II

But by August 24, there were only fifty-three Tanks of the 1st, 3rd and 4th Brigades fit for action, and nearly all the units which went in on this day were motley collections from various Battalions. One composite unit of the 11th Battalion fought a very successful action in conjunction with the 4th Corps, in spite of the fact that their orders reached them late and that they had an approach march of six or seven miles. They managed to catch up the infantry and all their objectives were taken.

In the course of the afternoon, Tanks belonging to the 9th Battalion attacked and met with very stubborn resistance opposite Mory Copse, where the Hindenburg Line was strongly held. Here more than one enemy garrison refused to surrender and had all to be killed. One party of about sixty was accounted for by four rounds of 6-pounder case shot.

One machine, which was doing a piece of reconnaissance work near Croisilles later in the day, had a particularly exciting experience. The crew was forced to evacuate the Tank on account of the phosphorus bombs with which the enemy had drenched it. Before leaving it, the officer in command turned the head of his machine towards home and started the Tank on its lonely way; then, almost choked with the fumes, he got out and walked between the front horns of the moving machine till the inside of the Tank was clear of phosphorus. All the while, he and the machine were completely surrounded by the enemy. In the end, he got his Tank home in safety.

On the 4th Army front, five Tanks of the 1st Battalion attacked at dawn with the 47th Division in an effort to recapture Happy Valley, which had been lost by us on the previous afternoon. The attack was exceedingly successful, and besides our original objective, the large village of Bray was added to our gains.

For the next week, the fighting consisted of a series of small local engagements for the most part improvised on the spot by the Divisions concerned.

Tanks fought every day in one part of the line or another, and every day we forced a stubbornly resisting enemy further and further back.

We propose only to give a short account of most of the actions of this period.

On August 25, about forty-two Tanks were again in action in little “blobs,” strung out on the fronts of the 4th and 6th Corps. Tanks from the 3rd, 7th, and 10th Battalions went into action, the 9th Battalion attacking with the Guards Division, north of Mory. Owing to the dense mist, co-operation between Tanks and infantry was phenomenally difficult and the attack was not very successful. During the engagement one Tank had five of its crew wounded by anti-Tank rifle bullets.

On the Canadian Corps front an attack was carried out on August 26, near Fampoux and Neuville-Vitasse, with the help of Tanks of the 9th and 11th Battalions.

Near Monchy several Tanks were knocked out, the crews joining the infantry to repel a local counter-attack. The sergeant of one crew hearing that the enemy had captured his Tank, collected his men and charged forward to recover it, arriving at one sponson door of the machine as the enemy were scrambling out of the opposite one.

The Tank Corps records characterise August 27 as “an uneventful day.” Fourteen Tanks of the 9th and 11th Battalions were used for mopping up points of resistance.

On the 28th no Tanks went into action at all.

But the 29th was more memorable, for on this day the enemy evacuated Bapaume, and in a minor attack on Frémicourt Lieutenant C. H. Sewell won the V.C.

It was a very small engagement south-west of Beugnâtre, in which only four Whippet Tanks took part.

The following is extracted from the report of the engagement sent in by Lieutenant Sewell’s Commanding Officer:

“At about 2 p.m. on the afternoon of August 29, ‘Whippets’ of the 3rd (Light) Tank Battalion reached the Quarry near the ‘Monument Comémoratif,’ south-west of Favreuil. Acting under instructions received from the New Zealand Division, one Section of ‘Whippets’ under Lieutenant C. H. Sewell was ordered forward to clear up the situation on the front of the 3rd New Zealand Rifle Brigade before Frémicourt and the Bapaume-Cambrai road, where the infantry were reported to be held up by machine-gun fire.

“On reaching the railway line south-east of Beugnâtre in advance of our infantry, enemy batteries and machine-guns opened heavy fire on the Section of ‘Whippets.’ In manœuvring to avoid the fire and to retain formation, Car No. A.233, commanded by Lieutenant O. L. Rees-Williams, side-slipped in a deep shell crater and turned completely upside down, catching fire at the same time.

“Lieutenant Sewell, in the leading ‘Whippet,’ on seeing the plight of Lieutenant Rees-Williams’ car, immediately got out of his own ‘Whippet’ and came to the rescue; with a shovel he dug an entrance to the door of the cab, which was firmly jammed and embedded in the side of the shell-hole, forced the door open and liberated the crew.

“Had it not been for Lieutenant Sewell’s prompt and gallant action, the imprisoned crew might have been burnt to death, as they were helpless to extricate themselves without outside assistance.

“During the whole of this time ‘Whippets’ were being very heavily shelled and the ground swept by machine-gun fire at close range. On endeavouring to return to his own car, Lieutenant Sewell was unfortunately hit several times, his body being subsequently found lying beside that of his driver, Gunner Knox. W., also killed, just outside the Tank, which at that time was within short range of several machine-guns and infantry gun-pits.”

The rescued men were emphatic in their praise of the gallant manner in which Lieutenant Sewell had saved them from a peculiarly horrible form of death.

On the 30th, the 3rd Division was to undertake operations designing to seize the villages of Ecoust and Longâtte with the trench system beyond. Six Tanks of the 12th Battalion were to operate, and in anticipation of their orders had already moved forward to the head of the Sensée Valley. Unfortunately their orders did not reach the Battalion till 9 p.m. on the night before the battle. The night was intensely dark, and as luck would have it, the Reconnaissance Officer who alone knew the ground had been recalled to England that day, and there still remained nearly four miles by the shortest route before the Tanks reached the jumping-off place. It was clear the machines would have their work cut out if they were to reach the place in time. The whole operation was dogged by misfortune. The taping party took the wrong direction in the pitch dark, and when at last the Tanks reached the point where the infantry guides were to lead them the rest of the way, the guide for the left-hand section lost himself and the Tanks completely before they had gone half the distance. For an hour the Tanks and their conductor wandered about the devastated wastes about Ecoust. The guide could not even point out on the map where the infantry were formed up. At last the Section Commander went forward by himself and managed to discover the whereabouts of the front line and his own position, but only to find he was nearly a mile away and it wanted five minutes to “zero.” It was impossible that he should reach the battle in time, and he withdrew his Section according to instructions as he was in an exposed position. Thus the unfortunate infantry went over the top unaccompanied by a single Tank. The assault was a complete failure and the infantry suffered heavy casualties.

[84]“On August 31 a further action took place. ‘C’ Company of the 15th Battalion under Captain G. A. Smith assisting the 185th Brigade in attacking Vaulx-Vraucourt from the south.

“Five Tanks reached their objectives, one failing owing to mechanical trouble; these Tanks did considerable execution and rendered great assistance to the infantry. Again heavy machine-gun and anti-Tank rifle fire were encountered. After the show the Tanks themselves bore mute witness to what they had been through. In particular the Tank ‘Opossum,’ commanded by Lieutenant C. F. Uzielli, had very little paint left on its sides because of bullet marks. The infantry suffered heavily. In one case the strength of a platoon on reaching its objective was only three men.”