The Negro in Chicago: A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot

by Chicago Commission on Race Relations

A. LEGAL STATUS OF NEGROES IN ILLINOIS

The legal status of Negroes in Illinois differs in no respect from that of white persons. The limitations which affect Negroes are established through rules imposed by persons who offer public services and accommodations. When these rules are unfair, evasive, or even illegal, they can be enforced only because of non-enforcement of existing laws. Federal and state courts are in accord in holding Negro men and women in Illinois to be citizens of the United States and of the commonwealth, protected by the laws against discrimination or oppression on account of their race or color.

There are two lines of decisions in Illinois relating to discriminations on account of color. One line of cases prohibits discrimination in certain public places and the other prohibits discrimination against school children. All but two of these cases were tried since the passage of the School Act and the Civil Rights Act, prohibiting such discrimination, enacted in 1874 and 1885, respectively. The civil-rights cases[28] are briefly reviewed below by a consideration of the school cases.

I. CIVIL RIGHTS IN PUBLIC PLACES

The Civil Rights Act, originally passed in 1885, was amended in 1903, and again in 1911. Section 1 of this act now provides:

That all persons within the jurisdiction of said State of Illinois shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodation, advantages, facilities and privileges of inns, restaurants, eating houses, hotels, soda-fountains, saloons, barber shops, bathrooms, theaters, skating rinks, concerts, cafés, bicycle rinks, elevators, ice-cream parlors or rooms, railroads, omnibuses, stages, street cars, boats, funeral hearses, and public conveyances on land and water, and all other places of public accommodation and amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all citizens; nor shall there be any discrimination on account of race or color in the price to be charged and paid for lots or graves in any cemetery or place for burying the dead, but the price to be charged and paid for lots in any cemetery or place for burying the dead shall be applicable alike to all citizens of every race and color.

Section 2 provides:

That any person who shall violate any of the provisions of the foregoing section by denying to any citizen, except for reasons applicable alike to all citizens of every race and color and regardless of color or race, the full enjoyment of any accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges in said section enumerated or by aiding or inciting such denial, shall for every such offense forfeit and pay a sum not less than $25 nor more than $500 to the person aggrieved thereby, to be recovered in any court of competent jurisdiction in the county where said offense was committed, and shall also for every such offense be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not to exceed $500 or shall be imprisoned not more than one year or both; and provided further, that a judgment in favor of the party aggrieved, or punishment upon an indictment, shall be a bar to either prosecution respectively.

Anna William v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company (55 Ill. 185)—the first case of color discrimination which reached the supreme court of Illinois—was heard in 1870, before the passage of the Civil Rights Act. The court decided that a railroad company could not exclude a Negro woman on account of her color from a certain car reserved for the use of ladies. The evidence showed that the brakeman had refused to permit the Negro woman to enter the "ladies' car" and pushed her away. The jury awarded her $200 damages, which the court upheld as reasonable.

Before the Amendment of 1903, the Civil Rights Act of 1885 provided that all persons should be entitled

to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodation, advantages, facilities and privileges of inns, restaurants, eating houses, barber shops, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and all other places of public accommodation and amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all citizens.

In 1896, in Cecil v. Green (60 Ill. App., 61; affirmed, 161 Ill. 265), the court decided that the expression "all other places of public accommodation" embraced only places of the same general character as those enumerated, and therefore that soda fountains were not included within the general term.

The amendment of 1903 included soda fountains, saloons, bathrooms, skating rinks, concerts, bicycle rinks, elevators, and ice-cream parlors.

In Baylies v. Curry (30 Ill. App. 105; affirmed, 128 Ill. 36), decided in 1889, a Negro woman, after being refused tickets at the box-office of Curry's Theater, had a white woman purchase two tickets for her in the balcony. Upon attempting to use them, the Negro woman and her husband were referred back to the box-office and their money returned. The proprietor introduced evidence to show that his theater was in a bad neighborhood, and he had, therefore, adopted the rule of reserving certain rows for Negroes in each section of the house. The supreme court, in affirming judgment for $100 damages, said: "Beyond all question, the Civil Rights Act prohibits the denial of access to the theater and to the several circles or grades of seats therein, because of race or color."

In 1903, in Grace v. Moseley (112 Ill. App. 100), it was held that the statute imposes liability only where the defendant denies or incites a denial of service, not where he merely fails to provide service.

The amendment of 1911 provided that there should not be any discrimination on account of race or color in the price charged for lots or graves in any cemetery.

Relying upon this provision, Gaskill, a Negro, applied for a writ of mandamus to compel the Forest Home Cemetery Company to receive the body of his wife for burial (People ex rel. Gaskill v. Forest Home Cemetery Company, 258 Ill. 36, 1913). The cemetery company had passed a resolution in 1907 that thereafter the cemetery would be maintained for the burial of white persons only—except that colored persons owning lots in the cemetery, and their direct heirs, should be admitted for burial. Gaskill did not own a lot in the cemetery, but four of his children had been buried there fifteen to twenty years before in single graves separated from each other; and when he applied in 1912 for space for the burial of his wife, the company refused permission solely on account of her color.

The court held that the 1911 amendment did not prohibit a cemetery corporation, which did not have the power of eminent domain under its charter and which had no monopoly of the burial places in its vicinity, from making and enforcing a rule excluding colored persons from burial in its cemetery. The case was taken on writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States (238 U.S. 606), but the writ was dismissed for want of jurisdiction without further comment.

In Dean v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company (183 Ill. App. 317; 1913), Dean, a Negro, recovered damages of $300 from the railway company for its refusal to allow him to ride in a station elevator because of his color.[29]

II. DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

The first school case was decided in 1874, before there was any statute forbidding discrimination against Negro children in the public schools.[30] In Chase v. Stephenson (71 Ill. 383; 1874) a taxpayer filed a bill to enjoin the directors of a school district from maintaining a separate school for Negro children; and the court held that the directors had no authority to discriminate on account of color, and the separate school was enjoined.

In March, 1874, "An Act to Protect Colored Children in Their Rights to Attend Public Schools" was passed which provided:

That all directors of schools, boards of education, or other school officers, whose duty it now is or may be hereafter to provide in their respective jurisdictions schools for the education of all children between the ages of six and twenty-one years, are prohibited from excluding directly or indirectly any such child from such school on account of the color of such child.

Two school cases have since arisen at Quincy, Illinois. The first, decided in 1882 (People ex rel. Longress v. Board of Education of Quincy, 101 Ill. 308), was a quo warranto proceeding, attacking a regulation of the school board, requiring all Negro children to attend one school, and excluding them from all others. The court held that the laws of Illinois prohibited such discrimination and the board was without authority to make the regulation.

In the second Quincy case, decided in 1888 (People v. McFall and Board of Education of Quincy 26 Ill. App. 319; affirmed, 124 Ill. 642), the petition for quo warranto charged that the Board of Education had continued the illegal discrimination against Negro children ever since the decision in the first case. The petition was supported by a number of affidavits of Negroes. After a full hearing on affidavits and counter-affidavits the trial court denied the petition. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, characterizing the affidavits in support of the petition as "vague and unsatisfactory"; and the supreme court affirmed the judgment.

Quincy has fourteen schools, and the School Board has divided the city into four school districts. The Lincoln School is exclusively a Negro school and is the only school in the district in which most of the Negroes live. All white children in that district are transferred to other schools, and the few Negro children outside the Lincoln district are urged to attend the Lincoln School. The Negro teachers and Negro principal of the Lincoln School are paid higher salaries than other teachers in Quincy, and are told that if they wish to maintain themselves in the Quincy schools, they must persuade Negro children in other districts to attend the Lincoln School. In this way the board has succeeded in confining Negro children with few exceptions to the Lincoln School. Yet some Negroes are attending five other schools, including the high school.

There have also been two school cases from Alton, Illinois. The first case was People v. Board of Education of Upper Alton (127 Ill. 613), decided in 1889. This was a proceeding by mandamus, begun in the supreme court by John Peair, to compel the Board of Education to admit his two children to the high school of Upper Alton. Certain issues of fact were certified to the circuit court for trial by jury. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of the Board of Education, notwithstanding the following special findings in answer to questions asked by the relator, John Peair:

Q.: When application was made ... to the principal in charge of the said building on behalf of relator's two children for permission to attend school in said building, was such permission refused by said principal because said children were colored?

A.: Yes.

Q.: Have not the children of relator, John Peair, been excluded from attending school in said high school building by the defendants on account of the color of said children?

A.: Yes.

The supreme court held that the general verdict in favor of the Board of Education was "so manifestly the result of misdirection by the court as to be entitled to no consideration," and a writ of mandamus was ordered.

The second school case from Alton, though begun in 1899, was not finally decided until 1908. This was a petition for mandamus filed in the supreme court by Scott Bibb to compel the mayor and city council of Alton to admit his children to the Washington School which they had been attending, and from which he alleged they were excluded on account of color and were transferred to a school attended only by Negro children. The supreme court certified the case to the circuit court of Madison County for the trial of certain issues of facts. Before the supreme court finally ordered the mandamus to issue in 1908 the case had been tried by a jury seven times, had been before the supreme court five times, and the Bibb children were grown up. It is interesting as a flagrant example of race prejudice in the trial judge and jury.

In this case (People ex rel. Scott Bibb v. Mayor and Common Council of Alton, 233 Ill. 542) the supreme court said:

The issues in this case have been tried seven times by juries in the circuit court, and in two of them the jury disagreed. Upon the first trial where there was a verdict it was in favor of the respondents, and it was certified to this court. That verdict was set aside for manifest error prejudicial to the relator in rulings of the court in the admission of evidence. (People ex rel. v. Mayor and Common Council of Alton, 179 Ill. 615.) There was another trial resulting in a verdict in favor of the respondents, which was set aside on account of a misdirection of the court in submitting to the jury a question of law. (People ex rel. v. Mayor and Common Council of Alton, 193 Ill. 309.) Upon another trial there was a third verdict in favor of the respondents, which this court set aside because clearly contrary to the facts proved and without any support in the evidence. It was proved at that trial, beyond dispute or controversy, that the respondents were guilty of the charge contained in the petition, and the evidence introduced by them had no tendency to prove that the intention clearly manifested by their acts did not exist. The verdict could only be accounted for as a product of passion, prejudice or hostility to the law. (People ex rel. v. Mayor and Common Council of Alton, 209 Ill. 461.) The attorney for relator then urged that a peremptory writ should be awarded on the ground that the evidence in the record clearly showed the relator to be entitled to it. The relator, however, had not requested the circuit court to direct a verdict in his favor, and it was said that if such a motion had been made the court would doubtless have granted it. The court said that the issues were sent to the circuit court for trial in conformity with the practice governing the trial of issues of fact in actions at law before a jury, and it was not deemed advisable, in the existing condition of the record, to set aside that order. The case was sent back for another trial, and upon the next trial the attorney for relator moved the court to direct a verdict in his favor, and this the court refused to do, assigning as a reason that this court had directed that the issues be submitted to another jury. The excuse was so shallow and baseless as to justify a conclusion that it was a mere pretext to evade a compliance with the law as declared by this court, and the verdict was set aside and the circuit court directed, in the trial of the questions of fact, to proceed in accordance with the opinion then filed and the earlier opinions in the case. (People ex rel. v. Mayor and Common Council of Alton, 221 Ill. 275.) The case has been again tried, and a verdict in favor of the respondents, unsupported by any evidence, has been returned to this court. The evidence was to all intents and purposes the same as upon the former trials, and demonstrated, beyond the possibility of a doubt, that the children of relator were excluded from the Washington School, which was the most convenient of the public schools of the city to which they had the right to be admitted, and that the exclusion was solely on account of their race and color, and for no other reason whatever. The evidence for the respondents that nothing was said about schools or colored children by the mayor and council in changing the ordinances for the purpose of excluding colored children from schools attended by white children; that the intention to exclude them was not declared, or that orders were never issued to the police, or that the mayor never intended the police force under his control to do what they did and what he knew they were doing, had no tendency whatever to prove that the children of the relator were not excluded by the respondents on account of their race or color. At the conclusion of the evidence the attorney for the relator moved the court to direct a verdict finding the issues in favor of the relator and presented to the court a written instruction for that purpose, but the court denied the motion and refused to give the instruction. In so doing the court erred, and the error was in a matter of law, and contrary to the law in this case as declared by this court in previous opinions filed in the case.

The attorney for respondents says that we ought to approve this verdict for the reason that the questions of fact have been tried seven times in the circuit court; that the juries have twice disagreed and five juries have decided in favor of the respondents, and all the trials have been presided over by learned judges. Great weight is justly given to the conclusion of a jury upon controverted questions of fact where the verdict appears to be the result of an honest exercise of judgment and the weighing, with fair deliberation, of the credibility of witnesses, but it is beyond dispute that this verdict, when viewed in the most favorable light for the respondents, does not represent any conclusion of the jury from the evidence, and that all of the verdicts represent nothing but a refusal by juries to enforce a law which they do not personally approve or which is distasteful to them. In the first opinion filed in this case it was said that it might be that the wisest of both races believe that the best interests of each would be promoted by voluntary separation in the public schools, but that it is no less the duty of courts to enforce the law as it stands, without respect to race or persons. We would be remiss in our duty to enforce the law and would forfeit the respect of all law-abiding citizens if we should approve this verdict for no other reason than because it is one of a series which represent, not the enforcement of law or the discharge of duty, but a deplorable disregard for the law and for the rights of citizens. The verdicts have all been more offensive and dangerous assaults upon the law, the government, and organized societies, than utterances of individuals or societies who are opposed to all law, and which are regarded only as the sentiments of the ignorant, depraved and vicious who are the enemies of a government of laws. These verdicts were pronounced, not by those who were avowed enemies of law and government, but by those who constituted a part of the governmental machinery for the enforcement of the law and who had been sworn to discharge their duty in that regard. Such verdicts not only denote opposition to the enforcement of the law, but they also jeopardize the highest interests of society and individuals. When the law, through the refusal of jurors to regard their oaths, becomes impotent to protect the rights of the humblest, the rights of no person are secure; and jurors may take heed that they obey and enforce the law, lest their refusal to enforce the law for the protection of others becomes effective to deprive them of their legal rights and substitute the beliefs of jurors and courts as to the wisdom of laws enacted for their protection. The error of the court in refusing to direct a verdict is not obviated by the fact that there have been so many verdicts contrary to the law and the evidence. The verdict must be set aside, and the next question is whether the issues shall be again sent to the circuit court for trial.

In this case the effort to obtain a fair trial of the issues of fact before a jury has proved utterly futile, and upon the trial now under review the court refused to direct a verdict in passing upon a question of law raised by the motion of the relator for such a direction. It is clear that after so many trials there can be no further evidence produced by either party but that all the evidence relating to the issues is before us. We are of the opinion that it would be a wrong to the relator to further delay him in establishing his rights and to compel him to add to the trouble and expense already incurred in an effort to compel obedience to the law. The verdict of the jury is set aside and the issues will not be again certified to the circuit court for trial but will now be finally disposed of. The averments of the petition have been fully proved upon repeated trials and the evidence is preserved in the record. The evidence produced by the respondents affords no support to their answer.

We therefore find that all the material facts alleged in the petition are true as therein stated and that the relator is entitled to a writ of mandamus as therein prayed, and it is therefore ordered that a peremptory writ of mandamus issue according to the prayer of the petition, that the respondents pay the costs, and that execution issue therefor.