Memoirs of the life, exile, and conversations of the Emperor Napoleon. (Vol. IV)

by comte de Emmanuel-Auguste-Dieudonné Las Cases

LETTER FROM LORD CASTLEREAGH TO LORD BATHURST,

RELATIVE TO THE TREATY OF FONTAINEBLEAU.

(Paris, April 15, 1814.)

“... I shall, therefore, on the present occasion, confine myself to an explanation of what has passed with respect to the future destination and settlement of Napoleon and his family.

“Your Lordship has been already informed, by Lord Cathcart, of the Act of Abdication which was signed by Buonaparte, on the 4th instant, and of the assurance which was given him by the Emperor of Russia, and the Provisional Government, of a pecuniary provision of six millions of francs, with a safe asylum in the Island of Elba. The act in question was deposited in the hands of M. de Caulaincourt, and Marshals Ney and Macdonald, to be given up upon the due execution of engagements on the part of the Allies, with respect to the proposed arrangement. These persons were also authorized to agree to an armistice, and to settle such a line of demarcation as might be satisfactory to the Allies, and, in the mean time, prevent an unnecessary effusion of blood.

“On my arrival, I found this arrangement on the point of execution. A convention had been discussed, and would have, in fact, been signed in the course of the day by the Russian Minister, had not the approach of the Allied Ministers been announced. The motives for accelerating the immediate conclusion of this act, were the inconvenience, if not the danger of Napoleon’s remaining at Fontainebleau, surrounded by troops, who still, in a considerable degree, remained faithful to him; the apprehension of intrigues in the army and in the capital; and the importance attached, by a considerable portion of the officers, to some arrangement favourable to their chief, in satisfaction of their personal honour, before they left him.

“On the night of my arrival, the four Ministers had a conference with the Prince de Benevento, on the subject of the proposed convention, to which I stated my objections, desiring, at the same time, to be understood as not urging them then, at the hazard of the internal tranquillity of France, nor in impeachment of what was due, in good faith, to the assurance given, under the exigency of the moment, by Russia.

“The Prince de Benevento admitted the weight of many of the objections stated, but declared that he did consider it, on the part of the Provisional Government, as an object of the first importance, to avoid any thing that might assume the character of a civil war, even for the shortest time:—that he also found some such measure necessary, to make the army pass over in a temper to be made use of. Upon these declarations, and the Count de Nesselrode’s, that the Emperor, his master, had found it necessary, in the absence of the Allies, to act for the best, in their name as well as his own; I withdrew any further opposition to the principle of the measure, suggesting only some alterations in the details. I desired, however, to decline, on the part of my Government, being more than an acceding party to the treaty, and declared that the Act of Accession on the part of Great Britain should not go beyond the territorial arrangements proposed in the Treaty. My objections to our unnecessarily mixing in its forms, especially in the recognition of Napoleon’s title under present circumstances, were considered as perfectly reasonable: and I now enclose the protocol and note, which will explain the extent to which I have taken it upon me to give assurances on the part of my Court.

“At my suggestion, the recognition of the imperial titles in the family were limited to their respective lives, for which there was a precedent in the case of the King of Poland, when he became Elector of Saxony.

“To the arrangement in favour of the Empress, I not only felt no objection, but considered it due to the distinguished sacrifice of domestic feelings which the Emperor of Austria was making to the cause of Europe. I should have wished to substitute another position in lieu of Elba, for the seat of Napoleon’s retirement; but none, having the quality of security on which he insisted, seemed disposable, to which equal objections did not occur; and I did not feel that I could encourage the alternative which M. de Caulaincourt assured me Buonaparte repeatedly mentioned, namely, an asylum in England.

“On the same night, the Allied Ministers had a conference with M. de Caulaincourt, and the Marshals, at which I assisted. The treaty was gone through, and agreed to with alterations: it has been since signed and ratified, and Buonaparte will commence his movement towards the south to-morrow, or the day following.

(Signed) “CASTLEREAGH.”

I thought it advisable to transcribe this letter; it throws a complete light on the treaty of the 11th of April, of the particulars of which I was ignorant, even when at St. Helena; and it presents two points to which I particularly wish to call attention. It explains the observation which fell from the Emperor, when I observed to him that on an important occasion he seemed to have forgotten the acknowledgement of his title by the English at Fontainebleau: when he merely replied that it was done on purpose. Now, I learn from the letter above quoted, that Lord Castlereagh studiously avoided the recognition; but this is no impeachment of the scrupulous correctness of Napoleon’s assertions.

The second point, which impartiality induces me to advert to is that Lord Castlereagh, in his letter, speaks of the alternative offered by Napoleon, to retire to England, in default of the cession of the Isle of Elba. A few pages further on (Nov. 16), it will be found that Napoleon, on the contrary, reproaches Lord Castlereagh with having caused it to be insinuated to him that the adoption of England, as a place of residence, would be the preferable course. These two statements are certainly quite contradictory; but regard for impartiality, as I before observed, has induced me to insert them. The reader is, therefore, free to decide as he may think fit; for, as I have often heard the Emperor say, one man’s word is as good as another’s. For my own part, my choice is soon determined: I adopt the words of Napoleon, in spite of the assertions of Lord Castlereagh. I still bear in mind the erroneous declarations of Lord Whitworth, which have been mentioned in the course of this Journal; the scandalous assertions respecting Napoleon, made by Lord Castlereagh in Parliament or in public assemblies; the garbled documents, on the authority of which Murat’s deposition was decreed; and the numerous denials so confidently expressed by Lord Bathurst in the House of Lords, the falsehood of which was manifest to every individual at St. Helena, and occasioned embarrassment even to Sir Hudson Lowe. I shall, therefore, adhere to the opinion I have formed, until I find good reason to alter it.