V
There was to be nothing novel in our general plan of assault.
[34] “The 5th Army attack was to be carried out on well-recognised lines; namely, a lengthy artillery preparation followed by an infantry attack on a large scale and infantry exploitation until resistance became severe, when the advance would be halted and a further organised attack prepared on the same scale. This methodical progression was to be continued until the exhaustion of the German reserves and moral created a situation which would enable a complete break through to be effected.”
Tanks were everywhere to be auxiliary, and were to be employed to deal with strong points and for “mopping up” behind the infantry.
There was, however, one great improvement in the method of using them.
They were to be used in definite “waves.” That is to say, supposing thirty-six Tanks were to be employed on a sector where the Germans had established the usual three lines of defence, twelve Tanks would start at zero and be used to take the first objective. Meanwhile, the second wave would have been advancing, and as soon as the first objective had been taken by the first wave, the second wave would pass through them and on to the second objective. The third party of twelve would advance in the same way—a wave to each objective.
The method did not, as a matter of fact, have a good trial on this occasion, for, in the first place, the Tanks’ first objective was only the infantry second objective; and as we have seen, the enemy did not this time employ his usual method of three set lines at all.
Altogether three Brigades of Tanks were to be employed with the 5th Army.
Tank Brigade Commanders were to keep in touch with Corps Commanders, Tank Battalions were to act with Divisions, Tank Companies (twelve fighting Tanks) with Brigades, and individual Tanks with Battalions.
The three Brigades were to be distributed as follows:—
A. 2nd Corps (consisting of the 24th, 30th, 18th, 8th and 25th Divisions).
2nd Tank Brigade (“A” and “B” Battalions).
72 Tanks to be allotted as follows:—
| 1st Objective | 16 |
| 2nd” | 24 |
| 3rd ” | 24 |
| The remainder to be held in reserve. | |
The main objective was to be the Broodseinde Ridge.
The ground in this area was broken by swamps and woods; only three approaches were possible for Tanks, and these formed dangerous defiles.
B. 19th Corps (consisting of the 15th, 55th, 16th and 36th Divisions).
3rd Tank Brigade (“C” and “F” Battalions).
72 Tanks to be arranged as follows:—
| 1st Objective | 24 |
| 2nd” | 24 |
| Reserve | 24 |
The main objective was to be a section of the Gheluvelt-Langemarck line.
On the 19th Corps front the valley of the Steenbeek was in a terrible condition, innumerable shell-holes and pools of water existed, the drainage of the Steenbeek having been seriously affected by the shelling.
C. 18th Corps (consisting of the 39th, 51st, 11th and 48th Divisions).
1st Tank Brigade (“D” and “G” Battalions).
36 Tanks to be allotted thus:—
| 1st Objective | 12 |
| 2nd” | 12 |
| Corps Reserve | 12 |
They were to seize the crossings of the Steenbeek and establish posts beyond it.
On the 18th Corps front the ground between our front line and Steenbeek was cut up and sodden. The Steenbeek itself was a difficult obstacle, and the only good crossing was at St. Julien, thus forming a dangerous defile.
Thirty-six Tanks belonging to the 1st Brigade were held in Army Reserve.
Such was the battle order of the Tanks.
Zero was fixed for 3.30 a.m. on July 31. By the last week in July misty weather with often a drizzle of rain at night had set in.
Our preparations were complete, but it was perhaps not without a certain anxiety that our commanders awaited the issues of the engagement.
By none might such an uneasiness have been felt with better reason than by General Elles.
The Army had staked much upon a gamble, but at least it had not been forced to stake its prestige. General Elles must have been conscious that the very existence of the Tank Corps might hang upon the fortunes of the coming attack.