A Review of the Systems of Ethics Founded on the Theory of Evolution

by Cora May Williams

CONTENTS

PART I
PAGES
Introductory Remarks [1]-2
Darwin [2]-12
Wallace [12]-23
Haeckel [23]-28
Spencer [28]-76
Fiske [77]-82
Rolph [82]-107
Barratt [107]-120
Stephen [120]-143
Carneri [143]-175
Höffding [175]-200
Gizycki [200]-224
Alexander [225]-263
(Ree) [264]-268

PART II

Introduction

Refutation of a priori objections to Evolutional Ethics, and a statement of reasons for supposing that an application of the theory of Evolution to Ethics must be of use [269]-276

CHAPTER I

The Concepts of Evolution

Extension of the meaning of Darwinian concepts since Darwin—Lewes on the Struggle for Existence as internal—The mystery of "Variation" according to Darwin not a metaphysical mystery, but one of the incompleteness of scientific knowledge—Rolph's criticism of the Darwinian conception of the Struggle for Existence criticised—General classification of the theories of Evolution—Fechner's theory of the Tendency to Stability—Petzoldt on Fechner—Petzoldt's concepts of Tendency and Competition—Zöllner and Du Prel—Examination of the concept of Absolute Stability, and of a full stability of the universe, in the light of the question as to the finite or infinite character of the material universe—Periodicity in Organisms—Criticism of the concepts of Cause and Effect—Criticism of Spencer's definition of Life—The concepts of Heredity and Adaptation—The point of dispute with regard to Variation—Darwin, Haeckel, and Eimer with regard to the inheritance of individual acquirements—Criticisms of Weismann—Habit in the life of the individual—Advantage of the method pursued by Avenarius in the "Kritik der reinen Erfahrung"—Lamarck on the relation of Use and Function—Darwin on Habit and Instinct—Function and Tendency to Function—Relation of organism and environment—Theory of a special vital force—The relation of exercise to strength of Tendency—The concepts of Cause and Effect as applied to organism and environment—Relation of primary tendency to later-evolved function—Form and Function—The mixture of types in sexual propagation—Summary of conclusions [277]-306

CHAPTER II

Intelligence and "End"

The question as to the extent to which Reason is diffused in the universe— Darwin and Haeckel on Reason and Instinct—Du Prel on Reason as a fundamental property of all matter—Carneri on the automatism of animals—The dependence of theories on this question on the starting-point assumed in the argument—Difficulties of assigning a limit-line to Reason—Schneider's criteria—Insectivorous plants—Knight, Darwin, etc., on the movements of plants—Race-habits—So-called reflex-action in man—From non-analogy no inference possible—Arbitrary nature of the assumptions involved in the two starting-points of query—Reason = Cause or Effect?—Further criticism of the concepts of Cause and Effect—The bias of the specialist—Attempted definition of the province of reason—Definition of "End"—Unreliability of inference as to the nature of ends in other individuals; in other species—Possible inferences from the analogy of the nervous system—Certain possible limiting assumptions as to the province of knowledge in animal species—The Law of the Variation of Pain and Pleasure in function—The ultimate dilemma—Examinations of Teleological conceptions with respect to the Tendency to Stability—Criticism of Wallace on the Origin of Life, or of Consciousness—Summary of conclusions [307]-340

CHAPTER III

The Will

Difficulties of definition—The Will and Consciousness—"Involuntary" action—Will in passivity—The concept of Choice—"Ends" and the Will—The Future and Will—The External and Will—Criticism of Barratt's axioms and propositions—Discussion of the relation of Thought and Feeling to Will—The argument of the Physiologist—The argument of the Evolutionist—The argument from social statistics—The argument from Psychiatry, Criminology, etc.—The argument from the psychological principles on which Evolutional Ethics is founded—Definition of Natural Law and Necessity—The positive factors of Evolution—The positive and active character of the organism as the result of evolution—The equivalence of Conditions and Results—The positive character of the organism as a part of Nature—The sense of Freedom as the sense of Activity—The theory of the Will as determined by Motives—As determined by Feeling—As determined by the desirability of the end or object—The argument of Concomitance and that of Sequence as used by both Materialist and Spiritualist—The endeavor to prove (1) the causal character of physiological process; (2) the causal character of Consciousness—Inconsistencies of these attempts [341]-359

CHAPTER IV

The Mutual Relations of Thought, Feeling, and Will in Evolution

Hume on Reason and Passion—The constant connection of Thought with Feeling, and with Feeling as pleasure or pain—The question as to whether Thought or Feeling is primary—Application of answer to previous considerations on the diffusion of Consciousness in Nature—The relation of the concepts of the Pleasurable and Painful to the concept of "End"—Will as a constant accompaniment of Consciousness—Absurdities to which the division of Consciousness into distinct faculties leads—Law of the growth of functional tendency and of pleasure in function—The New as a disturber of equilibrium—The pleasure involved in the overcoming of obstacles—The equilibrium of function as Health—Connection of the pleasure of food-taking with Health—Criticism of Rolph's principle of the Insatiability of Life—Further criticism of Rolph on the Darwinian theory of Growth—The coördinate progress of physiological adaptation with the advancement of knowledge, and with the variation of Feeling and Will—The pleasure of the strongest motive as relative, not absolute—The character of the End in view—The pleasure of anticipation and the pleasure of the event—Criticism of Sidgwick on Hedonism—Criticism of Rolph's theory of Want as universal motive—Suicide—Rest—The diminution of pain with lapse of time as adaptation—Pleasure in pain as pleasure in function—The relation of Health to Happiness—The theory of the absolute Freedom of Feeling—The concepts of Cause and Effect as applied to the evolution of Thought, Feeling, and Will—Application of conclusions to the Teleological Argument [360]-382

CHAPTER V

Egoism and Altruism in Evolution

Prototypes in other animal species of what we term Egoism and Altruism in man; care for the young on the part of the parent-animal; mutual aid between the sexes; animal societies—Experiments of Lubbock showing the irregularity and caprice of action altruistic in form, among the ants—Benno Scheitz on maternal care among lower species—Answers to the argument of automatism—Dependence of a theory of moral Evolution on the definition of Egoism and Altruism—The significance of the terms progressive—The possibility of differences in the form of the evolution of Altruism, in different species—The possibility of the combination of different forms in the evolution of a single species—Discussion of the question of the first beginning of action prompted by altruistic motive—The argument of the illogical nature of a supposed development of Altruism from Egoism—The question as to whether Health, the Preservation of Species, or Pleasure, is the actual final end of action—The question of Heredity in relation to that of the moral evolution—Stephen's views—Arguments from Ribot, Dugdale's "Jukes," etc. [383]-422

CHAPTER VI

Conscience

The gradual character of the evolution of Altruism—Paul Friedmann on the genesis of benevolence—The observable growth of Altruism from Egoism in the individual—Human society as necessitated by increase of the species—Criticism of Darwin's form of statement on this point—The mixed character of the motives which lead to advancement—The necessity of evolution, primal organisms once having come into existence—General features of the moral evolution in the human race—Personal and Social Virtues—Racial evolution as subordinate to the evolution of the species—Criticism of Stephen—The theory of the connection of Intelligence and Morality—Testimony of Maudsley, Lombroso, Dugdale—The advantages of conformity to social standards—Definition of "advantage"—Arguments from the general direction of social advancement—The direction of evolution in the race as a whole and in the individual not always the same—Conclusion: the connection of Intelligence with Morality not invariable—Definition of Morality—Identification of Morality with Justice—Special rules of morality—Morality as inward—The virtue of Truthfulness—Necessity of individual sacrifice—Dependence of Justice on certain general features of particular circumstances—-Definition of Conscience—The mixed character of remorse—The theory of Conscience as a special sense—Criticism of Utilitarianism—Criticism of some forms of reaction against Utilitarianism—The terms "higher" and "lower" as applied to pleasures and "ends"—The idea of a "return to Nature"—The objection to Evolutional Ethics on the ground of degradation—Struggle as an element of virtue—The evolution of social rewards and punishments—Criticism of the objection to state-punishment on the ground of Determinism—Morality and the question of the Transcendental—Conscience in other species—The contempt for "mere habit"—The concepts of Cause and Effect as applied to the moral evolution [423]-465

CHAPTER VII

The Moral Progress of the Human Species as shown by History

The assimilative character of human progress—The character of our savage ancestors—Greek civilization—The Greek treatment of children—Of old men—Human sacrifices among the Greeks—Slaughter of prisoners—Slavery—The Greek attitude towards the fundamental virtues of trustworthiness—Athenian Democracy—Roman civilization—Treatment of children—Human sacrifices—Gladiatorial shows—Slavery—Moral character of the Middle Ages—Human sacrifice in England before the Roman conquest—Slave laws—State punishment in England: burning, hanging, and boiling, quartering and disembowelling—Women under the criminal law—Blood-money—The classification of crimes—Caste-favor in English criminal law—Mutilation—Flaying—Ordeals—Punishment by starvation—The press—The rack—"Skevington's Daughter"—Benefit of Clergy—The position of the English churl—The worship of rank—Hanging for petty theft—The pillory—Brutality of public feeling—Condition of the prisons—Jail-breaking, bribery, etc.—More concerning women under the law—Favor to rank—The logical consistency of human character in its various directions of action—General comparison of the past with the present—The evidence of literature—Modern philanthropy—Decrease of national prejudices—Growth of the democratic spirit—Lack of imagination a reason for the failure to realize the evils of the past—The Golden Age of Man [466]-499

CHAPTER VIII

The Results of Ethical Inquiry on an Evolutional Basis

Criticism of Alexander's theory of the right as always absolute right and as the expression, on all planes of development, of an equal equilibrium—The Moral Evolution as one involving the whole of humanity and the whole earth—Gradual relaxation of the Struggle for Existence—The final limitation of the increase in density of population—The increase of vitality—The habituation to progress—The gradual coördination of individual with social welfare through (1) Spread and increase of sympathy with the individual on the part of society as a whole; (2) Growth of individual predilections in the direction of harmony with social requirements—Decrease of punishment through (1) Increase in general sympathy; (2) Increase of amenability of the individual to influence—Increase of pleasure in pleasure—The possible egoistic element in sympathy with pain—Criticism of Rolph on Want as necessary to induce action—The moral evolution and emotion—Criticism of Spencer on Altruism—Criticism of Wundt on Evolutional Ethics—The theory that Evolution adds nothing to Ethics—Criticism of Stephen on the impossibility of predicting the course of Evolution—The Moral Evolution as willed—The motives furnished by Evolutional Ethics—The theological doctrine of a "change of heart"—The doctrine of the Atonement—Divine forgiveness—Theology and social evils—The prominence of the idea of self-salvation in Christian doctrine—Human sacrifice among the Jews—Biblical authority for the killing of witches and heretics—The infliction of death for ceremonial offences among the Jews—The visiting of the sins of the fathers upon the children—Slave-holding, adultery, murder, etc., by God's chosen, bloodshed and cruelty of all sorts by God's express command—Animal sacrifice among the Jews—The original idea of Jehovah and of Heaven—The autocracy of the Jewish priesthood confirmed by Christ—Forced exegesis—The asceticism of Christianity—Slavery and the New Testament—Predestination, Hell, and the Justification of the Elect—The defence of Christianity as being a comforting belief [500]-528

CHAPTER IX

The Ideal and the Way of its Attainment

Criticism of Stephen's assertion that the ideal cannot be determined—The necessity of the choice between evils, under present social conditions—The argument for individual gratification of "natural desire"—Dangers of Utilitarianism—Moral right of the minority and the ethical demand for compensation to the minority—The contest between Individualist and Socialist—Criticism of Spencer on personal vice—Individualistic errors—Socialistic pessimism—The idea of a "return to Nature"—The Socialistic glorification of the laborer—The agitation against machinery—The agitation against luxury—The abolition of luxury and the population question—The proposed change of social "environment"—Socialism at the present date—Arbitrary character of many Socialistic ideas—Criticisms of Bellamy—The idea of a Revolution—Conclusions—The education of the child—The right of the child to state protection—The advantages of parental control—The education of women—The question of prostitution—Monogamy or polygamy?—Temporary contracts—Divorce—The argument that the freedom of women must involve the forfeiture of chivalric feeling in men—The respect for age—Desirable changes in criminal law—Criticism of Bellamy on Crime—The question of Capital Punishment—Arguments for—Arguments against—Conclusions—The conflict between justice and mercy—The supreme arbiter—The courage of Moral Sincerity—Heroic characters—The final destruction of the human species—The loss of belief in personal immortality—The human and earthly ideal [529]-581

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