I
And what, the reader will ask, is the conclusion of the whole matter?
First, how far did Tanks really contribute to our overthrow of the Germans?
Secondly, what would be the place of the Tank if another war broke out within the next generation; and, thirdly, what place are Tanks going to be given in the reconstituted British Army?
As far as they can be answered, we will reply to these questions in order. For upon the performances of the Tanks in this war, will be—or should be—based the answers to the other questions, and on this point we propose to call the evidence of three or four expert witnesses.
For the rest, the reader has had an opportunity of studying a large mass of evidence for himself.
He has seen how, when the line from Switzerland to the sea had been formed, both armies sought some means of putting an end to the stalemate.
How to both the Allies and the Germans the solution by artillery was the first to occur. How, secondly, we and the Germans each according to our national habits of mind, thought of another solution. The Germans—who were chemists—of gas, used treacherously in despite of signed undertakings to the contrary; we, who were mechanics, of a self-propelled shield, from behind which we could direct an effective fire.
He knows how gas was countered, after the first surprise, by means of various air-filtering devices; but how the Tank gradually revolutionised warfare, because there was no particular specific or antidote to the Tank, which depended not so much upon surprise as on the simple factors of its enormous fire power, and its ability to surmount obstacles. For whether the troops attacked had fought against Tanks before or no, the Tank crushed down wire and smothered machine-gun fire just the same.
Marshal Foch is the first of our witnesses.
He sketches the evolution of the Tank, and describes the circumstances which called it into being, in his foreword to the English translation of his republished Principles of War. He has dealt with the old slowness of “digging in.”
We translate his words literally:
“The machine-gun and the barbed-wire entanglement have permitted defences to be organised with indisputable rapidity. These have endowed the trench, or natural obstacle, with a strength which has permitted offensive fronts to be extended over areas quite impracticable until this time.... The offensive for the time was powerless, new weapons were sought for, and, after a formidable artillery had been produced Tanks were invented—i.e. machine-guns or guns protected by armour, and rendered mobile by petrol, capable, over all types of ground, to master the enemy’s entanglements and his machine-guns....
“Thus it is the industrial power of nations that has alone permitted armies to attack, or the want of this power has reduced them to the defensive.”
Monsieur Loucheur—in January 1919 French Minister of Munitions—was a strong advocate for Tanks in the French Army.
“There are two kinds of infantry: men who have gone into action with Tanks, and men who have not; and the former never want to go into action without Tanks again.”
Sir Douglas Haig’s summing up in his Despatch, though necessarily conservative, is not therefore the less significant:
“Since the opening of our offensive on August 8 Tanks have been employed in every battle, and the importance of the part played by them in breaking the resistance of the German infantry can scarcely be exaggerated. The whole scheme of the attack of August 8 was dependent upon Tanks, and ever since that date on numberless occasions the success of our infantry has been powerfully assisted or confirmed by their timely arrival. So great has been the effect produced upon the German infantry by the appearance of British Tanks that in more than one instance, when for various reasons real Tanks were not available in sufficient numbers, valuable results have been obtained by the use of dummy Tanks painted on frames of wood and canvas.
“It is no disparagement of the courage of our infantry or of the skill and devotion of our artillery, to say that the achievements of those essential arms would have fallen short of the full measure of success achieved by our armies had it not been for the very gallant and devoted work of the Tank Corps, under the command of Major-General H. J. Elles.”
Lastly, what is the opinion of the enemy?
Herr Maximilian Harden in a speech upon the causes of the German defeat, gave first place to the “physical shock of the Tank,” at which “Ludendorff had laughed.”
Speaking for the Minister of War in the Reichstag, General Wrisberg said:
“The attack on August 8 between the Avre and the Ancre was not unexpected by our leaders. When, nevertheless, the English succeeded in achieving a great success the reasons are to be sought in the massed employment of Tanks and surprise under the protection of fog....
“The American Armies should not terrify us.... More momentous for us is the question of Tanks.”
The G.O.C. of the 51st German Corps, in an Order dated July 23, 1918, remarks: “As soon as the Tanks are destroyed the whole attack fails.”
On October 23 the German Wireless published the following statement by General Scheuch, Minister of War:
“Germany will never need to make peace owing to a shortage of war material.
“The superiority of the enemy at present is principally due to their use of Tanks.
“We have been actively engaged for a long period in working at producing this weapon (which is recognised as important), in adequate numbers.
“We shall thus have an additional means for the successful continuance of the war, if we are compelled to continue it.”
The following passage occurred in a German Order issued on August 12, 1918:
“It has been found that the enemy’s attacks have been successful solely because the Tanks surprised our infantry, broke through our ranks, and the infantry thought itself outflanked.”
The German Press was also very generally inclined to attribute the German failure to the Allied use of Tanks, and their attitude is well illustrated by the following paragraph which appeared early in October, a time when German journalists seem to have been most carefully instructed from official quarters. It was their task to prepare the German people for surrender.
“The successes which the Allies have gained since the First Battle of Cambrai do not rest on any superior strategy on the part of Foch or on superiority in numbers, although the latter has undoubtedly contributed to it. The real reason has been the massed use of Tanks. Whereas the artillery can only cut wire and blot out trenches with an enormous expenditure of ammunition, the Tank takes all these obstacles with the greatest of ease, and will make broad paths in which the advancing infantry can follow. They are the most dangerous foe to hostile machine-guns. They can approach machine-gun nests and destroy them at close range. The great danger of the Tank is obvious when one considers that the defence of the front battle zone chiefly relies on the defensive value of the machine-guns, and that the armour of the Tank renders it invulnerable to rifle fire, and that only seldom and in exceptional cases is machine-gun fire effective. The infantry is therefore opposed to an enemy to whom it can do little or no harm.”