Russo-Turkish War (1877-78).
Superiority of Turkey to Russia in the matter of Ships.—On the Danube, in the Black Sea, and Mediterranean, where the principal naval portion of the war was carried out, Turkey was possessed of a fleet of ships infinitely superior to Russia, both in point of numbers and strength, and therefore, to enable her to hold her own against this vast superiority of the Turks, the Russians resorted to an extensive employment of torpedoes, for both offensive and defensive purposes.
Russian Torpedoes.—For many years previous to the outbreak of hostilities in April, 1877, the Russians had been studying the subject of torpedo warfare in all its branches, a certain number of their naval and military officers and men having every year passed through a regular course of torpedo study, at a school specially formed for such a purpose; they had also laid in large stores of submarine mines, spar torpedoes, and were in possession of the Whitehead and towing torpedoes, and also several electric lights, and a few months after war was declared they obtained a fast Thornycroft torpedo boat.
Turkish Torpedoes.—On the other hand, the Turks were only in possession of a number of those huge, unwieldy 500 lbs. buoyant mines, and one electric light; circuit closers, contact mines, boats (steam or otherwise) fitted for use with torpedo, or offensive torpedoes, being conspicuous by their absence.
Thus it will be seen that in the matter of submarine offence and defence, the Russians were as superior to the Turks as the latter were to the former in the matter of ships.
Turkish Defensive Torpedo Operations.—The defensive torpedo operations carried out by the Ottoman naval officers and men were as follows:—
The harbour of Batoum in the Black Sea was protected by a few 500 lbs. buoyant mines, arranged to be fired by observation.
The mouth of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were similarly defended. For this work great praise is due to those who executed the work, for the very strong current and great depth met with in those waters would render such a service a work of great difficulty, even when properly constructed mooring boats, and men trained to such, were employed, both of which in this particular instance were absent.
Soulina, one of the mouths of the Danube, and Suda Bay (Candia) were also protected by similar means.
Russian Defensive Torpedo Operations.—The Russian defensive torpedo operations were very extensive, their principal harbours in the Baltic, as well as those in the Black Sea, were carefully defended by electro-contact mines of the latest type; so also they protected their numerous bridges across the Danube, double and sometimes treble rows of such mines being moored on either side, and in addition they also placed several mines in the Danube, on the chance of destroying the Turkish Danube flotilla.
Destruction of Turkish Gunboat "Suna" by a Russian Submarine Mine.—The only instance that occurred during this war of a vessel being sunk by a stationary submarine mine was that of the Turkish gunboat Suna, at Soulina, in October, 1877, on the occasion of the unsuccessful attack on that place made by the combined Russian and Roumanian flotilla.
About 6 A.M. on the morning of the attack, a "loftcha" containing two of the enemy's electro-contact mines, fitted for laying down, was captured by the Turks, from which it was evident that the Russians had been employed during the night in torpedoing the reach immediately above the Turkish defences. However, not heeding this very practical warning, the Pacha in command of the Soulina squadron ordered the Kartal (a paddle-wheel tug vessel) and the Suna (an old wooden gunboat) to reconnoitre up the river; they accordingly started, the Kartal leading the way. At 8.5 A.M., about fifteen minutes after the two vessels had left their moorings, an explosion was heard, and almost at the same instant the unfortunate gunboat Suna was observed to go down head foremost, her masts only remaining above water. The Kartal, which at the time of the catastrophe was some distance in advance, at once turned back to the assistance of her consort, and managed to save a number of the gunboat's crew, this work having to be performed under a galling fire from the allied flotilla. Owing to this day being the "Feast of Bairam," the unfortunate gunboat was dressed with masthead flags, thus four Turkish ensigns fell into the hands of the enemy, the Pacha refusing permission for any attempt to be made to save them. The reason that the Kartal escaped the fate of her consort was due to her only drawing some 5 feet of water, while the Suna drew at least 8 feet.
The gunboat struck the mine that sunk her on her port bow, the effect of the explosion being to completely smash in that side of her bow, dismount her foremost guns, and carry away her foremast just above the deck (the mast remained standing, though inclined forward); the second lieutenant of the Suna, who was at the time of the explosion standing on her fore bridge, was thrown off and killed, and some twelve of the crew were killed and wounded. To complete the destruction of the Suna, another torpedo was exploded under her port quarter by the Russians. The torpedo that was used on this occasion is detailed at [page 68].
Offensive Torpedo Operations.—The numerous boat torpedo attacks made by the Russians against the Turkish fleet will now be considered. The following accounts have been carefully compiled from two sources, viz. an article written by Captain Chardonneau, which appeared in the 'Revue Maritime et Coloniale,' 1878, and which has been recently translated for the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution by Lieutenant J. Meryon, R.N., and notes taken by the author during his service with the Imperial Ottoman Navy (1877-78).