III
It is but proper that Senator Kern’s relation to the presidential nomination should be disclosed, for his was the name that hovered over the convention constantly as the most probable compromise selection in the event of a hopeless deadlock. Because of the persistency of the “Kern talk” there has been from hostile quarters a tendency to question his loyalty to the candidacy of Governor Marshall; and during the prevalence of the talk The New York World’s convention correspondent attempted to create the impression that the reactionary forces were working quietly for the nomination of the man who next to Bryan did more to force the convention into progressive channels than any man in it.
Senator Kern was as loyal as it was possible for man to be to the candidacy of the Indiana governor. He felt that Mr. Marshall had many elements of strength and looked upon him as a possible compromise between the two leading candidates in the event of a deadlock. Under these circumstances he frowned down any suggestion of his own name as calculated to weaken the prospects of Indiana’s candidate by casting suspicion upon the sincerity of Indiana’s support. I had personal evidence of this of the most positive character.
Several months before the convention, as the number of candidates multiplied and the possibility of complications developed, a number of prominent politicians of a Pacific coast state wrote Senator Kern expressing a desire to launch his candidacy in that state, and to follow it immediately with the organization of “Kern for President” clubs. Assuming of course that a letter of such importance should be answered personally, I placed the letter in his hands. He was seated at his desk writing, and, as usual, smoking. He read it through carefully, a puzzled expression on his face, and then with a quizzical smile he handed it back.
“Aren’t you going to answer it?” he was asked.
By this time he had resumed his writing.
“No—you acknowledge it,” he said, still writing.
“What shall I say?”
“Say that I am not and will not be a candidate; that Indiana has a candidate and one that would give a good account of himself.” That is the kind of letter, not even bearing Kern’s signature, that went back to men of real political potentiality on the Pacific coast. After that many other people in different parts of the country outside Indiana wrote along the same line. These letters were always shown Kern, but with the exception of the first one not one of these was read through to the end, and in every case a letter similar in character to the one he ordered written in the first instance was sent. After a while he was clearly annoyed and disturbed by the suggestion these letters conveyed. He simply ignored them, refused to seriously consider them, and evidently preferred not to see them.
In Indiana he had many importunate friends who insisted on making him a candidate against his will, and with these he dealt directly and always with the stern injunction that they do absolutely nothing that could possibly create the impression outside the state that there was any divided opinion in the state regarding the position the state should take on the presidency.
This dangling of a possible prize before him was carried to the convention on the day it met and was never permitted out of his range of vision up to the very day that Woodrow Wilson was nominated. Mr. Bryan tells me that one of the reasons given him by Kern for his opposition to being nominated for the temporary chairmanship was the fact that “he was embarrassed by the fact that he was being mentioned for the presidency by men in other delegations” and such prominence as might follow his nomination for the chairmanship might be falsely interpreted as a bid for the prize. On the second day of the convention the Associated Press carried the story that many astute politicians had reached the conclusion that under the two-thirds rule of Democratic conventions none of the avowed candidates could be nominated and that “some of the progressives” had commenced to “test sentiment for Kern” and that the movement had “gained considerable momentum.” On that day it was a commonplace comment about the hotel lobbies that the nominee “would be Wilson or Kern.” And on that day men of much political importance in other states than Indiana began to interest themselves in “testing sentiment for Kern.” The theory of these men was that when the “conservatives” found they could not nominate Clark or Harmon, and the “progressives” learned they could not nominate Wilson, both elements would find in Kern the satisfactory way out. And during that time Kern was importuned, and harassed, every hour of the day, dragged from the Resolutions committee to meet delegates anxious to vote for him, followed to his room at night. When the movement reached such proportions as to seem serious he took the position that as long as there was any possibility of the nomination of any of the avowed candidates, and as long as there was any chance of a compromise on Marshall his name should not under any circumstances appear in the balloting.
Long before the various candidates had been formally presented to the convention it required no extraordinary perspicacity on the part of veterans of national conventions to see that none of the avowed candidates could or would be nominated without prolonged balloting, and that there was a strong possibility of a hopeless deadlock. It did not require many ballots to justify the fear. In the resulting discussion of a compromise candidate or “dark horse” no name appeared with such frequency as that of Kern. Although he was constantly holding his friends in check this did not spare him from the suspicion of some and the open criticism of others. The New York World sounded a “note of warning” in a direct charge that “the reactionaries of the convention” were planning to throw the nomination to Senator Kern to prevent it from going to Wilson. The absurdity of the assumption that “reactionaries” would be interested in the nomination of the progressive leader of Indiana, who had been intimately identified with the reform measures of Mr. Bryan was not explained. The truth is that the men who were drawn to the Kern solution of a deadlock were found among members of both wings of the party. But the men who gave the movement impetus in the beginning and remained throughout the most faithful to it were progressives of the most militant stripe. Among them were men whose first choice were Wilson, Clark, Harmon and Marshall. The Underwood forces alone contributed no support to the movement. The most active and aggressive sponsor of the Kern compromise idea in the event the deadlock continued long enough to engender bitterness was Senator Luke Lea of Tennessee, whose first choice was Wilson.
The name of Kern appeared for the first time in the balloting on the third ballot when a delegate from Ohio went to him. After that there was scarcely a ballot in which he did not appear usually with one vote, frequently with two and sometimes with more. This was only significant in that it kept his name constantly before the convention as a way out.
On June 29th, three days before the nomination of Wilson, the Associated Press carried the story of the “dark horse” talk and said that “the names of Kern and Gaynor are most frequently mentioned;” and on the same day the United Press announced that Kern would not be a candidate until it had been clearly demonstrated that Wilson, Clark or Marshall could not be nominated, and that Indiana would then lead the way, to be followed by Illinois.
During these days no man did more to hold the Indiana delegation together for Marshall than Senator Kern. When on the 29th ballot Major G. V. Menzies of Indiana broke the solidarity of the delegation by voting for Kern no man resented it more than the senator, who was more embarrassed than flattered. To all Indianians who called upon him at his room with the suggestion that the “time has come to break from Marshall”—and there were many both on and off the delegation—he stubbornly refused to listen. The thought behind his uncompromising attitude was that once the delegation broke away from its instructions there was no certainty that the majority would not ultimately find their way into the camp of ultra-conservativism.
Meanwhile he was given to understand that Illinois was ready at any moment Indiana led the way to transfer her vote to him, and he had good reasons for assuming that with his consent he could have the support of Ohio. In the event such a “drive” had been undertaken, assurances were given by men of potentiality that Michigan would follow and that far western states such as Colorado and Wyoming would fall in line. It was a tremendous temptation that was placed before him, and the very incongruity of the company urging it—progressives and bosses—would have made it seem to one less astute and less given to analysis as peculiarly auspicious. The feeling between the followers of the two leading candidates was hourly intensifying. The delegates were tired, and many financially embarrassed by the unexpected prolongation of the convention and were anxious to get away. If at such an hour and under such circumstances three such states as Indiana, Illinois and Ohio had bolted toward a dark horse, followed by Michigan and states from the far west and from the south, it might have resulted in a stampede and his nomination. It was Kern’s personal opinion that it might result in throwing the convention into a turmoil of uncertainty out of which would come the nomination of a reactionary; and such he believed to be the intent of some who were most insistent on his giving consent. He refused his consent.
At no time did Mr. Bryan give any encouragement to those who tried to interest him in Kern as a compromise candidate. This led to the silly story that the two former running mates had cooled toward one anther because “Kern had not warmed up to Bryan’s convention propositions.” It was immediately after this story became current, at a time when there was much speculation as to whether the convention would be compelled to adjourn without making a nomination, that Mr. Bryan, in an interview suggesting possible compromise candidates, named Kern, Ollie James, Senator O’Gorman and Senator Culbertson as a list from which a selection might be made. The fact that Kern was first in the list was immediately seized upon as evidence of Bryan’s partiality to his nomination, and that same day bets were offered that he would be nominated. Speaking of Kern, Mr. Bryan said:
“Senator Kern of Indiana already has received the support of nearly six million and a half of Democrats for the vice-presidency, and since that time he not only has been elected to the United States senate, but has distinguished himself among his associates by the prominent part he has taken. He is the leader of the fight against Senator Lorimer. If there can be no agreement upon any of those now being balloted for it ought to be easy to compromise on a man like Senator Kern.”
Then the drift toward Wilson began with the action of Bryan in withdrawing his vote from Clark because of the action of Tammany in throwing him its support and casting it for the New Jersey governor. It was the beginning of the end. On the day following the action of Bryan Senator Kern in a statement given to The Indianapolis News correspondent declared that the Indiana delegation was “first, last and all the time for Governor Marshall and had no second choice,” but added that the second choice of the people of Indiana was probably Wilson. From this time on the probability of a “dark horse” dwindled and the convention hurried to the conclusion of its work with the nomination of the ticket of Wilson and Marshall.
No single man with the probable exception of Bryan was more instrumental in the general result of the Baltimore convention than John W. Kern.
His dramatic action in the chairmanship fight had done more than any other one thing could to throw the burden of responsibility for the contest upon the reactionaries; his work on the committee on Resolutions made for progressivism; and his refusal under great pressure to permit the use of his name in the convention for the purpose of breaking away from the avowed candidates probably made the nomination of Wilson possible; and the support given the candidacy of Governor Marshall by the delegation of a doubtful state like Indiana no doubt made his selection for the vice-presidency logical and inevitable.
But the emotional conflicts through which he passed during those steaming days left him in a state of physical exhaustion from which he did not recover during the summer.