V
This time the Tanks were to be put in the south, in the 4th Army area.
There were to be about twenty Tanks, and they were to work with the Australians and the 9th and 3rd Corps on a wide front between Epehy and Villeret.
[87]“The operations about to be undertaken by the 4th Army aimed at the capture of the Hindenburg Outpost Line in order (1) to secure direct observation over the main Hindenburg Line, and (2) to allow our artillery positions to be advanced in preparation for the assault on the main positions.”
The area attacked had a front of about fourteen miles, thus a Battalion of twenty Tanks could merely be employed against certain known strong points.
Eight Tanks were allotted to the 3rd Corps on the left, eight Tanks in the centre were to work with the 1st and 4th Divisions of the Australian Corps.
On the 9th Corps sector on the right, four Tanks were allotted to the 6th Division.
The night had been fine, but when zero hour came (5.20) it was raining heavily, and all day the weather was dull and cloudy, visibility being often bad enough to make the Tank Commanders glad of their compasses.
[88]“The company operating with the 3rd Corps had for their two main objectives the villages of Epehy and Ronssoy. The former place was taken with no great resistance, the enemy surrendering in numbers on the appearance of the Tanks. Ronssoy was more stoutly defended; here machine-gun fire with armour-piercing bullets was very heavy, and anti-Tank rifles were also freely used. Two Tanks had for their objective the very strong organisation of trenches and fortified cottages known as the Quadrilateral, which formed the key to the German Defensive System between Fresnoy and Selency.”
During the attack two Tanks belonging to “C” Company fought an extremely gallant action.
[89]“Fresnoy was the line of the first objective, but in going forward, the infantry came under heavy machine-gun fire from the Quadrilateral on their right flank. Both officers, unseen by one another in the mist and smoke, headed their Tanks straight for the thickest of the fire. Second Lieutenant G. F. Smallwood arrived first and encountered terrific resistance, with which he was successfully dealing when his Tank became ditched while crossing a sunken road, all guns but one being covered. It was impossible to use the unditching beam owing to the intense fire from short range. At this moment Second Lieutenant W. R. Hedges, driving his own Tank, as the driver had been killed and the second driver badly wounded, appeared from the mist heading for the Quadrilateral with all guns firing. Captain Hamlet, the Section Commander, was also inside this Tank. Just as Second Lieutenant Hedges was appearing to get the upper hand of the enemy his Tank burst into flames. Desperate efforts were apparently made to put these out, but after five minutes Captain Hamlet and the crew jumped out of the Tank on the right-hand side straight into the arms of the Huns, who had surrounded the Tank. Second Lieutenant Hedges, however, sprang out from the other side and darted through them though subject to a heavy fire. Though hit two or three times he reached the shelter of the sunken road about fifty yards from Second Lieutenant Smallwood’s Tank. The latter left the Tank and brought Second Lieutenant Hedges back with him. Heavy shelling all round the Tank compelled its evacuation, and Second Lieutenant Smallwood and crew took up a position with their machine-guns and successfully held off the enemy. Later on, the infantry, who had been held up some 200 yards behind, were able to come up and take over the post. Meanwhile Second Lieutenant Hedges had been sent to a Dressing Station, but he never arrived there. This very gallant officer’s fate is still unknown.”
On the 9th Corps front progress was slow, but by the end of the day we held Ronssoy and Hargicourt.
A good idea is given of the minor mechanical difficulties of this part of the campaign in the 2nd Battalion History:
“Liaison, reconnaissance and Tank maintenance were rendered far more difficult than usual owing to the lack of transport, which was in such a state that no car, box-body, lorry or motor-cycle could be relied upon. The nearest M.T. Park for repairs was twenty-five miles away. Long treks by night meant work on Tanks by day. Reconnaissance and liaison had often to be carried out on foot with consequent loss of time. There was very little rest or sleep for any one between September 13 and 18.”
We did not renew the advance till the 21st, when nine Tanks helped the attack on the 3rd Corps front against the Knoll and Guillemont and Quennemont Farms. Two of these Tanks were of the Mark V. Star pattern and carried forward infantry machine-gunners.
But we were up against a desperate enemy resistance, machine-guns firing armour-piercing bullets, anti-Tank rifles, field guns and land mines all being used against us.
The attack did not succeed in gaining us the coveted positions, and we were to pay dearly for this failure.
Again two days elapsed, and meanwhile (on the 20th) the 8th, 16th and 13th Battalions, and the 5th Supply Co. had been brought forward.
There was a big enterprise in view.
This hitherto more or less isolated sector of attack was to be “federated” with the new vast projected attack which was to be made by no fewer than three Armies, their blows timed to fall in rapid succession.
Meanwhile a piece of ground which we coveted remained in enemy hands.
We were anxious to hold the high ground north of Selency and to clear up the formidable Quadrilateral south of Fresnoy.
The 9th Corps, therefore, was to attack on a two-division front with the aid of twenty Tanks of the newly arrived 13th Battalion.
The plans were discussed at a conference held on September 22, and the Tanks brought up to the assembly points by skeleton crews that same night.
The fighting crews were brought up by lorry the following afternoon, according to the wise practice which was now beginning to be generally employed, whenever there was enough personnel to make it possible. The final approach march was begun at 8.30 p.m. the night of the 23rd.
[90]“After Clearing St. Quentin Wood, in which some delay was caused by overhead signal wires, which had to be passed from hand to hand to avoid catching the semaphore standards, Tanks had to pass through a heavy harassing fire in which gas shell was largely employed. Thus the latter part of the march was made with Tanks closed and gas masks often worn; in consequence the crews, especially of the company working on the left, suffered greatly from gas and petrol fumes. While waiting on the Start Lines, Tanks were heavily shelled, and enemy ’planes twice during the night dropped flares exactly over the sections with the 6th Division on the right.”
Anti-Tank guns were extremely active throughout the operation.
Three Tanks, which with their infantry penetrated right into the Quadrilateral, were all put out of action by a single gun.
Altogether, the Tanks suffered a 50 per cent. loss of machines in this action.
However, we won some of the points of observation that were needed for the next attack, and though we failed to hold the Quadrilateral we had practically outflanked and sterilised it by the end of the day.
So ended the little Battle of Epehy.
Our advance had not been a long one, for the enemy had contested every yard with a desperate valour.
His losses had been enormous, and this minor battle added no less than 12,000 prisoners and 100 guns to the Allied “bag.”