SECOND SECTION FIRST EXPERIMENTS WITH AEROPLANES IN THE FRENCH AUTUMN MANOEUVRES, 1910.
I. The historic Picardy tests—First official report upon movements of troops, as gleaned by aeroplane.
After these introductory notes, intentionally brief, we are led to a consideration of the first practical tests to which aeroplanes were put, so far as their military use is concerned.
During the summer of 1910, the French authorities were instructing officers in the handling of machines. They had purchased several Voisin, Wright, and Farman biplanes, and possessed also a few monoplanes, including Blériots and Antoinettes.
For the autumn army manœuvres of 1910, which were due to take place in Picardy, it was decided to make as complete a test as possible of the value of the aeroplane as a scout in time of war. Ten or fifteen machines were requisitioned for the experiments, some being stationed with each of the manoeuvring forces.
To augment the military pilots, several civilian airmen readily gave their services, notably Mr Hubert Latham with his Antoinette, and M. Louis Paulhan, flying a Farman.
Although this was the first time aeroplanes had been used in mimic warfare, and although the airmen themselves, and the military authorities, were naturally unacquainted with the best methods of utilising the new "arm," astonishing results were nevertheless obtained.
Two French officers. Lieutenant Sido and Adjutant Menard, were highly successful in their work. This was due to the fact they had gone through a careful course of training and were, in consequence, familiar with the task of compiling precise and informing reports of all that they saw when upon a reconnoitring flight.
Lieutenant Sido acted as observer upon the Farman biplane which they were using, and Adjutant Menard undertook the work of pilot. The former carried maps with him, and made frequent notes as the machine flew from point to point.
The value of the work these two officers were able to perform, is best indicated by setting forth the actual result of two of their reconnoitring flights. On the first occasion, acting under definite instructions, they left a place named Poix at 6 a.m., and flew over a sixty-kilometre course, being an hour and five minutes in the air, before returning to their starting-point.
This is the form in which they presented their report to Headquarters:—
6.5 A.M.—
At Thieuloy, three squadrons of chasseurs-a-cheval, hidden
behind the southern edge of the village on the road from Thieuloy
to St Maur.
6.30 A.M.—
At Feuquieres, a brigade of infantry on the march eastward on the
road from Feuquieres to Brombos. Head of main body just leaving
Feuquieres. Six batteries of artillery parked south of
Feuquieres.
6.32 A.M.—
At point 1800 metres north of Feuquieres, two companies on
outpost, one facing north and the other northeast, astride the
Feuquieres-Sarcus road. One company has dug rifle-pits to the
west, and the other company section trenches to the east of the
road. A Blériot monoplane has just landed behind the company west
of the road. We followed its flight for three minutes.
6.40 A.M.—
Agneres—A company in column of route marching from Agneres
towards Mereaucourt along the Saint Martin-de-Ponsis ravine.
The completeness and detail of this statement certainly surprised the officers who received it. No one, save a well-trained military observer, could have presented such a report. Its value was self-evident. It revealed, indeed, in a manner that was undeniable, the extremely useful work which could be done, in time of war, by a well-handled scouting aeroplane.
II. Second conclusive test—Detecting an army in retreat—France’s determination to possess an air-fleet.
On another early-morning flight, during these same Picardy manœuvres, Lieutenant Sido and Adjutant Menard made a second important aerial reconnaissance, surveying a specified tract of country occupied by the "enemy."
This was how they presented their report:—
5.56 A.M.—
At Halloy, a cyclist company.
5.59 A.M.—
Thieuloy—Sixteen squadrons of cavalry and six batteries at the
southwest entrance to the village.
6.5 A.M.—
South-west of Rothois—At the north point of Malmifet wood, a
company and two batteries of artillery on the march towards
Marseille-le-Petit.
6.7 A.M.—
Haute-Epine—Northern entrance to the village, one company of
infantry to the right and one to the left of the road. One
company at point 188. One company in the village of Haute-Epine.
6.9 A.M.—
At the cross-road to Lihus, a squadron of dragoons concealed
behind the edge of the wood.
6.14 A.M.—
On the road Cievecoeur-Marseille south of Lihus, a squadron on
the march towards Marseille-le-Petit, and a troop in the village
of Lihus.
6.16 A.M.—
On the Lihus-Potangy road, a squadron and two machine-guns
marching towards Marseille-le-Petit.
6.19 A.M.—
South-west entrance to Cieve-coeur, three regiments of cavalry,
including cuirassiers, and six batteries of artillery, in
assembly formation.
"The value of these two reports," declared one of the chief French military experts, "cannot be overestimated. Each one exposed the dispositions of the enemy, and the information was obtained in a remarkably short space of time."
As regards the second report of the two air-scouts, it provided one remarkable instance of the practical value of the aeroplane in time of war. Upon the night before the airmen carried out their reconnaissance, the troops they were observing had been heavily attacked, and the Commander-in-Chief for whom they were acting was particularly anxious to know whether his enemy intended to hold its ground, or was about to fall back.
The aerial report, when received, threw a clear light upon this point. Mainly cavalry and rear-guards had been detected during the flight. It was obvious, therefore, that the enemy was in retreat. Such results as these convinced the military experts who were studying the manœuvres that the future of the aeroplane, at any rate from the reconnoitring point of view, was practically assured.
For the splendid work which he had accomplished, Lieutenant Sido received promotion, and his pilot, Adjutant Menard, was presented with the Cross of the Legion of Honour. Lieutenant Sido, explaining afterwards how he succeeded in setting out such terse and informing reports, made several interesting observations regarding the work of a military observer.
At first, he said, the man who attempted aerial scouting could not distinguish things below him with sufficient clearness. He himself had found that quite a number of flights were necessary before he could make anything like satisfactory or accurate observations. But practice, he added, was everything. Granted plenty of this, and sharp eyesight, he considered that an aerial observer should make few mistakes in reporting what he saw when in an aeroplane.
A military correspondent of The Times, who went through these manœuvres in Picardy, and thus had ample opportunity of studying the work of the air-scouts, declared afterwards: "In my belief the aeroplane, given a trained pilot, and a skilled observer, must revolutionise the whole service of reconnaissance." No statement could be more definite.
This, as has been said, was the first practical revelation of what an air-scout might accomplish in time of war. France was not slow to profit by the lesson. Without delay, she began to create an efficient aeroplane fleet. If feats such as those recorded in the Picardy manœuvres could be carried out with a few aeroplanes, what could not be achieved with highly-organised squadrons of machines? This, in effect, was the question which France asked herself.
[Illustration: READY FOR A SCOUTING FLIGHT. Here a latest-type reconnoitring monoplane, with its observer in the front seat and the pilot behind him, is seen just about to start upon an aerial voyage. The machine is a British-built Bristol, such as will be used in the forthcoming military trials.]