IX
We called a halt, and the Battle of Amiens was at an end, for it was again at last the Allies who chose the time and the place where they would offer battle.
Commanders who had the bitter taste of the forced actions of the March retreat in their mouths, must have savoured this easy choice extraordinarily. There is something thrilling in the assured words of the Despatch. We did not care for the new battle site! We would change it and fight elsewhere!
“The derelict battle area which now lay before our troops, seared by old trench lines, pitted with shell-holes, and crossed in all directions with tangled belts of wire, the whole covered by the wild vegetation of two years, presented unrivalled opportunities for stubborn machine-gun defences....
“I therefore determined to break off the battle on this front, and transferred the front of attack from the 4th Army to the sector north of the Somme, where an attack seemed unexpected by the enemy. My intention was for the 3rd Army to operate in the direction of Bapaume so as to turn the line of the old Somme defences from the north.”
We struck at once. Only four days were given to the Tanks for overhauling machines and patching up the crews, for on August 21 we opened the new battle.
Meanwhile it was hard to realise how great was the moral and physical blow which we had dealt the Germans. The July attacks had been tentative, but the Battle of Amiens was the decisive victory, the sure proof that the Germans had lost all hope of winning the War by force of arms.
But at the time we could not read the thundering sign of our deliverance with certainty. We could see only what were the more immediate results of the battle.
[79]“Within the space of five days the town of Amiens and the railway centring upon it had been disengaged. Twenty German Divisions had been heavily defeated by thirteen British Infantry Divisions and three Cavalry Divisions, assisted by a regiment of the 33rd American Division and supported by some 400 Tanks. Nearly 22,000 prisoners and over 400 guns had been taken by us, and our line had been pushed forward to a depth of some twelve miles in a vital sector. Further, our deep advance, combined with the attacks of the French Armies on our right, had compelled the enemy to evacuate hurriedly a wide extent of territory to the south of us.
“The effect of this victory—following so closely after the Allied victory on the Marne—upon the moral both of the German and British troops was very great. Buoyed up by the hope of immediate and decisive victory, to be followed by an early and favourable peace, constantly assured that the Allied reserves were exhausted, the German soldiery suddenly found themselves attacked on two fronts and thrown back with heavy losses from large and important portions of their earlier gains. The reaction was inevitable and of a deep and lasting character.
“On the other hand, our own troops felt that at last their opportunity had come, and that, supported by a superior artillery and numerous Tanks they could now press forward resolutely to reap the reward of their patient, dauntless, and successful defence in March and April.”
We knew, however, that we had still hard fighting before us, and we were careful to analyse every phase of the action to see if we could not learn some practical lesson from it that should help us in the coming months.
The Tank Command noted several points “for reference.” In the first place, the battle would have been ended the quicker if the Tanks had had a larger general reserve.
Then neither the Mark V. nor the Whippet was fast enough for open warfare.
Had we then possessed machines such as we have now,[80] of double the speed of the Mark V., and having a radius of action of 100 miles and more, we should, at a modest estimate, have finished the battle on the first day.
Last, we had not used our Whippets to the best advantage.
The 3rd (Light) Brigade Commander, Brig.-General Hardress-Lloyd, thus admirably summarised the lessons of the battle, and laid down alternative principles upon which the light machines might be used:
“I do not think it advisable to attempt to use the present Whippet in conjunction with cavalry. Better results would have been obtained during these operations if Whippets had been working in close liaison with Mark V. Tanks and infantry.
“The Whippet is not fast enough to conform to cavalry tactics in the early stages of a battle.
“The Whippets’ rôle should be to push on amongst the retreating enemy and prevent him from reorganising, engage reinforcements coming up, eventually enabling the infantry to make a further advance, capture prisoners, guns, etc.
“... They must move forward in close touch with the heavy Tanks so as to be near enough up to go though when required. If kept back with the cavalry the speed of the Whippet is not sufficient to enable the machine to be in the forward position at the required moment, and its offensive power will be seriously diminished.”
But it was not for us that the battle of August 8 had its chief lessons.
The German High Command waxed eloquent with indignant exhortation, and demanded passionately that the experiences of the German Army should be utilised, and that such things as had occurred on the 8th should never happen again.
On August 11 General Ludendorff issued a secret Order:
“Troops allowed themselves to be surprised by a mass attack of Tanks, and lost all cohesion when the Tanks suddenly appeared behind them, having broken through under cover of a mist, natural and artificial. The defensive organisation, both of the first line and in the rear, was insufficient to permit of a systematic defence.... As a weapon against Tanks, the prepared defence of the ground must play a larger part than ever, and the aversion of the men to the pick and shovel must be overcome at all hazards.... Especially there must be defences against Tanks. It was absolutely inadmissible that the Tanks, having penetrated into our advance line without meeting with obstacles or anything, should be able to push on along the roads or beside them for miles.... The principle that a body of troops even when surrounded must defend their ground, unless otherwise ordered, to the last man and the last cartridge, seems to have fallen into oblivion ... a large proportion of our ranks fight unskilfully against Tanks. A Tank is an easy prey for artillery of all calibres....”
An account follows of measures for the proper disposition of artillery against Tanks, and the rest of the Order is occupied with directions to the infantry concerning the question at what range the anti-Tank rifle and gun are most effective. The consideration of these points is long and exhaustive. Ludendorff further hopes much from “the active and inventive genius of the lower ranks of the non-commissioned officers to arrange Tank traps, and demands that every encouragement should be shown to those who show any inventive talent.”
These were but peddling remedies. When, as at Amiens, the understanding between infantry and Tanks is almost perfect, and when the magnificent élan of an assault by Australians and Canadians is supported by the weight of 400 Tanks, not even the troops of what was the best-trained Army in the world can stand the concerted shock of their attack.
A Special Order was issued on August 16 by General Sir Henry Rawlinson, the 4th Army Commander:
“Tank Corps.—The success of the operations of August 8 and succeeding days was largely due to the conspicuous part played by the 3rd, 4th and 5th Brigades of the Tank Corps, and I desire to place on record my sincere appreciation of the invaluable services rendered both by the Mark V. and the Mark V. star and the Whippets.
“The task of secretly assembling so large a number of Tanks entailed very hard and continuous work by all concerned for four or five nights previous to the battle.
“The tactical handling of the Tanks in action made calls on the skill and physical endurance of the detachments which were met with a gallantry and devotion beyond all praise.
“I desire to place on record my appreciation of the splendid success that they achieved, and to heartily congratulate the Tank Corps as a whole on the completeness of their arrangements and the admirable prowess exhibited by all ranks actually engaged on this occasion. There are many vitally important lessons to be learned from their experiences. These will, I trust, be taken to heart by all concerned and made full use of when next the Tank Corps is called upon to go into battle.
“The part played by the Tanks and Whippets in the battle on August 8 was in all respects a very fine performance.
“(Signed) H. Rawlinson, General,
“Commanding 4th Army.
“Headquarters, 4th Army,
“August 16, 1918.”
Nor were the Australians less generous.
The following message is typical of many. It was sent to Brig.-General Courage (commanding 5th Tank Brigade) by the 4th Australian Divisional Commander:
“G.O.C. 5th Tank Brigade.
“I wish to express to you and the command associated with us on August 8 and following days, on behalf of the 4th Australian Division, our deep appreciation of the most gallant service rendered during our offensive operations by the Tank Corps. The consistent skill and gallantry with which the Tanks, individually and collectively, were handled during the battle, was the admiration of all ranks of the infantry with whom they were so intimately associated, and our success was due in a very large measure to your efforts.
“We hope sincerely, that in future offensive operations in which we may take part, we shall have the honour to be associated with the same units of the Tank Corps as during the operations on August 8 and following days.
“(Signed) E. G. Sinclair McLagan,
“Major-General,
“Commanding 4th Australian Division.”
Finally, in a congratulatory telegram after the battle, the Commander-in-Chief paid a high tribute to the skill and bravery displayed by the Tank Corps in the gaining of this signal victory.