The Negro in Chicago: A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot

by Chicago Commission on Race Relations

THE PROBLEM

The relation of whites and Negroes in the United States is our most grave and perplexing domestic problem. It involves not only a difference of race—which as to many immigrant races has been happily overcome—but wider and more manifest differences in color and physical features. These make an easy and natural basis for distinctions, discriminations, and antipathies arising from the instinct of each race to preserve its type. Many white Americans, while technically recognizing Negroes as citizens, cannot bring themselves to feel that they should participate in government as freely as other citizens.

Countless schemes have been proposed for solving or dismissing this problem, most of them impracticable or impossible. Of this class are such proposals as: (1) the deportation of 12,000,000 Negroes to Africa; (2) the establishment of a separate Negro state in the United States; (3) complete separation and segregation from the whites and the establishment of a caste system or peasant class; and (4) hope for a solution through the dying out of the Negro race. The only effect of such proposals is to confuse thinking on the vital issues involved and to foster impatience and intolerance.

Our race problem must be solved in harmony with the fundamental law of the nation and with its free institutions. These prevent any deportation of the Negro, as well as any restriction of his freedom of movement within the United States. The problem must not be regarded as sectional or political, and it should be studied and discussed seriously, frankly, and with an open mind.

It is important for our white citizens always to remember that the Negroes alone of all our immigrants came to America against their will by the special compelling invitation of the whites; that the institution of slavery was introduced, expanded, and maintained in the United States by the white people and for their own benefit; and that they likewise created the conditions that followed emancipation.

Our Negro problem, therefore, is not of the Negro's making. No group in our population is less responsible for its existence. But every group is responsible for its continuance; and every citizen, regardless of color or racial origin, is in honor and conscience bound to seek and forward its solution.

Centuries of the Negro slave trade and of slavery as an institution have created, and are often deemed to justify, the deep-seated prejudice against Negroes. They placed a stamp upon the relations of the two races which it will require many years to erase. The memory of these relations has profoundly affected and still affects the industrial, commercial, and social life of the southern states.

The great body of anti-Negro public opinion, preserved in the literature and traditions of the white race during the long, unhappy progress of the Negro from savagery through slavery to citizenship, has exercised a persistent and powerful effect, both conscious and unconscious, upon the thinking and the behavior of the white group generally. Racial misunderstanding has been fostered by the ignorance and indifference of many white citizens concerning the marvelous industry and courage shown by the Negroes and the success they have achieved in their fifty-nine years of freedom.

The Negro race must develop, as all races have developed, from lower to higher planes of living; and must base its progress upon industry, efficiency, and moral character. Training along these lines and general opportunities for education are the fundamental needs. As the problem is national in its scope and gravity, the solution must be national. And the nation must make sure that the Negro is educated for citizenship.

It is of the first importance that old prejudices against the Negroes, based upon their misfortunes and not on their faults, be supplanted with respect, encouragement, and co-operation, and with a recognition of their heroic struggles for self-improvement and of their worthy achievements as loyal American citizens.

Both races need to understand that their rights and duties are mutual and equal, and that their interests in the common good are identical; that relations of amity are the only protection against race clashes; that these relations cannot be forced, but will come naturally as the leaders of each race develop within their own ranks a realization of the gravity of this problem and a vital interest in its solution, and an attitude of confidence, respect, and friendliness toward the people of the other race.

All our citizens, regardless of color or racial origin, need to be taught by their leaders that there is a common standard of superiority for them all in self-respect, honesty, industry, fairness, forbearance, and above all, in generous helpfulness. There is no help or healing in appraising past responsibilities, or in present apportioning of praise or blame. The past is of value only as it aids in understanding the present; and an understanding of the facts of the problem—a magnanimous understanding by both races—is the first step toward its solution.

CHAPTER I
THE CHICAGO RIOT
July 27-August 2, 1919

Thirty-eight persons killed, 537 injured, and about 1,000 rendered homeless and destitute was the casualty list of the race riot which broke out in Chicago on July 27, 1919, and swept uncontrolled through parts of the city for four days. By August 2 it had yielded to the forces of law and order, and on August 8 the state militia withdrew.

A clash between whites and Negroes on the shore of Lake Michigan at Twenty-ninth Street, which involved much stone-throwing and resulted in the drowning of a Negro boy, was the beginning of the riot. A policeman's refusal to arrest a white man accused by Negroes of stoning the Negro boy was an important factor in starting mob action. Within two hours the riot was in full sway, had scored its second fatality, and was spreading throughout the south and southwest parts of the city. Before the end came it reached out to a section of the West Side and even invaded the "Loop," the heart of Chicago's downtown business district. Of the thirty-eight killed, fifteen were whites and twenty-three Negroes; of 537 injured, 178 were whites, 342 were Negroes, and the race of seventeen was not recorded.

In contrast with many other outbreaks of violence over racial friction the Chicago riot was not preceded by excitement over reports of attacks on women or of any other crimes alleged to have been committed by Negroes. It is interesting to note that not one of the thirty-eight deaths was of a woman or girl, and that only ten of the 537 persons injured were women or girls. In further contrast with other outbreaks of racial violence, the Chicago riot was marked by no hangings or burnings.

The rioting was characterized by much activity on the part of gangs of hoodlums, and the clashes developed from sudden and spontaneous assaults into organized raids against life and property.

In handling the emergency and restoring order, the police were effectively reinforced by the state militia. Help was also rendered by deputy sheriffs, and by ex-soldiers who volunteered.

In nine of the thirty-eight cases of death, indictments for murder were voted by the grand jury, and in the ensuing trials there were four convictions. In fifteen other cases the coroner's jury recommended that unknown members of mobs be apprehended, but none of these was ever found.

The conditions underlying the Chicago riot are discussed in detail in other sections of this report, especially in those which deal with housing, industry, and racial contacts. The Commission's inquiry concerning the facts of the riot included a critical analysis of the 5,584 pages of the testimony taken by the coroner's jury; a study of the records of the office of the state's attorney; studies of the records of the Police Department, hospitals, and other institutions with reference to injuries, and of the records of the Fire Department with reference to incendiary fires; and interviews with many public officials and citizens having special knowledge of various phases of the riot. Much information was also gained by the Commission in a series of four conferences to which it invited the foreman of the riot grand jury, the chief and other commanding officers of the Police Department, the state's attorney and some of his assistants, and officers in command of the state militia during the riot.

Background of the riot.—The Chicago riot was not the only serious outbreak of interracial violence in the year following the war. The same summer witnessed the riot in Washington, about a week earlier; the riot in Omaha, about a month later; and then the week of armed conflict in a rural district of Arkansas due to exploitation of Negro cotton producers.

Nor was the Chicago riot the first violent manifestation of race antagonism in Illinois. In 1908 Springfield had been the scene of an outbreak that brought shame to the community which boasted of having been Lincoln's home. In 1917 East St. Louis was torn by a bitter and destructive riot which raged for nearly a week, and was the subject of a Congressional investigation that disclosed appalling underlying conditions.

This Commission, while making a thorough study of the Chicago riot, has reviewed briefly, for comparative purposes, the essential facts of the Springfield and East St. Louis riots, and of minor clashes in Chicago occurring both before and after the riot of 1919.

Chicago was one of the northern cities most largely affected by the migration of Negroes from the South during the war. The Negro population increased from 44,103 in 1910 to 109,594 in 1920, an increase of 148 per cent. Most of this increase came in the years 1916-19. It was principally caused by the widening of industrial opportunities due to the entrance of northern workers into the army and to the demand for war workers at much higher wages than Negroes had been able to earn in the South. An added factor was the feeling, which spread like a contagion through the South, that the great opportunity had come to escape from what they felt to be a land of discrimination and subserviency to places where they could expect fair treatment and equal rights. Chicago became to the southern Negro the "top of the world."

The effect of this influx of Negroes into Chicago industries is reviewed in another section of this report.[4] It is necessary to point out here only that friction in industry was less than might have been expected. There had been a few strikes which had given the Negro the name of "strike breaker." But the demand for labor was such that there were plenty of jobs to absorb all the white and Negro workers available. This condition continued even after the end of the war and demobilization.

In housing, however, there was a different story. Practically no new building had been done in the city during the war, and it was a physical impossibility for a doubled Negro population to live in the space occupied in 1915. Negroes spread out of what had been known as the "Black Belt" into neighborhoods near-by which had been exclusively white. This movement, as described in another section of this report, developed friction, so much so that in the "invaded" neighborhoods bombs were thrown at the houses of Negroes who had moved in, and of real estate men, white and Negro, who sold or rented property to the newcomers. From July 1, 1917, to July 27, 1919, the day the riot began, twenty-four such bombs had been thrown. The police had been entirely unsuccessful in finding those guilty, and were accused of making little effort to do so.

A third phase of the situation was the increased political strength gained by Mayor Thompson's faction in the Republican party. Negro politicians affiliated with this faction had been able to sway to its support a large proportion of the voters in the ward most largely inhabited by Negroes. Negro aldermen elected from this ward were prominent in the activities of this faction. The part played by the Negro vote in the hard-fought partisan struggle is indicated by the fact that in the Republican primary election on February 25, 1919, Mayor Thompson received in this ward 12,143 votes, while his two opponents, Olson and Merriam, received only 1,492 and 319 respectively. Mayor Thompson was re-elected on April 1, 1919, by a plurality of 21,622 in a total vote in the city of 698,920; his vote in this ward was 15,569, to his nearest opponent's 3,323, and was therefore large enough to control the election. The bitterness of this factional struggle aroused resentment against the race that had so conspicuously allied itself with the Thompson side.

As part of the background of the Chicago riot, the activities of gangs of hoodlums should be cited. There had been friction for years, especially along the western boundary of the area in which the Negroes mainly live, and attacks upon Negroes by gangs of young toughs had been particularly frequent in the spring just preceding the riot. They reached a climax on the night of June 21, 1919, five weeks before the riot, when two Negroes were murdered. Each was alone at the time and was the victim of unprovoked and particularly brutal attack. Molestation of Negroes by hoodlums had been prevalent in the vicinity of parks and playgrounds and at bathing-beaches.

On two occasions shortly before the riot the forewarnings of serious racial trouble had been so pronounced that the chief of police sent several hundred extra policemen into the territory where trouble seemed imminent. But serious violence did not break out until Sunday afternoon, July 27, when the clash on the lake shore at Twenty-ninth Street resulted in the drowning of a Negro boy.

The beginning of the riot.—Events followed so fast in the train of the drowning that this tragedy may be considered as marking the beginning of the riot.

It was four o'clock Sunday afternoon, July 27, when Eugene Williams, seventeen-year-old Negro boy, was swimming offshore at the foot of Twenty-ninth Street. This beach was not one of those publicly maintained and supervised for bathing, but it was much used. Although it flanks an area thickly inhabited by Negroes, it was used by both races, access being had by crossing the railway tracks which skirt the lake shore. The part near Twenty-seventh Street had by tacit understanding come to be considered as reserved for Negroes, while the whites used the part near Twenty-ninth Street. Walking is not easy along the shore, and each race had kept pretty much to its own part, observing, moreover, an imaginary boundary extending into the water.

Williams, who had entered the water at the part used by Negroes, swam and drifted south into the part used by the whites. Immediately before his appearance there, white men, women, and children had been bathing in the vicinity and were on the beach in considerable numbers. Four Negroes walked through the group and into the water. White men summarily ordered them off. The Negroes left, and the white people resumed their sport. But it was not long before the Negroes were back, coming from the north with others of their race. Then began a series of attacks and retreats, counter-attacks, and stone-throwing. Women and children who could not escape hid behind débris and rocks. The stone-throwing continued, first one side gaining the advantage, then the other.

Williams, who had remained in the water during the fracas, found a railroad tie and clung to it, stones meanwhile frequently striking the water near him. A white boy of about the same age swam toward him. As the white boy neared, Williams let go of the tie, took a few strokes, and went down. The coroner's jury rendered a verdict that he had drowned because fear of stone-throwing kept him from shore. His body showed no stone bruises, but rumor had it that he had actually been hit by one of the stones and drowned as a result.

On shore guilt was immediately placed upon a certain white man by several Negro witnesses who demanded that he be arrested by a white policeman who was on the spot. No arrest was made.

The tragedy was sensed by the battling crowd and, awed by it, they gathered on the beach. For an hour both whites and Negroes dived for the boy without results. Awe gave way to excited whispers. "They" said he was stoned to death. The report circulated through the crowd that the police officer had refused to arrest the murderer. The Negroes in the crowd began to mass dangerously. At this crucial point the accused policeman arrested a Negro on a white man's complaint. Negroes mobbed the white officer, and the riot was under way.

One version of the quarrel which resulted in the drowning of Williams was given by the state's attorney, who declared that it arose among white and Negro gamblers over a craps game on the shore, "virtually under the protection of the police officer on the beat." Eyewitnesses to the stone-throwing clash appearing before the coroner's jury saw no gambling, but said it might have been going on, but if so, was not visible from the water's edge. The crowd undoubtedly included, as the grand jury declared, "hoodlums, gamblers, and thugs," but it also included law-abiding citizens, white and Negro.

This charge, that the first riot clash started among gamblers who were under the protection of the police officer, and also the charge that the policeman refused to arrest the stone-thrower were vigorously denied by the police. The policeman's star was taken from him, but after a hearing before the Civil Service Commission it was returned, thus officially vindicating him.

The two facts, the drowning and the refusal to arrest, or widely circulated reports of such refusal, must be considered together as marking the inception of the riot. Testimony of a captain of police shows that first reports from the lake after the drowning indicated that the situation was calming down. White men had shown a not altogether hostile feeling for the Negroes by assisting in diving for the body of the boy. Furthermore a clash started on this isolated spot could not be augmented by outsiders rushing in. There was every possibility that the clash, without the further stimulus of reports of the policeman's conduct, would have quieted down.

Chronological story of the riot.—After the drowning of Williams, it was two hours before any further fatalities occurred. Reports of the drowning and of the alleged conduct of the policeman spread out into the neighborhood. The Negro crowd from the beach gathered at the foot of Twenty-ninth Street. As it became more and more excited, a group of officers was called by the policeman who had been at the beach. James Crawford, a Negro, fired into the group of officers and was himself shot and killed by a Negro policeman who had been sent to help restore order.

During the remainder of the afternoon of July 27, many distorted rumors circulated swiftly throughout the South Side. The Negro crowd from Twenty-ninth Street got into action, and white men who came in contact with it were beaten. In all, four white men were beaten, five were stabbed, and one was shot. As the rumors spread, new crowds gathered, mobs sprang into activity spontaneously, and gangs began to take part in the lawlessness.

Farther to the west, as darkness came on, white gangsters became active. Negroes in white districts suffered severely at their hands. From 9:00 p.m. until 3:00 a.m. twenty-seven Negroes were beaten, seven were stabbed, and four were shot.

Few clashes occurred on Monday morning. People of both races went to work as usual and even continued to work side by side, as customary, without signs of violence. But as the afternoon wore on, white men and boys living between the Stock Yards and the "Black Belt" sought malicious amusement in directing mob violence against Negro workers returning home.

Street-car routes, especially transfer points, were thronged with white people of all ages. Trolleys were pulled from wires and the cars brought under the control of mob leaders. Negro passengers were dragged to the street, beaten, and kicked. The police were apparently powerless to cope with these numerous assaults. Four Negro men and one white assailant were killed, and thirty Negro men were severely beaten in the street-car clashes.

The "Black Belt" contributed its share of violence to the record of Monday afternoon and night. Rumors of white depredations and killings were current among the Negroes and led to acts of retaliation. An aged Italian peddler, one Lazzeroni, was set upon by young Negro boys and stabbed to death. Eugene Temple, white laundryman, was stabbed to death and robbed by three Negroes.

A Negro mob made a demonstration outside Provident Hospital, an institution conducted by Negroes, because two injured whites who had been shooting right and left from a hurrying automobile on State Street were taken there. Other mobs stabbed six white men, shot five others, severely beat nine more, and killed two in addition to those named above.

Rumor had it that a white occupant of the Angelus apartment house had shot a Negro boy from a fourth-story window. Negroes besieged the building. The white tenants sought police protection, and about 100 policemen, including some mounted men, responded. The mob of about 1,500 Negroes demanded the "culprit," but the police failed to find him after a search of the building. A flying brick hit a policeman. There was a quick massing of the police, and a volley was fired into the Negro mob. Four Negroes were killed and many were injured. It is believed that had the Negroes not lost faith in the white police force it is hardly likely that the Angelus riot would have occurred.

At this point, Monday night, both whites and Negroes showed signs of panic. Each race grouped by itself. Small mobs began systematically in various neighborhoods to terrorize and kill. Gangs in the white districts grew bolder, finally taking the offensive in raids through territory "invaded" by Negro home seekers. Boys between sixteen and twenty-two banded together to enjoy the excitement of the chase.

Automobile raids were added to the rioting Monday night. Cars from which rifle and revolver shots were fired were driven at great speed through sections inhabited by Negroes. Negroes defended themselves by "sniping" and volley-firing from ambush and barricade. So great was the fear of these raiding parties that the Negroes distrusted all motor vehicles and frequently opened fire on them without waiting to learn the intent of the occupants. This type of warfare was kept up spasmodically all Tuesday and was resumed with vigor Tuesday night.

At midnight, Monday, street-car clashes ended by reason of a general strike on the surface and elevated lines. The street-railway tie-up was complete for the remainder of the week. But on Tuesday morning this was a new source of terror for those who tried to walk to their places of employment. Men were killed en route to their work through hostile territory. Idle men congregated on the streets, and gang-rioting increased. A white gang of soldiers and sailors in uniform, augmented by civilians, raided the "Loop," or downtown section of Chicago, early Tuesday, killing two Negroes and beating and robbing several others. In the course of these activities they wantonly destroyed property of white business men.

Gangs sprang up as far south as Sixty-third Street in Englewood and in the section west of Wentworth Avenue near Forty-seventh Street. Premeditated depredations were the order of the night. Many Negro homes in mixed districts were attacked, and several of them were burned. Furniture was stolen or destroyed. When raiders were driven off they would return again and again until their designs were accomplished.

The contagion of the race war broke over the boundaries of the South Side and spread to the Italians on the West Side. This community became excited over a rumor, and an Italian crowd killed a Negro, Joseph Lovings.

Wednesday saw a material lessening of crime and violence. The "Black Belt" and the district immediately west of it were still storm centers. But the peak of the rioting had apparently passed, although the danger of fresh outbreaks of magnitude was still imminent. Although companies of the militia had been mobilized in nearby armories as early as Monday night, July 28, it was not until Wednesday evening at 10:30 that the mayor yielded to pressure and asked for their help.

Rain on Wednesday night and Thursday drove idle people of both races into their homes. The temperature fell, and with it the white heat of the riot. From this time on the violence was sporadic, scattered, and meager. The riot seemed well under control, if not actually ended.

Friday witnessed only a single reported injury. At 3:35 a.m. Saturday incendiary fires burned forty-nine houses in the immigrant neighborhood west of the Stock Yards. Nine hundred and forty-eight people, mostly Lithuanians, were made homeless, and the property loss was about $250,000. Responsibility for these fires was never fixed. The riot virtually ceased on Saturday. For the next few days injured were reported occasionally, and by August 8 the riot zone had settled down to normal and the militia was withdrawn.

Growth of the riot.—The riot period was thirteen days in length, from Sunday, July 27, through Thursday, August 8, the day on which the troops were withdrawn. Of this time, only the first seven days witnessed active rioting. The remaining days marked the return toward normal. In the seven active days, rioting was not continuous but intermittent, being furious for hours, then fairly quiescent for hours. The first three days saw the most acute disturbance, and in this span there were three main periods: 4:00 p.m. Sunday till 3:00 a.m. Monday; 9:00 a.m. Monday till 9:00 a.m. Tuesday; noon Tuesday till midnight. This left two long intervals of comparative quiet, six hours on Monday and three hours on Tuesday. On the fourth day, Wednesday, there were scattered periods of rioting, each of a few hours' duration. Thus Monday afternoon to Tuesday morning was the longest stretch of active rioting in the first four days.

For the most part the riot was confined to the South Side of the city. There were two notable exceptions, the district north and west of the south branch of the Chicago River and the "Loop" or downtown business district. A few isolated clashes occurred on the North Side and on the extreme West Side, but aside from these the area covered was that shown on the accompanying outline map.

For the purposes of discussion it is convenient to divide the riot area into seven districts. The boundaries in some instances are due to the designation of Wentworth Avenue by the police as a boundary west of which no Negroes should be allowed, and east of which no whites should be allowed.

1. "Black Belt." From Twenty-second to Thirty-ninth, inclusive; Wentworth Avenue to the lake, exclusive of Wentworth; Thirty-ninth to Fifty-fifth, inclusive; Clark to Michigan, exclusive of Michigan.
2. Area contested by both Negroes and whites. Thirty-ninth to Fifty-fifth, inclusive; Michigan to the lake.
3. Southwest Side, including the Stock Yards district; south of the Chicago River to Fifty-fifth; west of Wentworth, including Wentworth.
4. Area south of Fifty-fifth and east of Wentworth.
5. Area south of Fifty-fifth and west of Wentworth.
6. Area north and west of the Chicago River.
7. "Loop" or business district and vicinity.

In the district designated as the "Black Belt" about 90 per cent of the Negroes live. District II, the "contested area," is that in which most of the bombings have occurred. Negroes are said to be "invading" this district. Extension here instead of into District III, toward the Stock Yards neighborhood, may be explained partly by the hostility which the Irish and Polish groups to the west had often shown to Negroes. The white hoodlum element of the Stock Yards district, designated as III, was characterized by the state's attorney of Cook County, when he remarked that more bank robbers, pay-roll bandits, automobile bandits, highwaymen, and strong-arm crooks come from this particular district than from any other that has come to his notice during seven years of service as chief prosecuting official.[5]

In District IV and V, south of Fifty-fifth Street, Negroes live in small communities surrounded by white people or are scattered through white neighborhoods. District VI has a large Italian population. District VII is Chicago's wholesale and retail center.

THE CHICAGO RIOT
JULY, 27 TO AUGUST, 8, 1919

On only one day of the riot were all these districts involved in the race warfare. This was Tuesday. On Sunday Districts I, III, and IV suffered clashes; on Monday all but District VI were involved; on Tuesday the entire area was affected; on Wednesday District VII was not included, and District VI witnessed only one clash; on Thursday District IV was again normal, and Districts II, V, and VII were comparatively quiet; during the remainder of the week only the first three districts named were active.

The worst clashes were in Districts I and III, and of those reported injured, 34 per cent received their wounds in the "Black Belt," District I, and 41 per cent on the Southwest Side, in the district including the Stock Yards, District III.

Factors contributing to the subsidence of the riot were the natural reaction from the tension, efforts of police and citizens to curb the rioters, the entrance of the militia on Wednesday, and last, but perhaps not least, a heavy rain.

The longest period of violence without noticeable lull was 9:00 a.m. Monday to 9:00 a.m. Tuesday. On Tuesday the feeling was most intense, as shown by the nature of the clashes. Arson was prevalent on Tuesday for the first time, and the property loss was considerable. But judging by the only definite index, the number of dead and injured, Monday exceeded Tuesday in violence, showing 229 injured and eighteen dead as against 139 injured and eleven dead on the latter day. While it is apparent that no single hour or even day can be called the peak of the riot, the height of violence clearly falls within the two-day period Monday, July 28, and Tuesday, July 29.

The change in the nature of the clashes day by day showed an increase in intensity of feeling and greater boldness in action. This development reached its peak on Tuesday. Later came a decline, sporadic outbursts succeeding sustained activity.

Factors influencing growth of the riot.—After the attacks had stopped, about 3:00 a.m. Monday, they did not again assume serious proportions until Monday afternoon, when workers began to return to their homes, and idle men gathered in the streets in greater numbers than during working hours. The Stock Yards laborers are dismissed for the day in shifts. Negroes coming from the Yards at the 3:00 p.m., 4:00 p.m., and later shifts were met by white gangs armed with bats and clubs. On Tuesday morning men going to work, both Negro and white, were attacked.

The main areas of violence were thoroughfares and natural highways between the job and the home. On the South Side 76 per cent of all the injuries occurred on such streets. The most turbulent corners were those on State Street between Thirty-first and Thirty-ninth, on Cottage Grove Avenue at Sixty-third Street, on Halsted Street at Thirty-fifth and Forty-seventh streets and on Archer Avenue at Thirty-fifth Street. Injuries at these spots were distributed as follows:[6]

		Injuries	Deaths
State Street—
	at Thirty-first	7
	between Thirty-first and Thirty-fifth	2
	at Thirty-fifth	9	1
	between Thirty-fifth and Thirty-ninth	19	2
	at Thirty-ninth	3
Cottage Grove Avenue—
	at Sixty-third Street	8
Halsted Street—
	at Thirty-fifth	8
	at Forty-seventh	5
Archer Avenue—
	at Thirty-fifth Street	7
Streets which suffered most from rioting were—
	State	61	6
	Thirty-fifth	50	5
	Forty-seventh	32	2
	Halsted	32
	Thirty-first	29	1

The street-car situation had an effect upon the riot both before the strike and after it. Because of a shortage of labor at the time, the surface-street-car company had put on a number of inexperienced men. This may account for the inefficiency of some crews in handling attacked cars.

An example is the case of Henry Goodman who was killed in an attack on a Thirty-ninth Street car. The car was stopped at Union Avenue by a truck suspiciously stalled across the tracks. White men boarded the car and beat and chased six or eight Negro passengers. When asked under oath to whom the truck directly in front of him belonged and what color it was, the motorman replied, "I couldn't say." When asked what time his car left the end of the line and whether or not he had seen any Negroes hit on the car, he answered, "I didn't pay any attention." The motorman said he made a report of the case, but it could not be found by anyone in the street-car company's office. The conductor of this car had been given orders to warn Negroes that there was rioting in the district through which the car ran. He did not do this. He ignored the truck. No names of witnesses were secured. The motorman was an extra man and had run on that route only during the day of the attack.

In the case of John Mills, a Negro who was killed as he fled from a Forty-seventh Street car, the motorman left the car while Negroes were being beaten inside it. Neither motorman nor conductor took names of witnesses or attempted to fix a description of the assailants in mind.

When B. F. Hardy, a Negro, was killed on a street car at Forty-sixth Street and Cottage Grove Avenue, the motorman and conductor offered no resistance and did not get names or descriptions.

The testimony of the conductor and motorman on a car attacked at Thirty-eighth Street and Ashland Avenue was clear and showed an attempt to get all information possible. They secured names of witnesses. One member of the crew had been in the service of the Chicago Surface Lines for ten years, and the other for twelve years.

The tie-up of the street railways affected the riot situation by forcing laborers to walk, making them more liable to assault in the hostile districts, by keeping many workers from jobs, turning out on the streets hundreds of idle men, and by increasing the use of automobiles.

Tuesday morning two white men were killed while walking to work through the Negro area, and two Negroes were killed while going through the white area.

Curiosity led the idle to the riot zone. One such was asked on the witness stand why he went. "What was I there for? Because I walked there—my own bad luck. I was curious to see how they did it, that is all."

Under cover of legitimate use gangs used motor vehicles for raiding. Witnesses of rioting near Ogden Park said trucks unloaded passengers on Racine Avenue, facilitating the formation of a mob. On Halsted Street crowds of young men rode in trucks shouting they were out to "get the niggers." An automobile load of young men headed off Heywood Thomas, Negro, and shot him, at Taylor and Halsted streets, as he was walking home from work.

Beside daily routine and the street-car situation, the weather undoubtedly had an influence in the progress of the riot. July 27 was hot, 96 degrees, or fourteen points above normal. It was the culmination of a series of days with high temperatures around 95 degrees, which meant that nerves were strained. The warm weather of Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday also kept crowds on the streets and sitting on doorsteps until late at night. Innocent people trying to keep cool were injured when automobiles raced through the streets, the occupants firing to right and left. Wednesday night and Thursday it rained. Cool weather followed for the rest of the week.

[Gangs and "athletic clubs."]—Gangs and their activities were an important factor throughout the riot. But for them it is doubtful if the riot would have gone beyond the first clash. Both organized gangs and those which sprang into existence because of the opportunity afforded seized upon the excuse of the first conflict to engage in lawless acts.

It was no new thing for youthful white and Negro groups to come to violence. For years, as the sections of this report dealing with antecedent clashes and with recreation show, there had been clashes over baseball grounds, swimming-pools in the parks, the right to walk on certain streets, etc.

Gangs whose activities figured so prominently in the riot were all white gangs, or "athletic clubs." Negro hoodlums do not appear to form organized gangs so readily. Judges of the municipal court said that there are no gang organizations among Negroes to compare with those found among young whites.

The Stock Yards district, just west of the main Negro area, is the home of many of these white gangs and clubs; it is designated as District III in the discussion of the riot growth. The state's attorney, as already indicated (see [p. 8]), referred to the many young offenders who come from this particular district. A police detective sergeant who investigated the riot cases in this district said of this section, "It is a pretty tough neighborhood to try to get any information out there; you can't do it." A policeman on the beat in the district said, "There is the Canaryville bunch in there and the Hamburg bunch. It is a pretty tough hole in there."

There was much evidence and talk of the political "pull" and even leadership of these gangs with reference to their activities in the riot. A member of "Ragen's Colts" just after the riot passed the word that the "coppers" from downtown were looking for club members, but that "there need be no fear of the coppers from the station at the Yards for they were all fixed and told to lay off on club members." During the riot he claimed they were well protected by always having a "cop" ride in one of the automobiles so everything would be "O.K." in case members of the gang were picked up. Another member of the club said he had been "tipped off by the police at the Yards to clean out and keep away from the usual hangouts because investigators were working out of Hoyne's and out of Brundage's offices, and were checking up on the activities of the 'Ragen's' during the riot."

The foreman of the August grand jury which investigated the riot cases said in testifying before the Commission:

The lead we got to investigate the Forty-seventh Street district was from an anonymous letter stating that Ragen had such influence in the Forty-seventh Street police station that these individuals were allowed to go without due process of law.

I didn't believe that was a fact in this particular instance. We did learn that Ragen was a great power in that district and at the time of our investigation we learned that some of the "Ragen's Colts" had broken into the police station and pried open a door of a closet where they had a good deal of evidence in the nature of weapons of prisoners concealed, and they got all of this evidence out of there without the police knowing anything about it.

The station referred to is at Forty-seventh and Halsted streets. Gangs operated for hours up and down Forty-seventh Street, Wells, Princeton, Shields, and Wentworth avenues and Federal Street without hindrance from the police.

CROWDS ARMED WITH BRICKS SEARCHING FOR A NEGRO

WHITES STONING NEGRO TO DEATH
Actual photograph of the killing of a Negro by the mob shown above after chasing him into his home.

THE ARRIVAL OF THE POLICE
He was knocked from the stairway by a brick. Two men are here shown hurling bricks at the dying Negro.

A judge of the municipal court said in testimony before the Commission: "They seemed to think they had a sort of protection which entitled them to go out and assault anybody. When the race riots occurred it gave them something to satiate the desire to inflict their evil propensities on others."

Besides shouting as they rode down the streets in trucks that they were out to "get the niggers," they defied the law in other ways. When the militia men came on the scene on the fourth day of the riot, they testified to trouble with these gangsters. One of the colonels testified before the Commission: "They didn't like to be controlled. They would load up heavy trucks with rowdies and try to force through the lines. They'd come tooting their horns and having back pressure explosions like gatling guns."

Some of the "athletic club" gangsters had criminal records. L —— W —— was accused of being one of the leaders of the gang around Forty-seventh and Wells streets. He himself said boastfully, "I have been arrested about fifteen times for 'disorderly' and never was arrested with a knife or a gun." Several witnesses said they had seen him during the riot one night leading the mob and brandishing a razor and the next night waving a gun. He was not arrested. D —— H ——, seventeen years old, was identified as being active in the rioting near Forty-seventh Street and Forrestville Avenue. His defense was that he was not closer to the Negro assaulted than across the street, but because he was arrested the year before for a "stick-up" people looked "funny" at him when anything happened. R —— C —— was accused of having been implicated in the arson cases on Shields Avenue. When his mother was interviewed, she said she knew nothing of the rioting, but said her son was at the time in the county jail, "but not for that." W —— G —— was identified many times as having taken part in the arson on Wentworth Avenue. He was indicted for both arson and conspiracy to riot. Two years before the riot he had been arrested for larceny.

All who discussed gangs before the Commission said that most of the members were boys of seventeen to twenty-two years of age. Witnesses before the coroner's juries testified to the youth of the participants in mobs. Many of the active assailants of street cars were boys. In the case of the Negro Hardy who was killed on a street car, it was said that the murderers were not over twenty years, and many were nearer sixteen. In the raids in the Ogden Park district the participants were between the ages of fifteen and twenty. The raid just west of Wentworth Avenue, where a number of houses were much damaged, was perpetrated by boys of these ages. The attacking mob on Forty-third Street near Forrestville Avenue, was led by boys of eighteen to twenty-one. The only two hoodlums caught participating in the outrages in the "Loop," the downtown business district, were seventeen and about twenty-one. Most of those arrested on suspicion in the arson cases were taken before the boys' court. Negroes involved in many cases as assailants were also youthful. The young Negro boys who killed Lazzeroni were fourteen to eighteen; those who killed Pareko and Perel were about sixteen.

A member of "Ragen's Colts" is said to have boasted that their territory extended from Cottage Grove Avenue to Ashland Avenue and from Forty-third Street to Sixty-third Street. At Sixty-third Street and Cottage Grove Avenue they were said to have attacked a colored man in a restaurant and thrown him out of the window. It was reported that trucks of a downtown store, each carrying about thirty men, yelling that they were "Ragen's Colts" and that "Ragen's bunch" were going to clean out the community, came to Sixtieth Street and Racine Avenue. Some of the boys who took part in the assault upon Negroes at Sixtieth and Ada streets were reputed to be members of "Ragen's Colts." The club, according to some of its own members, operated with automobiles from which they managed to "bump off a number of Niggers." A truck driver said he had driven some "Ragen's Colts" to Forty-seventh and Halsted streets, where they "dropped" four or five people, then he drove them back to the "Ragen's Colts" clubhouse at Fifty-second and Halsted streets. "And," he says, "they had plenty of guns and ammunition." State's Attorney Hoyne, however, said that no evidence could be found that "Ragen's Colts" had a store of arms. Members of the Illinois Reserve Militia reported that they had been threatened by "Ragen's Colts" that they would be picked off one by one when they got off duty.

One of the most serious cases of rioting in which members of "Ragen's Colts" were reported to be implicated was the raid upon Shields Avenue, where there were nine houses occupied by Negroes. At 8:30 Tuesday evening 200 or 300 gangsters started at one corner and worked through the block, throwing furniture out of windows and setting fires. A white man who owned a house on this street which he rented to Negroes says that after the raid several young men warned him, "If you open your mouth against 'Ragen's' we will not only burn your house down but we will 'do' you."

The Lorraine Club, according to five witnesses, was also implicated in arson and raids upon homes of Negroes. Their operations, according to reports, were on Forty-seventh Street and on Wells Street and Wentworth Avenue between Forty-seventh and Forty-eighth streets. Negroes were chased, guns were fired, windows broken, front doors smashed in, furniture destroyed, and finally homes were burned. All Negro families were driven out. The attack was planned, and news of its imminence spread abroad in the morning. Rioting started in the afternoon of July 29, and culminated late that night. There was no interference from the police at any time. It was said that one of the leaders of the gang who had an express and coal yard carried away furniture in his wagon. Another was recognized as a youth who had shot a Negro woman during the afternoon. They are reported to have attacked an undertaker and friends who came to remove the body of a dead Negro. Three of the rioters were arrested upon the identification of several people, but two were released in the municipal court, and the third had a "no bill" returned before the grand jury. One was released because no witnesses were present to prosecute him. The witnesses said they were not notified.

A member of the Lorraine Club denied that his club had anything to do with this riot, but said it was Our Flag Club that did the "dirty work." Our Flag Club is located farther east on Forty-seventh Street near Union Avenue. When John Mills was dragged from a street car at this point and killed, a policeman recognized several of the club's members in the crowd, but vouchsafed the opinion that they were not part of the aggressive mob, "for they did not run as did the others when the patrol came down the street." Another policeman said he had never had any trouble with the club.

Eight members of the Sparklers' Club were seen at the fire at 5919 Wentworth Avenue, a building in which two Negro families lived. The arson is reported to have been planned in a neighboring cigar store. One of the boys put waste soaked in gasoline under the porch and ran. Two of them threw oil in the building and two others lit it. It took three attempts to make a fire at this place. Each time it was started the Fire Department put it out. Two of the boys are declared to have stolen phonograph records and silverware from the house. A lad not a member of the club was with them at the fire. Afterward one of the boys warned him, "Watch your dice and be careful or you won't see your home any more." Six boys were held for arson, in connection with this affair; one was discharged in the boys' court, and the cases of two others were nolle prossed. In connection with their arrest the Chicago Tribune of August 15, 1919, said:

Evidence that organized bands of white youths have been making a business of burning Negro dwellings was said to have been handed to Attorney General Brundage and Assistant State's Attorney Irwin Walker.... Chief of Police Garrity, also informed of the Fire Marshal's charges, declared several so-called athletic clubs in the Stock Yards district may lose their charters as a result.

A report about the Aylward Club was to the effect that as the Negroes came from the Stock Yards on Monday, a gang of its members armed with clubs was waiting for them and that each singled out a Negro and beat him, the police looking on.

The names of a number of gang ringleaders were reported by investigators. For illustration, L. Dennis, a Negro of 6059 Throop Street, was attacked on the night of Monday, July 28, by a mob led by three roughs whose names were learned and whose loafing place was at Sixty-third Street and Racine Avenue. A mob of thirty white men who shot Francis Green, Negro, eighteen years old, at Garfield Boulevard and State Street had a club headquarters in the vicinity of Fifty-fourth Street and their "hangout" was at the corner of Garfield Boulevard and State Street.

Other clubs mentioned in riot testimony before the coroner's jury, but not in connection with riot clashes, are the Pine Club, the Hamburgers, the Emeralds, the White Club, Favis Grey's, and the Mayflower. The police closed the clubs for a period of several months after the riot. There were then in existence a number of Negro gambling clubs, and the state's attorney declared that it was the colored gamblers who "started this shooting and tearing around town," and that "as soon as they heard the news that the boy Williams was drowned, they filled three or four machines and started out to shoot."

A saloon-keeper near Wabash Avenue and Fifty-fifth Street, one of the leaders of these colored gamblers, was identified by a white woman as being in an automobile with five other Negroes exhorting colored men to riot after the drowning of Williams. The next day he was arrested in an automobile with other colored men who were said to be shooting into the homes of white people. They were arrested but were discharged by Judge Barasa at the Stock Yards court.

Police raids were made on some of the "Black Belt" clubs on August 23. At the Ranier Club, 3010 South State Street, two revolvers, one razor, one "black-jack," seven cartridges, one cattle knife, and one ordinary knife were found. At the Pioneer Club, 3512 South State Street, eight guns, four packages of cartridges and twenty-four knives were taken. A raid at 2700 South State Street netted four guns, one hunting-knife, and fifty-eight cartridges and bullets.

The foreman of the grand jury which investigated the riots discussing the "athletic" and "social" clubs before the Commission, said:

Most of them were closed immediately after the riots. There were "Ragen's Colts," as they were known, concerning whom the grand jury were particularly anxious to get something concrete, although no evidence was presented that convicted any of the members of that club. There were the Hamburgers, another athletic club, the Lotus Club, the Mayflower, and various clubs. These were white clubs.

Asked if they really were athletic clubs, he replied:

I think they are athletic only with their fists and brass knuckles and guns. We had Mr. Ragen before the grand jury, and he told us of the noble work that they were doing in the district, that Father Brian, who had charge of these boys, taught them to box and how to build themselves up physically, and they were doing a most noble work, and you would think that Ragen was a public benefactor. During the deliberations of this grand jury a number of anonymous letters were written with reference to "Ragen's Colts," and most of the explanations of the fact that they failed to put their names on these letters were that they were afraid they would lose their lives.

The grand jury included in its report this reference to the gang and club phase of the riot:

The authorities employed to enforce the law should thoroughly investigate clubs and other organizations posing as athletic and social clubs which really are organizations of hoodlums and criminals formed for the purpose of furthering the interest of local politics. In the opinion of this jury many of the crimes committed in the "Black Belt" by whites and the fires that were started back of the Yards, which, however, were credited to the Negroes, were more than likely the work of the gangs operating on the Southwest Side under the guise of these clubs, and the jury believes that these fires were started for the purpose of inciting race feeling by blaming same on the blacks. These gangs have apparently taken an active part in the race riots, and no arrests of their members have been made as far as this jury is aware.

SCENES FROM FIRE IN IMMIGRANT NEIGHBORHOOD "BACK OF THE YARDS"

NEGROES UNDER PROTECTION OF POLICE LEAVING WRECKED HOUSE IN RIOT ZONE

The coroner's jury which conducted inquests into the thirty-eight riot deaths said:

The suggestion has also been made that race hatred and tendency to race rioting had its birth and was fostered in the numerous social and athletic clubs made up of young men and scattered throughout the city. We doubt this, but if in part true, it calls for the inspection and control of such clubs. These clubs are here, they are popular, they take the place of the disappearing saloon and poolroom. Properly governed and controlled, they should be encouraged and fostered and, when necessary, disciplined.

Hoodlums are the nucleus of a mob—the young, idle, vicious, and in many instances degenerate and criminal, impatient of restraint of law, gather together, and when fortified by sufficient numbers, start out on a mission of disorder, law-breaking, destruction, and murder. Mobs, white or colored, grow about a nucleus of this character.

[Types of clashes.]—Racial outbreaks are often characterized by hangings, burnings, and mutilations, and frequently the cause given for them is a reported Negro attack upon a white woman. None of these features appeared in the Chicago riot. An attempted hanging was reported by a white detective but was unsubstantiated. A report that Joseph Lovings, one of the Negroes killed in the riot, was burned, was heralded abroad and even carried to the United States Senate, but it was false. The coroner's physicians found no burns on his body.

Reports of assaults upon women were at no time mentioned or even hinted at as a cause of the Chicago riot, but after the disorder started reports of such crimes were published in the white and Negro press, but they had no foundation in fact.

Of the ten women wounded in the Chicago riot, seven were white, two were Negroes, and the race of one is unknown. All but one of these ten injuries appears to have been accidental. The exception was the case of Roxy Pratt, a Negro woman who, with her brother, was chased down Wells Street from Forty-seventh by gangsters and was seriously wounded by a bullet. No cases of direct attacks upon white women by Negro men were reported.

The Commission has the record of numerous instances, principally during the first twenty-four hours, where individuals of opposing races met, knives or guns were drawn, and injury was inflicted without the element of mob stimulus.

On Monday mobs operated in sudden, excited assaults, and attacks on street cars provided outstanding cases, five persons being killed and many injured. Nicholas Kleinmark, a white assailant, was stabbed to death by a Negro named Scott, acting in self-defense. Negroes killed were Henry Goodman at Thirtieth and Union streets; John Mills, on Forty-seventh Street near Union; Louis Taylor at Root Street and Wentworth Avenue; and B. F. Hardy at Forty-sixth Street and Cottage Grove Avenue. All died from beatings.

Crowds armed themselves with stones, bricks, and baseball bats and scanned passing street cars for Negroes. Finding them, trolleys were pulled off wires and entrance to the cars forced. Negroes were dragged from under car seats and beaten. Once off the car the chase began. If possible, the vanguard of the mob caught the fleeing Negroes and beat them with clubs. If the Negro outran the pursuers, stones and bricks brought him down. Sometimes the chase led through back yards and over fences, but it was always short.

Another type of race warfare was the automobile raids carried on by young men crowded in cars, speeding across the dead line at Wentworth Avenue and the "Black Belt," and firing at random. Crowded colored districts, with people sitting on front steps and in open windows, were subjected to this menace. Strangely enough, only one person was killed in these raids, Henry Baker, Negro.

Automobile raids were reported wherever colored people had established themselves, in the "Black Belt," both on the main business streets and in the residence sections, and in the small community near Ada and Loomis streets in the vicinity of Ogden Park.

These raids began Monday night, continued spasmodically all day Tuesday, and were again prevalent that night. In spite of the long period, reports of motorcycle policemen show no white raiders arrested. One suspected raiding automobile was caught on State Street Tuesday night, after collision with a patrol wagon. One of the occupants, a white man, had on his person the badge and identification card of a policeman assigned to the Twenty-fourth Precinct. No case was worked up against him, and the other men in the machine were not heard of again in connection with the raid.

Most of the police motorcycle squad was assigned to the Stanton Avenue station, which was used as police headquarters in the "Black Belt." Several automobile loads of Negroes were arrested, and firearms were found either upon their persons or in the automobile.

In only two cases were Negroes aggressively rioting found outside of the "Black Belt." One of these was the case of the saloon-keeper already mentioned, and the other was that of a deputy sheriff, who, with a party of other men, said they were on the way to the Stock Yards to rescue some beleaguered members of their race. It is reported that they wounded five white people en route. Sheriff Peters said he understood that the deputy sheriff was attacked by white mobs and fired to clear the crowd. He was not convicted.

"Sniping" was a form of retaliation by Negroes which grew out of the automobile raids. These raiding automobiles were fired upon from yards, porches, and windows throughout the "Black Belt." One of the most serious cases reported was at Thirty-first and State streets, where Negroes barricaded the streets with rubbish boxes. Motorcycle Policeman Cheney rammed through and was hit by a bullet. His companion officer following was knocked from his machine and the machine punctured with bullets.

After the wounding of Policeman Cheney and Sergeant Murray, of the Sixth Precinct, policemen made a thorough search of all Negro homes near the scene of the "sniping." Thirty-four Negroes were arrested. Of these, ten were discharged, ten were found not guilty, one was given one day in jail, one was given five days in jail, one was fined and put on probation, two were fined $10 and costs, one was fined $25; six were given thirty days each in the House of Correction, and one, who admitted firing twice but said he was firing at one of the automobiles, was sentenced to six months in the House of Correction. His case was taken to the appellate court.

Concerted retaliatory race action showed itself in the Italian district around Taylor and Loomis streets when rumor said that a little Italian girl had been killed or wounded by a shot fired by a Negro. Joseph Lovings, an innocent Negro, came upon the excited crowd of Italians. There was a short chase through back yards. Finally Lovings was dragged from his hiding-place in a basement and brutally murdered by the crowd. The coroner reported fourteen bullet wounds on his body, eight still having bullets in them; also various stab wounds, contusions of the head, and fractures of the skull. Rumor made the tale more hideous, saying that Lovings was burned after gasoline had been poured over the dead body. This was not true.

This same massing of race against race was shown in a similar clash between Italians and Negroes on the North Side. The results here, however, were not serious. It was reported in this last case that immediately after the fracas the Negroes and Italians were again on good terms. This was not true in the neighborhood of the Lovings outrage. Miss Jane Addams, of Hull-House, which is near the scene of Lovings' death, testified before the Commission that before the riot the Italians held no particular animosity toward Negroes, for those in the neighborhood were mostly from South Italy and accustomed to the dark-skinned races, but that they were developing antipathy. In the September following the riot, she said the neighborhood was still full of wild stories so stereotyped in character that they appeared to indicate propaganda spread for a purpose.

The gang which operated in the "Loop" was composed partly of soldiers and sailors in uniform; they were boys of from seventeen to twenty-two, out for a "rough" time and using race prejudice as a shield for robbery. At times this crowd numbered 100. Its depredations began shortly after 2:00 a.m. Tuesday. The La Salle Street railroad station was entered twice, and Negro men were beaten and robbed. About 3:00 a.m. activities were transferred to Wabash Avenue. In the hunt for Negroes one restaurant was wrecked and the vandalism was continued in another restaurant where two Negroes were found. One was severely injured and the other was shot down. The gangsters rolled the body into the gutter and turned the pockets inside out; they stood on the corner of Wabash Avenue and Adams Street and divided the spoils, openly boasting later of having secured $52, a diamond ring, a watch, and a brooch.

Attacks in the "Loop" continued as late as ten o'clock Tuesday morning, Negroes being chased through the streets and beaten. Warned by the Pinkerton Detective Agency, business men with stores on Wabash Avenue came to protect their property. The rioting was reported to the police by the restaurant men. Policemen rescued two Negroes that morning, but so many policemen had been concentrated in and near the "Black Belt" that there were only a few patrolmen in the whole "Loop" district, and these did not actively endeavor to cope with the mob. In the meantime two Negroes were killed and others injured, while property was seriously damaged.

Tuesday's raids marked the peak of daring during the riot, and their subsidence was as gradual as their rise. For the next two days the gangs roamed the streets, intermittently attacking Negro homes. After Tuesday midnight their operations were not so open or so concerted. The riot gradually decreased in feeling and scope till the last event of a serious nature occurred, the incendiary fires back of the Stock Yards.

While there is general agreement that these fires were incendiary, no clue could be found to the perpetrators. Negroes were suspected, as all the houses burned belonged to whites. In spite of this fact, and the testimony of thirteen people who said they saw Negroes in the vicinity before or during the fires, a rumor persisted that the fires were set by white people with blackened faces. One of the men living in the burned district who testified to seeing a motor truck filled with Negroes said, when asked about the color of the men, "Sure, I know they were colored. Of course I don't know whether they were painted." An early milk-wagon driver said that he saw Negroes come out of a barn on Forty-third Street and Hermitage Avenue. Immediately afterward the barn burst into flames. He ran to a policeman and reported it. The policeman said he was "too busy" and "it is all right anyway." One of the colonels commanding a regiment of militia said he thought white people with blackened faces had set fire to the houses; he got this opinion from talking to the police in charge of that district.

Miss Mary McDowell, of the University of Chicago Settlement, which is located back of the Yards, said in testimony before the Commission:

I don't think the Negroes did burn the houses. I think the white hoodlums burned them. The Negroes weren't back there, they stayed at home after that Monday. When we got hold of the firemen confidentially, they said no Negroes set fire to them at all, but the newspapers said so and the people were full of fear. All kinds of mythical stories were afloat for some time.

The general superintendent of Armour & Company was asked, when testifying before the Commission, if he knew of any substantial reason why Negroes were accused of setting fires back of the Yards. He answered:

That statement was originated in the minds of a few individuals, radicals. It does not exist in the minds of the conservative and thinking people of the community, even those living in back of the Yards. They know better. I believe it goes without saying that there isn't a colored man, regardless of how little brains he'd have, who would attempt to go over into the Polish district and set fire to anybody's house over there. He wouldn't get that far.

The controlling superintendent of Swift & Company said he could not say it from his own experience, but he understood there was as much friction between the Poles and Lithuanians who worked together in the Yards as between the Negroes and the whites. The homes burned belonged to Lithuanians. The grand jury stated in its report: "The jury believes that these fires were started for the purpose of inciting race feeling by blaming same on the blacks."

The methods of attack used by Negroes and whites during the riot differed; the Negroes usually clung to individual attack and the whites to mob action. Negroes used chiefly firearms and knives, and the whites used their fists, bricks, stones, baseball bats, pieces of iron, hammers. Among the white men, 69 per cent were shot or stabbed and 31 per cent were beaten; among the Negroes almost the reverse was true, 35 per cent being shot and stabbed and 65 per cent beaten. A colonel in charge of a regiment of militia on riot duty says they found few whites but many Negroes armed.

Arms and ammunition.—The foregoing figures and statements gave some color to the belief persistent during and after the riot that Negroes had stores of arms and ammunition. A lieutenant of police testified before the coroner's jury that he had known in advance that the riot was coming because "there were guns in every house out there; I knew they were there for a purpose." He said he had heard that Negroes had been advised to arm themselves and defend their homes, that the Constitution of the United States provided for that. The state's attorney said before the Commission that prior to the riot he had received reports from detectives of private agencies stating the same thing. He was informed that Negroes readily got firearms from Gary, Indiana, and that porters on the Pullman trains brought them in from outside places. He further stated: "I am very definitely assured of the fact that they were arming and that there were more arms and weapons grouped in that general district loosely termed the 'Black Belt' than any place else, and my information is that conditions are that way now."

During the riot there were frequent rumors that Negroes had broken into the Eighth Regiment Armory for guns and ammunition, but all these rumors were proved false.

Since the riot many tales have been told of stores of arms brought in by Pullman porters and by white prostitutes. Mexicans were reported to be assisting Negroes in the manufacture of bombs and hand grenades. Lists of addresses where ammunition was being stored have been gathered by detectives, but not verified.

The same sort of rumors are found circulating among the Negroes in regard to the arming of whites. It is said that such and such white men have great boxes of guns and ammunition in the cellars of their homes, and that white men are forming shooting clubs for the purpose of attacking Negroes in the event of another riot. There are also widely believed stories that a department store sold guns to white people before the riot but refused to sell to Negroes. It was said that pawn shops sold to white people without permits from the police.

Crowds and mobs.—It may be observed that a crowd is merely a gathering of people while a mob is a crowd with its attention so strongly fixed upon some lawless purpose that other purposes are inhibited and it acts along the line of the one purpose. During the riot many crowds of curiosity seekers were transformed into vicious mobs when exciting rumors circulated and the suggestion of vengeance was made by leaders. Such suggestion was frequently accompanied by some daring act, stimulated by the excitement.

The mob in its entirety usually did not participate actively. It was one in spirit, but divided in performance into a small active nucleus and a large proportion of spectators. The nucleus was composed of young men from sixteen to twenty-one or twenty-two years of age. Sometimes only four would be active while fifty or 150 looked on, but at times the proportion would be as great as twenty-five in 200 or fifty in 300. Fifty is the largest number reported for a mob nucleus. This was in the case of John Mills and five other Negroes who were beaten, dragged off a Forty-seventh Street car and chased, Mills being killed. Here there were three degrees of crowd formation. First came the nucleus of fifty active men who did the beating, chasing, and killing. Closely aiding and abetting them were 300 or 400 others. After the Negroes had been forced off the car and were being hunted through the neighborhood a crowd of about 2,000 gathered and followed the vanguard of attackers and spectators. These were present out of morbid curiosity, but sufficiently imbued with the spirit of the mob not to interfere with the outrages.

The fact that children were frequently a part of mobs is one of the thought-provoking facts of the Chicago riot. Psychologists say that impressions made upon the child mind are forces which mold adult character to a great extent. A number of children, some not more than four or five years old, swarmed in front of the Forty-seventh Street car in the John Mills case and effectively blocked it while men climbed aboard and sought out the Negroes. Children, often witnesses of mob brutality, ran to where Negro victims had fallen and pointed them out to the policemen who came up after the mobs had dispersed.

There were others, still children in mind, Negro boys of fifteen, accused of murders. The enormity of their acts faded in the joy of describing their weapons. "Fat had a club; it looked like a police club," said one, "it had leather on it." "And the gun had a little picture of an owl on the side of it," said another describing a patched-up weapon that brought down a white laboring-man who left a widow and eight children.

SCENES FROM FIRE IN IMMIGRANT NEIGHBORHOOD "BACK OF THE YARDS"

SCENE FROM FIRE IN IMMIGRANT NEIGHBORHOOD "BACK OF THE YARDS"

Among the spectators of mob violence were men, women, and children of all ages; they included tradesmen, craftsmen, salesmen, laborers. Though the spectators did not commit the crimes, they must share the moral responsibility. Without the spectators mob violence would probably have stopped short of murder in many cases. An example of the behavior of the active nucleus when out of sight of the spectators bears this out. George Carr, Negro, was chased from a street car. He outstripped all but the vanguard of the mob by climbing fences and hiding in a back yard. This concealed him from the rest of the crowd, who by that time were chasing other Negroes. The young men who followed Carr left him without striking a blow, upon his mere request for clemency. In regard to the large non-active elements in the crowds, the coroner said during the inquest, "It is just the swelling of crowds of that kind that urges them on, because they naturally feel that they are backed up by the balance of the crowd, which may not be true, but they feel that way." Juror Ware said, "If sightseers were lending their aid and assistance—" Juror Dillon interrupted and finished, "they ought to be punished."

Often the "sightseers" and even those included in the nucleus did not know why they had taken part in crimes the viciousness of which was not apparent to them until afterward. A mere attempt to cover up participation would have called forth excuses in testimony, but their answers show irritation at the questioning, an inability to appreciate the situation, or complete bewilderment. These excerpts from the testimony before the coroner's jury are examples:

Henry Woodman, in the mob at Sixtieth and Ada streets: "I don't know. I didn't have any grudge against them [the Negroes]. But they [the mob] seemed to have it in for the colored people. That is all."

Edward Klose, in the mob in front of 1021 South State Street: "I followed the crowd, and I was in there because I was in there; they all bunched around and what could I do?"

One of the boys in the mob at Forty-third Street and Forrestville Avenue: "I just wanted to see how things were getting along. We wanted to see what the riot looked like."

Another of this same crowd: "I was following the rest. I wanted to see what they were going to do."

Another from the same mob: "When they started to grab them [the Negroes] in the lot, I rushed over directly to the conflict, by the colored men, thinking I would see more on that side."

Mobs got under way for the commission of atrocities by having the direct suggestion put to them by one of the leaders. With minds already prepared by rumors circulating wherever crowds gathered, it was easy to arouse action. A street car approaching and the cry, "Get the niggers!" was enough. Prompt action clinched the idea, and the emotion of the attack narrowed the field of consciousness. War cries aided in keeping emotion at fever heat. "Get the nigger!" "Kill the black —— of a ——!" "Kill him!" These were always an incident of mob action.

Counter-suggestion was not tolerated when the mob was rampant. A suggestion of clemency was shouted down with the derisive epithet, "Nigger lover!" Silenced objectors made no further effort to thwart mob action. There are no records of such persons notifying the police or persisting in their remonstrances. Those whose objections took the form of action against the mob met with violence. A white man, an instructor in music at the University of Chicago, saw several white men attack a Negro who was waiting for a street car at Sixty-third Street and Cottage Grove Avenue. Without trying verbal remonstrance he struck out at them. His glasses were knocked off, and he was thrown into the middle of the street and left unconscious.

Not only did action once under way make interference hazardous, but it brought into the mob circle a greater number of participants and increased its energy. Five men jerked a trolley from the wires; ten men boarded the car; twenty-five men chased and beat the routed Negroes. The mob action grew faster than the increase in numbers. Ideas suggested by individual members were quickly carried out in the action of all. The mob as a whole and the individuals in it increased in fury, and a normal street crowd was often turned from peaceful assemblage to brutal murder.

A sharp diversion of attention sometimes caused the dispersal of mobs. An unexpected revolver shot was the most effective means of such diversion. Here are some instances:

When Thomas Joshua, a Negro boy, was shot by Police Lieutenant Day, a throng of Negroes came on the run from State Street. The officers, terrified, escaped in a taxi, leaving their own automobile behind. The mob attempted to make this car suffer vicariously for the escaped police officers. Other policemen on the scene had difficulty in holding them back. Two shots were heard on Federal Street. Immediately the crowd ceased its clamoring, left the automobile, and apparently lost all thought of Lieutenant Day and ran to Federal Street.

In the first mob of the riot, that at Twenty-ninth Street and Cottage Grove Avenue, Negroes and policemen were struggling in a mass in the middle of the street. A shot was fired by James Crawford, and the mob dispersed from that corner.

A mob chased a Negro off a street car on Thirty-ninth Street near Wallace. A policeman with presence of mind followed the group into the alley, fired a few shots in the air, and the crowd ran.

In no case where an unexpected shot was fired did it fail to scatter the mob, but shooting which was part of the mob's own action did not seem to have the same effect.

The course of one riotous mob can be traced in the activities of a certain group of five white boys who linked up with the riot excitement. They met at the corner of Sixty-third Street and Ingleside Avenue at 8:30 Monday evening. While they were trying to decide which movie to attend, a taxi driver informed them of a riot at Forty-seventh Street. They took the "L" to Forty-seventh Street and joined the mob. From then until 2:00 a.m. they were active in mobs which assaulted Negroes at several points. Two were beaten at Forty-seventh Street and the elevated railway. The mob then proceeded to Fifty-first Street, but the police drove it back and it moved on to Indiana Avenue and Forty-third Street, where a deputy sheriff held it off. Returning here later it attacked a street car, beat a Negro, and then moved south on Indiana Avenue, jerking trolleys from wires and assaulting passengers. At Forty-fifth Street a shot fired by a police sergeant scattered it toward Forty-third Street.

There the mob met Lieutenant Washington, a Negro ex-soldier, who, with five Negro companions, was obliged to walk across town because car service had been discontinued on account of the rioting. Lieutenant Washington, testifying before the coroner's jury, gave this account of the affair:

After we crossed Grand Boulevard I heard a yell, "One, two, three, four, five, six," and then they gave a loud cheer and said, "Everybody, let's get the niggers! Let's get the niggers," and we noticed some of them crossed the street and walked on up even with us. The rest of them were about ten or fifteen feet north ... there were about between four and six men ... crossed the street and got in front of us ... just before we got to Forrestville Avenue, about twenty yards, they swarmed in on us.

After this attack, in which Lieutenant Browning was shot, and Clarence Metz, a white boy, was killed by a stab wound inflicted by Lieutenant Washington in self-defense, the mob moved on to Grand Boulevard, preceded by the rumor that it intended to attack the homes of Negroes. A shot from a house grazed a white lad, and the crowd went on, leaving the police to come and arrest the Negroes who had fired.

Mob action in planned attacks was more daring, but not more dangerous. Robbery was occasionally an accompaniment of spontaneous attack, but arson never. Whether or not some of the organized raids could readily have been stopped by the police, and the mobs dispersed, remains unproved. No attempt was made either in the "Loop" district, in the Forty-seventh and Wells streets districts or in the Sixty-ninth and Elizabeth streets district to check the depredations.

Rumor.—Rumor was often the first step in crowd formation and often opened the way for the sharp transformation of a crowd into a mob. The circulation of rumors was partly due to natural repetition, often with increasing embellishment, by one person to another of what he had heard or read. The desire to tell a "big story" and create a sensation was no doubt an important factor. With so much bitter feeling there was also considerable conscious effort to provoke vengeful animosity by telling the worst that the teller had heard or could imagine about the doings of the opposite race. The latter type of rumor circulation especially fed the riot from the beginning to the final clash. It continues to be a constant menace to the friendly relations of the races.

Newspapers were often supplied a source of rumor material through mistake in fundamental facts, due either to misinformation or exaggeration.

In considering the newspaper handling of riot news, it should be borne in mind that the task was most difficult during a period of such excitement and such crowding of events. Further it must be considered that white reporters might very justifiably avoid the risk of seeking news where crowds of Negroes had been roused to a high pitch of resentment against whites. There were doubtless instances in which news was secured from sources ordinarily trustworthy, but inaccurate during the riot. On the other hand, it must be recognized that in a time of such excitement the effect of sensational news on the popular mind is generally accentuated, and the responsibility for careful handling of news is correspondingly greater. Where bias is as pronounced as in a race riot it is of the utmost importance that essential facts be stated correctly.

TABLE I

Date	Number of Injured as Reported by the "Tribune" and "Herald-Examiner" during the First Four Days of Riot			Facts as Later Obtained from Police, State's Attorney, Hospital Reports, and Olivet Baptist Church, Covering Each Day
	White	Negro	Total	White	Negro	Unknown	Total
July 27	29	19	48	10	31	5	46
July 28	64	60	124	71	152	6	229
July 29	62	72	134	55	80	4	139
July 30	40	21	61	20	20	2	42
Total	195	172	367	156	283	17	456
Percentage of total	53	47	100	34	62	4	100

Reports of numbers of dead and injured tended to produce a feeling that the score must be evened up on the basis of "an eye for an eye," a Negro for a white, or vice versa. A most unfortunate impression may be made upon an excited public, Negro and white, by such erroneous reporting as the following, in which newspapers, although they understated rather than exaggerated the number of injuries, reported that 6 per cent more whites were injured than Negroes, when the fact was that 28 per cent more Negroes were injured than whites.

The Tribune of July 29 in a news item said that before 3:00 a.m., July 29, twenty persons had been killed, of whom thirteen were white and seven colored. The truth was that of twenty killed, seven were white and thirteen colored.[7]

The Daily News of July 29 gave the starting-point of the riot as the Angelus clash, referring to it as "the center of the trouble." The same item mentioned the spread to the Stock Yards district. The fact was that the assault upon street cars in the Stock Yards district Monday afternoon and rumors of further brutalities there helped to start the Angelus riot Monday evening.[8]

The Tribune of July 30 stated that "the Black Belt continues to be the center of conflict." Up to July 30 the "Black Belt" had witnessed 120 injuries, while the district west of Wentworth Avenue had had 139. For the entire riot period the "Black Belt" furnished 34 per cent of the total number of injuries, and the district west of Wentworth Avenue 41 per cent.

Exaggeration in news reports, when popular excitement is at a high pitch, is peculiarly dangerous. For the very reason that the essential fact seems authenticated by the simultaneous appearance of the gist of the report in several papers, the individual reader is the more inclined to believe such exaggerations as may appear in his favorite journal.

Cases of exaggeration could be adduced from every Chicago newspaper, but a typical one is the report in the Chicago Daily News of July 29 concerning the killing of Harold Brignadello, white. This item said:

Four women and nine men are held at the South Clark Street Station after their arrest at 1021 South State Street, where they had a formidable arsenal.

Harry Signadell [sic], 35, white, died on the way to St. Luke's Hospital shortly before noon after his bullet-riddled body had been picked up by the police in front of 1021 South State Street, where a colored woman and 20 other Negroes had barricaded themselves and were shooting at all whites who passed the place.

Other persons arrested included Kate Elder, 26 years old, who gave her home as the State Street address. In all, four women and nine men were made prisoners at the raid on the place which was found to be an arsenal for the Negro rioters. Two revolvers, two rifles, an axe, several knives, and several hundred rounds of ammunition, including 38 and 48 [sic] calibre cartridges, were discovered piled up near the window from which the Negroes had been shooting.

Patrolman John Hayes, of the South Clark Street Station, heard the shots fired by the Negroes who were firing from the house and saw the spurts of fire from their rifles and revolvers whenever whites ventured to pass the place. An unknown white man, a victim of the Negroes' bullets, was found lying on the sidewalk. He was rushed to St. Luke's Hospital where he died.

The facts of this case, as reported by the coroner's jury are as follows:

... Harold Brignadello ... came to his death on the 29th day of July, a.d. 1919, at St. Luke's Hospital from shock and hemorrhage due to a bullet wound in the chest cavity.

[Note.—"a bullet wound," not "bullet-riddled.">[

We find the deceased while standing at the southwest corner of State and Taylor ... was shot and wounded by a bullet fired from the revolver held in the hand of one Emma Jackson who was standing at an open window on the second floor of the premises at 1021 South State Street.

Testimony shows that just prior to the shooting, said premises had been stoned by a mob of white men.

We, the jury, recommend that the said Emma Jackson, said Kate Elder, said John Webb, said Ed. Robinson, and said Clarence Jones be held to the grand jury upon a charge of murder until discharged by due process of law.

[Note.—Two women and three men, not "four women and nine men," nor yet "a colored woman and 20 other Negroes." They were indicted by the grand jury but found not guilty.]

We believe from the evidence that the police have sufficient information as to the identity of some of said white men to warrant arrest, and we recommend such action be taken.

[Note.—No arrests of men in the white mob were made.]

The testimony further showed that there were 150 white men in the mob grouped in front of 1021, and four of the men were stoning the house at the time Emma Jackson fired into their midst.

Only one gun was found and no stores of ammunition, instead of "a formidable arsenal," or a "barricade" or "an arsenal for Negro rioters," or "two revolvers, two rifles, an axe, several knives, and several hundred rounds of ammunition, including 38 and 48 [sic] calibre cartridges ... piled up near the window from which the Negroes had been shooting." The one gun was hidden in a niche in the skylight.

Following are examples of rumors current during the riot and disseminated by the press and by word of mouth, grouped on the basis of the emotions which they aroused—vengeful animosity, fear, anger, and horror:

Daily News, July 30. Subheadline: "Alderman Jos. McDonough Tells How He Was Shot at on South Side Visit. Says Enough Ammunition in Section to Last for Years of Guerrilla Warfare":

[Note.—The reference in the headline to the large amount of ammunition is repeated in the text, but not elaborated or explained.]

An alderman in an account of his adventures says the Mayor contemplates opening up 35th and 47th streets in order that colored people might get to their work. He thinks this would be most unwise for, he states, "They are armed and the white people are not. We must defend ourselves if the city authorities won't protect us." Continuing his story, he describes bombs going off, "I saw white men and women running through the streets dragging children by the hands and carrying babies in their arms. Frightened white men told me the police captains had just rushed through the district crying, 'For God's sake, arm. They are coming, we cannot hold them.'"

WRECKED HOUSE OF A NEGRO FAMILY IN RIOT ZONE

NEGROES AND WHITES LEAVING THE STOCK YARDS

The point here is not whether the alderman was correctly quoted, but the effect on the public of such statements attributed to him. There is no record in any of the riot testimony in the coroner's office or in the state's attorney's office of any bombs exploded during the riot, nor of police captains warning white people to arm, nor of any fear on the part of whites of a Negro invasion. In the Berger Odman case before the coroner's jury there is a statement that a police sergeant warned the Negroes of Ogden Park to arm and to shoot at the feet of rioters if they attempted to invade the few blocks marked off for Negroes by the police.

Herald-Examiner, July 28. Subheadline: "Negroes Have Arms":

A man whose name is withheld reported to the Herald-Examiner that Negroes had more than 2,000 Springfield rifles and an adequate supply of soft-nosed bullets. R. R. Jackson, alderman from the second ward, brands the story as untrue.

This statement is not substantiated.

Herald-Examiner, July 29:

Several thousand men stoned the old Eighth Regiment Armory in the heart of the riot zone, doors were burst in, and hundreds of guns with ammunition taken by the mob. Police rushed to the scene firing into the mob and finally drove it from the armory. According to reports more than 50 persons were shot or otherwise injured.

Refutation of this statement is found in the testimony of Police Captain Mullen before the coroner's jury in the Eugene Williams case:

I received a rumor that the soldiers [referring to Negro soldiers of the Eighth Regiment] had gone over to the armory for the sole purpose of breaking in and getting rifles. I dispatched two patrol wagons full of men; after arriving there, we found out they had been there and broke some windows, but they found out there were no weapons in there.

Another type of fear-provoking rumor current in street crowds reported the force and the aggressive plans of the opposing race. Some of these rumors, current among Negro crowds, were to the effect that a white mob was gathering on Wentworth Avenue ready to break into the "Black Belt"; that a white mob was waiting to break through at Sixtieth and Ada streets; that a white mob was ready to advance upon Twenty-seventh and Dearborn streets. The first of these rumors had its effect upon the inception of the Angelus riot, and the second so aroused the fears of Negroes that when a white mob led by young white boys did step over the "dead-line" boundaries established by the police, guns were immediately turned upon them, and one of the invaders was killed. Of the third rumor, Police Lieutenant Burns said:

... an old colored man came to me ... and said that the colored people on Dearborn Street in the 2800 block were moving out in fear of a white mob coming from across the tracks from across Wentworth Avenue.... On the southwest corner of Twenty-eighth and Dearborn I found a number of colored men standing in front of a building there. They had pieces of brick and stone in their pockets and were peering around the corner west on Twenty-eighth Street apparently in great fear.

Among the whites fear was not so prevalent. A fear-producing rumor was revealed, however, in the examination of two deputy sheriffs who fired on a Negro. The deputies had heard that Negroes were going to burn up or blow up factories in the district which they were patrolling. When a dark form was seen in an alley, panic seized both deputies, and they emptied their revolvers at an innocent Negro who lived in the adjoining house.

Chief among the anger-provoking rumors were tales of injury done to women of the race circulating the rumor. The similarity of the stories and their persistence shows extraordinary credulity on the part of the public. For the most horrible of these rumors, telling of the brutal killing of a woman and baby (sometimes the story is told of a Negro woman, sometimes of a white) there was no foundation in fact. The story was circulated not only by the newspapers of both races, but was current always in the crowds on the streets. Here is the story as told in the white press:

Chicago Tribune, July 29:

There is an account of "two desperate revolver battles fought by the police with colored men alleged to have killed two white women and a white child."

It is reported that policemen saw two Negroes knock down a woman and child and kick them. The Negroes ran before the police could reach them.

Herald-Examiner, July 29:

Two white women, one of them with a baby in her arms, were attacked and wounded by Negro mobs firing on street cars....

A colored woman with a baby in her arms was reported at the Deering Police Station, according to this item, to have been attacked by a mob of more than 100 white men. When the mob finally fled before the approach of a squad of police both the woman and child were lying in the street beaten to death, "it is said."

Daily News, July 29:

Another man is held at the Stock Yards station charged with the murder of a white woman in West 47th Street and Wentworth....

The Negroes, four in number, were arrested at East 39th and Cottage Grove Avenue, this afternoon by the detective. They are believed to be the ones who seriously wounded Mrs. Margaret Kelley, white woman, at W. 47th and Wentworth. She was shot in the back and may die. The names of those under arrest were not given out.

[Note.—"Murder" changed to "seriously injured" in the main story. Mrs. Mary Kelly was shot in the arm according to the police report and not in the back.]

The men arrested for the shooting were Henry Harris and Scott Brown, deputy sheriffs, and four others according to the records of the state's attorney. Sheriff Peters says of the case, that Harris was charged with shooting someone, but when the case came up the charge was dropped. Sheriff Peters was convinced that Harris was innocent.

Daily News, July 29. Headline, given place of first importance in the pink section: "Women Shot as Riots Grow." Columns 7 and 8 of first-page white section are headed, "Attack White Women as Race Riots Grow. Death Roster Is 30."

The item reads: "Race rioters began to attack white women this afternoon according to report received at the Detective Bureau and the Stock Yards Police Station." The article continues, that Swift & Company had not received any such reports of attacks on their women employees. But farther on the item gives an account of a Swift & Company truck filled with girl employees fired upon by Negroes at Forty-seventh Street and the Panhandle railroad. The driver was reported killed and several of the girls injured.

The juxtaposition of "Death roster is 30" and "Attack white women" gives a wrong impression. The "several girls injured" at Forty-seventh Street evidently refers to the case of Mrs. Mary Kelly. The records of the state's attorney's office also show that Josephine Mansfield was supposed to have been wounded by Harris, et al., but the charge was dropped. She was wounded in the shoulder, according to the police report.

Daily News, July 30:

Alderman McDonough described a raid into the white district the night before by a carload of colored men who passed Thirty-fifth Street and Wallace "shouting and shooting." The gunmen shot down a woman and a little boy who stood close by.

[Note.—No record of such a case.]

Here is the "injury done to women" story as it appeared in the Negro press:

Chicago Defender, August 2:

An unidentified young woman and three-months-old baby were found dead on the street at the intersection of Forty-seventh and Wentworth. She had attempted to board a car there when the mob seized her, beat her, slashed her body to ribbons, and beat the baby's brains out against a telegraph pole. Not satisfied with this one rioter severed her breasts and a white youngster bore it aloft on a pole triumphantly while the crowd hooted gleefully. The whole time this was happening several policemen were in the crowd but did not make any attempt to make a rescue until too late.

Concerning all of these stories it may be stated that the coroner had no cases of deaths of women and children brought before him. There was nothing in the police reports or the files of the state's attorney or hospital reports or the reports of Olivet Baptist Church, which would give any foundation for reports of the killing of a woman and child, white or Negro.

There were other rumors which had the same anger-producing effect as reports of attacks on women. A notable case of this kind was the fatal clash at the Angelus, an apartment house for white people at Thirty-fifth Street and Wabash Avenue, on Monday, July 28 (see [p. 6]). The trouble here grew from four o'clock in the afternoon until it culminated in the shooting at 8:00 p.m. The excitement was stimulated by the rapid spread of various rumors. It was said that a white mob was gathering at Thirty-fifth Street and Wentworth Avenue, only a few blocks from the colored mob which was massed on Thirty-fifth Street from State Street to Wabash Avenue. The rumor was that the white men are armed and prepared to "clean up the 'Black Belt.'" Another rumor had it that a Negro's sister had been killed while coming home from the Stock Yards where she worked. Finally came the rumor that a white person had fired a shot from the Angelus building, wounding a colored boy. The rumor quickly went through the crowd swarming around the building, but no one heard or saw the shooting. A search of the building disclosed no firearms. Police Sergeant Middleton, Negro, described the situation as "everybody trying to tell you something and you couldn't get anything." Another Negro policeman said it was "just a rumor that went around through the crowd and everybody was saying, 'He shot from that window'; I would go to that window and the crowd would say, 'That is the window over there.'"

The anger-provoking power of rumor was seen in the ensuing clash. About 1,500 Negroes massed on one corner of Thirty-fifth Street and Wabash Avenue, and about 100 policemen grouped themselves at the intersection of the two streets. At the sight of a brick flying from the Negro mob the police fired a volley into the midst of the mob. More shots came quickly from both sides. Four Negroes were killed, and many were injured, among both the Negroes and the police.

The Angelus rumor appeared as follows in a Negro newspaper, the Chicago Defender, August 2: "White occupants of the Angelus apartments began firing shots and throwing missiles from their windows. One man was shot through the head but before his name could be secured he was spirited away."

In the case of Joseph Lovings, a Negro killed by an Italian mob, press reports that were entirely false tended strongly to provoke the anger of Negro mobs. For example:

Herald-Examiner, July 30: "He had been shot, stabbed and gasoline had been thrown on his body which had been set afire. The police extinguished the fire and took the body to the County Morgue."

Tribune, July 30: "This report says that he was stabbed and shot sixteen times, then his body saturated with gasoline and set afire."

The coroner's jury in commenting on this rumor said: "It gives us satisfaction to say that this rumor, from our investigation, is false and unsubstantiated."

Among the horror rumors one finds such examples as the story of the white man who stood at the entrance to Exchange Avenue and knocked down half a dozen Negroes as they came by. This was current in the Stock Yards and was told by one of the workers at the inquest on the body of William Dozier, Negro, killed in the Yards. Another rumor had it that a Negro woman nicknamed "Heavy" had partly slashed off the head of a white man. This was picked up by a detective circulating among white people living in the "Black Belt."

But chief among horror rumors was the Bubbly Creek rumor, which took this form in the press:

Daily News, July 29. Subheadline: "Four Bodies in Bubbly Creek." The article does not give details but says, "Bodies of four colored men were taken today from Bubbly Creek in the Stock Yards district, it is reported."

This was one of the most persistent rumors of the riot, and intelligent men were found repeating it in half-credulous tones. A meat curer, talking in the superintendent's office of Swift & Company, said: "Well, I hear they did drag two or three out of Bubbly Creek.... Dead bodies, that is the report that came to the Yards, but personally I never got any positive evidence that there was any people who was found there."

A juror on the coroner's panel said: "A man told a friend of mine—I can furnish the name of that man—a man told him that he saw fifty-six bodies taken out of Bubbly Creek. They made a statement they used a net and seine to drag them out."

Mr. Williams, Negro attorney, said he was told that the bodies of 100 Negroes had been found in Bubbly Creek.

In its final report, the coroner's jury made this conclusive statement regarding the Bubbly Creek rumor:

Bubbly Creek has been the favorite cemetery for the undiscovered dead, and our inquiry has been partly directed to that stream. In our inquiry we have been assisted by the Stock Yards officials and workers, by adjacent property owners and residents, by private detective bureaus, the Police Department, Department of Health, State's Attorney's office, by observing and intelligent colored citizens, and by other agencies, and we are firmly of the opinion that these reports, so widely circulated, are erroneous, misleading, and without foundation in fact, the race riot victims numbering thirty-eight, and no more, nor are there any colored citizens reported to us as missing.

Rumor, fermenting in mobs, prepares the mob mind for the direct suggestion impelling otherwise law-abiding citizens to atrocities. Another more insidious and potentially more dangerous result is the slow accumulation of feeling which builds between the white and Negro the strongest barrier of race prejudice.

Police.—There has been much criticism of the manner in which the riot was handled by the authorities, but it may be pointed out that the riot was not quelled until at least four groups of peace guardians had taken part in handling it. The two most important groups were the police and the militia; the others were composed of deputy sheriffs and Negro ex-soldiers.

Testimony before the coroner's jury and in hearings before this Commission throws considerable light on the actions of the Police Department as a whole during the riot, its methods in meeting the unusual situation, and on the conduct of individual policemen. First-hand information and opinion was obtained from Chief of Police Garrity and State's Attorney Hoyne.

The police had two severe handicaps at the outset of the rioting. The first, as declared by Chief Garrity, was lack of sufficient numbers adequately to cope with the situation. The coroner's jury found that "the police force should be enlarged. It is too small to cope with the needs of Chicago." The grand jury added: "The police force is also inadequate in numbers, and at least one thousand (1,000) officers should be added to the existing force." This number approximates the need urged by Chief Garrity, who, when asked before the Commission as to the sufficiency of his force, answered: "No. I haven't sufficient force. I haven't got a sufficient force now to properly police the city of Chicago by one-third." Militia officers and other police officials held the same general opinion.

The second handicap, distrust of white policemen by all Negroes, while implied and not admitted by Chief Garrity, was frankly explained by State's Attorney Hoyne. He said before the Commission: "There is no doubt that a great many police officers were grossly unfair in making arrests. They shut their eyes to offenses committed by white men while they were very vigorous in getting all the colored men they could get."

Leaders among the Negroes clearly indicate that discrimination in arrest was a principal cause of widespread and long-standing distrust. Whether justified or not, this feeling was actual and bitter. This distrust had grown seriously during the six months preceding the riot because no arrests were made in bombing cases. State's Attorney Hoyne said before the commission: "I don't know of a single case where the police have apprehended any man who has blown up a house."

Charles S. Duke, a well-educated and fair-minded Negro, gave his reaction to the bombings when he said that he did not "believe a Negro would have been allowed to go unpunished five minutes." Mrs. Clarke, Negro, said her house was bombed three times, once while a plain-clothes policeman was inside waiting for bombers, but no arrests were made. One suspect was put under surveillance but was not held.

The trial of the three Negro policemen before the Merit Committee of the Police Department because they refused to use the "Jim Crow" sleeping-quarters in a police station doubtless added to race feeling, particularly in view of the publicity it received in the "Black Belt."

Negro distrust of the police increased among the Negroes during the period of the riot. With each clash a new cause for suspicion seemed to spring up. The most striking instance occurred on the first afternoon when Policeman Callahan refused to arrest the white man whom the Negro crowd accused of causing the drowning of Williams, the Negro boy. This refusal has been called the beginning of the riot because it led to mob violence of grave consequences. However that may have been, the fact remains that this refusal was heralded broadcast by the Negroes as the kind of action they might expect from the police.

Typical of the minor tales which laid the foundation for the Negroes' bitterness toward this white policeman are the following:

1. Kin Lumpkin, Negro, was beaten by a mob on the "L" platform at Forty-seventh Street, as he was going home from work. The policeman arrested Lumpkin and had him booked for rioting. No other arrests were made. Lumpkin was held from July 28 to August 1.

2. Two policemen, one of them Officer McCarty of the Twenty-sixth Precinct, witnessed the beating of Wellington Dunmore, Negro, of 4120 South Campbell Avenue, but, according to the victim, refused to assist him.

3. John Slovall and brother, Negroes, were beaten and robbed by whites in sight of a white policeman. No arrests were made. The officer did not even call for aid.

4. While looking for his mother at Thirty-first and State streets on Tuesday, July 29, Wm. F. Thornton, Negro, 3207 South Park Avenue, asked a policeman to take him home. The officer took him to the police station and locked him up. Another Negro applied for protection, but the police searched him, clubbed him, and when he ran, the sergeant told another policeman to shoot him. The policeman obeyed and the man fell under the "L" station. He was picked up by the same patrol wagon that took Thornton to the Cottage Grove Police Station. The officer, Bundy, arrested Thornton.

NEGROES BEING ESCORTED BY POLICE TO SAFETY ZONE FROM THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF FORTY-EIGHTH STREET AND WENTWORTH AVENUE

SEARCHING NEGROES FOR ARMS IN POLICE STATION

A report on 229 Negroes and whites accused of various criminal activities disclosed the fact that 154 were Negroes and seventy-five were whites. The state's attorney reported eighty-one indictments against Negroes and forty-seven against whites after all riot cases were cleared up. These figures show that twice as many Negroes appeared as defendants and twice as many were indicted as whites.

At first glance these figures indicate greater riot activity on the part of Negroes, and therefore one would expect to find twice as many whites injured as Negroes. But out of a total of 520 injured persons whose race was definitely reported, 342 were Negroes and 178 whites. The fact that twice as many Negroes appeared as defendants and twice as many were injured as whites suggests the conclusion that whites were not apprehended as readily as Negroes.

Herman M. Adler, state criminologist of Illinois, testifying before the Commission, expressed the belief that the police showed much more readiness to arrest Negroes than whites because the officers thought they were "taking fewer chances if they 'soaked' a colored man."

Negro distrust of police and courts seems to have been confirmed by the action of the state's attorney's office in bringing only Negro riot cases before the grand jury. This body, however, took a stand for fair play and justice for both sides, and though its action may have been novel, it was effective. In its final report, the grand jury said:

This jury has no apology to offer for its attitude with reference to requesting the state's attorney to supply it with information of crimes perpetrated by whites against blacks before considering further evidence against blacks. This attitude gave rise to the reports in the press that this grand jury "had gone on a strike." As a matter of fact, its position was merely a suspension of hearing further cases of crimes committed by blacks against whites until the state's attorney submitted evidence concerning the various crimes committed by whites against blacks. The reason for this attitude arose from a sense of justice on the part of this jury. It is the opinion of this jury that the colored people suffered more at the hands of the white hoodlums than the white people suffered at the hands of the black hoodlums. Notwithstanding this fact, the cases presented to this jury against the blacks far outnumber those against the whites.

State's Attorney Hoyne justified this action by saying that the Police Department brought in Negroes only, and until they arrested whites, he was limited to proceedings against Negroes.

The coroner's jury on November 3, 1919, reported as follows:

Our attention was called strikingly to the fact that at the time of race rioting, the arrests made for rioting by the police of colored rioters were far in excess of the arrests made of white rioters. The failure of the police to arrest impartially, at the time of rioting, whether from insufficient effort or otherwise, was a mistake and had a tendency to further incite and aggravate the colored population.

This seeming discrimination in arrests naturally deepened Negro distrust and lack of confidence in the police. Testimony was taken by the Commission on the plans and action of the Police Department during the riot period, since the Commission felt that the distribution of forces and the methods used by the department to meet such an emergency were matters of first importance.

Chief of Police Garrity testified that there were 3,500 policemen in the department at the time of the riot, and that he had "practically every policeman in the city of Chicago down there," indicating Thirty-fifth Street and Rhodes Avenue as "practically in the heart of the district where the most trouble was." The widest distribution from that center, he said, was over an area bounded by Lake Michigan, Ashland Avenue, Van Buren Street, and Sixty-ninth Street.

The heaviest concentration of police, however, was in the "Black Belt." The Stanton Avenue Police Station at Thirty-fifth Street and Rhodes Avenue is at about the center of the most congested Negro residential area. Asked how many policemen were assigned to that vicinity (the area from Twenty-second to Thirty-ninth streets), Chief Garrity said, "We had in the neighborhood of 2,800 men in that territory." Later the chief said only "the necessary sergeants and one or two men at each station were held back for emergency calls" in all other parts of the city. This means that four-fifths of the total police force was concentrated there.

Although there is no direct testimony as to the existence of flying squadrons of police, yet such bodies appear to have been operating. Probably the most important of these was the patrol under Police Captain Mullen, who said that his territory extended from Twenty-second to Thirty-ninth streets and from the lake to the Rock Island tracks, or roughly the "Black Belt." Chief Deputy Alcock[9] sent eighty-eight policemen into this district on Sunday afternoon, twenty-five more at midnight, and fifty more on Monday morning.

In describing the disposition of police details, Chief Garrity said: "They were routed by him [Alcock] according to conditions existing in different districts. Some districts might have a hundred men in the block and in the next block there might be only ten, according to what conditions were." Forces were moved from one point of disturbance to another by means of patrol wagons on request of local commanders.

The 2,800 policemen in the "Black Belt" were under the command of Chief Deputy Alcock with headquarters in the Stanton Avenue Station. He "used his discretion in the number of men assigned to the different points and the handling of them in the different territories."

Riot orders were given by Chief Garrity as follows: "Wherever possible suppress the riot and restore peace"; "the second day I ordered a dead line on Wentworth Avenue and Twenty-second Street to, I think, Sixty-third Street"; "instructions were that 'you will allow no colored people to go across to the west and no white people to go across to the east.'" Cabarets, saloons, and public places were ordered closed, and all large gatherings of either whites or Negroes were prohibited from Van Buren to Sixty-ninth streets and from Ashland Avenue to the lake. The chief added, "Closing clubrooms and everything in the district west of Wentworth Avenue as well as east of it." A general policy was adopted of search and seizure of persons suspected of carrying weapons on the street, and of houses from which firing came. Captain Mullen testified before the coroner's jury at the Eugene Williams inquest that on July 29 Chief Deputy Alcock lined up the policemen in front of the Stanton Avenue Station and gave them their orders. They were told to "preserve the peace; that was all."

Police records of clashes were incomplete and often inaccurate. This was in part due, and naturally so, to the stress of the moment. In many cases the station lists of injured were far from complete and in few instances were the names of witnesses given. Even the dates and hours of clashes were loosely recorded. Persons arrested were frequently not booked at all, while on the other hand it was not uncommon to find innocent persons charged with serious offenses. Henry Scholz, policeman of the Twenty-sixth Precinct, threw much light on police records while being examined in connection with certain automobile arrests:

They were all discharged, booked for "disorderly," because we couldn't find the guns in the mix-up. It was the first or second day down there and they were bringing them in right and left, and I suppose in the mix-up they mislaid the guns, or put them away somewhere, or booked them to someone else. We held them about a week trying to find the guns and trying to find the officers that got the guns.

It is important to know how the distribution and routing of police affected the general riot situation. As already shown four-fifths of the police forces were concentrated in the "Black Belt." This undoubtedly both weakened police forces elsewhere and also prevented or delayed reinforcements in outside districts. Only 34 per cent of the total number of reported injuries occurred in the area of concentration. Negro hatred of the police is worth mentioning again here, especially since many of the deaths and injuries occurred during clashes between white policemen and Negro mobs.

That other districts where danger existed were poorly protected is shown by the fact that fatal clashes occurred there without interruption by the police. The most conspicuous case is noted in the "Loop" atrocities on July 29, where two Negroes, Hardwick and Williams, were killed, several were injured and robbed, and business property of whites was damaged. A police sergeant said that only three officers and one sergeant were in the district on the night of July 28-29. In the Stock Yards district, where 41 per cent of the injuries and several deaths occurred, there is no record of an attempt by the police to increase the riot forces. In this district gang raids by whites were practically beyond control. On July 28 B. F. Hardy, a Negro, was killed at Forty-sixth Street and Cottage Grove Avenue. Sergeant Clancy later testified that there were no policemen in this district until after the trouble. The foreman of the grand jury investigated the activities of the Deering Street Station under Police Captain Gallery. He says: "They didn't have a sufficient number of policemen to handle the situation. If I remember correctly, he had eight patrolmen covering a district of any number of square miles."

In spite of the concentration of police in the "Black Belt" some parts of that area seem at times not to have been properly guarded. Several serious clashes occurred there after the police arrived in force. Theodore Copling, Negro, was shot to death at Thirtieth and State streets in the heart of the "Black Belt" on July 30. This had been a riotous corner for three days, yet no policemen were at hand. The nearest was a detective sergeant on Twenty-ninth Street between Federal and State streets. Samuel Banks, Negro, was shot and killed near the corner of Twenty-seventh and Dearborn streets on July 30 at 11:00 p.m., yet Lieutenant Burns, in charge of this district, testified at the inquest that twelve to fourteen officers were at Twenty-seventh and Dearborn streets immediately before the shooting.

It was undoubtedly the relatively large number of clashes which the police were unable to prevent that led the coroner's jury to recommend that "(6) there should be organization of the force for riot work for the purpose of controlling rioting in its incipient stages."

The conduct of individual policemen received much adverse criticism from the Negroes. This was to be expected in the circumstances, but disregarding the general prejudice of which white officers were accused, certain cases of discrimination, abuse, brutality, indifference, and neglect on the part of individuals are deserving of examination.

Abusive and brutal treatment was complained of by Horace Jennings, 3422 South Aberdeen Street. He reported to the state's attorney's office that Policeman G——, of the Grand Crossing Station, approached him, as he lay wounded by a mob attack, with the words, "Where's your gun, you black —— of a ——? You damn niggers are raising hell"; that the officer hit him on the head, and he did not regain consciousness until some time later in the Burnside Hospital; and he further charged that Gallagher took a purse containing $13 when he searched him.

Three Negroes were rescued by the police from a white mob of twenty-five or thirty men. Scott, one of the Negroes, was taken from the street car on which all three were riding, by the command of a policeman to "come out of there, you big rusty brute, you. I ought to shoot you," and was given a blow on the head. According to a witness he was again struck by the policeman as he was pushed into the patrol wagon. He was subjected to rough treatment at the jail and was kept incommunicado from July 28 to August 4, not being permitted to notify his wife or an attorney. None of the twenty-five or thirty white rioters was arrested. There was some evidence of fear on the part of the police to arrest rioting whites.

Fear by policemen of Negroes is also disclosed. George Crumm, white, 124 East Forty-sixth Street, informed the state's attorney's office that he was beaten by a Negro mob, got police assistance, and pointed out the rioters, but the police "didn't seem to want to interfere any."

On several occasions policemen left the scene of riots on questionable excuses while the rioting was in progress. Of the three mounted policemen at Thirty-fifth Street and Wabash Avenue who rushed to the spot where a mob was attacking Otterson, two accompanied the automobile of Otterson to the hospital. The mob was not quelled or dispersed. When the house of William O'Deneal, Negro, 4742 Wells Street, was attacked, the police took O'Deneal to the station and left the mob to sack and burn his house. At the killing of William Dozier, Negro, all three police officers who responded to notice of an attack by a white mob of 300 or more, left in the same patrol wagon. The names of witnesses were not taken. It was the custom for all to accompany the wagon, according to Officer McDonough.

Political "pull" exercised with the police on behalf of rioters has been indicated. It was noted that one of "Ragen's Colts" said an officer of the Stock Yards Station "tipped them off" to stay away from their club because Attorney General Brundage's office was out investigating them.

Indifference both to extreme lawlessness during the riot and to the procedure of the inquest marked the examination of Captain of Police Mullen before the coroner's jury. He was in command of twelve mounted men and between sixty-three and 100 men on foot at Thirty-fifth Street and Wabash Avenue when a clash between the police and a Negro mob occurred. While it appears to be the fact that he left just before the heavy firing to telephone from a saloon one block away, yet the building he was in was struck by bullets. The following excerpt from the inquest speaks for itself:

Q.: What time did the shooting take place at the building known as the Angelus Building? What time did that occur? Was there any shooting at that building?

Mullen: Not that I heard.

Q.: Had there been any shooting done there that evening around ... before you left?

Mullen: Not to my knowledge.

Q.: When was the shooting done, and where were you?

Mullen: What do you mean shooting?

Three men were killed and many injured at Thirty-fifth Street and Wabash Avenue at this time. Firing broke out near-by almost immediately.

Q.: There were some shots fired at Thirty-fifth and State, Captain, at eight that night, right after the volley was fired, we have absolute evidence.

Mullen: Well, you may have, but I have not.

Yet Captain Mullen was in command of the police who killed two more men and inflicted other wounds when the Negroes ran before the police advance.

Militia.—The rapid growth of the riot both in violence and territorially created such alarm among the authorities and the public that the question of its control became a matter of paramount concern to the community. Before twenty-four hours had elapsed requests were made to the local authorities for the militia. The representations were based on insufficiency of police forces and were strongly urged before the chief of police.

Chief Garrity steadily refused to ask for troops, in spite of his repeated statement that the police force was insufficient. He gave as his reason the belief that inexperienced militiamen would add to the deaths and disorders. Mayor Thompson supported the chief's refusal until outside pressure compelled him to ask the governor for aid. On the other hand the chief deputy of police was quoted by State's Attorney Hoyne as having said at the outbreak of the riot that the police would not be able to handle the situation, and that troops were needed. In this he was supported by Mr. Hoyne. From observation of conditions on the first three days of the riot, the chief of staff of the troops, Colonel Ronayne, concluded that the police were insufficient in numbers, that no improvement was apparent in the general situation, and that therefore the troops were necessary. He saw no reason, however, for putting the city under martial law. Other military men were of the same opinion.

During all of this time Governor Lowden kept in close touch with the situation from his quarters at the Blackstone Hotel. When the riot appeared to be subsiding he started to keep an appointment out of town but, on hearing that there was a renewal of violence, returned to the city on a special train. When the request was made for the active co-operation of the troops he acted with promptness.

The troops themselves were clearly of high caliber. For the most part they were in home service during the war and were older men than are ordinarily found in militia organizations. They "usually came from the higher type of business men, men of affairs, men that knew how to think," as one of their commanding officers described them. They were all American-born.

NEGROES UNDER PROTECTION OF POLICE AND MILITIA BUYING PROVISIONS BROUGHT INTO THEIR NEIGHBORHOOD IN WAGONS

THE MILITIA AND NEGROES ON FRIENDLY TERMS

The militia discipline was of the best. Not a single case of breach of discipline was reported to the regimental commanders. No guardhouse was necessary during the riot, a remarkable commentary on troop conduct.

The militia had been given special drills in the suppression of riots and insurrections for a year and a half previous to this occasion, and were, in the estimation of their commanding officer, "probably better prepared for riot drill than any troops ever put on duty in the state."

The activities of the militia did not begin as early as many citizens wished. Though troops began to mobilize in the armories on Monday night, July 28, they were not called to actual duty on the streets until 10:30 P.M., Wednesday, July 30. When called to active duty they were distributed in the areas of conflict. Between 5,000 and 6,000 troops were called out. This number was made up entirely of white troops from the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Infantry, Illinois National Guard, and from the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Reserve Militia regiments of the militia. Colored troops who had composed the Eighth Regiment were not reorganized at that time, and therefore none participated.

Distribution of troops was determined not by the militia command but by the police, because the city was not under martial law, the civil authority being merely insufficient, not broken. The Third Infantry covered the territory from Thirty-first to Thirty-eighth streets and from State to Halsted streets; Eleventh Infantry from Thirty-ninth to Forty-seventh streets, and from State to Halsted streets; Tenth Infantry from Forty-eighth to Fifty-fifth streets (later extended to Sixty-third Street by details from the First Infantry), and from Cottage Grove to Stewart avenues. The First, Fourth, and Ninth Infantry were held in reserve. Detachments responded to calls from the chief of police in districts outside these areas. Headquarters for the commanding general and his chief of staff were in the Congress Hotel at the northern boundary of the riot zone.

The orders under which the militia operated did not have the authority of martial law. The purpose of the orders was to effect a thorough co-operation with the police only, and not to take over any duties other than the preservation of law and order. Except in this respect, civilian routine remained undisturbed. The method of co-operation put the commanding officer of a regiment in absolute control, within the limits above described, in his district. The police reduced their number to normal requirements by removing their reserves as soon as the militia moved in. The patrolmen then went about on ordinary duties in the districts. Persons arrested by the militia were turned over to the police.

Responsibility for the preservation of law and order rested on the regimental commanders. Careful instructions were given troops for preventing violence: they were to act as soldiers in a gentlemanly manner; they were furnished with arms to enable them to perform their duties; they were to use the arms only when necessary; they were to use bayonet and butt in preference to firing, but if the situation demanded shooting, they were not to hesitate to deliver an effective fire. Above all, the formation of mobs was to be prevented.

The manner in which the militia was received by various elements in the communities where stationed is illuminating. Police officers were glad that the troops came to relieve them. Two policemen on duty with a patrol exclaimed, when they heard the militia had come in force, "Thank God! We can't stand up under this much longer!" The police at Cottage Grove Avenue said, "We are tickled to death to see you fellows come in; you have never looked so good to us before!" A regimental commander said his organization was "welcomed into the zone, of course, by everybody, and I'd say especially by the colored people." A similar report came from another regimental commander.

But there was some show of hostility to the troops. Hoodlums fired on some detachments when they first came in, and Colonel Bolte reported a hatred for the troops by "the Hamburg Athletic Club, the Ragen's, and the Emeralds, and a whole bunch of them over there who didn't like to be controlled!" Volunteer ex-service men with no legal status, but who aided the police at the time, and deputy sheriffs with overseas training ridiculed the militia with such taunts as, "Tin soldiers!" The effect of this attitude on the populace necessitated the arrest of some disturbers and the removal of unauthorized persons from the streets.

It is a singular fact that militia activities were principally against gangs of hoodlums, and the majority of these gangs were composed of white youths. Said one commander, "Rowdies of the white population tried to get through the lines and had to be arrested." "At one time a heavy truck or two loaded with white gangsters attempted to break through the militia but was checked." Plenty of trouble "with the Ragen's and other similar organizations" was reported by yet another commander.

The militia unquestionably prevented mob formations, raids, and "sniping." They checked marauders still in search of prey. In many cases they prevented the initial moves of lawlessness by taking stations at critical points long before raiders arrived.

There was a marked contrast between the militia and the police. The troops were under definite orders; commanders had absolute control of their forces and knew at all times where and how many effectives were available. Precision and promptness of movement was the rule. Reserves were always at hand. Discipline was always good. Only one person, a white man, was killed by the troops. Whatever other restraining causes contributed, it is certain that the riot was not revived after the troops were posted.

Most of the troops were withdrawn on August 8.

Volunteers.—Many Negro ex-service men, formerly members of the old Eighth Regiment (Negro) of the Illinois National Guard, donned their uniforms, armed, and offered their services to the police and militia. The militia on duty found that these Negro volunteers had no authority or military status and consequently ordered them to disband, which they did.

Before the troops were called out, however, a determined effort was made by one Britton, white police reserve, to organize ex-soldiers for volunteer service. He said as many as thirty-five joined him. They were denied permits to carry weapons but are reported to have done so. It was these men who used an automobile, driven with the mufflers open, to clear the streets.

Evidence of the use of liquor was noticed among these men during their active period. Some were involved in the killing of Samuel Banks, Negro; some in the robbery of a restaurant and in misdeeds of a minor character. Following the implication of individuals among them in these crimes, numbers of the ex-soldiers were arrested by the police, but were released by order of Chief Garrity on account of the assistance many of them had rendered the department and because of representations of business men who felt that the arrests were unjust.

Deputy sheriffs.—In addition to police, militiamen, and volunteers, another group composed of specially recruited deputy sheriffs, appeared in the riot zone as preservers of the peace. They were sworn in by Sheriff Peters, of Cook County, after citizens had appealed to him, he said, to quell the riot. In regard to their formation, numbers, orders, and duties, the sheriff had this to say:

I advertised for ex-service men to serve as deputy sheriffs. A thousand or more applied. They were all men who had returned from the war and were out of work. I hired 500 of them, kept them in the army uniforms, and instructed them to shoot to kill any disturbers or rioters. The presence of these men and the show of authority thereby made was effective, and the riot was quelled.

Fifteen thousand dollars was spent on this force.

It appears that these deputies came on the scene toward the end of the riot week and at once fell into disfavor with the militia, whom they ridiculed as "tin soldiers" in much the same manner as did the volunteers. Two regimental commanders of militia said the special deputies "did not behave in a very pleasant manner" and "in the majority of instances were no good." The sheriff was notified to call them in and they soon disappeared. There is no record of organized methods of procedure or of their activities.

Restoration of order.—Long before actual hostilities ceased, and even before the arrival of the militia, various agencies, in addition to the police, were at work trying to hold lawlessness in check and restore order. Efforts of citizens of both races helped greatly in bringing about peace. As long as the rioting was in progress thousands of Negroes were cut off from their employment. The Stock Yards workers especially were affected, since Negroes living east of Wentworth Avenue would have been forced to go to work on foot through the district in which the worst rioting occurred. The hostilities also cut off the food supply in the main riot areas. The dealers in the "Black Belt," principally Jewish merchants, became alarmed lest temporary lack of funds due to the separation from work and wages should lead Negroes to loot their stores.

On August 1, the various packing companies made the unpaid wages of Negro employees available for them by establishing pay stations at the Chicago Urban League at 3032 Wabash Avenue, the Wabash Avenue Young Men's Christian Association at 3763 Wabash Avenue, the South Side Community Service House at 3201 South Wabash Avenue, and the Binga State Bank, Thirty-eighth and State streets. Approximately 6,000 employees were paid in this way. Banks within the district made small temporary loans to stranded persons, sometimes without security. The cashier of the Franklin State Bank at Thirty-fifth Street and Michigan Avenue said that he had made loans of more than $200 to Negroes in sums of $2 and $3 on their simple promise to pay, and that every dollar had been repaid.

All the local newspapers in their editorial columns took a vigorous stand against disorder, urged the people to be calm and avoid crowds, and were insistent that those responsible for rioting should be brought to justice. The Tribune, for example, published editorials under the following captions: "Regain Order and Keep It," "Sane Men and Rioters," "This Is No Holiday," "The Facts of the Riot," and "Penalties for Rioters." All of these articles were calm appeals for tolerance, sanity, and dispassionate inquiry for the facts. The Evening American, in an editorial entitled "This Is Chicago's Crisis; Keep a Cool Head," said:

Chicago is facing its crisis today.

In one great section of the city law and order for the time being seem to have been flung to the four winds. White men and colored men are shooting one another down in the streets for no earthly cause except that the color of their faces differs.

These mobs are not representative of whites or blacks. They are the hoodlums of both races. But the law abiding whites and blacks are innocent victims.

Hotheads and smoking gun barrels have almost wrested the rule from the keepers of the peace.

It is worse than a calamity, this race rioting. It is a deadly, ghastly scourge, a dire contagion that is sweeping through a community for no reason except that mob violence is contagious.

It is up to the cool-headed men of Chicago to settle the great difficulty. It is up to the serious-minded business men of the city to get together and find a solution to a problem which has become so serious.

To meet violence with violence is but making matters worse. Gun toting at a time like this only adds fuel to the fire already raging.

Reason is the solution. It is mightier than the six-gun. How it is to be exerted is for the level-headed citizenry to decide, and decide at once.

Hardly an hour passes that more names are not added to the already long list of slain in the South Side rioting.

There is no time to be lost. Other matters must be put aside for the moment and a solution reached for Chicago's greatest problem.

NEGRO STOCK YARDS WORKERS CUT OFF FROM WORK RECEIVING WAGES
Photograph taken at temporary pay station established at the Y.M.C.A. by packing companies.

BUYING ICE FROM FREIGHT CAR SWITCHED INTO NEGRO RESIDENCE AREA

Labor unions also took a hand in the efforts toward peace. Unionists of both races were exhorted to co-operate in bringing about harmonious relations, and meetings for this purpose were planned by trade-union leaders, as described in the section of this report dealing with the Negro in industry. Probably the most effective effort of union labor was the following article in the New Majority, the organ of the Chicago Federation of Labor, prominently displayed:

For White Union Men to Read

Let any white union worker who has ever been on strike where gunmen or machine gun have been brought in and turned on him and his fellows search his memory and recall how he felt. In this critical moment let every union man remember the tactics of the boss in a strike when he tries by shooting to terrorize striking workers into violence to protect themselves.

Well, that is how the Negroes feel. They are panic-stricken over the prospect of being killed.

A heavy responsibility rests on the white portion of the community to stop assault on Negroes by white men. Violence against them is not the way to solve the vexed race problem.

This responsibility rests particularly heavy upon the white men and women of organized labor, not because they had anything to do with starting the present trouble, but because of their advantageous position to help end it. Right now it is going to be decided whether the colored workers are to continue to come into the labor movement or whether they are going to feel that they have been abandoned by it and lose confidence in it.

It is a critical time for Chicago.

It is a critical time for organized labor.

All the influence of the unions should be exerted on the community to protect colored fellow-workers from the unreasoning frenzy of race prejudice. Indications of the past have been that organized labor has gone further in eliminating race hatred than any other class. It is up against the acid test now to show whether this is so.

Various social agencies took steps to help in the emergency and restore order. The American Red Cross has a branch at Thirty-fifth Street and Michigan Avenue. As soon as the rioting became serious a special relief headquarters was established here, and food was distributed to needy families cut off from work. The Urban League was used as a headquarters for the distribution of food.

The Urban League had for several years, through its employment bureau, handled a large proportion of the city's Negro labor supply and was conversant with difficulties likely to result from the rioting. It made food surveys of the entire Negro area, printed and distributed thousands of circulars and dodgers urging Negroes to stay off the streets, refrain from dangerous discussions of the riot, and co-operate with the police in every way to maintain order. The League sent telegrams to the governor and mayor suggesting plans for curbing disorder, organized committees of citizens to aid the authorities in restoring order, and served as a bureau of information and medium of communication between the white and Negro groups during the worst hostilities.

The Young Men's Christian Association was similarly active within the area of its efforts. Religious bodies, ministers' associations, and individual ministers exerted their influence over their respective groups by advising the citizens to "keep cool," "hold their heads," and generally to let the authorities settle the riot. Negro business men and one Negro alderman sent wagons through the streets bearing large signs which advised Negroes not to congregate on streets, engage in arguments, or participate in any way in the disorders. The signs further stated that people would be advised when it would be safe to return to work. Other persons went about speaking on street corners urging co-operation with the police and militia. Appeals by officials and leading citizens were published in the white and Negro papers, carrying similar advice. During the riot a committee of citizens representing forty-eight social, civic, commercial, and professional organizations met at the Union League Club and petitioned the governor to take steps to quiet the existing disorder and appoint a commission to study the situation with a view to preventing a repetition of it. As a result of this appeal followed by similar urgings by many committees, the present Chicago Commission on Race Relations was appointed and began its work.

Aftermath of the riot.—After the restoration of order community activities were superficially the same as before the riot, but under the surface there remained a deepened bitterness of race feeling which spread far beyond the time and territorial limits of the riot itself.

All the deep-seated causes of friction which had developed so largely from the failure to work out an adjustment of the increased Negro population due to the migration were and are still present, undiminished in influence. Consciousness of racial difference and more or less unconscious fear and distrust were increased and spread by the riot. Among the whites this was evidenced by the general belief that Negroes were gathering stores of arms and ammunition. Among the Negroes a growing race solidarity has been marked. There is a greater lack of confidence in the white man's law and machinery of protection. Continued bombings of Negro houses in mixed areas and failure to apprehend the culprits no doubt strengthen this attitude.

Reports of various Negro gatherings held soon after the riot show this to be the case. Many Negroes frankly urged their brothers that they must arm themselves and fight if attacked. At one meeting a Negro is reported to have said:

The recent race riots have done at least one thing for the colored race. In the past we Negroes have failed to appreciate what solidarity means. We have, on the contrary, been much divided. Since the riot we are getting together and devising ways and means of protecting our interests. The recent race riots have convinced us that we must take steps to protect ourselves. Never again will we be found unprepared. It is the duty of every man here to provide himself with guns and ammunition. I, myself, have at least one gun and at least enough ammunition to make it useful.

The riot furnished the gang and hoodlum element a chance to indulge in lawlessness. Fear of death and injury may help to hold that element in check. But it cannot be argued that fear of punishment is much of a factor, for very few convictions of rioters were secured.

Quick justice would have been a salutary means of curbing tendencies to riot, according to both the coroner's jury and the grand jury. The coroner's jury said: "One remedy for race rioting is a speedy conviction and punishment of those guilty, regardless of race or color, giving all concerned a fair and impartial hearing." Its eighth recommendation reads: "Above all, a strict enforcement of the law by public officials, fair and impartial, will do more than any other agency in restoring the good name of Chicago, and prevent rioting from any cause from again disturbing the peace of our city."

The August, 1919, grand jury said: "This jury feels that in order to allay further race prejudice and to prevent the re-enactment of shameful crimes committed during the recent riots, efficient, prompt, and fearless justice on the part of the judiciary be meted out to the guilty ones, whether they be white or black."

In a fair consideration of whether swift and impartial justice was meted out, it must be noted that it was extremely hard to secure evidence sufficient for successful prosecution. Police attention upon arriving at the scene of a clash was directed more to removing the injured than apprehending the guilty. Where attempts were made to search out the offenders, it was next to impossible to get results on account of the keen race consciousness which made Negroes disclaim knowledge of Negro culprits and white people deny seeing specific white men act aggressively. Many of the crowds were neighborhood gatherings and leaders were often the sons of neighbors.

In most of the riot cases brought before the state's attorney's office the same difficulty was experienced. Whole blocks of residents were subpoenaed and accurately described the assaults, but failed entirely to recognize any of the assailants. The grand jury found the same obstacle. The foreman, referring to the kind of testimony brought before that body by Negroes on complaints against whites, said: "... they [the grand jury] usually found it to be hearsay testimony. Some other individual told them about So-and-So. That a crime had been committed there was no question, but to get at the root of it was absolutely impossible."

In spite of these difficulties, those familiar with the riot situation believe that more arrests of active rioters might have been made and more convictions obtained. A study of the riot deaths shows that justice failed to be as swift and sure as the coroner's and grand juries recommended. The blame for this failure is variously placed on the police, state's attorney, judge, or jury, according to the prejudice of the one attempting to fix blame, or his connection with any of these agencies. The fact remains that the punitive results of the legal processes were too negligible to furnish a proper deterrent to future rioters.

Of the thirty-eight persons whose death constituted the riot's principal toll—

Fifteen met death at the hands of mobs. The coroners' jury recommended that the members of the unknown mobs be apprehended. None were ever found.

Six were killed under circumstances establishing no criminal responsibility: three white men were killed by Negroes in self-defense, and three Negroes were shot by policemen in the discharge of their duty.

Four Negroes lost their lives in the Angelus riot. The coroner made no recommendations, and the cases were not carried farther.

Four cases—two Negro and two white—led to recommendations from the coroner's jury for further investigation of certain persons, but sufficient evidence was lacking for indictments.

Nine cases resulted in indictments, four of which led to convictions.

Thus in only four cases was criminal responsibility for death fixed and punishment meted out to the guilty.

Indictments and convictions are divided according to the race of the persons criminally involved as follows:

	Negro		White
	Cases	Persons	Cases	Persons
Indictments[10]	6	17	3	4
Convictions	2	3	2	2

There is evidence that the riot of 1919 aroused many citizens of both races to a quickened sense of the suffering and disgrace which had come and might come again to the community, and developed a determination to prevent a recurrence of so disastrous an outbreak of race hatred. This was manifest, as another section of this report shows, in the courage and control which people of both races displayed on at least two occasions in 1920 when confronted suddenly with events out of which serious riots might easily have grown.

MILK WAS DISTRIBUTED FOR THE BABIES

PROVISIONS WERE SUPPLIED BY THE RED CROSS TO HUNDREDS OF NEGRO FAMILIES

This examination of the facts of the riot reveals certain outstanding features, as follows:

1. The riot violence was not continuous, hour by hour, but was intermittent.

2. The greatest number of injuries occurred in the district west of Wentworth Avenue, inclusive of Wentworth, and south of the Chicago River to Fifty-fifth Street, or, broadly speaking, in the Stock Yards district. The next greatest number occurred in the so-called "Black Belt," Twenty-second to Thirty-ninth streets, inclusive, Wentworth to the lake, exclusive of Wentworth; Thirty-ninth to Fifty-fifth streets, inclusive, Clark Street to Michigan Avenue, exclusive of Michigan.

3. Organized raids occurred only after a period of sporadic clashes and spontaneous mob outbreaks.

4. Main thoroughfares witnessed 76 per cent of the injuries on the South Side. The streets which suffered most severely were State, Halsted, Thirty-first, Thirty-fifth, and Forty-seventh. Transfer corners were always centers of trouble.

5. Most of the rioting occurred after working hours. This was particularly true after the street-car strike started.

6. Gangs, particularly among the young whites, formed definite nuclei for crowd and mob leadership. "Athletic clubs" supplied the leaders of many gangs.

7. Whites usually employed fists and clubs in their attacks upon Negroes; Negroes used firearms and knives in their attacks.

8. Crowds and mobs engaged in rioting were usually composed of a small nucleus of leaders and an acquiescing mass of spectators. The leaders were young men, usually between sixteen and twenty-one. Dispersal was most effectively accomplished by sudden, unexpected gun fire.

9. Rumor kept the crowds in an excited, potential mob state. The press was responsible for wide dissemination of much of the inflammatory matter in spoken rumors, though editorials calculated to allay race hatred and help the forces of order were factors in the restoration of peace.

10. The police lacked sufficient forces for handling the riot; they were hampered by the Negroes' distrust of them; routing orders and records were not handled with proper care; certain officers were undoubtedly unsuited to police or riot duty.

11. The personnel of the militia employed in this riot was of an unusually high type. This unquestionably accounts for the confidence placed in them by both races. Riot training, definite orders, and good staff work contributed to their efficiency.

12. The machinery of justice was affected by prejudices and political rivalries.

From their reviews of the evidence brought before them, the coroner's jury and the grand jury presented analyses of the riot, and each made recommendations of a remedial sort. These recommendations follow:

CORONER'S JURY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. We believe that a representative committee of white and colored people, working together, could suggest and bring about the necessary and advisable changes.

2. In specifically attacking the housing situation: The correction of the evil by enlarging the living quarters and placing them in a better sanitary state would in part solve the difficulty. We believe voluntary segregation would follow and to a considerable extent remove one cause of unrest.

This is a matter that might well be considered by the Real Estate Board and by improvement clubs and organizations of property owners in the South Division, and by the Health Department.

3. In regard to the "athletic clubs": Properly governed and controlled they should be encouraged and fostered and, when necessary, disciplined.

4. Hoodlumism evokes this comment: Citizens of Chicago, make your hoodlum element amenable to law, break up and destroy hoodlumism as you would a pestilence. It is our belief that this element can be brought under control of the law, and it must be done if we are to remove the danger of rioting from any cause. Vicious hoodlumism, entirely aside from race hatred, was present in practically all of the thirty-eight killings, known as race riots.

5. We earnestly urge that fathers and mothers teach their children the lesson of remaining at home when rioting occurs, and furthermore, they should be kept occupied, as idleness and bad association often cause young people to become bad men and women.

6. One remedy for race rioting is a speedy conviction and punishment of those guilty, regardless of race or color, giving all concerned a fair and impartial hearing.

7. Tolerance must be practiced between both white and colored in the discussion of the race problem, practiced in our everyday intercourse, in public conveyances, and in meetings of all kinds.

8. Our attention was called strikingly to the fact that at the time of race rioting the arrests made for rioting by the police of colored rioters were far in excess of the arrests made of white rioters. The failure of the police to arrest impartially at the time of rioting, whether from insufficient effort or otherwise, was a mistake and had a tendency to further incite and aggravate the colored population.

9. In cases of murder it is of the utmost importance that expert criminologists should arrive on the scene at the earliest possible moment, and that a complete examination may be made of the scene of the murder before the body is removed or handled, and while the necessary evidence for conviction may be obtained, which otherwise may be lost or destroyed. We have found in the riot cases many instances where the removal of bodies by inexperienced men, in some cases police officers, destroyed valuable evidence.

We heartily concur with Coroner Hoffman as to the fact that Chicago badly needs a permanent murder-investigation squad, which the coroner planned and has so persistently advocated in the past. We believe that this squad should be equipped with motor vehicles and subject to call at any hour of the day or night. This squad should consist of six or more trained policemen, working in relays of eight hours, a photographer, a finger-print expert, a coroner's physician and chemist, the coroner or deputy coroner, and a state's attorney. In addition thereto, two trained policemen from the police department precinct wherein the murder occurred, and a representative of the City News Bureau. This squad should be available for immediate service, and it should be the duty of the police at the scene of the murder to allow no one to handle the body or enter premises where murder occurred until the arrival of the squad.

10. The police force should be enlarged. It is too small to cope with the needs of Chicago, and under the present living conditions the policeman's pay is entirely inadequate and should be substantially increased.

Superannuated and incapacitated members of the police force should be retired under a proper and satisfactory pension system.

There should be organization of the force for riot work, for the purpose of controlling rioting in its incipient stages.

GRAND JURY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is reasonable to believe that the colored people, if provided with proper housing facilities and an area sufficient in extent, would voluntarily segregate themselves. The present neighborhood known as the "Black Belt" could, by reasonable public improvement, assisted by our leading public citizens, be made a decent place to live in for a much larger population than it now accommodates.... This movement should enlist the financial and moral support of the industries employing large numbers of the black race.

2. Facilities for bathing, playgrounds, police protection, better housing and neighborhood conditions, are matters deserving the earnest attention of the proper authorities.

3. The employment of the colored people is imperative to the welfare of this community. Discriminating against the Negro, or, in other words, failure to give him an opportunity to make an honest livelihood after having induced him to migrate to this section of the country, simply adds to the already far too great number of hoodlums that infest our city.

4. This jury feels that in order to allay further race prejudice and to prevent the re-enactment of shameful crimes committed during the recent riots, efficient, prompt, and fearless justice on the part of the law-enforcing officers, as well as on the part of the judiciary, be meted out to the guilty ones, whether they be white or black.

5. ... There is a lack of co-operation and harmony among the agencies of law enforcement, which impairs their efficiency, leads to miscarriages of justice, and wastes the public funds.

6. The parole law should be amended so that a criminal once paroled and subsequently arrested may not a second time be paroled.

7. The efficiency of the police force would be further greatly increased by the co-operation of the judiciary in refusing to grant wholesale continuances without carefully scrutinizing the results thereof when members of the police force are required to act as witnesses.

8. The police department is in need of a thorough house-cleaning. Every officer, no matter what his position is, who fails in his full duty should be dismissed. Grafters and those who allow themselves to be dominated by political influences, who are paid to protect the lives and property of our citizens, should be dismissed and punished to the fullest extent of the law.

9. It is the opinion of this jury that the police force is also inadequate in numbers, and at least one thousand (1,000) officers should be added to the existing force.

10. Policemen who have arrived at the age where their usefulness is a matter of the past should be pensioned, notwithstanding their present number, and notwithstanding the fact that the pension fund is already taxed to its utmost. The needed funds for this purpose should be provided.

11. ... payment of salaries to public officers commensurate with the increased cost of living.

12. The authorities employed to enforce the law should thoroughly investigate clubs and other organizations posing as athletic and social clubs which really are organizations of hoodlums and criminals formed for the purpose of furthering the interest of local politics.

13. The jury also finds that vice of all kinds is rampant in the "Black Belt," and a thorough cleaning up of that district is absolutely essential to the peace and welfare of the community.

14. Political influence to a large extent is responsible for the brazenness with which the Chicago bum, pickpocket, and gun and hold-up man operates. It is also the opinion of the jury that the indeterminate-sentence law frequently operates in a miscarriage of justice, and it is our opinion that the court should fix the sentence of offenders at the time of their conviction.

15. Because of the large number of young boys involved in the rioting, the jury recommends the resumption of the activities of the Y.M.C.A., the Knights of Columbus, and Salvation Army, as well as other similar organizations....

CHAPTER II
OTHER OUTBREAKS IN ILLINOIS