
If instruction be needed on this point, it will be found in the authoritative words of publicists, showing how even the terms of a treaty may be disregarded where there has been a change in the form of government.
Thus, Vattel does not hesitate to say,—
“It may say, upon a good foundation, that it would not have entered into an alliance with that nation, had it been under the present form of government.”[11]
One of our own publicists, Alexander Hamilton, has dealt with the same question in congenial language:—
“Contracts between nations, as between individuals, must lose their force where the considerations fail.
“A treaty pernicious to the state is of itself void, where no change in the situation of either of the parties takes place. By a much stronger reason it must become voidable at the option of the other party, when the voluntary act of one of the allies has made so material a change in the condition of things as is always implied in a radical revolution of government.”[12]
We but follow the simple principles of these texts, when we declare that the outrage perpetrated in Georgia so far changed the condition of things that the Legislature lost all title to recognition by Congress. It ceased to be the Legislature contemplated by Congress. Nor was it the first regular Legislature contemplated by the State Constitution. It was irregular, abnormal, revolutionary. To recognize such a body as the first regular Legislature is a fraud on the State Constitution. To insist that members chosen as the first regular Legislature shall be treated as provisional only is unjust to them. To insist that such members shall be despoiled of the regular term is a direct surrender to the disorganizers, who will rejoice to see Congress sacrifice the true men to whom it owes protection. To my mind there can be no surer rule than so to act that these disorganizers shall not rejoice. Especially will I not please them at the expense of patriot citizens.
In the exercise of this power Congress is acting on principles of Equity. And here allow me to say, that, in superintending the process of Reconstruction, Congress is a Court of Equity, bound to supply deficiencies in the existing law, to enjoin against threatened wrong, and generally to see justice done in spite of technicalities. Here I only follow the best definitions of Equity from the earliest times. No student can forget that profound definition by Aristotle,[13] adopted by Grotius[14] also,—“Equity is the correction of that wherein the law by reason of its universality is deficient”; nor can he forget the phrase of Lord Bacon, when he gives it a higher character still, namely, “The general conscience of the realm, which is Chancery.”[15] These two philosophers were each right; for Equity is at once a correction of law and the voice of conscience. In conformity with these principles, an ample jurisdiction has been established, under which, among other things, the powers of ordinary courts are supplemented by more flexile methods, the rules of law are prevented from becoming instruments of injustice, persons are restrained from asserting doubtful rights in a manner productive of irreparable damage, and, in the absence of positive law, universal justice is maintained. It has been a constant aspiration to bring Law and Equity into harmony. Lord Chancellor Eldon relates that on one occasion Lord Chief-Justice De Grey said, he “never liked Equity so well as when it was like Law”; and he adds, “The day before I heard Lord Mansfield say he never liked Law so well as when it was like Equity.”[16] In the same spirit, Bishop Burnet says of Sir Matthew Hale:—
“As great a lawyer as he was, he would never suffer the strictness of law to prevail against conscience; as great a chancellor as he was, he would make use of all the niceties and subtilties in law, when it tended to support right and equity.”[17]
Such is Equity, and such are the principles which preside in its courts. No strictness of law can prevail against conscience. The niceties and subtilties of law are all to be used in support of right and equity. These noble and authoritative rules are a pathway of light. Against all strictness of law conscience must prevail. If there are niceties and subtilties in the law, let them all be employed on the side of right and equity. That is according to reason and the harmonies of the Universe. It is Equity.
Am I not right, when I now insist that Congress is a High Court of Equity with Georgia at its bar? It only remains that it should apply the principles of Equity, especially supplying deficiencies in the existing law, enjoining against threatened wrong, and seeing that justice is done,—all technicalities to the contrary notwithstanding. Against all strictness of law conscience must prevail; and if there are niceties and subtilties in the law, they must all minister to the completion of Reconstruction. To this end, the process of Congress must go forth in such form as will best establish peace and security in that State under the safeguard of equal laws. With the execution of this process Georgia will be a republican government in reality as in name.
The assertion of this power is necessary now, not merely for Georgia, where it will bring peace and security, but also for the Nation, which will be elevated in character and strengthened in that unity against which the Rebellion dashed itself in battle. An ancient sage has left in perpetual testimony, that the best government is where an injury to a single citizen is redressed as an injury to the whole nation. In harmony with the saying of the sage is the fundamental law that protection and allegiance are reciprocal, so that the Nation owes protection in exchange for the allegiance it receives. The duties of the Nation are correlative with the duties of the citizen. Are we a Nation? Surely we are not, if any State can without correction deny Equal Rights within its border, or in any way imperil the tranquillity of the Republic. There was a time when all this might be done with impunity,—when a State was permitted to exalt itself above the Nation,—when a State determined for itself the standard of Human Rights,—when there was one rule of citizenship at Boston and another at New Orleans, and as many different rules as there were States,—when State Rights were made the protection for all that a State chose to do, and the turtle, with its impenetrable shell, was the prototype of a political community constituting part of the Nation. But this time has passed. A State can no longer play the turtle; State Rights have ceased to be a protection for all that a State inclines to do; there can be but one rule of citizenship in all the States, being the same in Boston and New Orleans; no State can determine for itself the standard of Human Rights; no State can exalt itself above the Nation; nor can any State without correction deny Equal Rights within its borders, or in any way imperil the tranquillity of the Republic. The judgments of courts, the arguments of Senators, with all possible learning and all possible skill, are impotent against that prevailing law which places the National Unity and the Equal Rights of All beneath the safeguard of the Nation. There they will remain from this time forevermore, making the Republic more than ever an example to mankind.
After various amendments, the bill was finally taken into a new draft, leaving the questions presented in the Bingham Amendment to the determination of the State Constitution, and in this form passed both Houses without a division.
INCOME TAX.
Remarks in the Senate, April 7, 1870.
The Senate having under consideration a Joint Resolution from the House, with an amendment by the Committee on Finance, declaratory of the meaning and intention of the law relating to the Income Tax, Mr. Sumner said,—
I shall make no opposition to the amendment of the Committee on Finance, as I understand it is to relieve the Department from a difficulty which has arisen in the interpretation of a statute; but I desire to say now—and I take this earliest opportunity—that I think the income tax ought not to be continued any longer.
Mr. Conkling [of New York]. Reëstablished, you mean.
Mr. Sumner. Very well; I accept the amendment of the Senator from New York: it ought not to be reëstablished.
Mr. Scott [of Pennsylvania]. It has expired.
Mr. Sumner. It has expired. There was an understanding, when it was established, that it should live only into the year 1870. It has now reached its natural death, and no resurrection ought to operate upon it. An income tax is a war tax. It ought not to be made a peace tax. “The medicine of the Constitution should not become its daily bread.” I am against the continuance of this tax; and if the occasion required, I would go forward and assign reasons. But I am unwilling now to enter into any general discussion of the question, as it is not directly presented by the proposition before the Senate; but I hope the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Sherman], who has charge of this bill, and is Chairman of the Finance Committee, will bear in mind the radical objection to any reëstablishment of this tax, and will also bear in mind another important proposition,—that the taxes of the country must be reduced. I have on another occasion, and more than once, said, “Down with the taxes!”—and I repeat the cry now. We cannot do better than to begin with a tax inequitable in its operation, and which, according to the original understanding when first adopted, was to end now.
After further debate, in which different Senators participated, Mr. Sumner spoke again, as follows:—
Mr. President,—I should not have said another word but for the very confident statement made by my friend, the Senator from Ohio, that at a proper time he will show the fairness of this tax. Sir, if he can show its fairness, he will do what no person before him has ever been able to do,—what no speaker in Parliament, no speaker in Congress, no writer on taxation or political economy has ever been able to accomplish. The Senator assumes in advance a very considerable task. Let me commend him to the candid, absolutely impartial, and authoritative words of Mr. McCulloch, in his work on Taxation and Funding. We all know the authority of this writer; none better can be adduced. A committee of this body might be well satisfied, could it have the sanction of this writer. Now what does he say of the tax on income? One would think he had listened to my honorable friend on this question. Of its effects he says:—
“It would no doubt have the supposed effects, [i. e. be successful,] could it be fairly assessed. But the practical difficulties in the way of its fair assessment are not of a sort that can be overcome. And the truth is, that taxes on income, though theoretically equal, are in their practical operation most unequal and vexatious.”[18]
Mr. Sherman. Read the paragraph immediately before that, in which he speaks of the theory of an income tax.
Mr. Sumner. I should rather read a paragraph after it, with the permission of the Senator. [Laughter.] I have read the chapter, and I understand it; and there are words here to which I call the attention of my friend:—
“After the Legislature has done all that can be done to make it equal, it will be most unequal.”
Strong language that!
“To impose it only on certain classes of incomes, or to impose it on all incomes, without regard to their origin, is alike subversive of sound principle. Nothing, therefore, remains but to reject it, or to resort to it only when money must be had at all hazards, when the ordinary and less exceptionable means of filling the public coffers have been tried and exhausted, and when, as during the late war, Hannibal is knocking at your gates, and national independence must be secured at whatever cost. An unreasoning necessity of this sort is the only satisfactory justification of taxes on property and income.”[19]
This is the voice of Science. It is not the voice of a political partisan, or of the representative of any Administration anxious to establish a system of taxation, but it is the voice of Science itself, speaking by one of its—I may say chosen authorities. How can this testimony be answered? If you come back to an authority of a different character, take a statesman. The Senator from California [Mr. Casserly] has referred to Sir Robert Peel, who is known as the modern author of the income tax; but he has left his testimony behind. I quote words from different speeches, showing how he has characterized it. He admitted that it was “a tax which had hitherto been reserved for time of war”; and that “the question of its imposition was, whether the political necessity was of such magnitude and urgency as to justify it”; and then that it “ought to be accompanied by measures of simultaneous relief.” Then, “he did not deny that it was an inquisitorial tax”; and again, that “a certain degree of inquisitorial scrutiny was inseparable from an income tax”; and further, that “a good deal of inconvenience inevitably arose from the inquiries that must be instituted into the properties of men, in the imposition of an income tax”; moreover, that “one great objection to the income tax was, that it fell with peculiar severity upon those who were determined to act honestly.”[20]
In harmony with his testimony is that also of Mr. Gladstone, named by the two Senators who have preceded me. The Senator from Ohio reminds us that Mr. Gladstone has sustained an income tax. Have we not all sustained an income tax?
Mr. Sherman. He does it this very year.
Mr. Sumner. This very year, and why? The Senator knows perfectly how England is pressed by taxation,—how difficult it is to find objects for taxation in order to meet the great demands upon her exchequer. He knows that England is obliged now, in time of peace, to meet the responsibilities of war. It is on account of that terrible war debt which still hangs over her, the interest of which must be annually paid, that she is obliged to assume even in a period of peace this responsibility. I think we are in no such condition. Our war is happily over, and I know no reason why the responsibilities and obligations assumed during that period should be prolonged now during the reign of peace. Sir, let us put an end to the war. And I know no better way to give our testimony to the end of the war than by stopping that taxation which was born of the war.
MORE WORK TO BE DONE.
Letter to the American Antislavery Society at its Final Meeting, April 8, 1870.
Senate Chamber, April 8, 1870.
GENTLEMEN,—You propose to celebrate the triumph of Equal Rights at the ballot-box, and at the same time to abandon that famous shibboleth by which you once rallied the country against Slavery.
It was said of Wolfe, the conqueror at Quebec, that he died in the arms of Victory; and such will be the fortune of your noble Society. “They run!” was the voice that fell on the ears of the expiring General. “Who run?” he exclaimed. “The enemy,” was the answer. “Now, God be praised, I shall die in peace,” said he, and his battle ended.
The Antislavery Society may now die in peace. Slavery is ended. But I do not doubt that the same courage and fidelity which through long years warred against this prodigious Barbarism will continue determined to the end in protecting and advancing the work begun.
I do not think the work finished, so long as the word “white” is allowed to play any part in legislation,—so long as it constrains the courts in naturalization,—so long as it rules public conveyances, steamboats, and railroads,—so long as it bars the doors of houses bound by law to receive people for food and lodging, or licensed as places of amusement,—so long as it is inscribed on our common schools;—nor do I think the work finished until the power of the Nation is recognized, supreme and beyond question, to fix the definition of a “republican government,” and to enforce the same by the perfect maintenance of rights everywhere throughout the land, according to the promises of the Declaration of Independence, without any check or hindrance from the old proslavery pretension of State Rights. It must be understood that every State, while perfectly free in its local administration, is subject to the supremacy of the Nation, whenever it touches the Rights of Man,—so that, according to the ancient words of Demosthenes, the law shall be “a general ordinance, equal and alike to all.”[21] Let there be Equality before the Law, and all rights are assured. In this cause count me always as your devoted and grateful fellow-worker.
Accept my thanks for the invitation with which you have honored me, and believe me sincerely yours,
Charles Sumner.
To the Committee of the Antislavery Society.
EDUCATION.
Remarks in the Senate, May 9, 1870.
The question being on an amendment to the Legislative Appropriation Bill, reducing the appropriation for the Bureau of Education from $14,500 to $5,400, in conformity with a previous reduction of the clerical force, Mr. Sumner said:—
MR. PRESIDENT,—I hope there may be no hesitation in refusing to agree to this amendment. It seems to me that the House of Representatives has acted wisely in increasing the appropriation, and we shall act very unwisely, if we fail to unite with the House. We, Sir, are a Republic; we are living under republican institutions; and, as I understand them, one of their essential elements is Education. Now, Sir, here is an agency associated with the National Government, having education for its object; and what is the appropriation proposed by our excellent committee? It is $5,400: that is all. Looking on the opposite page of the bill, I find an appropriation of $9,000 for stationery, furniture, and books for the Interior Department; I find an appropriation of $16,000 for fuel and lights for the Interior Department; and yet we propose to give only $5,400 to create and support a Bureau of Education! Sir, is that decent? It seems to me, in this age, at this period of our history, when more than ever we are beginning to see the transcendent advantage of education, how much we owe to light,—
“Hail, holy light!”—
it seems to me strange that we should now cut down the appropriation for the Bureau of Education. Turning on, I come to the Department of Agriculture, and there I find an appropriation of $72,170; and then I turn back again to the $5,400 for the Bureau of Education. I think the House did not go far enough, when it made the appropriation $14,500. I would make the appropriation as large as that for the Agricultural Department; and I know full well the period is at hand when all of you will rejoice to make an appropriation for the Educational Bureau twice more than that for the Agricultural Department.
As to the question whether there is any existing statute to sanction this appropriation, I dismiss it entirely. It is merely a technicality; and it ought not now, on this Appropriation Bill, at this stage, after the vote of the House, to be allowed to stand in the way.
Mr. Sherman, of Ohio, supported the amendment as a step toward the abolition of the Bureau, which he regarded as useless,—at the same time urging the withdrawal, for consideration in a full Senate, of a proviso, just voted, for the restoration of the original clerical force; and it being thereupon suggested that the whole matter be passed over till the next day, Mr. Sumner said:—
Before that passes away, I wish to make one comment on a single word of the Senator from Ohio. The Senator said that he hoped we should take no backward step; and yet his speech and his proposition were a backward step. Sir, there is nothing that any State or any nation can do for education that is not for civilization itself; and now the Senator from Ohio is against appropriating a paltry sum of $10,000 for education.
Mr. Sherman. No,—for two or three clerks.
Mr. Sumner. My friend will pardon me,—for education. He is against making this paltry appropriation for education; and he reminds us that in his great State $3,000,000 are set apart for this purpose. Is it not shameful, that, while $3,000,000 are set apart for this purpose in his great State, so small a sum as is now proposed is to be set apart by the Nation? Am I told that the Nation has nothing to do with this question? Allow me to reply at once, it has everything to do with it; it has more to do with it than the State of Ohio, inasmuch as in the Nation are all the States. Ohio is only one State; all the States compose the Nation; and the Nation is responsible for the civilization of all the States. The Nation is the presiding genius, not only of Ohio, but of all the associate States of the Union. Therefore, Sir, should the Nation by every means in its power, by appropriation, by a department, by a bureau, by clerks, by officers, do everything possible to promote the interests of education.
But the question may be asked, What can it do? With the sum proposed, unhappily, very little,—too little. But let us not give up doing even that little. A little in such a cause is much. If nothing else, information may be accumulated, statistics may be gathered, facts may be brought together, which can be laid before those interested in education all over our own country and in foreign lands. That may be a specific object of the Bureau of Education.
Then, again, it may supply a general impulse to education in every State,—even in Ohio, with its $3,000,000 appropriated to that purpose. Permit me to say, the State of Ohio, great as it is, is not yet above the reach of educational influences; and I am sure that this Bureau, if properly organized, might be of advantage even to the great State which my friend represents with so much ability on this floor. I therefore adopt the language of my friend, when he said, “Let us take no backward step.” I would increase this appropriation, rather than diminish it. I wish it were $100,000,—ay, Sir, $500,000.
The amendment was rejected,—Yeas 19, Nays 38.
NO EXCLUSION OF RETIRED ARMY OFFICERS FROM CIVIL OFFICE.
Remarks in the Senate, May 12, 1870.
The Senate having under consideration a bill for the reduction of the Army, reported by Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, from the Committee on Military Affairs, as a substitute for one from the House, and the pending question being on an amendment by Mr. Trumbull, of Illinois, restoring to its original form in the House bill the provision “That it shall not be lawful for any officer of the Army of the United States on the active list to hold any civil office,” by striking out the words “on the active list,” Mr. Sumner said:—
MR. PRESIDENT,—There is a principle of our institutions, to which reference is constantly made in this debate, which is worthy of constant memory. It is the subordination of the military to the civil power. Mr. Jefferson, in his Inaugural Address, so memorable as a representation of the fundamental principles of republican institutions, expressly declares the subordination of the military to the civil an essential element of a republic. I accept that idea; and I confess that I have always admired in our system that the Navy Department and the War Department each is in charge of a civilian; that neither a naval officer nor a military officer, in the ordinary course of affairs, takes his place at the head of either of these Departments, to the end that the Navy and the Army shall see in a civilian the visible head of each. In that I recognize the genius of the Republic.
But now, Sir, for the application. I confess I agree entirely with the argument of the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Sherman]. I consider that the demands of republican institutions are completely satisfied, if we exclude men in active service from taking part in civil life. To go further is to tie the hands of the appointing power,—to take from the country the opportunity of securing, it may be, important service,—and, I think, is to be needlessly hard on men who in their day have rendered good service to the country. It does seem to me that cases may occur where it may be important to take into the civil service a retired officer. Why may not that occur in the natural course of events? There is talent, there is experience. Are our offices so well filled, is the public service so completely performed, that we can afford to exclude talent and experience?
Mr. Conkling. Is not that much more true in regard to active officers?
Mr. Sumner. There, Sir, you come in conflict with the fundamental principle of republican institutions. You cannot, as I submit, fill civil offices from the active service of the Army or Navy without conflict with that fundamental principle.
Mr. Conkling. Why?
Mr. Sumner. But I find no such conflict, if you take an officer on the retired list.
Mr. Conkling. Will the Senator point out the distinction?
Mr. Sumner. The Senator asks, “Why?” For the obvious reason, that, when the officer is on the retired list, he has, for all the ordinary purposes of the service, ceased to be an officer,—he enjoys what I think has been called a pension, which in reality is a pension under another name,—and he has ceased to be in the active, practical service either of Navy or of Army. On that account I see a clear distinction.
Therefore it seems to me, for the sake of the public service, and that we may not be guilty of hardship to any portion of the community, that the words introduced by my colleague in the pending bill ought to be preserved. I hope they will not be struck out.
The amendment prevailed,—Yeas 34, Nays 22.
ARCTIC EXPEDITIONS.
Remarks in the Senate, May 27, 1870.
On the question of an appropriation of $100,000 for “one or more expeditions towards the North Pole,” moved by Mr. Sumner, under a resolution of the Committee on Foreign Relations,—it being objected by Mr. Morrill, of Vermont, that “we could not afford to embark in such an enterprise,” that “the money was needed for purposes altogether more pressing,” Mr. Sumner remarked,—
The Senator from Vermont has just moved and carried a large appropriation for the extension and adornment of the Capitol grounds, and now he opposes a smaller appropriation having for its object the extension of geographical knowledge in this hemisphere. I voted gladly for the proposition of the Senator; but he does not favor mine. He is against the North Pole. His mood is not unlike that of Lord Jeffrey, when he broke forth against it. Somebody, to whom he had spoken impatiently on the subject, complained to Sydney Smith of the language he had employed, being nothing less than “Damn the North Pole!”—when the great wit endeavored to soothe the injured man, saying, “Do not be concerned; I have heard him speak disrespectfully of the Equator.” I presume the Senator from Vermont would do the same thing, if there were any question of exploration under the Equator.
I doubt not that in former days the Senator has circulated under his frank Herndon’s “Exploration of the Valley of the Amazon.” Here was an Equatorial exploration by which our country has gained honor. There is nothing in our history by which we have acquired a better fame than what we have done for science. The scientific reports on our Western territory are much valued where science is cultivated. And the United States Exploring Expedition, organized by the care of John Quincy Adams, has given to our Republic a true renown. Who would blot from our annals this invaluable record? But we, too, may do something not unworthy of companionship with this early expedition.
Thus far our Government has attempted nothing for Polar exploration. Kane and Hayes have added to our geographical knowledge, and inscribed the names of honored countrymen on Arctic headlands; but their expeditions proceeded from private munificence. The time has come when the Government should take up this work, nor leave the monopoly to foreign powers. Perhaps I desire too much; but I would have my country explore this whole North American Continent, not only in the interest of science, but for the sake of the near future. It is easy to see that our Capitol grounds will be broader than anything included in the amendment of the Senator from Vermont, and I hope we shall not delay their exploration.
Nor should we be daunted by difficulties. I cannot doubt that the time will come when every quarter of the globe, with every corner, every recess, whether at the Equator or the Pole, whether land or sea, will be brought within the domain of knowledge, and find its place on the map, so that there shall be no Terra Incognita; but we must do our part in this triumph. Do not say that this knowledge is without value. Just in proportion as we know the earth can we use and enjoy it. Therefore, for our own advantage and for our good name——
The Vice-President. It is the duty of the Chair to remind the Senator from Massachusetts that his five minutes have expired.
The appropriation was voted,—Yeas 28, Nays 25.
ONE CENT POSTAGE, WITH ABOLITION OF FRANKING.
Speech in the Senate, June 10, 1870.
The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, having under consideration the House bill “to abolish the franking privilege,” Mr. Sumner said:—
MR. PRESIDENT,—This debate began with a simple proposition to abolish the franking system, sometimes called “the franking privilege.” The bill for this purpose rudely terminates the existing system, without supplying any substitute, and without taking advantage of the proposed change to reduce the rate of postage. The bill is destructive, but in no respect constructive. It pulls down, but does not pretend to set up. It abolishes an old and time-honored, if not beneficent system, under which the people have grown in knowledge; but it does not attempt to provide any means by which the original object of the system shall be accomplished. It is a raw, crude, naked proposition. To adopt it in its present form would be as if you voted the destruction of this Capitol, without providing any place for the meeting of Congress, or economizing the ruins you made.