FOOTNOTES:
[25] In the month of July the Division received 193 officers and 2,182 other ranks. These reinforcements left it still, of course, considerably below strength.
[26] Men who served do not need to be told, but perhaps civilians may, that there was no parallel between these conditions and those of early days, when there were often, literally, only a few rounds per gun available. At this time the ammunition was there, in the gun-pits and echelons behind, and could be used quite unsparingly at a sign of danger. When, however, there was no danger, it had to be conserved.
[28] The heavy and medium batteries were manned by artillery, the Stokes mortars by infantry, personnel.
[29] Local names were frequently transformed by British troops, followed by the map-makers. This was probably La Plus Douce. When the Douve overflowed its banks the new name was certainly the more suitable.
[CHAPTER V]
Messines: June 1917
The Battle of Messines has more than one claim to a prominent position in the history of the war. It was, in the first place, the first completely successful single operation on the British front. It shares with the action of Malmaison, fought four months later, the distinction of being the most perfect and successful example of the limited offensive. Lastly, it was by far the most elaborately and carefully "mounted" action ever fought by British arms. Fine as were the fighting qualities of the formations and units that took part in it, the most remarkable aspects which stand out when we look back upon it are the perfection of its organization and of the liaison between all arms. It represented a triumph of staff work. Every man in the huge force under his command was made to feel the guiding hand of the Commander of the Second Army, and of one of the most brilliant staff officers the war discovered. The troops entered upon it with high heart. The capture of the Vimy Ridge had seemed of good augury for the year's campaign. The doubtful success of the French offensive in Champagne, which might have acted as a check upon this optimism, was not generally known.
Before no other battle was there such an infinity of detail to be mastered as in the preparation of this. It would not be difficult to write fifty pages about the plans. Since space permits of about six only being allotted to them, it is impossible to do more than outline them in the briefest manner.
Some idea of the thoroughness of the training for the assault may be gained when it is recorded that not only were attacks practised over ground marked out to represent the German trench system, but officers from the flanking battalions of divisions attended each others' field days to ensure that in the minutest details there was harmony along the line. An elaborate model of the Messines Ridge, with all its trenches, forts, roads, and woods, was constructed by the C.E. of the IX. Corps on the slopes of the Scherpenberg Hill, between Locre and La Clytte. It was surrounded by a wooden gallery and trench-board walks, so that at least a company could examine it at one time. The men took great interest in it, while all day long little knots of officers were to be observed studying it. Another new feature of the attack was the message-map served out on a large scale to officers and N.C.O.'s. This had on one side a map of the German trenches, on which the position could be marked; and on the other a skeleton message-form, bringing forcibly to the mind of the sender those details in a message that were of importance to the recipient, which, in the heat of battle, a young and inexperienced officer might forget.
Nothing was studied more carefully than the provision of food, water, ammunition, and stores for the advancing troops. In front of the huge divisional dumps at Lindenhoek cross-roads and "Daylight Corner," on the Lindenhoek-Neuve Eglise Road, there were an advance dump, a dump for each of the attacking brigades, six battalion dumps, and many smaller in the trenches. An elaborate system of pack transport was devised, two hundred extra pack-saddles with special crates attached being issued. Two hundred and fifty "Yukon packs"—a Canadian device which enabled a man trained in its use to carry a very heavy load—were also issued. Arrangements were made to serve in the trenches a hot meal at midnight prior to the assault. A special ration of oranges, Oxo cubes, chewing gum, and lime juice was issued to every man, and a tin of solidified alcohol for cooking to every fourth man.
Means of communication, by visual signalling, pigeons, wireless, the fullerphone, runners, and the rocket for S.O.S. calls, were worked out in detail. For the fullerphone there were two lines of buried cables, with cable-heads in our front line trenches. Forward stations were selected in the enemy's line at Spanbroekmolen and Peckham, to which armoured lines were to be laid across "No Man's Land," from the cable-heads, by the brigade forward parties. As soon as the final objective was reached, these forward stations were to move to the crest of the ridge. Working independently of this machinery, which was in the hands of the Signal Service, were the brigade and battalion intelligence sections, the former of which were to establish observation posts at Spanbroekmolen and Peckham, while the latter moved up behind their battalions, selected observation posts to follow their movements and cover their final position, and sent out scouts to obtain touch with flanking battalions and bring information as to their progress. For visual signalling a divisional signal station was established on Kemmel Hill, which had a clear line to the brigade forward stations, so that messages could be sent either forward or back by the Lucas lamp.
The Second Army was to attack the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge, and the ground east of it as far as the Oosttaverne line.[31] The IX. Corps was allotted from the Wulverghem-Wytschaete Road to the Diependaal Beek, a distance of six thousand four hundred yards along the front line of the enemy's salient. It was to attack with three divisions in line: from right to left the 36th (Ulster) Division, the 16th (Irish) Division, and the 19th (Western) Division. These troops were to advance to the Black Line, east of the Messines-Wytschaete Road, after which the 11th Division, in Corps Reserve, was to pass through to the final objective. A glance at the map will show how the frontage of attack narrowed with every thousand yards of the advance. On the right of the 36th Division was the 25th, in the II. Anzac Corps.
The attack of the 36th Division, of which the final objective was from Lumm Farm to a cutting on the Wytschaete-Oosttaverne Road east of Staenyzer Cabaret, was to be made by two Brigades, the 107th on the right and the 109th on the left, each having one battalion from the 108th Brigade attached. Each Brigade was to attack with two battalions in front, which advanced as far as the Blue Line, the ground in rear of that objective being "mopped up" by the attached battalion of the 108th Brigade. The remaining two battalions of each Brigade were to pass through on the Blue Line for the advance to the Black, providing their own "mopping-up" parties. The 107th Brigade was to use the 8th Rifles on the right and the 9th on the left for the attack on the Blue Line, with the 15th and 10th Rifles to pass through to the Black Line. The 12th Rifles, from the 108th Brigade, carried out the work of "mopping up" and consolidation in rear. The 109th Brigade was to use the 14th Rifles on the right and the 11th Inniskillings on the left to take the Blue Line, and the 10th and 9th Inniskillings to take the Black Line. The 11th Rifles were attached for consolidation and "mopping up." The boundary line between the 36th and 16th Divisions ran, it will be noticed, along the main street of Wytschaete, half the village being in the objective of each Division.
The date of the attack was designated "Z" day, the five days of preliminary bombardment being designated "U," "V," "W," "X," and "Y." There had been considerable bombardment of the ridge before "U" day, but from this day onwards it became more intense. Its object was not the total destruction of the hostile trench system, but the disorganization of the defence by the smashing of concrete emplacements and shelters. It took nothing short of an 8-inch howitzer to destroy the German concrete, while 12-inch and 15-inch howitzers fired on Wytschaete. The cutting of wire was performed by the 18-pounders, assisted in the case of the front line by trench mortars. Further to disorganize the enemy, a programme of barraging night and day his communications, and shelling his billets, was carried out, while bursts of fire with lethal and lachrymatory gas shell of various sorts took place throughout the period. Special half-hour hurricane bombardments of Messines and Wytschaete, during which every gun available, from largest to smallest, was in action, were carried out. The barrage for the advance consisted of, firstly, a creeping barrage of 18-pounder shrapnel, moving in advance of the infantry, with average lifts of a hundred yards, at the rate of a hundred yards in three minutes; and, secondly, a standing barrage of 18-pounders, 4.5 inch howitzers, and medium and heavy howitzers, established in succession on trenches and strong points. For the creeping barrage there was one gun to twenty yards, firing at maximum rate. One gun a section fired smoke shell, to screen the infantry. The barrage was highly complicated, as, owing to the configuration of the German salient and the varying rate of the advance, it lifted off none of the objectives at the same moment all along the line.
Meticulous care was taken by Army Headquarters to ensure that the preparation was as complete as human forethought could make it. Each morning air photographs, showing the effect of the previous day's bombardment, were circulated to Divisions in the line. Each Division was required to state, day by day, what further special bombardment it desired. From its observation post on Kemmel Hill the Staff of the 36th Division could see practically all the slope of the Messines Ridge, from just above the dip of the Steenebeek valley to the crest. Day by day it studied the ground during the bombardment. A trench or concrete work which did not appear to have been sufficiently shelled was noted, and request made that it should receive further attention next day. Such requests were invariably met. Trenches and dug-outs were shelled again and again, till Divisional Headquarters declared itself satisfied. Many of the concrete structures were revealed only when the bombardment of the trenches had blown away the earth about them. They were then subjected to the fire of heavy howitzers till destroyed. Finally, each Division was asked to state if it were satisfied with the preparation. In the case of the 36th Division at least, the answer was an enthusiastic affirmative.
The sympathy and understanding which existed between the Staff of the Second Army and the man in the fighting line created a moral tone of incalculable value to the Army's efficiency as a striking force.
The work of the preliminary bombardment threw a great strain upon the personnel of the artillery, though such rest as possible was given by carefully organized reliefs. The infantry was greatly impressed with the results it could witness. In particular the liaison between infantry and heavy gunners, hardly thought of before this action, was of the closest, the artillery officers bringing battalion commanders aeroplane photographs to show the results of the bombardment on their front.
Stokes mortars and machine-guns were assigned important rôles in the early part of the attack. The 3-inch mortars belonging to the Division, less four a brigade, to be taken forward in the attack, were to open a hurricane bombardment for three and a half minutes at "Zero." A battery of 4-inch Stokes mortars, specially attached, was to preface the assault with a bombardment of the Spanbroek salient, with two lifts, using the highly demoralizing incendiary shell known as "thermit." Six guns of the Machine-Gun Companies of the attacking Brigades were to go forward with them; the rest of the guns of these companies, with those of the 108th, the 32nd, two sections of the 33rd, and six guns of the 19th Motor Machine-Gun Battery,[32] a total of sixty-six guns, were to be employed to provide a creeping barrage beyond that of the artillery, a standing barrage on the main defences of the ridge, and fire on strong points, woods, and ravines. One section of Tanks[33] was allotted. They were not to catch up the infantry till the Blue Line was reached, and in the advance to the Black Line were to concentrate mainly upon Wytschaete.
All the successive lines, with the exception of the Green, were to be consolidated, special strong points being established at such positions as L'Enfer Farm, Skip Point, and Jump Point, in the Blue Line; and Lumm Farm, Pick House, and Torreken Farm in the Black. The infantry was to start the work of consolidation; then, when the Black Line had been taken, the 121st and 150th Field Companies were to move up to work upon the principal strong points. After dusk on the evening of "Z" day, the 122nd Field Company was to move up and construct a wire entanglement along the whole front of the Black Line. Small opportunity, it will be seen, was left for successful counter-attack if the assault reached its objectives.
Two contact aeroplanes were to be in the air at once throughout the battle, calling at fixed hours, by the sounding of a Klaxon horn and the firing of a Vérey light, for the signals by which the infantry was to mark its progress. The latter consisted of green flares, lit in bunches of three, and the turning of Watson fans, marked white on one side and black on the other.
A whole series of mines, the greatest ever used in war, was to be fired at "Zero." Of these there were three on the 36th Division's front: one at Kruisstraat Cabaret, one at Spanbroekmolen, and one at Peckham. The second had been doubtful up to the last minute. The passage to the charge had been cut some time before by a German defensive "camouflet," and it had seemed as though the toil of a year and of thousands of men had been wasted. The tunnellers of the 171st Company had laboured unceasingly to cut a new gallery. On the eve of the action a scribbled note from the commanding officer to Colonel Place, G.S.O.1. of the Division, announced that the work was accomplished and that it was "almost certain" the mine would go up. In case there might be failure with this or any other charge, the assaulting infantry was instructed not to wait more than fifteen seconds after the opening of the barrage before leaving its trenches.
For the evacuation of the wounded there was an Advanced Dressing Station at Lindenhoek, close to the main road, skilfully prepared by the 109th Field Ambulance. Wounded could be carried into the main shelter by the entrance on the north side, from the trench tramway, given what attention was necessary, and conveyed out by the exit on the west side, where the motor ambulances of the Division arrived by a specially constructed semi-circular road. This relieved the main road at that point, and enabled the cars to sweep round without turning. The cars bore the wounded to the Main Dressing Station just east of Dranoutre, manned by the 108th Field Ambulance, while "walking wounded" were sent by a specially-marked track to the Main Dressing Station prepared for them and manned by the 110th Field Ambulance a mile east of the village. From these Dressing Stations the Motor Ambulance Park had the task of carrying the wounded to the two Casualty Clearing Stations in Bailleul. Distances were shorter and roads better than on the Somme; and, had the casualties been as many as on that occasion, they would have been removed in less than half the time and with far less discomfort to the wounded. As it most happily chanced, the casualties were less than a fourth of those at Thiepval.
So much for the preparations. Any of importance which have not been mentioned will appear in the account of the actual battle.
The 108th Brigade held the line during the period of preliminary bombardment, employing for the purpose the two battalions which it was to retain during the battle as divisional reserve. It having been decided to carry out some practice barrages in broad daylight, to note the effect of the smoke shell, and see whether any guns were shooting short, these seemed to offer good opportunity for big raids. The first of these raids took place at 3 p.m. on June the 3rd. A party of three officers and seventy other ranks of the 13th Rifles entered the enemy's trenches at Peckham behind the barrage, and after a short bombing fight captured nineteen prisoners of the 2nd German Division. On the following afternoon at 2 p.m., a larger party of the 9th Irish Fusiliers followed the barrage into the Spanbroek salient, returning with one officer and thirty men as prisoners—a remarkable haul for a raid. Their casualties were two killed and six wounded. It was a fine, sunny day, and, despite the haze of dust caused by the shelling, the whole operation could be seen in detail from the observation posts on Kemmel Hill. The barrage, though the rate of fire was but a third of what it was to be on the great day, was very impressive. It appeared a wall of curling smoke creeping slowly up the ridge. The figures of the infantrymen following it could be seen distinctly; there was the flash of bombs, and there were Germans coming from their dug-outs holding up their arms. As the party returned one man was seen to break away from it, walk back fifty yards in most leisurely fashion, summon forth two Germans whom he had evidently observed hiding in a hole, and bring them in at the point of the bayonet.
The day of battle was at hand. Nothing could have been more favourable than the elements to the British cause. The weather was clear for observation, dry, and not unduly cold at night.[34] The infantry which was to make the attack was bivouacked in tents and shelters, the 107th Brigade south of Locre, the 109th S.W. of Dranoutre, thus avoiding the shelling, particularly with gas, wherewith the Germans visited all our hutted camps. After dusk on June the 6th, "Y" day, these Brigades moved up to their positions of assembly, which consisted partly of our front and support line trenches, and partly of slit trenches specially dug. As on the occasion of the assembly for the Somme Battle, cross-country tracks had been prepared to avoid the congested roads. East of the Neuve Eglise-Lindenhoek Road there were no less than four tracks available for each brigade. It was reported that the assembly was complete, without a hitch, by 2-30 a.m. on June the 7th.
The reader must strive to imagine the emotions of the men who waited in the dark for the fateful moment. Some, the luckier ones, those of the battalions and attached troops that were to take the Blue Line, had but another forty minutes, though those forty minutes must have seemed long enough. The battalions which were to pass through them on that objective had two hours after that. It was eleven months since the Division had made its first great attack. Despite its heavy losses on that day and since, there was here a large proportion of officers and men who had taken part in it, including many who had then been wounded. They must have recalled, as they waited for the crash of opening artillery, with what high hopes they had gone forward on the banks of the Ancre. The task must have appeared to them almost equally formidable to-day. And yet there was a general feeling of confidence, and confidence not unreasoned. The British Army had learnt much since then, and the men in the line realized the growth of that knowledge and had their part in it. They had watched the stage prepared for the triumphant dénouement, prepared with matchless industry and forethought, and they were ready to play their part fitly when the curtain rose. There was among the men, it may be, less of that spirit of gay, generous, headlong valour, ready to spill itself without a thought of the cost, but there was a greater store of the soldier's craft; the craft which seeks to save itself that it may inflict the more loss upon the opponent. In fighting efficiency the Division, war-tried, but not war-weary, was probably, in the small hours of that June morning, at the highest pitch it ever attained.
Zero was at 3-10 a.m. It had been fixed, after long consultation with Divisions, by the Army as the hour at which men should be able to see just one hundred yards ahead. In the conferences after the battle the general opinion seemed to be that it had been put five or ten minutes too early. It had been arranged that a normal programme of harassing fire should be carried out, as a cessation of this would have appeared suspicious to the enemy. It seemed, nevertheless, to those who watched and waited, that the night was unusually quiet. A few of our howitzers spoke now and again, and from the German lines came regularly the hiccoughing double thud of their great gun, followed by the whine of its missile overhead, on its course to some objective as far back as Hazebrouck.
Then, with one monstrous roar, every British gun upon ten miles of front opened fire. At the same time the great semi-circle of mines exploded, spewing up, as it seemed, the solid earth, of which fragments fell half a mile away, and sending to the skies great towers of crimson flame, that hung a moment ere they were choked by the clouds of dense black smoke which followed them from their caverns. There came first one ghastly flash of light, then a shuddering of earth thus outraged, then the thunder-clap. That opening uproar was heard quite distinctly in England. General Nugent, returning to his command post on Kemmel from the observation post a hundred yards away, declared that the sight he had seen was "a vision of hell."
Amid a gloom still thick and intensified by a smother of dust, the first wave of the infantry sprang from its trenches and went forward. The second followed at twenty-five yards' interval to avoid the German barrage. One of the mines was fifteen seconds late. Curiously enough, it was the doubtful one at Spanbroekmolen. The infantry had obeyed instructions and had not waited for it. A few of the leading men of the 14th Rifles, out in "No Man's Land," were thrown off their feet by the force of the explosion. But there were no casualties, and the men quickly closed in to the barrage. The size of the craters to be skirted and the darkness made the keeping of direction a matter of difficulty. It would have been impossible but for the use of compasses by the platoon commanders. There was considerable overlapping by the troops of the Division on our right, at least two companies of which swung across our front. The body of one of their officers was subsequently found in the bed of the Steenebeek, at L'Enfer Wood, over two hundred yards within the 36th Division's boundary.
There was no resistance by the enemy in his front or support trenches. Dazed and disorganized by the mines and the tremendous weight of artillery, the few survivors surrendered. Two machine-guns only, firing through our barrage, are recorded to have come into action at this stage, on the front of the 109th Brigade. They came into the open when it had passed, on the extreme left flank, and were put out of action, one by a section of rifle grenadiers, the other by a Lewis gun of the 11th Inniskillings. The enemy's barrage was unaccountably light and ragged, even when the violence of our counter-battery fire is considered, and fell upon the British front line. The assaulting troops went straight forward to the Red Line, close upon the barrage, leaving to the "moppers up" the task of taking prisoners. It was reached at Zero plus 35; that is, at 3-45 a.m. Here there was a halt in the barrage of a quarter of an hour, and here the third and fourth company of each battalion "leap-frogged" the first and second for the assault of the Blue Line. The serious business of the attack was but beginning.
As in almost every action of the war, the stoutest-hearted German was the German behind the machine-gun. The artillerymen, with shell hailing upon their positions, were more anxious to withdraw their batteries than to support their infantry, but the machine-gunners lived up to their reputation. As the new waves swept on, dipping now on the right brigade front into the marshy bed of the Steenebeek, guns came into action directly the barrage was past at L'Enfer Wood, Earl Farm, Skip Point, and Scott Farm. At Skip Point, in particular, two guns were handled with boldness, firing till the work was rushed with the bayonet by the 9th Rifles, assisted by a platoon of the 14th, which swung in from the left. There was still resistance in this veritable fortress, and some bombing of its dug-outs. Upwards of a hundred and fifty prisoners were taken in it. At Scott Farm an officer was seen standing on top of the work, encouraging his men. He was shot at long range by a sniper, whereat the defence at this point collapsed. There yet remained, however, Jump Point, the strongest position short of the road. By this time the Intelligence Officer of the 109th Brigade was on the high ground beyond Peckham, in touch with his Brigadier on the telephone. He reported that he saw a yellow flag at Jump Point. Now, the battalion flag of the 14th Rifles was orange, a far more significant shade. "I said," writes General Ricardo, "'Yellow be damned!' slammed down the 'phone, called the Division on the other, and said I wished to report that Jump Point was occupied. Corps was informed accordingly, within a few minutes of schedule time. I was asked by B.G.G.S. Corps next day how we managed our information and communications. I told him, 'by orange flags.'" And so the first flag moved forward from the border of the map at IX. Corps Headquarters, which was to mark the progress of the battle, and was stuck into Jump Point.
All along the front the leading waves, well closed up to the barrage, reached the Blue Line at the appointed hour, 4-50 a.m. The troops of the 36th Division were in touch with those of the 25th and 16th Divisions on right and left, both of which also reached their objectives successfully. Here there was a halt of two hours, during which consolidation was begun, during which also the battalions attacking the Black Line, the 15th and 10th Rifles and the 10th and 9th Inniskillings, moved up in artillery formation. The two former battalions had to pass through a light barrage which the enemy had now put down upon the valley of the Steenebeek, but had not many casualties. At 6-50 a.m. the barrage moved forward once more, the fresh troops following it with great dash.
The severest resistance was not met here till the Green Line was past and the troops were almost on the famous road, upon which they had looked so long. Pick House was strongly held. With the rifle grenade it was attacked, while a captured machine-gun was brought into action against it from the flank.[35] The garrison, which included a battalion commander, then surrendered. A little further north the 10th Inniskillings were held up by a machine-gun. A tank was just in front, but the occupants apparently could not see the gun, nor could the infantrymen attract their attention to it. A sergeant of the Inniskillings ran up to the tank, beat upon its side with a Mills bomb, and so gained the attention of the crew. The tank then bore down upon the machine-gun and put it out of action. Still further north, on their extreme left flank, the 10th had trouble from a line of riflemen behind a ditch. A platoon of their neighbours, the 9th Inniskillings, outflanked this party, killing three and making prisoners of the rest. In their half of Wytschaete the 9th Inniskillings had some "mopping up" to accomplish, and took about fifty prisoners. Their neighbours, the Munsters of the 16th Division, had a like task in the northern half of the village—a village that was now a crumbled rubbish-heap of bricks, nowhere more than a few feet high.
But the point at which resistance was most dogged was on the extreme right, and it was the 15th Rifles which had the heaviest casualties among the infantry. The following graphic account is taken from a letter written by Captain P. K. Miller, who commanded the right flank company of this battalion:
"About a hundred, or perhaps two hundred, yards short of the Messines-Wytschaete Road we came into a lot of machine-gun fire, and the men went to ground to find out where it came from, so I crossed the road and lay down on the other side for about five minutes and got my field-glasses going. Very warm spot, as our barrage was dropping about there! Beat it back to the company, and ordered Lieut. Falkiner to take his platoon, less Lewis-gun team, and put out of action the strong point which I had spotted on my right. Got the L.G. in action to spray the place meantime (had three out of five riflemen killed doing this; however, they kept the gun going). Then I went along to left of line and started Lieut. —— of 'B' Company (forget his name, but he got the M.C. for it) to attack another S.P. which was plugging at our left. (O.C. 'B' Company had got a 'blighty' coming up hill.) Then I went back to the right of the line and found that Lieut. Falkiner had got Lumm Farm. The Huns put up a fight here. However, one of the concrete places was bombed by Riflemen Aicken and Cochrane. In the other the Hun officer and Lieut. Falkiner had a rough-and-tumble fight. The Hun collared him somehow round the waist, but he managed to get an arm free and shot him, and his men came tumbling down after him and finished the rest of them. About fifteen were left alive and surrendered.... I then pushed all the men on a hundred yards and started them digging.... Some time later the commander of the (25th Division) company on my right came along and asked me if I would let him use Lumm Farm as a company headquarters, as he had no dug-outs in his sector. So I gave him one of the rooms—there were three or four in the dug-out."
The final part of this first-hand narrative is inserted because, in a book recently published, the capture of Lumm Farm is attributed to the 25th Division.[36]
Consolidation of the Black Line was started. At 8-40 a.m. patrols pushed forward in touch with those of the 25th and 16th Divisions, and established themselves without much difficulty a thousand yards ahead, on what had been known on the preliminary plans as the Dotted Black Line, afterwards called the Mauve Line, which was held as an outpost line. Meanwhile, in the lull that followed, the field artillery was moving forward. Most of the batteries moved to the neighbourhood of the old British front line, but batteries of the 153rd and 173rd Brigades crossed "No Man's Land," and established themselves as far forward as the Red Line. The gunners, in the enthusiasm of victory, forgot their fatigue and the strain of those sleepless nights of bombardment, and rushed their guns forward over the difficult ground with the delight of schoolboys. At 10-5 a.m. it was reported to General Nugent that batteries of the 173rd Brigade were in position. A few minutes later came a similar report with regard to the 153rd Brigade. Not for upwards of two hours was there sign of a counter-attack in force. Then the IX. Corps announced that long columns of troops and transport had been observed by balloon and aeroplane moving west from the canal at Houthem. The German command had, however, been too slow. By this time good progress had been made with the work of consolidation of the Black Line, and of the strong points in rear of it, the latter of which the engineers of the 121st and 150th Field Companies had already taken in hand. In addition to the wire brought forward on pack mules, far greater quantities of German wire had been found, particularly at one big dump near Guy Farm. All the twelve Vickers guns which had gone forward with the infantry had arrived successfully. There were now three in position north of Lumm Farm, three between Guy Farm and Staenyzer Cabaret, three some hundred yards west of the main road, and two in reserve. All the sixteen guns of the 108th Machine-Gun Company were in position in their rear, a battery of eight east of L'Enfer Wood, four at Jump Point, and four on Hill 94, at the south-west corner of Wytschaete. A big counter-attack would have driven in the outposts on the Mauve Line; it appeared improbable that it would dislodge our troops from the Black. When it came, a little after one o'clock, it was not on the front of the 36th Division, but on that of its right-hand neighbours, the 25th and New Zealand Divisions. The Germans came forward stoutly enough across the open ground, but the attack got nowhere near the British lines. Before the terrific blast of our barrage it withered away and dispersed.
The heat was now very great and the stench round Wytschaete from the many horses that had been killed by our bombardments of the past week was almost overwhelming. The troops were suffering from fatigue. It was the hour at which reaction from the strain he has endured, and the high pitch to which he has keyed himself, begins to creep upon all but the very strongest of men. They solaced themselves during the intervals of digging and wiring with the doubtful joys of German ration cigars, found in great quantities in some of the dug-outs. The Germans had begun to shell Messines and Wytschaete heavily.
The hour of the "New Zero"—that is, for the passing through of the troops of the 11th Division—had been fixed meanwhile at 3-10 p.m. At 12-20 p.m. came an order from the IX. Corps that the Mauve Line was to be held in force and consolidated, so that a good second line of defence should be prepared by the time the 11th Division had captured the Oosttaverne Line. Each Brigade was accordingly instructed to garrison the Mauve Line with a battalion. Each Brigadier decided to use the attached battalion of the 108th Brigade which had been employed for "mopping up," and so was fresher than his other battalions. Before three o'clock the 12th and 11th Rifles were upon the Mauve Line, and at work putting it into a state of defence.
Punctually at 3-10 p.m. the 34th Brigade of the 11th Division moved through the Mauve Line, behind a splendid barrage and with four tanks. Though less artillery was firing, the barrage was even thicker than had been that of the 36th Division, owing to the frontage having been reduced to less than one half. It reached its objective, the Oosttaverne Line, but was subjected to intense bombardment from the German artillery, now all east of the Canal. The IX. Corps Cavalry went through at 6 p.m.—too late, even if it had ever had a chance. It suffered casualties from machine-gun fire, and could make little or no progress.
The 16th Rifles (Pioneers) had attacked their heavy task of road-making. Bridges for the trenches had been prepared and were set in position. Shell-holes were hastily filled. With such a will did the two companies on the road work, that before dusk wheeled transport could move on the Lindenhoek-Messines Road beyond the great crater in the Spanbroek salient. Another company cleared tracks for pack transport up to the Black Line, marking them out with white stakes and notice-boards. After the taking of the Oosttaverne Line the battalion turned its attention to the top of the ridge, clearing old communication trenches and cutting new ones. The 122nd Field Company put up a fine obstacle along the whole length of the Black Line, using, for the most part, German wire. This task was completed by 3 a.m. on June the 8th.
It was an ideal opportunity for the employment of pack transport. Once the enemy had been pushed off the ridge it was secure from ground observation, while, as for German aeroplanes, they had no chance to cross our lines, so complete was the British mastery of the air. The pack was one of the successes of the battle. Officers commanding battalions had in most cases picked their headquarters in the enemy's lines days before, and told their transport officers they would expect them at such an hour with the rations, just as if they had been holding the most placid trenches on the front. They were not disappointed. Indeed, mules were moving up with grenades, water, and wire, before ever the Black Line was reached. The transport officers of the battalions showed in this action that long months of stagnation in the war had not robbed them of their initiative.
The forward slopes of the Messines Ridge, ere dusk put for a while a decent veil upon it, presented a ghastly spectacle to bear witness to the destructive power of modern artillery. The ground had been literally ploughed up. L'Enfer Wood, which had remained a considerable copse of stunted trees through years of shell-fire, was now but an indeterminate collection of stumps. Some of the concrete structures had disappeared. The Steenebeek stream was a stream no more. Its path was marked by mud thicker than elsewhere, and where its bed had been the shell-holes were full of water. There were a number of dead Germans in the valley, with their faces turned toward the hill. They had run back before the dreadful moving wall of the British barrage, and had been caught by it in the marshy ground. Some lay on their faces, arms outstretched. It was a sight that, at normal times, would have filled the breast of everyone who witnessed it with pity and horror. But in such moments the wells of these emotions are almost dried up.
At night the 108th Brigade relieved the 107th and 109th in the line; that is to say, its remaining battalions, which had been in divisional reserve, relieved the troops holding the Black and Blue Lines, while General Griffith took command of the front. The relieved troops moved back to the comparative comfort of the old British trenches. The night was very disturbed. On more than one occasion the S.O.S. rocket went up on the right of the Division, and at 10 p.m. a counter-attack on Messines was reported. If counter-attack there was, it was of small account. No big attack could, in fact, have been carried out in the darkness. Morning dawned, leaving the British in secure occupation of the battlefield and all their objectives. The ridge was, however, subjected to very heavy shelling all that day and at night, when the 150th Field Company had a very wild task in wiring the whole of the Mauve Line. On the afternoon of the following day, at 4 p.m., command of the sector, the actual front line of which had been held for upwards of forty-eight hours by his troops, passed to the G.O.C. 11th Division. That night the 32nd Brigade of the 11th Division relieved the 108th Brigade in the Mauve, Black, and Blue Lines, the weary battalions moving back to bivouac on the slopes of Kemmel Hill. On the 16th the Headquarters of the 36th Division returned to their old village, St. Jans Cappel.
The total number of prisoners captured by the 36th Division in the offensive was 31 officers and 1,208 other ranks. Against this its casualties, to the night of June the 9th, when it was relieved, were 61 officers and 1,058 other ranks. In the actual assault, the losses were probably not above seven hundred. Other divisions, notably some of the Australians of the II. Anzac Corps, suffered more severely than the 36th; but, on the whole, it seems safe to presume that the German losses were more than thrice our own. One prisoner stated that practically all his company was destroyed by one of the mines, while the tenor of the letters found upon others was that it had been "far worse than the Somme." No German field guns could be withdrawn by our troops before the Division was relieved, but a number were captured between the Black Line and the Mauve. Among the comparatively few officers killed was Captain H. Gallagher, D.S.O., of the 11th Inniskillings, whose gallantry and fine leadership upon the Somme have been recorded. At the beginning of the action his right arm was shattered by a fragment of shell. Urged to go back, he laughingly refused, threw down the rifle he was carrying, and took his revolver in his left hand, saying: "This will do me rightly." He led his company to its objective, and was returning later to have his arm dressed when he was killed instantly by a shell. He was buried in the old "No Man's Land," just outside the "Bull Ring," which he had so often held, from which he and his company had repulsed a big German raiding party a short while before.
The 16th Division lost one distinguished man in Major William Redmond, M.P., who was brought in by stretcher-bearers of the 36th Division, and conveyed to its Main Dressing Station. He had been attached to Divisional Headquarters, but had insisted on rejoining his regiment for the battle. His wound was light, but he was no longer a young man, nor in a state of physical fitness to withstand such a strain. He died some hours later.
The 36th Division had by no means finished with the Messines-Wytschaete Ridge, even for this year; but before dealing with its last days in the area, it may be not unprofitable to speculate upon the causes of this triumphant success. If this account has achieved its object, the majority of them will stand out clearly enough. In the conferences after the battle, and in reply to questionnaires issued by the commanders, there were very few criticisms made. Zero, as has been stated, was considered to have been too early, though by not more than a few minutes at most. All the infantry was enthusiastic about the manner in which the artillery had been handled, and about the effect of the barrage. Some battalions considered that it had been set to move rather too fast, but the general opinion was that the infantry had been able to keep up with it comfortably enough, and that the pace was a factor in the success. The mines, it was agreed, had been decisive in the capture of the front-line system, and had exercised a great moral effect much farther back. The tanks had been a success. They were useful in incidents such as that which has been described, and they probably saved the infantry some casualties on the top of the ridge. Broadly speaking, however, they did not appear to have exercised any great effect upon the course of the battle. Brigadiers and battalion commanders were unanimous in praise of the smoothness with which the machinery worked from behind. The services of supply—the Divisional Train, Supply Column, and Divisional Ammunition Column—were at their best, and their standard of excellence was high. The Ordnance had responded to every demand made upon it for the multifarious material used in the offensive.
With regard to the infantry itself, the most interesting feature of the Battle of Messines was the triumph of the platoon. Each platoon had now a Lewis-gun section and a section of rifle grenadiers. It was converted thereby into a little self-sufficing force, an army in miniature, with every weapon necessary for the carrying out of the minor operations likely to confront it in such an assault. Some of the platoon leaders displayed in this battle a high order of tactical skill.
But let us glance also at the affair from the other side, where a German Army Commander, the famous Sixt von Armin, was seated at his map-table. What were the problems that confronted him, and how did he face them?
The Germans meant to hold the ridge if they could. It was a valuable position that had cost them dear in the winning. They knew an attack was coming, but they put it one or two days later than it was delivered. The Higher Command was well aware that the troops in the trenches were in no fit state to meet it, after days of terrific pounding, heavy losses, and shortage of food. It was in the act of relieving them when the attack was launched. The relief of one Division was incomplete when the mines went up and the British bayonets came in the dark upon the columns in the communication trenches. The confusion must have been indescribable. Again, the German position, admirable for trench warfare, had weaknesses in such a battle as this. It was a sharp salient, with a semi-circle of artillery about it. The artillery had excellent observation. Had the weather been misty, Kemmel would have been of little avail, and the work of destruction comparatively ineffective. But the atmosphere was wonderfully clear. The British fire upon the forts was overwhelming. The counter-battery work was the best accomplished in the war. An average of one gun to every German battery in action was destroyed by our fire, according to the evidence of captured artillerymen. The loss in horses alone constituted a severe blow. As to the counter-attack, which was made in the afternoon with the 7th and probably regiments of the 24th Divisions, it was launched late, and met the full weight of our barrage. With its failure the High Command appears to have decided, wisely no doubt, to abandon the struggle, and made all haste to get every gun left to it east of the Canal d'Ypres. It must have appeared to it that the position held by the British offered doubtful results to a counter-attack in force. The latter had now all the best of the ground, and a great counter-attack upon the re-entrant held by them would have required more troops than the enemy probably had available.
On the 13th of July the 36th Division, less its Artillery, which remained in position, moved to the area between Mont Noir and Bailleul. A certain amount of rest was obtained, but large parties of infantry had to work under the Chief Engineer of the IX. Corps. However, better things were in prospect, the Division being under orders to move back to Merris. These orders were suddenly cancelled. On the night of the 19th, the 107th Brigade on the right, and the 109th on the left, took over from the 11th Division the whole front now held by the IX. Corps, from the Blauwepoortbeek at Deconinck Farm, just north of the village of Gapaard, on the right, to Rose Wood, north of the Roozebeek, on the left. The length of the front was about three thousand yards. The Headquarters of the 107th Brigade were established in a company headquarters of our old trenches, those of the 109th Brigade in enemy dug-outs in the northern part of Grand Bois. On the 20th, 36th Divisional Headquarters opened at Ulster Camp.
The holding of a new-won position after a great attack was always an unpleasant task. In this case the conditions were, from some points of view, more difficult than those of the capture of the ridge. "Jerry was angry," said the men, with justice. The Germans now had a mass of heavy artillery behind the Canal d'Ypres, and day and night they shelled the British forward positions and the western slope of the ridge. On their second day in the line the Headquarters of the 109th Brigade in the Grand Bois were so heavily bombarded that General Nugent decided they should be withdrawn to a company headquarters in our old lines. The troops in the front trenches were on a forward slope, very exposed to observation, and suffered heavily. At night ration parties on the roads had many evil experiences. Casualties rarely amounted to less than a hundred for the period of twenty-four hours, and several battalions had considerably greater losses in ten days of this experience than in the period from the 7th to the 9th of June.
Nor was it alone upon areas over which he had observation from the ground that the enemy was able to bring to bear accurate fire. Parties on railway work, lorries on the Wytschaete Road, suffered very heavily also. The reason was that the situation in the air had altered. British supremacy there had been absolute. Not a German aeroplane had been seen during the battle. Since then certain of our squadrons had moved north to the Salient. The German air force, on the contrary, had been heavily reinforced. In particular the famous Richthofen, with a squadron of very fast single-seater scouts, painted bright red, raged up and down the front, catching many of our comparatively slow photographic and artillery aeroplanes, and shooting them down. Another favourite device of his was to sweep low over our trenches, firing belt after belt upon the infantry in them, who retorted, without much effect, by the fire of machine-guns on anti-aircraft mountings. But his most spectacular feat was undoubtedly the burning of our balloons. Of these there was a great number on the front. From Kemmel about fourteen could be counted, stretching almost to the coast on one side, and perhaps to Estaires on the other. For men in the neighbourhood of the hill it became one of the interests of those sunny afternoons to watch the balloons. The programme was always of a similar nature. There would be a sudden uproar of anti-aircraft fire, a fast-moving dot would approach one of the balloons, two silver dots below the latter would represent the observers making their way earthwards in their parachutes. A tiny flicker of fire would appear atop of the balloon, swiftly growing and spreading. Within a few seconds the flaming mass would sink slowly. Sometimes the aggressor would dart straight off to the next balloon in the line, and repeat the process with that. On the afternoon of June the 23rd, three balloons in succession were brought down by one aeroplane. It must, however, have been displeasing to the Germans to observe how swiftly every balloon burnt by them was replaced.
The German infantry, it must be added, was entirely unaggressive, nor was it easy to locate its positions. It held the ground west of the Canal d'Ypres with isolated posts, and made no effort to improve the half-dug trenches already existing. All labour was concentrated upon the positions east of the Canal.
On the 29th a welcome relief of the 36th by the 37th Division took place. On the following day the G.O.C. 37th Division took over command of the front, the whole of the 36th Division, less Artillery, Engineers, and Pioneers, moving to the Merris area. The Headquarters of the Division and that of the 108th Brigade were in that village; the 107th Brigade at Outtersteene, and the 109th at Strazeele. The batteries, which had withdrawn to their forward wagon-lines for rest on the 19th, had returned to the line by the 27th in relief of the 11th Divisional Artillery, and remained there till July the 5th, under heavy hostile shelling, in indifferent weather with poor visibility. The Pioneers and Field Companies had but a day's rest before being moved to the Salient to begin new work.
The first week of July was given to rest and training at Merris.
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Map II.
The Battle of Messines, 1917.