GREAT PRINCIPLE OF “EQUALITY OF NATIONS” VIOLATED.
International Law is to nations what the National Constitution is to our coëqual States: it is the rule by which they are governed. As among us every State and also every citizen has an interest in upholding the National Constitution, so has every nation and also every citizen an interest in upholding International Law. As well disobey the former as the latter. You cannot do so in either case without disturbing the foundations of peace and tranquillity. To insist upon the recognition of International Law is to uphold civilization in one of its essential securities. To vindicate International Law is a constant duty, which is most eminent according to the rights in jeopardy.
Foremost among admitted principles of International Law is the axiom, that all nations are equal, without distinction of population, size, or power. Nor does International Law know any distinction of color. As a natural consequence, whatever is the rule for one is the rule for all; nor can we do to a thinly-peopled, small, weak, or black nation what we would not do to a populous, large, strong, or white nation,—nor what that nation might not do to us. “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you,” is the plain law for all nations, as for all men. The equality of nations is the first principle of International Law, as the equality of men is the first principle in our Declaration of Independence; and you may as well assail the one as the other. As all men are equal before the Law, so are all nations.
This simple statement is enough; but since this commanding principle has been practically set aside in the operations of our Navy, I proceed to show how it is illustrated by the authorities.
The equality of nations, like the equality of men, was recognized tardily, under the growing influence of civilization. Not to the earlier writers, not even to the wonderful Grotius, whose instinct for truth was so divine, do we repair for the elucidation of this undoubted rule. Our Swiss teacher, Vattel, prompted, perhaps, by the experience of his own country, surrounded by more powerful neighbors, was the first to make it stand forth in its present character. His words, which are as remarkable for picturesque force as for juridical accuracy, state the whole case:—
“Nations composed of men, and considered as so many free persons living together in the state of Nature, are naturally equal, and inherit from Nature the same obligations and rights. Power or weakness does not in this respect produce any difference. A dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is no less a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom. By a necessary consequence of that equality, whatever is lawful for one nation is equally lawful for any other, and whatever is unjustifiable in the one is equally so in the other.”[67]
Later authorities have followed this statement, with some slight variety of expression, but with no diminution of its force. One of the earliest to reproduce it was Sir William Scott, in one of his masterly judgments, lending to it the vivid beauty of his style:—
“A fundamental principle of Public Law is the perfect equality and entire independence of all distinct states. Relative magnitude creates no distinction of right; relative imbecility, whether permanent or casual, gives no additional right to the more powerful neighbor; and any advantage seized upon that ground is mere usurpation. This is the great foundation of Public Law, which it mainly concerns the peace of mankind, both in their politic and private capacities, to preserve inviolate.”[68]
The German Heffter states the rule more simply, but with equal force:—
“Nations, being sovereign or independent of each other, treat together on a footing of complete equality. The most feeble state has the same political rights as the strongest. In other terms, each state exercises in their plenitude the rights which result from its political existence and from its participation in international association.”[69]
The latest English writers testify likewise. Here are the words of Phillimore:—
“The natural equality of states is the necessary companion of their independence,—that primitive cardinal right upon which the science of International Law is mainly built.… They are entitled, in their intercourse with other states, to all the rights incident to a natural equality. No other state is entitled to encroach upon this equality by arrogating to itself peculiar privileges or prerogatives as to the manner of their mutual intercourse.”[70]
Twiss follows Phillimore, but gives to the rule a fresh statement:—
“The independence of a nation is absolute, and not subject to qualification; so that nations, in respect of their intercourse under the Common Law, are peers or equals.… Power and weakness do not in this respect give rise to any distinction.… It results from this equality, that whatever is lawful for one nation is equally lawful for another, and whatever is unjustifiable in the one is equally unjustifiable in the other.”[71]
In our own country, Chancellor Kent, a great authority, gives the rule with perfect clearness and simplicity:—
“Nations are equal in respect to each other, and entitled to claim equal consideration for their rights, whatever may be their relative dimensions or strength, or however greatly they may differ in government, religion, or manners. This perfect equality and entire independence of all distinct states is a fundamental principle of Public Law.”[72]
General Halleck, whose work is not surpassed by any other in practical value, while quoting especially Vattel and Sir William Scott, says with much sententiousness:—
“All sovereign states, without respect to their relative power, are, in the eye of International Law, equal, being endowed with the same natural rights, bound by the same duties, and subject to the same obligations.”[73]
Thus does each authority reflect the others, while the whole together present the Equality of Nations as a guiding principle not to be neglected or dishonored.
The record already considered shows how this principle has been openly defied by our Government in the treatment of the Black Republic,—first, in the menace of war by Rear-Admiral Poor, and, secondly, in the manner of the menace,—being in substance and in form. In both respects the Admiral did what he would not have done to a powerful nation, what he would not have done to any white nation, and what we should never allow any nation to do to us.
Hayti was weak, and the gallant Admiral, rowing ashore, pushed to the Executive Mansion, where, after what he called “a friendly visit,” he struck at the independence of the Black Republic, pointing from the windows of the Executive Mansion to his powerful armament, and threatening to employ it against the Haytian capital or in sinking Haytian ships. For the present I consider this unprecedented insolence only so far as it was an offence against the Equality of Nations, and here it may be tried easily. Think you that we should have done this thing to England, France, or Spain? Think you that any foreign power could have done it to us? But if right in us toward Hayti, it would be right in us toward England, France, or Spain; and it would be right in any foreign power toward us. If it were right in us toward Hayti, then might England, France, Spain, or Hayti herself do the same to us. Imagine a foreign fleet anchored off Alexandria, while the admiral, pulling ashore in his boat, hurries to the Executive Mansion, and then, after announcing a friendly visit, points to his war-ships visible from the windows, and menaces their thunder. Or to be more precise, suppose the Haytian Navy to return the compliment here in the Potomac. But just in proportion as we condemn any foreign fleet, including the Haytian Navy, doing this thing, do we condemn ourselves. The case is clear. We did not treat Hayti as our peer. The great principle of the Equality of Nations was openly set at nought.
To extenuate this plain outrage, I have heard it said, that, in our relations with Hayti, we are not bound by the same rules of conduct applicable to other nations. So I have heard; and this, indeed, is the only possible defence for the outrage. As in other days it was proclaimed that a black man had no rights which a white man was bound to respect, so this defence assumes the same thing of the Black Republic. But at last the black man has obtained Equal Rights; and so, I insist, has the Black Republic. As well deny the one as the other. By an Act of Congress, drawn by myself and approved by Abraham Lincoln in the session of 1862, diplomatic relations were established between the United States and Hayti, and the President was expressly authorized to appoint diplomatic representatives there. At first we were represented by a Commissioner and Consul-General; now it is by a Minister Resident and Consul-General. Thus, by Act of Congress and the appointment of a Minister, have we recognized the Equal Rights of Hayti in the Family of Nations, and placed the Black Republic under the safeguard of that great axiom of International Law which makes it impossible for us to do unto her what we would not allow her to do unto us. In harmony with the United States, the “Almanach de Gotha,” where is the authentic, if not official, list of nations entitled to Equal Rights, contains the name of Hayti. Thus is the Black Republic enrolled as an equal; and yet have we struck at this equality. How often have I pleaded that all men are equal before the Law! And now I plead that all nations are equal before the Law, without distinction of color.