III
Each Tank could only carry one fascine, and once it had dropped it into a trench had no means of picking it up again. There were, however, three broad trenches to be crossed.
This circumstance had to be taken into account in the general scheme of attack. Every detail of this plan had been most ably worked out either by Lieut-Colonel Fuller himself (G.S.O.I. to the Tank Corps), or by the Staff whom he inspired. Every movement and formation which we are going to describe had been reduced to an exact drill, several special exercises being evolved for the occasion. One of them, a simple platoon drill for the infantry, was, we are told by an official historian, based upon a drill described by Xenophon in the Cyropædia, and attributed by him to Cyrus of Persia (circa 500 B.C.).
Very briefly the main plan was as follows:—
The whole line of attack was divided into areas for three Tanks who formed a section and worked together.
Of these one was an “Advance Guard Tank,” and the other two were “Infantry Tanks.”
The advance guard Tank was to go straight forward through the enemy’s wire, and, turning to the left without crossing it, to shoot along the fire trench which lay in front of it.
Its object was to keep down the enemy and protect the two infantry Tanks. These the while both made for one selected spot in the trench; the left-hand one cast in its fascine, crossed the trench on it, turned to the left and worked down the fire trench; the right-hand Tank crossed the fire trench on the first Tank’s fascine, and made for the second trench, dropped in its fascine, and crossing, worked down this second trench. Meanwhile the advance guard Tank had swung round and crossed over the first and second trenches on the fascines of the two infantry Tanks, and it therefore moved forward with its own fascine still in position for the third line.
The infantry were also divided into three forces and worked in single file. The first force were “Trench Clearers.” They worked with the Tanks, and helped to clear up trenches and dug-outs. They carried small red flags with which they marked the paths which the Tanks had made through the wire. The second were the “Trench Stops,” who, as it were, played the net over the rabbit hole to the Tank’s ferret. The third force were the “Trench Garrisons,” who took over the trenches as they were captured.
One feature of the combined Tank and infantry training for this battle was particularly interesting.
They had not very long to work together, yet it was essential that the infantry should have confidence in the trench-spanning and wire-cutting power of the Tanks.
Infantry units were therefore invited by the Tank Corps to build their own defences and entanglements, the Tanks guaranteeing to cross the trenches and chew up the wire of their best efforts.
Some very formidable and ingenious defences were made.
The Tanks, however, everywhere carried out their guarantee, to the great edification of the infantry.
The following table gives briefly the allocation of Tanks and infantry to the various objectives:
Allocation of Fighting Tanks
| 1st Brigade Battalions. | Tanks (No.) | 3rd Corps Divisions. |
| D (4) | 42 | On Right: 51st. |
| E (5) | 42 | 51st and 62nd. |
| G (7) | 42 | On Left: 62nd. |
Objectives: Havrincourt, Flesquières.
Of each battalion: thirty-six Tanks for 1st, 12 (plus survivors) for 2nd Objective.
Exploitation towards Fontaine, Bourlon Wood, the Bapaume-Cambrai Road, Bourlon Village and Graincourt. Bridges over Canal du Nord.
| 2nd Brigade Battalions. | Tanks (No.) | 4th Corps Divisions. |
| B (2) | 42 on Right. | 6th. |
| H (8) | 42 on Left. | 6th. |
Objectives: Beaucamp, Villers, Plouich Road.
Exploitation towards Marcoing, Preny Chapel, and Nine Wood.
| 3rd Brigade Battalions. | Tanks (No.) | 4th Corps Divisions. |
| C (3) | 42 | 12th. |
| F (6) | 42 | ” |
| I (9) | 42 | 20th. |
| A[44] (1) | 42 | ” |
Objective: La Vacquerie.
Exploitation towards Crèvecœur, Masnières, and Marcoing.
The part to be played by the artillery was carefully worked out. There was to be no preliminary bombardment, but as soon as the attack was launched the heavy guns were to begin counter-battery work and were to shrapnel the bridges along the Canal.
At the same time a jumping barrage of smoke shells and H.E. was to cover the advance of the Tanks and infantry.
The secrecy of the attack made it impossible for any registering shots to be fired, and the ranges could be worked out in theory only.
Several squadrons of the R.A.F. were to co-operate, flying low; their especial work being to bomb enemy Headquarters.
The cavalry were also billed to co-operate.
Special wire-pulling Tanks fitted with grapnels were employed to clear convenient broad lanes through the wire for them, and their needs were throughout carefully considered.
For one reason and another, however, the cavalry did not, after all, find it possible to take much part in the fighting.
The preparations for the battle were of the thorough and laborious kind always requisite for a “full-dress” attack.
An immense amount of railway movement was necessary in order to bring up the three Tank Brigades, whose component parts were a good deal scattered. Thirty-six trainloads of twelve Tanks each had to be dealt with, and their stores besides.
For the sake of secrecy all this movement was done after dark. There were only two minor accidents, otherwise the whole scheme was worked out exactly to programme.
The usual huge dumps of petrol and grease and special stores had to be formed. Most of them were made in neighbouring woods, where the Tanks also lay up. Havrincourt Wood and Desert Wood were, for instance, used for main dumps, and as lying-up places for the 1st and 2nd Brigades, for in these woods the hornbeam undergrowth had not yet shed its leaves and the Tanks and their stores could lie in perfect secrecy.
For the 3rd Brigade, however, there was no wood conveniently near, and the Tanks lay out in a village with camouflage clothes thrown over them, painted to represent bricks and tiles.
For the forward dumps splendid work was done by the 3rd Army’s light railways, who handled astonishing masses of stores; for example, 165,000 gallons of petrol, 541,000 rounds of 6-pounder ammunition, and 5,000,000 rounds of S.A.A.
Beyond the light railways the Tank fills were transported by supply Tanks.
All these preparations had to be carried out as secretly as possible. Moves were made after dark.
No new wheel tracks must be made. There must be no reference to the battle over the telephone. There must be no extra horse or mechanical transport seen about in daylight.
The concentration of Tanks in the background was explained by the establishment of an alleged new training area. Tank Corps Headquarters established with the army at Albert was disguised under the plausible alias of “The Tank Corps Training Office.”
There must be no increase in aeroplane activity for reconnaissance purposes.
The same troops were to continue to hold the line, the attacking forces passing through them, and those in the line were as far as possible to be kept in the dark as to the new operations. There was always a danger of men in the trenches being taken prisoner in some raid, and the less they knew the better. Oosthoek Wood had not been forgotten.
All the Reconnaissance Officers and the Tank Staff who had to frequent the line wore non-committal burberries and discreet tin hats; one well-known Staff Officer even went to the length of affecting blue glasses; in fact, in the matter of disguise the line was only drawn at ginger whiskers. The cars they came in had their distinguishing badges taken off, and their drivers were carefully primed with cock-and-bull stories with which to explain their presence. Staff and Reconnaissance Officers slunk about, above all avoiding Headquarters and those other social centres which etiquette enjoins must be first called upon by all who visit other people’s trenches. Friends were stealthily avoided, and a curious jumble of assorted and obvious lies was gradually put into circulation.
At the Lyceum the villain conducts his affairs in this sort of way without arousing the least suspicion in any one, but in real life, and particularly in the line where a look-out must constantly be kept for spies, such conduct is apt to cause remark.
Before Cambrai embarrassing situations frequently arose which could be elucidated only by the drawing aside of some justly indignant Commanding Officer for a few minutes’ whispered conversation.
At the 1st Brigade Headquarters in Arras there was a locked room with “No admittance” written large upon the door. Here were ostentatiously hung spoof maps of other topical districts and a profusion of plans lay spread about.
The Reconnaissance Officer always hoped that this room was duly ransacked by the “unauthorised person,” for whose visit he had taken such pains to prepare.
One more precaution was most carefully observed in the line itself. Exactly the amount of artillery fire to which the enemy was accustomed must be continued, and from guns of the calibre which he expected. It was considered that more or less shooting, or the use of guns to which he was not accustomed, would be sure to alarm him.
For more than a week before the battle there was no rain. Low, creeping mists screened our movements and made it almost impossible that the enemy should have seen us from the air.
But the time was, nevertheless, an anxious one.
On the night of the 18th-19th the enemy raided our line and captured some of our men.
We were uncertain how much these men knew, and how much information they would give under examination.
If under prompt examination they gave away the gist of our plans the enemy would have twenty-four hours in which to bring up reserves. There was, however, nothing to be done except to await the event.
There was yet one other particular in which the Battle of Cambrai was to differ from other battles.
In modern warfare the place of the General commanding any considerable body of troops is almost invariably in the rear at some point where communications are good and whence he can effectively control his reserves.
His leadership is more a matter of the spirit and moral which he can infuse into his troops, than of his actual presence in the forefront of the battle. But General Elles had determined to lead his Tanks in person. All the available machines were to be used, there would be no reserves for him to handle. He would be best placed, he argued, in his Flag Tank where he could keep his hand on the pulse of the battle. It must have been with great satisfaction that he perceived that he would here once more be able to indulge his remarkable penchant for battles, a penchant from whose gratification his responsibilities as a commander had now long (officially) debarred him.
On the evening before the attack he issued his Special Order to the Tank Corps. It was not the incitement to “do their damnedest” which the contemporary Press fathered upon him. That spurious fosterling he hated the worse, the more he perceived its popularity.
His authentic Order was as follows:—
“Special Order, No. 6
“1. To-morrow the Tank Corps will have the chance for which it has been waiting for many months, to operate on good going in the van of the battle.
“2. All that hard work and ingenuity can achieve has been done in the way of preparation.
“3. It remains for unit commanders and for Tank crews to complete the work by judgment and pluck in the battle itself.
“4. In the light of past experience I leave the good name of the Corps with great confidence in your hands.
“5. I propose leading the attack of the Centre Division.
November 19, 1917.
(Signed) Hugh Elles,
“B.-G. Commanding Tank Corps.”
The statement that the G.O.C. was to lead the attack came as a great surprise to every one; it was probably a greater surprise to some of the authorities than it was even to the Tank Corps themselves. This decision was generally accepted with pleasure by the fighting troops, but many of the more thoughtful were filled with very great anxiety. It was clear that the General’s Tank, the “Hilda,” was going to be thrust close behind the barrage in a conspicuous position flying the flag; the dangers that it ran were, therefore, greater than those run by any of the other Tanks. On the other hand, it was generally realised that the Tank Corps had, in this action, a very great deal at stake; it risked not merely machines and the lives of its officers and men, but its very existence. If the Tanks failed to make good this time there is little doubt that this type of mechanical warfare would have been abandoned for some time at least. On November 20, therefore, the Tank Corps was “all in” in every sense of the word.