II
The Battle of Messines did not prove one in which Tanks were able to show to any particular advantage; this not because of adverse conditions, but because of the battle’s very success. It was throughout an extremely well-planned little action, and would probably have been perfectly successful even without the co-operation of Tanks.
An expert military critic has said of it:
“The Battle of Messines, one of the shortest and best mounted limited operations of the War, was in no sense a Tank battle.”
It was perhaps a little hard on the 2nd Brigade, who fought throughout with particular gallantry, that more of the laurel could not fall to them.
For not only was the 2nd Brigade’s maiden battle notable for gallantry in the field, but also for the very high standard of the Staff work—the administrative arrangements indeed long remaining the model for subsequent Tank operations.
So inspiring a little action was it, so well planned and executed in every stage, that the 2nd Brigade themselves felt that they had been privileged in playing even a relatively minor part in such an assault.
Though Tanks proved useful in several phases of the battle, Tank Commanders are the first to attribute the successes of the day to the artillery, the tunnelling companies and the infantry.
They had early established particularly cordial relations with the infantry, and it is said that a Maori Unit of the 2nd Anzac Corps gave expert help to the 2nd Tank Battalion in camouflaging its machines.
Messines was to be a prelude to a more considerable attack in the Ypres Salient. The village of Messines itself and the Wytschaete Ridge were to be taken, thus securing the British Right for the Ypres attack, and depriving the enemy of dominating ground.
The advance was to be a very short one, and the rôle of the Tanks was to be subsidiary to that of gunners, sappers and infantry.
Land Mines were to be a special feature of the action. The explosion of twenty of these containing over a million pounds of ammonal was to be the signal for attack on the morning of June 7.
Some of the mines had been ready for more than a year, and we had constructed nearly five miles of galleries. The Germans too had not been idle.
At the time of our attack we knew that the enemy was driving a gallery leading to our Hill 60 mine. By careful listening we judged that if our offensive were launched on the date arranged the enemy’s counter-mine would just fail to reach us. He was, therefore, allowed to proceed.
Altogether seventy-two Mark IV. Tanks were to be employed, and, the lesson of Arras having been learnt, twelve Mark I. and Mark II. Tanks had been converted into supply machines. Each of these was able to bring up sufficient petrol, ammunition and other stores to replenish five fighting Tanks.
Forty Tanks were to cross the parapet at zero hour and the rest of the Tanks were to be held in reserve.
They were to be distributed as follows:—
To the North: twelve Tanks were to work with the 10th Corps, whose objective was the Oosttaverne line.
In the Centre: sixteen Tanks were attached to the 9th Corps, who were to capture Wytschaete.
To the South: twenty Tanks were to fight with the 2nd Corps, who were to take Messines and a strong point named Fanny’s Farm, the reserves pushing on to capture the Oosttaverne line in the second phase of the attack.
The weather had been fine and hot for nearly three weeks before the battle, and a heavy thunder shower which fell on June 6 hardly laid the dust which had hung for weeks in a hazy curtain over the approach roads.
The Tanks were as usual moved up during the night before the action. It was very dark, with heavy thunder clouds hiding the moon.
[24]“The last part of the approach march will never be forgotten by those who took part in it.
“The enemy took it into his head to bombard with lachrymatory and other gas shells, and the night was so black that it was impossible to keep gas-masks on the whole time.
“So with streaming eyes, with no sort of light, with Tank Commanders and drivers coughing and spluttering, the Tanks forged ahead over this area of unseen trenches, barbed wire and shell-holes, the men buoyed up by the knowledge of the shock the Hun would receive in an hour or so.”
Zero hour was to be at dawn.
Somewhere north of Wytschaete a German dump had caught fire, and the red flames streamed up against the pale summer sky.
It grew lighter, and our aeroplanes and balloons began to go up, dark against the dawn.
Our unusual activity in the air did not escape the watchful enemy, and his suspicions were soon thoroughly aroused.
He began to send up rockets calling for barrage fire, and soon his guns were responding with growing emphasis.
At seven minutes past three our artillery stopped, and the rattle of machine-guns stood out in the comparative silence.
There was a pause. A low rumbling was heard. The earth rocked and quivered until with a prolonged and rending crash a screen of fire rose where the German front lines had been.
Masses of earth were hurled skywards, and as they rose gleamed for a moment purple and gold in the first rays of the sun. They writhed and shifted, fantastically swaying, and shot through with flames. Balls of fire were hurled in every direction, and the air quivered and vibrated with the shock. Before the tortured earth could fall again, down came the stunning roar and crash of the British barrage; and Tanks and infantry were over the parapet.
By 7 a.m. the Anzacs were in Messines, and both Tanks and infantry had reached Fanny’s Farm by noon, their day’s objective gained.
One Tank working with the 2nd Corps reached its final objective (at a distance of about two miles) in an hour and forty minutes.
A Tank led the Ulstermen and the Southern Irish of the 9th Division into Wytschaete.
By about three o’clock three Tanks had reached Oosttaverne, and they patrolled the ground beyond the village till their accompanying Welsh and West Country troops came up.
By nightfall we held our final objective everywhere, and had besides captured 7300 prisoners and 67 guns, 94 trench mortars and a very large number of machine-guns.
All through the night of the 7th-8th the Germans launched small hastily organised counter-attacks, and in repelling one of these, chance enabled three Tanks to play a curious and useful part.
Three of the Tanks, which had helped in the capture of Oosttaverne, had ultimately got ditched near a place named Joye Farm.
It was impossible to extricate them in the darkness, and the crews stood by, hoping to get them out as soon as it was light again.
Meanwhile towards morning word came that the Germans were going to counter-attack.
In the position in which the Tanks lay, the crews were able to train their 6-pounders against the enemy, who had been seen massing in the Wanbeke Valley. As the Lewis guns could not be brought to bear, they were dismounted, and the rest of the crews operated them from neighbouring shell-holes.
[25]“Word was sent to the infantry to warn them of the coming attack, and to ask for co-operation. They replied that they had run short of ammunition for their Lewis gun, and some was supplied to them from the Tanks.”
The attack did not develop as early as had been expected, but when it came it was in force.
From about 6.30 onwards the enemy repeatedly attempted to advance, raking the Tanks with a hail of armour-piercing bullets, which, however, failed to penetrate.
They were driven off every time with heavy loss, until at 11.30 a.m. our artillery opened and dispersed them with barrage fire.