RECORD OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT.
If the Report of the State Department is a confession, that of the Navy Department is an authentic record of acts flagrant and indefensible,—unless we are ready to set aside the Law of Nations and the Constitution of the United States, two paramount safeguards. Both of these are degraded in order to advance the scheme. If I called it plot, I should not err; for this term is suggested by the machination. The record is complete.
The scheme first shows itself in a letter from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy, under date of May 17, 1869, informing the latter that the President deems it “desirable that a man-of-war, commanded by a discreet and intelligent officer, should be ordered to visit the several ports of the Dominican Republic, and to report upon the condition of affairs in that quarter.” The Secretary adds:—
“It is also important that we should have full and accurate information in regard to the views of the Dominican people of all parties in regard to annexation to the United States, or the sale or lease of the Bay of Samana, or of territory adjacent thereto.”[42]
No invitation from the island appears,—not a word even from any of its people. The beginning is in the letter of the Secretary; and here we see how “a man-of-war” formed part of the first stage. A mere inquiry is inaugurated by “a man-of-war.” Nor was it to stop at a single place; it was to visit the several ports of the Dominican Republic.
The Secretary of the Navy obeyed. Orders were given, and under date of June 29, 1869, Rear-Admiral Hoff reports that the Nipsic, with an armament of one 11-inch and two 9-inch guns, “is to visit all the ports of the Dominican Republic.”[43] Here again is a revelation, foreshadowing the future; all the ports are to be visited by this powerful war-ship. Why? To what just end? If for negotiation, then was force, force, FORCE our earliest, as it has been since our constant plenipotentiary. Already we discern the contrast with Old Spain.
The loss of a screw occurred to prevent this war-breathing perambulation. The Nipsic did not go beyond Port-au-Prince; but Lieutenant-Commander Selfridge, in his report, under date of July 14, 1869, lets drop an honest judgment, which causes regret that he did not visit the whole island. Thus he wrote:—
“While my short stay in the island will not permit me to speak with authority, it is my individual opinion, that, if the United States should annex Hayti on the representation of a party, it would be found an elephant both costly in money and lives.”[44]
The whole case is opened when we are warned against annexion “on the representation of a party.”
Still the scheme proceeded. On the 17th July, 1869, General Babcock sailed from New York for San Domingo, as special agent of the State Department. The records of the Department, so far as communicated to the Senate, show no authority to open negotiations of any kind, much less to treat for the acquisition of this half-island. His instructions, which are dated July 13, 1869, are simply to make certain inquiries;[45] but, under the same date, the Secretary of the Navy addresses a letter to Commander Owen, of the Seminole, with an armament of one 11-inch gun and four 32-pounders, of 4,200 pounds, in which he says:—
“You will remain at Samana, or on the coast of San Domingo, while General Babcock is there, and give him the moral support of your guns.”[46]
The phrase of the Secretary is at least curious. And who is General Babcock, that on his visit the Navy is to be at his back? Nothing on this head is said. All that we know from the record is that he was to make certain inquiries, and in this business “guns” play a part. To be sure, it was their “moral support” he was to have; but they were nevertheless “guns.” Thus in all times has lawless force sought to disguise itself. Before any negotiation was begun, while only a few interrogatories were ordered by the State Department, under which this missionary acted, “the moral support of guns” was ordered by the Navy Department. Here, Sir, permit me to say, is the first sign of war, being an undoubted usurpation, whether by President or Secretary. War is hostile force, and here it is ordered. But this is only a squint, compared with the open declaration which ensued. And here again we witness the contrast with Old Spain.
But the “guns” of the Seminole were not enough to support the missionary in his inquiries. The Navy Department, under date of August 23, 1869, telegraphed to the commandant at Key West:—
“Direct a vessel to proceed without a moment’s delay to San Domingo City, to be placed at the disposal of General Babcock while on that coast. If not at San Domingo City, to find him.”[47]
Here is nothing less than the terrible earnestness of war itself. Accordingly, the Tuscarora was dispatched; and the missionary finds himself changed to a commodore. Again the contrast with Old Spain!
How many days the Tuscarora took to reach the coast does not appear; but on the 4th September the famous protocol was executed by Orville E. Babcock, entitling himself “Aide-de-Camp to his Excellency, General Ulysses S. Grant, President of the United States of America,” where, besides stipulating the annexion of Dominica to the United States in consideration of $1,500,000, it is further provided that “his Excellency, General Grant, President of the United States, promises, privately, to use all his influence in order that the idea of annexing the Dominican Republic to the United States may acquire such a degree of popularity among members of Congress as will be necessary for its accomplishment.”[48] Such was the work which needed so suddenly—“without a moment’s delay”—a second war-ship besides the Seminole, which was already ordered to lend “the moral support of its guns.” How unlike that boast of Old Spain, that there was not a Spanish bottom in those waters!
Returning to Washington with his protocol, the missionary was now sent back with instructions to negotiate two treaties,—one for the annexion of the half-island, and the other for the lease of the Bay of Samana. By the Constitution ambassadors and other public ministers are appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; but our missionary held no such commission. How the business sped appears from the State Department. The Report of the Navy Department shows how it was sustained by force. By a letter under date of December 3, 1869, on board the ship Albany, off San Domingo, addressed to Lieutenant-Commander Bunce on board the Nantasket, the missionary, after announcing the conclusion of a treaty for the lease of Samana and other purposes, imparts this important information:—
“In this negotiation the President has guarantied to the Dominican Republic protection from all foreign interposition during the time specified in the treaties for submitting the same to the people of the Dominican Republic.”
Of the absolute futility and nullity of this Presidential guaranty until after the ratification of the treaties I shall speak hereafter. Meanwhile we behold the missionary changed to plenipotentiary:—
“For this purpose the honorable Secretary of the Navy was directed to place three armed vessels in this harbor, subject to my instruction.”
Why three armed vessels? For what purpose? How unlike the boast of Old Spain! What follows reveals the menace of war:—
“I shall raise the United States flag on shore, and shall leave a small guard with it.”
Here is nothing less than military occupation. Besides war-ships in the waters, the flag is to be raised on shore, and soldiers of the United States are to be left with it. Again the contrast with Old Spain, boasting not only that there was not a single Spanish “bottom” on the coast, but not a single Spanish soldier on the land. Then follows an order to make war:—
“Should you find any foreign intervention intended, you will use all your force to carry out to the letter the guaranties given in the treaties.”
Nothing could be stronger. Here is war. Then comes a direct menace by the young plenipotentiary, launched at the neighboring Black Republic:—
“The Dominican Republic fears trouble from the Haytian border, about Jacmel. You will please inform the people, in case you are satisfied there is an intended intervention, that such intervention, direct or indirect, will be regarded as an unfriendly act toward the United States, and take such steps as you think necessary.”[49]
The Dominican Republic fears trouble, or in other words the usurper Baez trembles for his power, and therefore the guns of our Navy are to be pointed at Hayti. Again, how little like Old Spain! And this was the way in which our negotiation began. We have heard of an “armed neutrality,” and of an “armed peace”; but here is an armed negotiation.
The force employed in the negotiation naturally fructified in other force. Violence follows violence in new forms. Armed negotiation was changed to armed intervention, being an act of war,—all of which is placed beyond question. There is repetition and reduplication of testimony.
The swiftness of war appears in the telegram dated at the Navy Department January 29, 1870, addressed to Rear-Admiral Poor, at Key West. Here is this painful dispatch:—
“Proceed at once with the Severn and Dictator to Port-au-Prince; communicate with our Consul there, and inform the present Haytian authorities that this Government is determined to protect the present Dominican Government with all its power. You will then proceed to Dominica, and use your force to give the most ample protection to the Dominican Government against any Power attempting to interfere with it. Visit Samana Bay and the capital, and see the United States power and authority secure there. There must be no failure in this matter. If the Haytians attack the Dominicans with their ships, destroy or capture them. See that there is a proper force at both San Domingo City and Samana.
“If Admiral Poor is not at Key West, this dispatch must be forwarded to him without delay.”[50]
“Proceed at once.” Mark the warlike energy. What then? Inform the Haytian Government “that this Government is determined to protect the present Dominican Government [the usurper Baez] with all its power.” Strong words, and vast in scope! Not only the whole Navy of the United States, but all the power of our Republic is promised to the usurper. At Dominica, where the Admiral is to go next, he is directed to use his force “to give the most ample protection to the Dominican Government [the usurper Baez] against any Power attempting to interfere with it.” Then comes a new direction. At Samana and the City of San Domingo “see the United States power and authority secure there.” Here is nothing less than military occupation. Pray, by what title? Mark again the warlike energy. And then giving to the war a new character, the Admiral is told: “If the Haytians attack the Dominicans with their ships, destroy or capture them.” Such is this many-shotted dispatch, which is like a mitrailleuse in death-dealing missives.
This belligerent intervention in the affairs of another country, with a declaration of war against the Black Republic, all without any authority from Congress, or any sanction under the Constitution, was followed by a dispatch dated January 31, 1870, to Lieutenant-Commander Allen, of the Swatara, with an armament of six 32-pounders, 4,500 pounds, and one 11-inch gun, where is the breath of war. After hurrying the ship off to the City of San Domingo, the dispatch says:—
“If you find, when you get there, that the Dominican Government require any assistance against the enemies of that Republic, you will not hesitate to give it to them.”[51]
What is this but war, at the call of the usurper Baez, against the enemies of his Government, whether domestic or foreign? Let the usurper cry out, and our flag is engaged. Our cannon must fire, it may be upon Dominicans rising against the usurper, or it may be upon Haytians warring on the usurper for their rights, or it may be upon some other foreign power claiming rights. The order is peremptory, leaving no discretion. The assistance must be rendered. “You will not hesitate to give it to them”: so says the order. On which I observe, This is war.
This was not enough. The Navy Department, by still another order, dated February 9, 1870, addressed to Commodore Green, of the ship Congress, with an armament of fourteen 9-inch guns and two 60-pounder rifles, enforces this same conduct. After mentioning the treaty, the order says:—
“While that treaty is pending, the Government of the United States has agreed to afford countenance and assistance to the Dominican people against their enemies now in the island and in revolution against the lawfully constituted Government, and you will use the force at your command to resist any attempts by the enemies of the Dominican Republic to invade the Dominican territory, by land or sea, so far as your power can reach them.”[52]
Here again is belligerent intervention in Dominica, with a declaration of war against the Black Republic, included under the head “enemies of the Dominican Republic,” or perhaps it is a case of “running amuck,” according to Malay example, for the sake of the usurper Baez.
Thus much for the orders putting in motion the powers of war. I have set them forth in their precise words. Soon I shall show wherein they offend International Law and the Constitution. Meanwhile the case is not complete without showing what was done under these orders. Already the State Department has testified. The Navy Department testifies in harmony with the State Department. And here the record may be seen under two heads,—first, belligerent intervention in Dominica, and, secondly, belligerent intervention in Hayti.