III
Thirty-six Tanks belonging to the 1st Brigade had remained in Army Reserve. On August 16, the weather having been less wet for a day or two, the first and most considerable of a series of renewed attacks was to be made.
Twelve Tanks were to co-operate with the infantry on the Langemarck-St. Julien front.
On the night of the 13th the Tanks began to move up. The roads were already congested with other traffic, and the Tanks were not to be allowed to make use of them.
[37]“The country they had to traverse was all very deep in mud, and the Tanks wallowed on their bellies in ground too soft for the tracks to hold. The approach was continued during the following night, but in spite of the repeated use of unditching beams, the mutual help of Tanks in towing each other, and the valuable assistance of a Tunnelling Company, it was recognised on the 15th that none but the four leading Tanks could hope to reach the line in time to take part in the battle. These four made strenuous efforts to complete the journey the next night, but without success. None of them could overcome the difficulties of the ground, and the infantry had to go into attack without them.”
The infantry attacked, and after the action a nest of pill-box strongholds north-east of St. Julien still remained untaken.
Like most of these little fortresses, they had been extremely skilfully placed. An unwary advance would be trapped in their wire just within convenient range of their machine-guns.
They were so small, scattered, and well concealed as to be almost impossible targets for heavy guns, and as they were built of reinforced concrete at least three feet thick, the ordinary high-explosive shell thrown by a field gun had no effect upon them.
This particular nest consisted of four pill-boxes of more than average size.
Three of them were hidden in the ruins of farmsteads. That in the Mont du Hibou was manned by a garrison of about eighty men, and the Cockcroft was still more strongly held. Triangle Farm and Hillock Farm were slightly smaller. It was essential that they should be taken, and General Sir Ivor Maxse, commanding the 18th Corps, was informed by the Brigadiers concerned that their capture would probably cost us 600 to 1000 casualties. He and Colonel Baker-Carr (commanding 1st Brigade of Tanks) then considered the possibility of a Tank attack.
Colonel Baker-Carr, admirably undismayed by the dismal events of the 16th, optimistically guaranteed the fortresses at half the estimated cost to the infantry, and the attack was arranged. One innovation he specially asked for. There was to be no shelling, but he was to be granted the concealment of a smoke barrage. Having once decided to entrust the affair to the Tanks, General Maxse was zealous to give them every possible chance of success and did not hesitate to modify his orders to suit their considered demands. Only twelve Tanks were to be employed, and they and their infantry were to use the roads for as far as these served them. Colonel Baker-Carr decided to form a composite Company from “G” (7th) Battalion under the command of Major Broome.
The resulting action, small as were the numbers engaged, will ever find a place in the annals of the Tank Corps.
[38]“In spite of the appalling condition of the ground, for it had now been raining steadily for three weeks, a very memorable feat of arms was achieved.”
The four strong points were triumphantly captured.
[39]“Phenomenal results were obtained at very little cost, for instead of 600 to 1000 casualties, the infantry following the Tanks only sustained fifteen!”
At 4.45 a.m. on the morning of August 19, the artillery isolated the doomed strongholds in clouds of dense smoke.
The action had been carefully rehearsed. Two Tanks were to be used against each pill-box, and they were to take them in rear, so striking where the forts were most vulnerable, and at the same time cutting off the garrison’s retreat.
Just before six o’clock the enveloping manœuvre was complete, and the first pill-box—Hillock Farm—fell, nearly all its garrison having fled.
At 6.15 two Tanks reached the Mont du Hibou, and fired forty rounds from their 6-pounder guns into the back door of the stronghold. Sixty of the garrison fled, of whom about half escaped or were shot down, and the rest surrendered to the infantry as soon as it came up.
Triangle Farm fell ten minutes afterwards. The garrison had put up a fight against the Tanks and our infantry killed them all, mostly with the bayonet.
At the Cockcroft the attacking Tank[40] got ditched within fifty yards of its victim. But at sight of it the garrison of over 100 “withdrew.” The Tank and its infantry immediately opened fire with their Lewis guns, and more than half the fugitives fell.
[41]“Our infantry then consolidated the Cockcroft. This completed the capture of all objectives.
“The Tanks waited till consolidation was well forward before returning.
“Casualties—Infantry: no killed, 15 wounded.
“Tank Personnel—Killed: Officers, none; other Ranks, 2. Wounded: Officers, 2; other Ranks, 10.”
In one of the strong points we found a German officer who had been hanged by his men.
The St. Julien attack, as it was afterwards called, proved a sufficient counterblast to the 5th Army report.
The friends of the Tank Corps made the most of it. It was a brilliant little exploit, and once brought to notice, the casualty figures pleaded too loudly to be ignored.
It is probably no exaggeration to say that it was in some measure to the Tanks which won the little Battle of St. Julien that the Tank Corps owed the opportunity of winning the Battle of Cambrai.