III
On our side the preparations for a formidable attack continued steadily.
[32]“The various problems inseparable from the mounting of a great offensive, the improvement and construction of roads and railways, the provision of an adequate water supply and of accommodation for troops, the formation of dumps, the digging of dug-outs, subways and trenches, and the assembling and registering of guns, had all to be met and overcome in the new theatre of battle, under conditions of more than ordinary disadvantage.
“On no previous occasion, not excepting the attack on the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge, had the whole of the ground from which we had to attack been so completely exposed to the enemy’s observation. Even after the enemy had been driven from the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge, he still possessed excellent direct observations over the Salient from the east and south-east, as well as from the Pilckem Ridge to the north. Nothing existed at Ypres to correspond with the vast caves and cellars which proved of such value in the days prior to the Arras battle, and the provision of shelter for the troops presented a very serious problem.”
It was a problem which in some sectors proved insoluble, and troops and working parties had to come up night by night into the forward area, going back far behind the lines at dawn.
Like their fellows of every other arm, members of the Tank Corps carried out their battle preparations under conditions of peculiar difficulty.
But the 1st Brigade of Tanks had something more than indiscriminate harassing fire and “area shoots” to trouble them.
The enemy had obtained information of our tankodrome in Oosthoek Wood from a British prisoner, who was either a garrulous fool or a very treacherous knave.
A soldier belonging to a certain infantry regiment, had betrayed every detail of the whereabouts of the Tanks of the 1st Brigade, and of the programme of their movements. A German document was captured setting forth the whole of this creature’s evidence and explaining its value and significance. The official account of this murderous piece of treachery was periodically read out on parade to all Tank units, and formed the text of many discourses on the vital importance of strict secrecy and high moral. The name of this man will for ever have a sinister sound for all who served in the Tank Corps.
Fortunately for us, the Germans seem to have but half believed his story—at any rate, the shelling to which they thereafter periodically subjected the secret tankodrome was, though accurate, never so heavy as such an important target would have seemed to warrant. Perhaps the Germans, having no illusions as to what fighting in Flanders meant, and being reasonably alive to the natural limitations of Tanks, scouted the idea of a Tank attack being possible or being even seriously contemplated. Be that as it may, they certainly failed to act on the very valuable information given them in anything like an adequate way.
Still, after some days of well-directed shelling and bombing, it was decided to withdraw the whole of the personnel from Oosthoek Wood, and to lodge them in camps in the plantations just north of Château Lovie, where the Headquarters of the 1st Brigade was already established.
Hither, too, had come the Advanced Headquarters of the Tank Corps, the original intention of occupying a most eligible house in the town of Poperinghe being given up, in view of the inconvenience caused by the periodic shelling of the place and the consequent interruption of communications.
The advance Reconnaissance party had spent some weeks in the town, and had been considerably annoyed by frequent and accurate high-velocity shelling.
The concentration of personnel which thus came about seemed inconvenient enough at first, but turned out most usefully, and liaison between the Brigade and its battalions had never been so good.
There were forward dumps to be established with the aid of the supply Tanks.[33]
Very special preparations had to be made in order to bring the Tanks within striking distance of the enemy. The roads were reserved for lighter traffic. The enemy shelling was too heavy for railway making to be possible beyond the detraining camps at Oosthoek Wood.
Tentative attempts to push the line further on were constantly made, and as constantly detected and discouraged by the enemy.
The Tanks must have some sort of independent routes of their own over the innumerable small waterways that must be crossed.
The Kemmelbeke, the Lambardtheke, and in some places the Yser Canal, all lay in the way. Miles of rough causeways over the marshes had to be built; splinter-proof shelters for the various advanced Headquarters, and, further back, camps, Tank “stables,” storage sheds, kitchens and so forth, had all to be constructed.
Such a programme of work was beyond the unaided power of the Tank Corps, and therefore the 184th Tunnelling Company was allotted to the Corps, one section to each Brigade.
Much of the canal bridging and of the track making was done under fire, shrapnel, gas and H.E.
Often a series of shells, bursting on the newly laid causeway would undo a day’s work in a few minutes. Half the time the men had to wear gas-masks, and almost always they worked knee-deep in liquid mud or in the oozy bed of some little “beke.”
Yet in no instance did the 184th Tunnelling Company fail to carry out the work allotted to it.
One very ingenious piece of mechanism for use on the Tank itself had been evolved at Central Workshops in view of the Flanders mud. This was the “Unditching Beam.” It was a massive baulk of teak, iron shod at the ends, and having heavy chains whereby it might be secured to the tracks when it was needed.
Its length was somewhat greater than the width of the Tank over its tracks, and therefore ordinarily it was carried lengthwise along the back of the machine.
Its battle position was across the Tank, where it rested on the raised guide-rails which served to lift it clear of the conning-tower, the silencer and the other excrescences above the armoured back.
To these guide-rails it was secured by special holdfasts to prevent it from breaking adrift when the Tank pitched or rolled amongst the shell-holes.
When the Tank got “bellied,” these holdfasts had to be released and the drag-chains attached to the tracks by one of the crew climbing out on to the roof—the feat being one of some danger when in the near presence of the enemy.
The beam having been duly attached, the differential gear would be locked and the clutch released, when the revolving tracks would carry the beam over the nose of the Tank, from which it would dangle by its two track-chains until dragged beneath the Tank itself.
If the ground proved loose and boggy beyond a certain point, the beam would merely be dragged under the Tank to come up again behind, clogged and dripping with mud and leaving the “ditched” Tank still wallowing on its belly.
Sometimes Tanks would thrash away with their unditching beams until their vain efforts to struggle out of some quaking quagmire on to better ground overheated the engines or caused the machine to settle down so hopelessly in the oozing mud as to be flooded out.
Save on the very worst ground, however, the unditching beam proved a most effective contrivance, and but little could have been done in the Ypres fighting without it.
A FLANDERS PILL-BOX
THE UNDITCHING BEAM IN ACTION
THE STEENBECK VALLEY BEFORE THE BATTLE
THE STEENBECK VALLEY AFTER BOMBARDMENT