APPENDIX.
(A.) Page 15.
AUTHORITIES REFERRED TO IN SPEECH.
Wheaton, our great authority, in Lawrence’s edition, page 727, quotes Vattel as laying down the rule of neutrality:—
“To give no assistance where there is no previous stipulation to give it; nor voluntarily to furnish troops, arms, ammunition, or anything of direct use in war.”
Vattel, as quoted, then says:—
“I do not say, To give assistance equally, but, To give no assistance; for it would be absurd that a State should assist at the same time two enemies.”—Le Droit des Gens, Liv. III. ch. vii. § 104.
Another home authority, the late General Halleck, in his work on International Law, after speaking of merchants engaged in selling ships and munitions of war to a belligerent, says:—
“The act is wrong in itself, and the penalty results from his violation of moral duty as well as of law. The duties imposed upon the citizens and subjects flow from exactly the same principle as those which attach to the government of neutral States.”
He then says, quoting another:—
“By these acts he makes himself personally a party to a war in which, as a neutral, he had no right to engage, and his property is justly treated as that of an enemy.”—International Law, p. 631.
Our other home authority, Professor Woolsey, in his work on International Law, section 162, says:—
“International Law does not require of the neutral sovereign that he should keep the citizen or subject within the same strict lines of neutrality which he is bound to draw for himself.”—Introduction to the Study of International Law, 2d edition, p. 270.
That is, a citizen may sell ships and arms to a belligerent and take the penalty, but the Government cannot do any such thing.
Another authority of considerable weight, Bluntschli, the German, lays down the rule as follows:—
“The neutral State must neither send troops to a belligerent, nor put ships of war at its disposal, nor furnish subsidies to aid it in making the war.
“In coming directly to the aid of one of the belligerent powers by the sending of men or war material, one takes part in the war.”—Droit International Codifié, tr. Lardy, art. 757, p. 381.
There is the true principle: “By the sending of men or war material one takes part in the war.”
But the most important illustration of this question, and the only case bearing directly on this point, which, according to my recollection, has ever been diplomatically discussed, is one somewhat famous at the time, known as that of the Swedish Frigate, which will be found in the second series of “Causes Célèbres,” by Baron Charles de Martens.
It seems that in 1825, after ten years of peace, the Swedish Government conceived the idea of parting with ships, some of them more than twenty years old, as comparatively useless. A contract for their sale was made with a commercial house in London. The Spanish Government, by their minister at Stockholm, protested, on the alleged ground, that, though nominally sold to merchants, they were purchased for the revolted colonies in Mexico and South America, and in his communication, dated the 1st of July, 1825, used the following energetic language, which I translate:—
“And what would his Majesty the King of Sweden think, on the supposition of the revolt of one of his provinces,—of the kingdom of Norway for example,—if friendly and allied powers furnished the rebels with arms, munitions, a fleet even, through intermediate speculators, and under pretence of not knowing the result—
I translate literally,—
“intermediate speculators, and under pretence of not knowing the result? Informed of these preparations, would the Cabinet of Stockholm wait till the steel and the cannon furnished to its enemies had mown down its soldiers, till the vessels delivered to the rebels had annihilated its commerce and desolated its coasts, to protest against similar supplies, and to prevent them if possible? And if the protests were rejected, independently of every other measure, would it not raise its voice throughout Europe, and at the courts of all its allies, against this act of hostility, against this violation of the rights of sovereignty, and against this political scandal?”—Causes Célèbres, Tom. II. pp. 472-73.
These are strong words, but they only give expression to the feelings naturally awakened in a Power that seemed to be imperilled by such an act.
In another communication the same minister said to the Swedish Government:—
“It is the doctrine of irresponsibility which the Cabinet of Stockholm professes with regard to the sale of these war vessels, which excites the most lively representations on the part of the undersigned.”—Note of 15 July 1825: Ibid., p. 480.
Mark the words, “the doctrine of irresponsibility.” Then, again, the minister says in other words worthy of consideration at this moment:—
“The Swedish Government on this occasion, creating this new kind of commerce, determined to furnish ships of war indiscriminately to every purchaser, even to private individuals without guaranty,—establishing, as it seems to indicate, that the commercial benefits of these sales are for the State a necessity of an order superior to political considerations the most elevated, as to moral obligations the most respectable.”—Note of 9 September, 1825: Ibid., p. 486.
I ask if these words are not applicable to the present case? Did it not become the Government of the United States at this time, when making these large sales, almost gigantic, so that its suspicion was necessarily aroused, to institute inquiry into the real character of the purchaser? Was it not put on its guard? Every morning told us of war unhappily raging in Europe. Could there be doubt that these large purchases were for the benefit of one of the belligerents? Was our Government so situated that for the sake of these profits it would neglect political considerations called in this dispatch the most elevated, as moral obligations the most respectable? Was it ready to assume the responsibility characterized by the Spanish minister in a case less plain, as “an act of hostility,” a “violation of the rights of sovereignty,” a “political scandal”?
PARLIAMENTARY LAW ON THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEES OF THE SENATE.
Two Protests against the Competency of the Senate Committee to Investigate the Sale of Arms to France; March 26 and 27, 1872.
March 26, 1872, Mr. Sumner appeared before the Committee to investigate the sale of arms by the United States during the French and German War, in response to a communication signed by the chairman of the Committee requesting his attendance. After reading this communication, Mr. Sumner proceeded to read and file a protest in the following terms:—