DUTY TO CHINA.
Had this question arisen in our relations with a European power, it would be only according to an important precedent, if we forbore to open the transaction. By two separate conventions, one in 1815 and the other in 1818, France paid to England a large sum, amounting to one hundred and thirty million francs, on account of English claimants, and the English Government undertook to dispose of all their claims, as the United States undertook to dispose of all the claims of American citizens in China. In 1852 Lord Lyndhurst brought the subject before the House of Lords, when he stated that there was “an unapplied balance of upwards of £200,000”;[134] and in 1861 Mr. Denman did the same in the House of Commons, when he said, that, “after all claims had been satisfied, there still remained a sum of £200,000 not in any way to be considered due under the convention.”[135] Nothing was said of returning this surplus to France. The Baron de Bode, a renowned litigant, made an ineffectual attempt to obtain something out of it on account of losses in France, although his case was argued with consummate ability in the English courts, and awakened the eloquence of Lord Lyndhurst in the House of Lords. In an appeal for justice, the Baron declares that out of the amount received by England, only 67,071,301 francs had been paid to claimants, and he insists that the Crown should account to the claimants, or to France, for the unexpended surplus,—thus recognizing an eventual proprietorship in France, after the satisfaction of the claims.[136] What has been done with this surplus since is not known.
But while the importance of doing equity always is a paramount duty, the Committee feel that there is something in the negotiation under which this surplus accrued which should make us particularly careful lest we fail to do equity. It will be observed that the sum received from China was on account of certain claims of our citizens, and that it was in no sense a national indemnity; in other words, the consideration was specific, and not general in character. The preamble of the convention recites that it was entered into “for the satisfaction of claims of American citizens,”—thus expressly excluding any other consideration. With regard to these claims the Chinese had little or no information, while our Minister saw clearly, that, with the disallowance of those doubtful, which he regarded as probable, there would be a surplus. His words were: “If they be recognized, the fund will be exhausted. If they be disallowed, there will be a surplus at the disposition of the Government.”[137] The actual surplus was about thirty-three and a third per cent. of the amount stipulated, and about fifty per cent. of the amount awarded to claimants. The considerableness of this sum is another reason why we should hesitate to take advantage of a transaction where we were so situated as to be the best informed on the matter in issue. If we did not know everything bearing on it, we knew much more than the Chinese.
In fact, the Chinese acted in the dark; and here we have the testimony of Mr. Williams, the interpreter of our Minister in the negotiation, and still an honored servant of the Government, who has said in a dispatch: “No list was presented to the Chinese by Mr. Reed”; and again, “The United States Government was made the sole judge of the justice of the claims”; and then again, “In reality, they [the Chinese] paid the demands made upon them by the English and French Ministers, as well as the American, under pressure.”[138] If this were so,—and one of our own officers is the witness,—the equity of the Chinese becomes more apparent. Obviously, they were unable to examine the claims, and did not pretend to examine them. Everything was left to the United States. And this was done while the ancient empire was torn by civil war, aggravated by the menacing attitudes of England and France. It is not too much to say that it was done “under pressure.” According to well-known authorities, a deed made under duress may be set aside; and this rule of jurisprudence shows a just sensitiveness with regard to that absolute freedom which is essential to the life of a contract. Such a rule, if applied in the intercourse of nations, would invalidate most of those conventions after war or menace by which one power has assumed obligations to another, and, indeed, would strike at war and menace as modes of pursuing a claim. In the present case the validity of the convention is not called in question; but, since we assert no right of conquest, it is properly suggested that the original pressure upon China, attested by one of our own functionaries, peculiarly intimate with the transaction, is an additional reason why we should decline to take advantage of the convention beyond the just satisfaction of our citizens.
And this brings the Committee to the conclusion, that, in equity, this fund does not belong to us. Whatever may be our technical title, in conscience the money is not ours.
In returning to China the fund in question and its accretions, the United States will relieve themselves of an embarrassing trust, while they render unto the distant Cæsar what is his own, and set an example by which republican institutions will be elevated. The question of its application, which has occupied the attention of successive Presidents, which has been presented to successive Congresses, and is still undecided, will be at rest. Schemes for the bestowal of the fund in such a way as to harmonize our sense of justice with our obligations to China, if not with Chinese proprietorship, will cease. There will be nothing for “disappointed claimants” to pursue. China will receive her own,—if with astonishment, it will be only because nations have so rarely lived according to the Golden Rule. Such an act cannot be otherwise than honorable to the United States. It will be a victory in a new field, making us first in a new order of conquerors. China, with infinite resources, will be more than ever open to American enterprise. Thus, while doing right, shall we benefit ourselves. So is justice to others the way to national advantage. But whatever this advantage, it must not be forgotten that the first inducement is the essential equity of the case.
The measure now proposed will be valuable in proportion as it is spontaneous. Thus far China has made no demand, or suggestion even. A year hence the venerable Empire may appear before the youthful Republic with a formal claim. The very fact that we deliberate about this fund will spread the tidings of its existence. Better anticipate a demand than wait and at last yield an ungracious compliance, urged by a foreign plenipotentiary in the service of the ancient government whose money is now in our hands.
The Report was accompanied by the following Joint Resolution, which was read and passed to a second reading:—