THE MACHINERY OF OUR FOREIGN SERVICE.


Report of a lecture delivered by Hon. Eugene Schuyler in the National Museum, Washington, D. C., on Saturday, February 28th.


This topic is especially interesting from the fact that so little is known of it except by those in the service of the government whose duties are connected with the foreign service. The government of the United States, in uneventful times at least, is a despotism in the hands of five or six men, working under and through constitutional forms, and subject only to the penalty which is always exacted from very grave mistakes. These men are the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the chairman of the standing Committee on Appropriations, and the chairman of the standing Committee on Ways and Means. In times of disorder, others are added to this list, both from the Senate and from the Cabinet officers. The chairmen of committees for other branches of the service also, at such times, rise into prominence. Without the consent of some one, two or three of these dignitaries no important step in public affairs can be taken. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury are the only Cabinet officers who in ordinary times can influence, not only the policy of the government, but also the welfare of the country, without the permission of Congress; it may be, even without the knowledge of the President.

The currency question, the silver coinage, the position taken recently by the Clearing House in New York, and the state of the gold market, show how a sudden emergency may induce, if not compel, the Secretary of the Treasury to take action which might strongly affect for good or for evil the most vital interests of the nation. Nor is it otherwise with the Secretary of State, who by an intemperate or ill-timed insistence on national or individual rights, or by even a want of tact may cause irritations hard to be appeased. On the other hand, by an ignorance of precedence, an unguarded admission or an act of good nature, he may give up rights which the nation has jealously claimed for a century, or has held in reserve for future use. However, judging by the past, I think our Secretary of State will do none of these things. This official is selected with greater care than any other public officer. He is usually a statesman of high rank or of long experience, and frequently a cautious and shrewd lawyer into the bargain. The possibilities of diplomatic mistakes, however, are such that it is necessary for the Secretary of State to be surrounded by thoroughly trained and skilled subordinates. This department is among the earliest of the great divisions of the administration created by Congress in 1789 for facilitating public business, and during the first forty years of our national existence was in reality, as now in rank, the leading department of the government. Years ago, indeed, our foreign policy was of far more consequence to the country than our domestic policy, although we still had to struggle, if not for our existence, at least for our position and our national rights. The Secretary of State, therefore, is the leading statesman of the party, and at one time in the nation’s history was almost sure of succeeding to the presidency. The duty of the Secretary of State not only is the supervision and management of all the foreign relations of the United States, but also those duties which in other countries are generally given to the Keeper of the Seals, or to the Minister of Justice: such, for instance, as the keeping, promulgation, and publication of the laws; the custody of the great seal, and the preservation of the government archives, as well as the charge of all special relations between the general government and the several states. The first Assistant Secretary is to be considered as a political officer, in the full confidence of his chief, able to advise him, and even at times to replace him; while the second and third Assistant Secretaries have by necessity and custom become permanent officers. The affairs of the department are managed with great secrecy, not only because the officials are careful and trustworthy persons, but because the general public, as a rule, is but slightly interested in matters pertaining to our foreign relations, save when some great subject is under dispute. In England, France or Italy the case is different, since the Minister of Foreign Affairs has a place in Parliament, and can be interrogated at any time with regard to particular questions arising with foreign countries, by which means the public can not help being more or less informed on such matters, even though the progress of negotiations may be kept secret. Here the only method for obtaining such information is by a resolution of either house of Congress, asking from the President the papers on the question in point, and making an investigation, if considered necessary, through the Committee on Foreign Affairs. These papers, however, may be refused, if thought by the President that their publication would be disadvantageous to the interests of the government. There is probably no other country, even Russia or Germany not excepted, where so little is known by the public of the negotiations carried on at any one time by the Secretary of State. This has great advantages, enabling the government to conduct with tranquility a negotiation which may be extremely necessary, and often to settle disputes which, if public opinion were excited, might result in a breach of friendly relations. On account of this quiet way of doing business, many people are of the opinion that very little work is done by the State Department. Clerks often work till late at night and all Sunday, sometimes, preparing commercial and statistical information in response to a question asked in Congress. The work of the chief clerk, in one sense, is the hardest of all, for he has to work in a public room, accessible to all, must inspect every paper that comes in or goes out, must carry the whole business of the department in all its details in his head, must see every one who calls, assist those who have legitimate business, listen to others, giving “suave answers, but no information,” and withal be patient and keep his temper. During the last fiscal year the real expense of the State Department to the nation was less than $400,000; since the total sum expended ($1,288,355.28) was in great part met by the fees, which amounted to $899,652.67.

The State Department has not sole authority for the administration of foreign affairs, for the consideration and approval of the Senate is required, not only regarding nominations to diplomatic and consular posts made by the President, but also regarding treaties made with foreign powers before they can be ratified. It is fortunate, however, that the Senate can only affirm or reject a treaty; but, owing to the wording of the article of our Constitution, which says that the President “with the consent and advice of the Senate shall conclude treaties,” the Senate considers that it has the right to amend a treaty already negotiated, a practice which causes great difficulty, as frequently a Senator to whom the subject under discussion is not quite clear, insists on the addition of two or three words to an instrument, which causes a long delay and frequently protracted negotiations. Treaties are discussed in secret session, partly because the Senate is acting as a privy council to the President, and partly because, if the debates were open, things might be said which would give offense to foreign governments. As to this latter point, I can only observe that the practice of debating a treaty in open session has not been found to work badly in those countries in which it is the habit.

A feeling of jealousy has been growing up between the House of Representatives and the Senate, and has become very evident during the last few months, the House maintaining that, as it alone was empowered to initiate measures touching the revenue, the President had no right to negotiate a commercial treaty without previously consulting that body. I do not think that this contention is supported by the Constitution, but at the same time the practice of our government has changed so much of recent years, in giving larger and larger powers to the lower House, that it is not without some reason that such a view is supported. In order to obviate such disputes, the Secretary of the State Department, before making a commercial treaty and engaging the country in a new commercial system, should, as was done in the negotiation of the Mexican treaty, ask Congress for authority to conclude it. Again, the powers allowed by the Senate to its standing committees form another obstacle to the ratification of treaties, since it is impossible, except by an actual vote of the Senate, to compel the committee to report to the full Senate a treaty which has already been referred to it for consideration. In the Senate committees are elected; in the House they are named by the Speaker. The sub-committee of three, which is in charge of the appropriations for the diplomatic and consular service, is generally named by the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, and in nine cases out of ten is composed of persons possessing no previous acquaintance with the subject. To the sub-committee are presented the estimates made up by the Secretary of State, and a bill is then prepared. It can raise a grade here, establish a consul there, pare down a salary in one place, or abolish a mission in another. Of course some of the changes made by this sub-committee are often very excellent, and even necessary but its main idea seems to be to reduce the appropriation to the lowest limit from motives of economy; not that the nation at large cared for a saving of ten or twenty thousand dollars, but because by gaining the reputation of being economical, constituents might believe its members worthy of a new election. The bill is next reported to the House, where party strength is drilled to support the committees. Every amendment is there voted down, for the men whose salaries are sometimes retroactively voted down, are too far away to be heard. From the House the bill is passed to the Senate. The general theory of the Senate committees is to reject every change made by the House, and to hold pretty closely to the law of the last Congress, restoring what had been omitted, and adding some appropriations for unforeseen expenses, secret service money, or as technically expressed, for “expenses in carrying out the Neutrality Act,” etc. The Senate generally passes the amended bill with slight debate, except in unusual cases. The House next, on motion of the sub-committee, is wont to reject without debate all the Senate amendments, and very often suggests a committee of conference. In like manner the Senate refuses to recede from its amendments, and accepts the conference. Then a secret meeting is held of the two sub-committees, who bargain with each other, giving and taking, each yielding part, and reporting the results to their respective houses in such a technical form that it is impossible to understand it without a careful examination of all the papers. This the clerk reads hastily, and it is passed without debate, often containing new matter never before proposed in the open House. I am not blaming either body, but simply explaining a system which is becoming the habitual way of passing all appropriation bills. How can an already underpaid consul perform his duties properly and vigorously, when every few months he has to consider the chances of having his salary cut down, or when engaged in an important investigation by order of his government, he is quietly informed that his salary ceased a month or six weeks before?

The interests of our country demand that our diplomatic and consular service should be fixed by a general law, subject of course to necessary changes, to be recommended by the department, and not undergo this annual tinkering, to which no other branch of the government and no other class of officials are subjected.

Let us next consider the duties of the agents of the government under the control of the State Department, which belongs to one of two classes, those in the consular and those in the diplomatic service.

Consuls differ from diplomatic agents (by whatever name they may be known), in that while the latter are the representatives of one state or government to another, consuls are the representatives of the individuals of the nation sending them, empowered to protect individual interests, and to procure for their fellow-citizens, as far as possible, the same protection to their rights that they enjoy at home. They represent commercial interests only. They can address themselves directly to the local authorities when the rights of their fellow-citizens are infringed, but if redress be not given, they can not apply to the supreme government, except in cases specially provided for by treaty. They must refer the matter to legation or their own government. In other words they have no diplomatic or representative rights, powers or privileges. Formerly consuls had power as arbitrators, but gradually the legal jurisdiction over disputes was withdrawn in nearly all except non-Christian countries, although for purposes of wills or intestate property this jurisdiction has still been in some measure preserved. With regard to maritime matters the case is different; and here, for the purpose of avoiding protracted disputes in the courts of the country, the consuls are still allowed large jurisdiction. This is nowadays in most cases regulated by special treaties.

Consuls are in a certain way charged with watching over the execution of treaties, for they must protect any of their countrymen whose rights are invaded, and must immediately bring to the attention of their government any such infringement. In general, they observe the movements of naval forces of all nations on the coast near the port in which they are placed, and it is their duty also to watch over the dignity of their own country in maintaining the rights of their flag. Not only are they obliged to give aid, advice, and assistance to the ships of their commercial marine, but they should in their correspondence with their government report all events touching the navigation, the various changes in the commerce of the countries where they live, and especially anything touching the special commerce with the country which sends them. In fine, they are bound to keep pace with the state and progress of manufactures, the rise of new branches of industry, and in general, the increase or diminution of the public wealth, taking especial care to be well acquainted with all matters where other countries may gain advantage over their own. They are given a sort of police jurisdiction over the commercial vessels of their own country; they are generally charged with the duty of investigating shipwrecks and saving property from the wrecked or stranded vessels; with all disputes between captains and sailors; with arresting deserters; and with sending back shipwrecked or discharged seamen. In time of war their duties in these respects are still more important, for they are obliged, so far as the international law, the special treaties, or the laws of the country in which they are placed will permit them, to protect at all hazard the commercial and naval interests of their country against arbitrary acts, whether committed by the country to which they are sent, or by the nation at war with it.

On the death of one of their countrymen they in general take possession of his effects, and in case of property left in the country, manage, keep, and dispose of it for the benefit of the heirs. They are charged, beside, with notarial duties of all kinds, and in most cases they are the only authorities who can validate legal instruments between citizens of their country, or others to be used at home.

In addition to the general duties of a consul various special duties are imposed on American consuls by our tariff system, which do not generally exist in the services of other countries.

It is necessary for our consuls to verify in triplicate every invoice of goods sent to the United States. Not only is he obliged to take the oaths of the manufacturer or exporter, but he is expected to have a special knowledge of the trade of the place and of the actual value of the goods, so that he can control the statements made to him; for our system does not accept the valuations of goods always at the actual price paid for them, but at the market value of the place where they are manufactured or chiefly sold. Besides keeping a number of official records, registers, and fee books, carrying on his ordinary correspondence with the Department of State, and carefully prescribed forms relating to the business of his office, and of everything of interest of a commercial nature to the government, the consul is obliged to make quarterly, semi-annual and annual returns, both to the State Department and to the Treasury. He must, for instance, at the end of each quarter give a digest of the invoices verified by him during that period; of the arrivals and departures of American vessels, a return nowadays exceedingly simple; of deceased American citizens; a record of his notarial services, or unofficial fees; a summary of the whole consular business; and, in case the consul has extraterritorial jurisdiction, a return of the business of the consular coast, and also a record of his official fees.

Still other duties are the submitting of quarterly, semi-annual, and annual reports. The consul at Shanghai has such duties placed upon him as give him supervisory control over all consulates in China, vest him with semi-diplomatic powers, cause him to participate in the municipal government of the foreign settlement, make him a judge in civil causes, give him charge of the gaol in which American prisoners are confined, constitute him judge of a criminal court, of a court of probate and divorce, of an equity and nisi prius court, appoint him United States postmaster, give him the duties of a seaport consulate, and place under his control the protection of the revenue of his government.

Diplomats are agents of a higher class and with different functions. According to Caloo, who is now generally accepted as the best modern writer of international law, diplomacy is the science of the relations existing between different states, such as result from their reciprocal interests, the principles of international law, and the stipulations of treaties and conventions; or, more concisely, diplomacy is the science of relations, or simply the art of negotiations. According to Caloo, the essential nature of diplomacy is to assure the well-being of peoples, to maintain between them peace and good harmony, while guaranteeing the safety, the tranquility, and the dignity of each of them. The part played by diplomatic agents consists principally in conducting negotiations relative to these important objects, in watching over the execution of treaties which follow from them, in preventing anything which might injure the interests of their fellow-citizens in the countries where they reside, and in protecting those of them who may be obliged to ask for their assistance. According to rules adopted by the Congress in Vienna in 1815, diplomatic agents were divided into three classes: (1) Ambassadors, legates, or nuncios; these two latter being sent only by the Pope; (2) Envoys, ministers plenipotentiary, or other persons accredited to a sovereign or sovereign state; and, (3) Chargés d’Affaires, who are accredited only to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. According to the old custom, ambassadors represented the person of the sovereign, and accordingly enjoyed higher ceremonial honors than were paid to other diplomatic agents. They could also address themselves personally to the sovereign or chief magistrate of the country to which they were sent for matters of business, instead of having to negotiate with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Nowadays ambassadors differ from other diplomatic agents only in rank and precedence. The United States having no ambassadors, and but few envoys and ministers plenipotentiary, does not always receive equal privileges of rank with some other countries. Our interests certainly demand that in every country we should be represented by agents of the highest title known or accepted there. More questions are settled by a few informal words at a dinner table than by a formal process of correspondence, although, of course, when great principles are at stake a formal mode of procedure is necessary. It is therefore evidently to be desired that diplomatic agents in a given place should be of equal rank and on a friendly footing with each other.

There are several cases in which the Minister of the United States, if he had more official authority, could manage to have matters arranged which ultimately affect our interests. At Constantinople, for instance, where there is an effort to undermine the treaty rights of all foreigners, the ambassadors have of late adopted the habit of meeting one another in an unofficial way, and of laying down rules and taking action regarding extraterritorial matters, which are then proposed to the rest of the diplomatic body. In general, the representatives of the smaller states are asked for their approval or dissent, but given no chance to suggest or argue. Three years ago, indeed, our government found it necessary to protest against this course, for it was beginning to be tacitly understood that only the ambassadors of what were called the Signatory Powers—those who were represented at the Congress in Berlin in 1878—should have any voice in matters which affected the interests of all foreigners in Turkey. Our protest had the theoretical result of bringing about occasional conferences of all foreign representatives, but the practice remains much as before.

Foreign ministers of the United States should be enabled to live in a style suitable to their rank. Nor is this simply a question of display, but for a minister to be useful he must make acquaintance with the leading persons of the country, and entertain them at his house.

The necessary qualifications for employment in the diplomatic service are a knowledge of French, and generally at least of one other language; a good acquaintance with history, treaties and international law. It is also necessary that he be a gentleman: i. e., acquainted with the ways of the world, and the usages and manners of the best society in each capital in which he is expected to move. The word “gentleman” does not necessarily imply a man of good birth, or belonging to a well known family, although the son or grandson of the President of the United States would always have more credit and influence in the place to which he was sent than one of whom nothing was known.


It is hard to create among a Christian people, enthusiasm for an infidel, however talented he may have been, or however much good he may have done; for his revelation to man, even if true, is an unwelcome and painful revelation, adding nothing to his happiness or comfort in life or in death; while the faith of the believer is an inspiring one, filling his life with the sunshine of hope, and surrounding it with a halo of imperishable glory. Most people have an instinctive dread of the man who with ruthless hand, attempts to destroy all those sacred hopes and fears which have been instilled into their minds by their nearest and dearest benefactor, their mother.—“How to Get On in the World,” by Robert Waters.