OF THE ACADEMICAL OR SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY.
PART I.
[116.] There is not a greater number of philosophical reasonings, displayed upon any subject, than those, which prove the existence of a Deity, and refute the fallacies of Atheists; and yet the most religious philosophers still dispute whether any man can be so blinded as to be a speculative atheist. How shall we reconcile these contradictions? The knights-errant, who wandered about to clear the world of dragons and giants, never entertained the least doubt with regard to the existence of these monsters.
The Sceptic is another enemy of religion, who naturally provokes the indignation of all divines and graver philosophers; though it is certain, that no man ever met with any such absurd creature, or conversed with a man, who had no opinion or principle concerning any subject, either of action or speculation. This begets a very natural question; What is meant by a sceptic? And how far it is possible to push these philosophical principles of doubt and uncertainty?
There is a species of scepticism, antecedent to all study and philosophy, which is much inculcated by Des Cartes and others, as a sovereign preservative against error and precipitate judgement. It recommends an universal doubt, not only of all our former opinions and principles, but also of our very faculties; of whose veracity, say they, we must assure ourselves, by a chain of reasoning, deduced from some original principle, which cannot possibly be fallacious or deceitful. But neither is there any such original principle, which has a prerogative above others, that are self-evident and convincing: or if there were, could we advance a step beyond it, but by the use of those very faculties, of which we are supposed to be already diffident. The Cartesian doubt, therefore, were it ever possible to be attained by any human creature (as it plainly is not) would be entirely incurable; and no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of assurance and conviction upon any subject.
It must, however, be confessed, that this species of scepticism, when more moderate, may be understood in a very reasonable sense, and is a necessary preparative to the study of philosophy, by preserving a proper impartiality in our judgements, and weaning our mind from all those prejudices, which we may have imbibed from education or rash opinion. To begin with clear and self-evident principles, to advance by timorous and sure steps, to review frequently our conclusions, and examine accurately all their consequences; though by these means we shall make both a slow and a short progress in our systems; are the only methods, by which we can ever hope to reach truth, and attain a proper stability and certainty in our determinations.
[117.] There is another species of scepticism, consequent to science and enquiry, when men are supposed to have discovered, either the absolute fallaciousness of their mental faculties, or their unfitness to reach any fixed determination in all those curious subjects of speculation, about which they are commonly employed. Even our very senses are brought into dispute, by a certain species of philosophers; and the maxims of common life are subjected to the same doubt as the most profound principles or conclusions of metaphysics and theology. As these paradoxical tenets (if they may be called tenets) are to be met with in some philosophers, and the refutation of them in several, they naturally excite our curiosity, and make us enquire into the arguments, on which they may be founded.
I need not insist upon the more trite topics, employed by the sceptics in all ages, against the evidence of sense; such as those which are derived from the imperfection and fallaciousness of our organs, on numberless occasions; the crooked appearance of an oar in water; the various aspects of objects, according to their different distances; the double images which arise from the pressing one eye; with many other appearances of a like nature. These sceptical topics, indeed, are only sufficient to prove, that the senses alone are not implicitly to be depended on; but that we must correct their evidence by reason, and by considerations, derived from the nature of the medium, the distance of the object, and the disposition of the organ, in order to render them, within their sphere, the proper criteria of truth and falsehood. There are other more profound arguments against the senses, which admit not of so easy a solution.
[118.] It seems evident, that men are carried, by a natural instinct or prepossession, to repose faith in their senses; and that, without any reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we always suppose an external universe, which depends not on our perception, but would exist, though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated. Even the animal creation are governed by a like opinion, and preserve this belief of external objects, in all their thoughts, designs, and actions.
It seems also evident, that, when men follow this blind and powerful instinct of nature, they always suppose the very images, presented by the senses, to be the external objects, and never entertain any suspicion, that the one are nothing but representations of the other. This very table, which we see white, and which we feel hard, is believed to exist, independent of our perception, and to be something external to our mind, which perceives it. Our presence bestows not being on it: our absence does not annihilate it. It preserves its existence uniform and entire, independent of the situation of intelligent beings, who perceive or contemplate it.
But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are only the inlets, through which these images are conveyed, without being able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object. The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove farther from it: but the real table, which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration: it was, therefore, nothing but its image, which was present to the mind. These are the obvious dictates of reason; and no man, who reflects, ever doubted, that the existences, which we consider, when we say, this house and that tree, are nothing but perceptions in the mind, and fleeting copies or representations of other existences, which remain uniform and independent.
[119.] So far, then, are we necessitated by reasoning to contradict or depart from the primary instincts of nature, and to embrace a new system with regard to the evidence of our senses. But here philosophy finds herself extremely embarrassed, when she would justify this new system, and obviate the cavils and objections of the sceptics. She can no longer plead the infallible and irresistible instinct of nature: for that led us to a quite different system, which is acknowledged fallible and even erroneous. And to justify this pretended philosophical system, by a chain of clear and convincing argument, or even any appearance of argument, exceeds the power of all human capacity.
By what argument can it be proved, that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects, entirely different from them, though resembling them (if that be possible) and could not arise either from the energy of the mind itself, or from the suggestion of some invisible and unknown spirit, or from some other cause still more unknown to us? It is acknowledged, that, in fact, many of these perceptions arise not from anything external, as in dreams, madness, and other diseases. And nothing can be more inexplicable than the manner, in which body should so operate upon mind as ever to convey an image of itself to a substance, supposed of so different, and even contrary a nature.
It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects, resembling them: how shall this question be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning.
[120.] To have recourse to the veracity of the supreme Being, in order to prove the veracity of our senses, is surely making a very unexpected circuit. If his veracity were at all concerned in this matter, our senses would be entirely infallible; because it is not possible that he can ever deceive. Not to mention, that, if the external world be once called in question, we shall be at a loss to find arguments, by which we may prove the existence of that Being or any of his attributes.
[121.] This is a topic, therefore, in which the profounder and more philosophical sceptics will always triumph, when they endeavour to introduce an universal doubt into all subjects of human knowledge and enquiry. Do you follow the instincts and propensities of nature, may they say, in assenting to the veracity of sense? But these lead you to believe that the very perception or sensible image is the external object. Do you disclaim this principle, in order to embrace a more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of something external? You here depart from your natural propensities and more obvious sentiments; and yet are not able to satisfy your reason, which can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove, that the perceptions are connected with any external objects.
[122.] There is another sceptical topic of a like nature, derived from the most profound philosophy; which might merit our attention, were it requisite to dive so deep, in order to discover arguments and reasonings, which can so little serve to any serious purpose. It is universally allowed by modern enquirers, that all the sensible qualities of objects, such as hard, soft, hot, cold, white, black, &c. are merely secondary, and exist not in the objects themselves, but are perceptions of the mind, without any external archetype or model, which they represent. If this be allowed, with regard to secondary qualities, it must also follow, with regard to the supposed primary qualities of extension and solidity; nor can the latter be any more entitled to that denomination than the former. The idea of extension is entirely acquired from the senses of sight and feeling; and if all the qualities, perceived by the senses, be in the mind, not in the object, the same conclusion must reach the idea of extension, which is wholly dependent on the sensible ideas or the ideas of secondary qualities. Nothing can save us from this conclusion, but the asserting, that the ideas of those primary qualities are attained by Abstraction, an opinion, which, if we examine it accurately, we shall find to be unintelligible, and even absurd. An extension, that is neither tangible nor visible, cannot possibly be conceived: and a tangible or visible extension, which is neither hard nor soft, black nor white, is equally beyond the reach of human conception. Let any man try to conceive a triangle in general, which is neither Isosceles nor Scalenum, nor has any particular length or proportion of sides; and he will soon perceive the absurdity of all the scholastic notions with regard to abstraction and general ideas.[31]
[123.] Thus the first philosophical objection to the evidence of sense or to the opinion of external existence consists in this, that such an opinion, if rested on natural instinct, is contrary to reason, and if referred to reason, is contrary to natural instinct, and at the same time carries no rational evidence with it, to convince an impartial enquirer. The second objection goes farther, and represents this opinion as contrary to reason: at least, if it be a principle of reason, that all sensible qualities are in the mind, not in the object. Bereave matter of all its intelligible qualities, both primary and secondary, you in a manner annihilate it, and leave only a certain unknown, inexplicable something, as the cause of our perceptions; a notion so imperfect, that no sceptic will think it worth while to contend against it.
PART II.
[124.] It may seem a very extravagant attempt of the sceptics to destroy reason by argument and ratiocination; yet is this the grand scope of all their enquiries and disputes. They endeavour to find objections, both to our abstract reasonings, and to those which regard matter of fact and existence.
The chief objection against all abstract reasonings is derived from the ideas of space and time; ideas, which, in common life and to a careless view, are very clear and intelligible, but when they pass through the scrutiny of the profound sciences (and they are the chief object of these sciences) afford principles, which seem full of absurdity and contradiction. No priestly dogmas, invented on purpose to tame and subdue the rebellious reason of mankind, ever shocked common sense more than the doctrine of the infinitive divisibility of extension, with its consequences; as they are pompously displayed by all geometricians and metaphysicians, with a kind of triumph and exultation. A real quantity, infinitely less than any finite quantity, containing quantities infinitely less than itself, and so on in infinitum; this is an edifice so bold and prodigious, that it is too weighty for any pretended demonstration to support, because it shocks the clearest and most natural principles of human reason.[32] But what renders the matter more extraordinary, is, that these seemingly absurd opinions are supported by a chain of reasoning, the clearest and most natural; nor is it possible for us to allow the premises without admitting the consequences. Nothing can be more convincing and satisfactory than all the conclusions concerning the properties of circles and triangles; and yet, when these are once received, how can we deny, that the angle of contact between a circle and its tangent is infinitely less than any rectilineal angle, that as you may increase the diameter of the circle in infinitum, this angle of contact becomes still less, even in infinitum, and that the angle of contact between other curves and their tangents may be infinitely less than those between any circle and its tangent, and so on, in infinitum? The demonstration of these principles seems as unexceptionable as that which proves the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right ones, though the latter opinion be natural and easy, and the former big with contradiction and absurdity. Reason here seems to be thrown into a kind of amazement and suspence, which, without the suggestions of any sceptic, gives her a diffidence of herself, and of the ground on which she treads. She sees a full light, which illuminates certain places; but that light borders upon the most profound darkness. And between these she is so dazzled and confounded, that she scarcely can pronounce with certainty and assurance concerning any one object.
[125.] The absurdity of these bold determinations of the abstract sciences seems to become, if possible, still more palpable with regard to time than extension. An infinite number of real parts of time, passing in succession, and exhausted one after another, appears so evident a contradiction, that no man, one should think, whose judgement is not corrupted, instead of being improved, by the sciences, would ever be able to admit of it.
Yet still reason must remain restless, and unquiet, even with regard to that scepticism, to which she is driven by these seeming absurdities and contradictions. How any clear, distinct idea can contain circumstances, contradictory to itself, or to any other clear, distinct idea, is absolutely incomprehensible; and is, perhaps, as absurd as any proposition, which can be formed. So that nothing can be more sceptical, or more full of doubt and hesitation, than this scepticism itself, which arises from some of the paradoxical conclusions of geometry or the science of quantity.[33]
[126.] The sceptical objections to moral evidence, or to the reasonings concerning matter of fact, are either popular or philosophical. The popular objections are derived from the natural weakness of human understanding; the contradictory opinions, which have been entertained in different ages and nations; the variations of our judgement in sickness and health, youth and old age, prosperity and adversity; the perpetual contradiction of each particular man's opinions and sentiments; with many other topics of that kind. It is needless to insist farther on this head. These objections are but weak. For as, in common life, we reason every moment concerning fact and existence, and cannot possibly subsist, without continually employing this species of argument, any popular objections, derived from thence, must be insufficient to destroy that evidence. The great subverter of Pyrrhonism or the excessive principles of scepticism is action, and employment, and the occupations of common life. These principles may flourish and triumph in the schools; where it is, indeed, difficult, if not impossible, to refute them. But as soon as they leave the shade, and by the presence of the real objects, which actuate our passions and sentiments, are put in opposition to the more powerful principles of our nature, they vanish like smoke, and leave the most determined sceptic in the same condition as other mortals.
[127.] The sceptic, therefore, had better keep within his proper sphere, and display those philosophical objections, which arise from more profound researches. Here he seems to have ample matter of triumph; while he justly insists, that all our evidence for any matter of fact, which lies beyond the testimony of sense or memory, is derived entirely from the relation of cause and effect; that we have no other idea of this relation than that of two objects, which have been frequently conjoined together; that we have no argument to convince us, that objects, which have, in our experience, been frequently conjoined, will likewise, in other instances, be conjoined in the same manner; and that nothing leads us to this inference but custom or a certain instinct of our nature; which it is indeed difficult to resist, but which, like other instincts, may be fallacious and deceitful. While the sceptic insists upon these topics, he shows his force, or rather, indeed, his own and our weakness; and seems, for the time at least, to destroy all assurance and conviction. These arguments might be displayed at greater length, if any durable good or benefit to society could ever be expected to result from them.
[128.] For here is the chief and most confounding objection to excessive scepticism, that no durable good can ever result from it; while it remains in its full force and vigour. We need only ask such a sceptic, What his meaning is? And what he proposes by all these curious researches? He is immediately at a loss, and knows not what to answer. A Copernican or Ptolemaic, who supports each his different system of astronomy, may hope to produce a conviction, which will remain constant and durable, with his audience. A Stoic or Epicurean displays principles, which may not be durable, but which have an effect on conduct and behaviour. But a Pyrrhonian cannot expect, that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind: or if it had, that its influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, that all human life must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in a total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence. It is true; so fatal an event is very little to be dreaded. Nature is always too strong for principle. And though a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point of action and speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches. When he awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself, and to confess, that all his objections are mere amusement, and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind, who must act and reason and believe; though they are not able, by their most diligent enquiry, to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations, or to remove the objections, which may be raised against them.
PART III.
[129.] There is, indeed, a more mitigated scepticism or academical philosophy, which may be both durable and useful, and which may, in part, be the result of this Pyrrhonism, or excessive scepticism, when its undistinguished doubts are, in some measure, corrected by common sense and reflection. The greater part of mankind are naturally apt to be affirmative and dogmatical in their opinions; and while they see objects only on one side, and have no idea of any counterpoising argument, they throw themselves precipitately into the principles, to which they are inclined; nor have they any indulgence for those who entertain opposite sentiments. To hesitate or balance perplexes their understanding, checks their passion, and suspends their action. They are, therefore, impatient till they escape from a state, which to them is so uneasy: and they think, that they could never remove themselves far enough from it, by the violence of their affirmations and obstinacy of their belief. But could such dogmatical reasoners become sensible of the strange infirmities of human understanding, even in its most perfect state, and when most accurate and cautious in its determinations; such a reflection would naturally inspire them with more modesty and reserve, and diminish their fond opinion of themselves, and their prejudice against antagonists. The illiterate may reflect on the disposition of the learned, who, amidst all the advantages of study and reflection, are commonly still diffident in their determinations: and if any of the learned be inclined, from their natural temper, to haughtiness and obstinacy, a small tincture of Pyrrhonism might abate their pride, by showing them, that the few advantages, which they may have attained over their fellows, are but inconsiderable, if compared with the universal perplexity and confusion, which is inherent in human nature. In general, there is a degree of doubt, and caution, and modesty, which, in all kinds of scrutiny and decision, ought for ever to accompany a just reasoner.
[130.] Another species of mitigated scepticism which may be of advantage to mankind, and which may be the natural result of the Pyrrhonian doubts and scruples, is the limitation of our enquiries to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding. The imagination of man is naturally sublime, delighted with whatever is remote and extraordinary, and running, without control, into the most distant parts of space and time in order to avoid the objects, which custom has rendered too familiar to it. A correct Judgement observes a contrary method, and avoiding all distant and high enquiries, confines itself to common life, and to such subjects as fall under daily practice and experience; leaving the more sublime topics to the embellishment of poets and orators, or to the arts of priests and politicians. To bring us to so salutary a determination, nothing can be more serviceable, than to be once thoroughly convinced of the force of the Pyrrhonian doubt, and of the impossibility, that anything, but the strong power of natural instinct, could free us from it. Those who have a propensity to philosophy, will still continue their researches; because they reflect, that, besides the immediate pleasure, attending such an occupation, philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life, methodized and corrected. But they will never be tempted to go beyond common life, so long as they consider the imperfection of those faculties which they employ, their narrow reach, and their inaccurate operations. While we cannot give a satisfactory reason, why we believe, after a thousand experiments, that a stone will fall, or fire burn; can we ever satisfy ourselves concerning any determination, which we may form, with regard to the origin of worlds, and the situation of nature, from, and to eternity?
This narrow limitation, indeed, of our enquiries, is, in every respect, so reasonable, that it suffices to make the slightest examination into the natural powers of the human mind and to compare them with their objects, in order to recommend it to us. We shall then find what are the proper subjects of science and enquiry.
[131.] It seems to me, that the only objects of the abstract science or of demonstration are quantity and number, and that all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion. As the component parts of quantity and number are entirely similar, their relations become intricate and involved; and nothing can be more curious, as well as useful, than to trace, by a variety of mediums, their equality or inequality, through their different appearances. But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and different from each other, we can never advance farther, by our utmost scrutiny, than to observe this diversity, and, by an obvious reflection, pronounce one thing not to be another. Or if there be any difficulty in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undeterminate meaning of words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the squares of the other two sides, cannot be known, let the terms be ever so exactly defined, without a train of reasoning and enquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, that where there is no property, there can be no injustice, it is only necessary to define the terms, and explain injustice to be a violation of property. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but a more imperfect definition. It is the same case with all those pretended syllogistical reasonings, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity and number; and these may safely, I think, be pronounced the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration.
[132.] All other enquiries of men regard only matter of fact and existence; and these are evidently incapable of demonstration. Whatever is may not be. No negation of a fact can involve a contradiction. The non-existence of any being, without exception, is as clear and distinct an idea as its existence. The proposition, which affirms it not to be, however false, is no less conceivable and intelligible, than that which affirms it to be. The case is different with the sciences, properly so called. Every proposition, which is not true, is there confused and unintelligible. That the cube root of 64 is equal to the half of 10, is a false proposition, and can never be distinctly conceived. But that Caesar, or the angel Gabriel, or any being never existed, may be a false proposition, but still is perfectly conceivable, and implies no contradiction.
The existence, therefore, of any being can only be proved by arguments from its cause or its effect; and these arguments are founded entirely on experience. If we reason a priori, anything may appear able to produce anything. The falling of a pebble may, for aught we know, extinguish the sun; or the wish of a man control the planets in their orbits. It is only experience, which teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and effect, and enables us to infer the existence of one object from that of another[34]. Such is the foundation of moral reasoning, which forms the greater part of human knowledge, and is the source of all human action and behaviour.
Moral reasonings are either concerning particular or general facts. All deliberations in life regard the former; as also all disquisitions in history, chronology, geography, and astronomy.
The sciences, which treat of general facts, are politics, natural philosophy, physic, chemistry, &c. where the qualities, causes and effects of a whole species of objects are enquired into.
Divinity or Theology, as it proves the existence of a Deity, and the immortality of souls, is composed partly of reasonings concerning particular, partly concerning general facts. It has a foundation in reason, so far as it is supported by experience. But its best and most solid foundation is faith and divine revelation.
Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment. Beauty, whether moral or natural, is felt, more properly than perceived. Or if we reason concerning it, and endeavour to fix its standard, we regard a new fact, to wit, the general tastes of mankind, or some such fact, which may be the object of reasoning and enquiry.
When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.
[FOOTNOTES.]
Footnote 1: [(return)]
It is probable that no more was meant by those, who denied innate ideas, than that all ideas were copies of our impressions; though it must be confessed, that the terms, which they employed, were not chosen with such caution, nor so exactly defined, as to prevent all mistakes about their doctrine. For what is meant by innate? If innate be equivalent to natural, then all the perceptions and ideas of the mind must be allowed to be innate or natural, in whatever sense we take the latter word, whether in opposition to what is uncommon, artificial, or miraculous. If by innate be meant, contemporary to our birth, the dispute seems to be frivolous; nor is it worth while to enquire at what time thinking begins, whether before, at, or after our birth. Again, the word idea, seems to be commonly taken in a very loose sense, by LOCKE and others; as standing for any of our perceptions, our sensations and passions, as well as thoughts. Now in this sense, I should desire to know, what can be meant by asserting, that self-love, or resentment of injuries, or the passion between the sexes is not innate?
But admitting these terms, impressions and ideas, in the sense above explained, and understanding by innate, what is original or copied from no precedent perception, then may we assert that all our impressions are innate, and our ideas not innate.
To be ingenuous, I must own it to be my opinion, that LOCKE was betrayed into this question by the schoolmen, who, making use of undefined terms, draw out their disputes to a tedious length, without ever touching the point in question. A like ambiguity and circumlocution seem to run through that philosopher's reasonings on this as well as most other subjects.
Footnote 2: [(return)]
Resemblance.
Footnote 3: [(return)]
Contiguity.
Footnote 4: [(return)]
Cause and effect.
Footnote 5: [(return)]
For instance, Contrast or Contrariety is also a connexion among Ideas: but it may, perhaps, be considered as a mixture of Causation and Resemblance. Where two objects are contrary, the one destroys the other; that is, the cause of its annihilation, and the idea of the annihilation of an object, implies the idea of its former existence.
Footnote 6: [(return)]
The word, Power, is here used in a loose and popular sense. The more accurate explication of it would give additional evidence to this argument. See Sect. 7.
Footnote 7: [(return)]
Nothing is more useful than for writers, even, on moral, political, or physical subjects, to distinguish between reason and experience, and to suppose, that these species of argumentation are entirely different from each other. The former are taken for the mere result of our intellectual faculties, which, by considering priori the nature of things, and examining the effects, that must follow from their operation, establish particular principles of science and philosophy. The latter are supposed to be derived entirely from sense and observation, by which we learn what has actually resulted from the operation of particular objects, and are thence able to infer, what will, for the future, result from them. Thus, for instance, the limitations and restraints of civil government, and a legal constitution, may be defended, either from reason, which reflecting on the great frailty and corruption of human nature, teaches, that no man can safely be trusted with unlimited authority; or from experience and history, which inform us of the enormous abuses, that ambition, in every age and country, has been found to make of so imprudent a confidence.
The same distinction between reason and experience is maintained in all our deliberations concerning the conduct of life; while the experienced statesman, general, physician, or merchant is trusted and followed; and the unpractised novice, with whatever natural talents endowed, neglected and despised. Though it be allowed, that reason may form very plausible conjectures with regard to the consequences of such a particular conduct in such particular circumstances; it is still supposed imperfect, without the assistance of experience, which is alone able to give stability and certainty to the maxims, derived from study and reflection.
But notwithstanding that this distinction be thus universally received, both in the active speculative scenes of life, I shall not scruple to pronounce, that it is, at bottom, erroneous, at least, superficial.
If we examine those arguments, which, in any of the sciences above mentioned, are supposed to be the mere effects of reasoning and reflection, they will be found to terminate, at last, in some general principle or conclusion, for which we can assign no reason but observation and experience. The only difference between them and those maxims, which are vulgarly esteemed the result of pure experience, is, that the former cannot be established without some process of thought, and some reflection on what we have observed, in order to distinguish its circumstances, and trace its consequences: Whereas in the latter, the experienced event is exactly and fully familiar to that which we infer as the result of any particular situation. The history of a TIBERIUS or a NERO makes us dread a like tyranny, were our monarchs freed from the restraints of laws and senates: But the observation of any fraud or cruelty in private life is sufficient, with the aid of a little thought, to give us the same apprehension; while it serves as an instance of the general corruption of human nature, and shows us the danger which we must incur by reposing an entire confidence in mankind. In both cases, it is experience which is ultimately the foundation of our inference and conclusion.
There is no man so young and unexperienced, as not to have formed, from observation, many general and just maxims concerning human affairs and the conduct of life; but it must be confessed, that, when a man comes to put these in practice, he will be extremely liable to error, till time and farther experience both enlarge these maxims, and teach him their proper use and application. In every situation or incident, there are many particular and seemingly minute circumstances, which the man of greatest talent is, at first, apt to overlook, though on them the justness of his conclusions, and consequently the prudence of his conduct, entirely depend. Not to mention, that, to a young beginner, the general observations and maxims occur not always on the proper occasions, nor can be immediately applied with due calmness and distinction. The truth is, an unexperienced reasoner could be no reasoner at all, were he absolutely unexperienced; and when we assign that character to any one, we mean it only in a comparative sense, and suppose him possessed of experience, in a smaller and more imperfect degree.
Footnote 8: [(return)]
'Naturane nobis, inquit, datum dicam, an errore quodam, ut, cum ea loca videamus, in quibus memoria dignos viros acceperimus multum esse versatos, magis moveamur, quam siquando eorum ipsorum aut facta audiamus aut scriptum aliquod legamus? Velut ego nunc moveor. Venit enim mihi Plato in mentem, quera accepimus primum hic disputare solitum: cuius etiam illi hortuli propinqui non memoriam solum mihi afferunt, sed ipsum videntur in conspectu meo hic ponere. Hic Speusippus, hic Xenocrates, hic eius auditor Polemo; cuius ipsa illa sessio fuit, quam videmus. Equidem etiam curiam nostram, Hostiliam dico, non hanc novam, quae mihi minor esse videtur postquam est maior, solebam intuens, Scipionem, Catonem, Laelium, nostrum vero in primis avum cogitare. Tanta vis admonitionis est in locis; ut non sine causa ex his memoriae deducta sit disciplina.'
Cicero de Finibus. Lib. v.
Footnote 9: [(return)]
Mr. Locke divides all arguments into demonstrative and probable. In this view, we must say, that it is only probable all men must die, or that the sun will rise to-morrow. But to conform our language more to common use, we ought to divide arguments into demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities. By proofs meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition.
Footnote 10: [(return)]
Footnote 11: [(return)]
Mr. Locke, in his chapter of power, says that, finding from experience, that there are several new productions in nature, and concluding that there must somewhere be a power capable of producing them, we arrive at last by this reasoning at the idea of power. But no reasoning can ever give us a new, original, simple idea; as this philosopher himself confesses. This, therefore, can never be the origin of that idea.
Footnote 12: [(return)]
It may be pretended, that the resistance which we meet with in bodies, obliging us frequently to exert our force, and call up all our power, this gives us the idea of force and power. It is this nisus, or strong endeavour, of which we are conscious, that is the original impression from which this idea is copied. But, first, we attribute power to a vast number of objects, where we never can suppose this resistance or exertion of force to take place; to the Supreme Being, who never meets with any resistance; to the mind in its command over its ideas and limbs, in common thinking and motion, where the effect follows immediately upon the will, without any exertion or summoning up of force; to inanimate matter, which is not capable of this sentiment. Secondly, This sentiment of an endeavour to overcome resistance has no known connexion with any event: What follows it, we know by experience; but could not know it priori. It must, however, be confessed, that the animal nisus, which we experience, though it can afford no accurate precise idea of power, enters very much into that vulgar, inaccurate idea, which is formed of it.
Footnote 13: [(return)]
[Greek: theos apo maechanaes.]
Footnote 14: [(return)]
Footnote 15: [(return)]
I need not examine at length the vis inertiae which is so much talked of in the new philosophy, and which is ascribed to matter. We find by experience, that a body at rest or in motion continues for ever in its present state, till put from it by some new cause; and that a body impelled takes as much motion from the impelling body as it acquires itself. These are facts. When we call this a vis inertiae, we only mark these facts, without pretending to have any idea of the inert power; in the same manner as, when we talk of gravity, we mean certain effects, without comprehending that active power. It was never the meaning of Sir ISAAC NEWTON to rob second causes of all force or energy; though some of his followers have endeavoured to establish that theory upon his authority. On the contrary, that great philosopher had recourse to an etherial active fluid to explain his universal attraction; though he was so cautious and modest as to allow, that it was a mere hypothesis, not to be insisted on, without more experiments. I must confess, that there is something in the fate of opinions a little extraordinary. DES CARTES insinuated that doctrine of the universal and sole efficacy of the Deity, without insisting on it. MALEBRANCHE and other CARTESIANS made it the foundation of all their philosophy. It had, however, no authority in England. LOCKE, CLARKE, and CUDWORTH, never so much as take notice of it, but suppose all along, that matter has a real, though subordinate and derived power. By what means has it become so prevalent among our modern metaphysicians?
Footnote 16: [(return)]
According to these explications and definitions, the idea of power is relative as much as that of cause; and both have a reference to an effect, or some other event constantly conjoined with the former. When we consider the unknown circumstance of an object, by which the degree or quantity of its effect is fixed and determined, we call that its power: And accordingly, it is allowed by all philosophers, that the effect is the measure of the power. But if they had any idea of power, as it is in itself, why could not they Measure it in itself? The dispute whether the force of a body in motion be as its velocity, or the square of its velocity; this dispute, I say, need not be decided by comparing its effects in equal or unequal times; but by a direct mensuration and comparison.
As to the frequent use of the words, Force, Power, Energy, &c., which every where occur in common conversation, as well as in philosophy; that is no proof, that we are acquainted, in any instance, with the connecting principle between cause and effect, or can account ultimately for the production of one thing to another. These words, as commonly used, have very loose meanings annexed to them; and their ideas are very uncertain and confused. No animal can put external bodies in motion without the sentiment of a nisus or endeavour; and every animal has a sentiment or feeling from the stroke or blow of an external object, that is in motion. These sensations, which are merely animal, and from which we can priori draw no inference, we are apt to transfer to inanimate objects, and to suppose, that they have some such feelings, whenever they transfer or receive motion. With regard to energies, which are exerted, without our annexing to them any idea of communicated motion, we consider only the constant experienced conjunction of the events; and as we feel a customary connexion between the ideas, we transfer that feeling to the objects; as nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation, which they occasion.
Footnote 17: [(return)]
The prevalence of the doctrine of liberty may be accounted for, from another cause, viz. a false sensation or seeming experience which we have, or may have, of liberty or indifference, in many of our actions. The necessity of any action, whether of matter or of mind, is not, properly speaking, a quality in the agent, but in any thinking or intelligent being, who may consider the action; and it consists chiefly in the determination of his thoughts to infer the existence of that action from some preceding objects; as liberty, when opposed to necessity, is nothing but the want of that determination, and a certain looseness or indifference, which we feel, in passing, or not passing, from the idea of one object to that of any succeeding one. Now we may observe, that, though, in reflecting on human actions, we seldom feel such a looseness, or indifference, but are commonly able to infer them with considerable certainty from their motives, and from the dispositions of the agent; yet it frequently happens, that, in performing the actions themselves, we are sensible of something like it: And as all resembling objects are readily taken for each other, this has been employed as a demonstrative and even intuitive proof of human liberty. We feel, that our actions are subject to our will, on most occasions; and imagine we feel, that the will itself is subject to nothing, because, when by a denial of it we are provoked to try, we feel, that it moves easily every way, and produces an image of itself (or a Velleïty, as it is called in the schools) even on that side, on which it did not settle. This image, or faint motion, we persuade ourselves, could, at that time, have been compleated into the thing itself; because, should that be denied, we find, upon a second trial, that, at present, it can. We consider not, that the fantastical desire of shewing liberty, is here the motive of our actions. And it seems certain, that, however we may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves, a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character; and even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition. Now this is the very essence of necessity, according to the foregoing doctrine.
Footnote 18: [(return)]
Thus, if a cause be defined, that which produces any thing; it is easy to observe, that producing is synonymous to causing. In like manner, if a cause be defined, that by which any thing exists; this is liable to the same objection. For what is meant by these words, by which? Had it been said, that a cause is that after which any thing constantly exists; we should have understood the terms. For this is, indeed, all we know of the matter. And this constancy forms the very essence of necessity, nor have we any other idea of it.
Footnote 19: [(return)]
Since all reasonings concerning facts or causes is derived merely from custom, it may be asked how it happens, that men so much surpass animals in reasoning, and one man so much surpasses another? Has not the same custom the same influence on all?
We shall here endeavour briefly to explain the great difference in human understandings: After which the reason of the difference between men and animals will easily be comprehended.
1. When we have lived any time, and have been accustomed to the uniformity of nature, we acquire a general habit, by which we always transfer the known to the unknown, and conceive the latter to resemble the former. By means of this general habitual principle, we regard even one experiment as the foundation of reasoning, and expect a similar event with some degree of certainty, where the experiment has been made accurately, and free from all foreign circumstances. It is therefore considered as a matter of great importance to observe the consequences of things; and as one man may very much surpass another in attention and memory and observation, this will make a very great difference in their reasoning.
2. Where there is a complication of causes to produce any effect, one mind may be much larger than another, and better able to comprehend the whole system of objects, and to infer justly their consequences.
3. One man is able to carry on a chain of consequences to a greater length than another.
4. Few men can think long without running into a confusion of ideas, and mistaking one for another; and there are various degrees of this infirmity.
5. The circumstance, on which the effect depends, is frequently involved in other circumstances, which are foreign and extrinsic. The separation of it often requires great attention, accuracy, and subtilty.
6. The forming of general maxims from particular observation is a very nice operation; and nothing is more usual, from haste or a narrowness of mind, which sees not on all sides, than to commit mistakes in this particular.
7. When we reason from analogies, the man, who has the greater experience or the greater promptitude of suggesting analogies, will be the better reasoner.
8. Byasses from prejudice, education, passion, party, &c. hang more upon one mind than another.
9. After we have acquired a confidence in human testimony, books and conversation enlarge much more the sphere of one man's experience and thought than those of another.
It would be easy to discover many other circumstances that make a difference in the understandings of men.
Footnote 20: [(return)]
Plutarch, in vita Catonis.
Footnote 21: [(return)]
No Indian, it is evident, could have experience that water did not freeze in cold climates. This is placing nature in a situation quite unknown to him; and it is impossible for him to tell a priori what will result from it. It is making a new experiment, the consequence of which is always uncertain. One may sometimes conjecture from analogy what will follow; but still this is but conjecture. And it must be confessed, that, in the present case of freezing, the event follows contrary to the rules of analogy, and is such as a rational Indian would not look for. The operations of cold upon water are not gradual, according to the degrees of cold; but whenever it comes to the freezing point, the water passes in a moment, from the utmost liquidity to perfect hardness. Such an event, therefore, may be denominated extraordinary, and requires a pretty strong testimony, to render it credible to people in a warm climate: But still it is not miraculous, nor contrary to uniform experience of the course of nature in cases where all the circumstances are the same. The inhabitants of Sumatra have always seen water fluid in their own climate, and the freezing of their rivers ought to be deemed a prodigy: But they never saw water in Muscovy during the winter; and therefore they cannot reasonably be positive what would there be the consequence.
Footnote 22: [(return)]
Sometimes an event may not, in itself, seem to be contrary to the laws of nature, and yet, if it were real, it might, by reason of some circumstances, be denominated a miracle; because, in fact, it is contrary to these laws. Thus if a person, claiming a divine authority, should command a sick person to be well, a healthful man to fall down dead, the clouds to pour rain, the winds to blow, in short, should order many natural events, which immediately follow upon his command; these might justly be esteemed miracles, because they are really, in this case, contrary to the laws of nature. For if any suspicion remain, that the event and command concurred by accident, there is no miracle and no transgression of the laws of nature. If this suspicion be removed, there is evidently a miracle, and a transgression of these laws; because nothing can be more contrary to nature than that the voice or command of a man should have such an influence. A miracle may be accurately defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent. A miracle may either be discoverable by men or not. This alters not its nature and essence. The raising of a house or ship into the air is a visible miracle. The raising of a feather, when the wind wants ever so little of a force requisite for that purpose, is as real a miracle, though not so sensible with regard to us.
Footnote 23: [(return)]
Hist. lib. iv. cap. 81. Suetonius gives nearly the same account in vita Vesp.
Footnote 24: [(return)]
This book was writ by Mons. Montgeron, counsellor or judge of the parliament of Paris, a man of figure and character, who was also a martyr to the cause, and is now said to be somewhere in a dungeon on account of his book.
There is another book in three volumes (called Recueil des Miracles de l'Abb(c) Paris) giving an account of many of these miracles, and accompanied with prefatory discourses, which are very well written. There runs, however, through the whole of these a ridiculous comparison between the miracles of our Saviour and those of the Abbh(c); wherein it is asserted, that the evidence for the latter is equal to that for the former: As if the testimony of men could ever be put in the balance with that of God himself, who conducted the pen of the inspired writers. If these writers, indeed, were to be considered merely as human testimony, the French author is very moderate in his comparison; since he might, with some appearance of reason, pretend, that the Jansenist miracles much surpass the other in evidence and authority. The following circumstances are drawn from authentic papers, inserted in the above-mentioned book.
Many of the miracles of Abb(c) Paris were proved immediately by witnesses before the officiality or bishop's court at Paris, under the eye of cardinal Noailles, whose character for integrity and capacity was never contested even by his enemies.
His successor in the archbishopric was an enemy to the Jansenists, and for that reason promoted to the see by the court. Yet 22 rectors or curu(c)s of Paris, with infinite earnestness, press him to examine those miracles, which they assert to be known to the whole world, and undisputably certain: But he wisely forbore.
The Molinist party had tried to discredit these miracles in one instance, that of Mademoiselle le Franc. But, besides that their proceedings were in many respects the most irregular in the world, particularly in citing only a few of the Jansenist witnesses, whom they tampered with: Besides this, I say, they soon found themselves overwhelmed by a cloud of new witnesses, one hundred and twenty in number, most of them persons of credit and substance in Paris, who gave oath for the miracle. This was accompanied with a solemn and earnest appeal to the parliament. But the parliament were forbidden by authority to meddle in the affair. It was at last observed, that where men are heated by zeal and enthusiasm, there is no degree of human testimony so strong as may not be procured for the greatest absurdity: And those who will be so silly as to examine the affair by that medium, and seek particular flaws in the testimony, are almost sure to be confounded. It must be a miserable imposture, indeed, that does not prevail in that contest.
All who have been in France about that time have heard of the reputation of Mons. Heraut, the lieutenant de Police, whose vigilance, penetration, activity, and extensive intelligence have been much talked of. This magistrate, who by the nature of his office is almost absolute, was vested with full powers, on purpose to suppress or discredit these miracles; and he frequently seized immediately, and examined the witnesses and subjects of them: But never could reach any thing satisfactory against them.
In the case of Mademoiselle Thibaut he sent the famous De Sylva to examine her; whose evidence is very curious. The physician declares, that it was impossible she could have been so ill as was proved by witnesses; because it was impossible she could, in so short a time, have recovered so perfectly as he found her. He reasoned, like a man of sense, from natural causes; but the opposite party told him, that the whole was a miracle, and that his evidence was the very best proof of it.
The Molinists were in a sad dilemma. They durst not assert the absolute insufficiency of human evidence, to prove a miracle. They were obliged to say, that these miracles were wrought by witchcraft and the devil. But they were told, that this was the resource of the Jews of old.
No Jansenist was ever embarrassed to account for the cessation of the miracles, when the church-yard was shut up by the king's edict. It was the touch of the tomb, which produced these extraordinary effects; and when no one could approach the tomb, no effects could be expected. God, indeed, could have thrown down the walls in a moment; but he is master of his own graces and works, and it belongs not to us to account for them. He did not throw down the walls of every city like those of Jericho, on the sounding of the rams horns, nor break up the prison of every apostle, like that of St. Paul.
No less a man, than the Due de Chatillon, a duke and peer of France, of the highest rank and family, gives evidence of a miraculous cure, performed upon a servant of his, who had lived several years in his house with a visible and palpable infirmity. I shall conclude with observing, that no clergy are more celebrated for strictness of life and manners than the secular clergy of France, particularly the rectors or cur(c)s of Paris, who bear testimony to these impostures. The learning, genius, and probity of the gentlemen, and the austerity of the nuns of Port-Royal, have been much celebrated all over Europe. Yet they all give evidence for a miracle, wrought on the niece of the famous Pascal, whose sanctity of life, as well as extraordinary capacity, is well known. The famous Racine gives an account of this miracle in his famous history of Port-Royal, and fortifies it with all the proofs, which a multitude of nuns, priests, physicians, and men of the world, all of them of undoubted credit, could bestow upon it. Several men of letters, particularly the bishop of Tournay, thought this miracle so certain, as to employ it in the refutation of atheists and free-thinkers. The queen-regent of France, who was extremely prejudiced against the Port-Royal, sent her own physician to examine the miracle, who returned an absolute convert. In short, the supernatural cure was so uncontestable, that it saved, for a time, that famous monastery from the ruin with which it was threatened by the Jesuits. Had it been a cheat, it had certainly been detected by such sagacious and powerful antagonists, and must have hastened the ruin of the contrivers. Our divines, who can build up a formidable castle from such despicable materials; what a prodigious fabric could they have reared from these and many other circumstances, which I have not mentioned! How often would the great names of Pascal, Racine, Amaud, Nicole, have resounded in our ears? But if they be wise, they had better adopt the miracle, as being more worth, a thousand times, than all the rest of the collection. Besides, it may serve very much to their purpose. For that miracle was really performed by the touch of an authentic holy prickle of the holy thorn, which composed the holy crown, which, &c.
Footnote 25: [(return)]
Lucret.
Footnote 26: [(return)]
Nov. Org. lib. ii. aph. 29.
Footnote 27: [(return)]
Luciani [Greek: symp. ae Lapithai].
Footnote 28: [(return)]
Luciani [Greek: eunouchos].
Footnote 29: [(return)]
Luciani and Dio.
Footnote 30: [(return)]
In general, it may, I think, be established as a maxim, that where any cause is known only by its particular effects, it must be impossible to infer any new effects from that cause; since the qualities, which are requisite to produce these new effects along with the former, must either be different, or superior, or of more extensive operation, than those which simply produced the effect, whence alone the cause is supposed to be known to us. We can never, therefore, have any reason to suppose the existence of these qualities. To say, that the new effects proceed only from a continuation of the same energy, which is already known from the first effects, will not remove the difficulty. For even granting this to be the case (which can seldom be supposed), the very continuation and exertion of a like energy (for it is impossible it can be absolutely the same), I say, this exertion of a like energy, in a different period of space and time, is a very arbitrary supposition, and what there cannot possibly be any traces of in the effects, from which all our knowledge of the cause is originally derived. Let the inferred cause be exactly proportioned (as it should be) to the known effect; and it is impossible that it can possess any qualities, from which new or different effects can be inferred.
Footnote 31: [(return)]
This argument is drawn from Dr. Berkeley; and indeed most of the writings of that very ingenious author form the best lessons of scepticism, which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosopher, Bayle not excepted. He professes, however, in his title-page (and undoubtedly with great truth) to have composed his book against the sceptics as well as against the atheists and free-thinkers. But that all his arguments, though otherwise intended, are, in reality, merely sceptical, appears from this, that they admit of no answer and produce no conviction. Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion, which is the result of scepticism.
Footnote 32: [(return)]
Whatever disputes there may be about mathematical points, we must allow that there are physical points; that is, parts of extension, which cannot be divided or lessened, either by the eye or imagination. These images, then, which are present to the fancy or senses, are absolutely indivisible, and consequently must be allowed by mathematicians to be infinitely less than any real part of extension; and yet nothing appears more certain to reason, than that an infinite number of them composes an infinite extension. How much more an infinite number of those infinitely small parts of extension, which are still supposed infinitely divisible.
Footnote 33: [(return)]
It seems to me not impossible to avoid these absurdities and contradictions, if it be admitted, that there is no such thing as abstract or general ideas, properly speaking; but that all general ideas are, in reality, particular ones, attached to a general term, which recalls, upon occasion, other particular ones, that resemble, in certain circumstances, the idea, present to the mind. Thus when the term Horse is pronounced, we immediately figure to ourselves the idea of a black or a white animal, of a particular size or figure: But as that term is also usually applied to animals of other colours, figures and sizes, these ideas, though not actually present to the imagination, are easily recalled; and our reasoning and conclusion proceed in the same way, as if they were actually present. If this be admitted (as seems reasonable) it follows that all the ideas of quantity, upon which mathematicians reason, are nothing but particular, and such as are suggested by the senses and imagination, and consequently, cannot be infinitely divisible. It is sufficient to have dropped this hint at present, without prosecuting it any farther. It certainly concerns all lovers of science not to expose themselves to the ridicule and contempt of the ignorant by their conclusions; and this seems the readiest solution of these difficulties.
Footnote 34: [(return)]
That impious maxim of the ancient philosophy, Ex nihilo, nihil fit, by which the creation of matter was excluded, ceases to be a maxim, according to this philosophy. Not only the will of the supreme Being may create matter; but, for aught we know a priori, the will of any other being might create it, or any other cause, that the most whimsical imagination can assign.
[INDEX.]
Abstraction
not source of ideas of primary qualities, [122].Academic
philosophy, [34].Action
and philosophy, [1], [4], [34], [128];Addition
[4].Analogy
a species of, the foundation of all reasoning about matter of fact, [82];Animals
the reason of, [83]-85;
learn from experience and draw inferences, [83];
which can only be founded on custom, [84];
cause of difference between men and animals, [84] n.Antiquity
[62].Appearances
to senses must be corrected by reason, [117].A priori
[25], [36] n, [89] n, [132], [132] n.Aristotle
[4].Association
of ideas, three principles of, [18]-19, [41]-44 (v. Cause C).Atheism
[116].Bacon
[99].Belief
(v. Cause C, [39]-45);
and chance, [46].Berkeley
really a sceptic, [122] n.Bigotry
[102].Body
and soul, mystery of union of, [52];
volition and movements of, [52].
Real existence of (v. Scepticism, B, [118]-123).Cause
first (v. God, Necessity, [78]-81; Providence, [102]-115, [132] n).
a principle of association of ideas, [19], [43];
sole foundation of reasonings about matter of fact or real existence, [22].
A. Knowledge of Causes arises from experience not from Reason, [23]-33.
Reasonings a priori give no knowledge of cause and effect, [23] f.;
impossible to see the effect in the cause since they are totally different, [25];
natural philosophy never pretends to assign ultimate causes, but only to reduce causes to a few general causes, e.g. gravity, [26];
geometry applies laws obtained by experience, [27].
Conclusions from experience not based on any process of the understanding, [28];
yet we infer in the future a similar connexion between known qualities of things and their secret powers, to that which we assumed in the past. On what is this inference based? [29];
demonstrative reasoning has no place here, and all experimental reasoning assumes the resemblance of the future to the past, and so cannot prove it without being circular, [30], [32];
if reasoning were the basis of this belief, there would be no need for the multiplication of instances or of long experience, [31];
yet conclusions about matter of fact are affected by experience even in beasts and children, so that they cannot be founded on abstruse reasoning, [33];
to explain our inferences from experience a principle is required of equal weight and authority with reason, [34].
B. Custom enables us to infer existence of one object from the appearance of another, [35]-38.
Experience enables us to ascribe a more than arbitrary connexion to objects, [35];
we are determined to this by custom or habit which is the great guide of human life, [36];
but our inference must be based on some fact present to the senses or memory, [37];
the customary conjunction between such an object and some other object produces an operation of the soul which is as unavoidable as love, [38];
animals also infer one event from another by custom, [82]-84;
and in man as in animals experimental reasoning depends on a species of instinct or mechanical power that acts in us unknown to ourselves, [85].
C. Belief, [39]-45.
Belief differs from fiction or the loose reveries of the fancy by some feeling annexed to it, [39];
belief cannot be defined, but may be described as a more lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object than can be attained by the imagination alone, [40];
it is produced by the principles of association, viz. resemblance, [41];
contiguity, [42];
causation, [43];
by a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and our ideas, [44];
this operation of our minds necessary to our subsistence and so entrusted by nature to instinct rather than to reasoning, [45].
Probability, [46]-7.
Belief produced by a majority of chances by an inexplicable contrivance of Nature, [46] (cf. [87]-8);
probability of causes: the failure of a cause ascribed to a secret counteracting cause, [47] (cf. [67]);
it is universally allowed that chance when strictly examined is a mere negative word, [74].
D. Power, [49]-57.
Power, force, energy, necessary connexion must either be defined by analysis or explained by production of the impression from which they are copied, [49];
from the first appearance of an object we cannot foretell its effect: we cannot see the power of a single body: we only see sequence, [50].
Is the idea of power derived from an internal impression and is it an idea of reflection? [51];
it is not derived, as Locke said, from reasoning about power of production in nature, [50] n;
nor from consciousness of influence of will over bodily organs, [52];
nor from effort to overcome resistance, [52] n (cf. [60] n);
nor from influence of will over mind, [53];
many philosophers appeal to an invisible intelligent principle, to a volition of the supreme being, and regard causes as only occasions and our mental conceptions as revelations, [54]-5;
thus diminishing the grandeur of God, [56];
this theory too bold and beyond verification by our faculties, and is no explanation, [57];
vis inertiae, [57] n.
In single instances we only see sequence of loose events which are conjoined and never connected, [58];
the idea of necessary connexion only arises from a number of similar instances, and the only difference between such a number and a single instance is that the former produces a habit of expecting the usual attendant, [59], [61].
This customary transition is the impression from which we form the idea of necessary connexion.
E. Reasoning from effect to cause and conversely, [105]-115 (v. Providence).
In arguing from effect to cause we must not infer more qualities in the cause than are required to produce the effect, nor reason backwards from an inferred cause to new effects, [105]-8;
we can reason back from cause to new effects in the case of human acts by analogy which rests on previous knowledge, [111]-2;
when the effect is entirely singular and does not belong to any species we cannot infer its cause at all, [115].
F. Definitions of Cause, [60] (cf. [74] n).Ceremonies
[41].Chance
ignorance of causes, [46];
has no existence, [74] (v. Cause B).Cicero
[4].Circle
in reasoning, [30].Clarke
[37] n.Colour
peculiarity of ideas of, [16].Contiguity
[19], [42].Contradiction
the test of demonstration, [132].Contrariety
[19] n.Contrary
of matter of fact always possible, [21], [132].Creation
[132] n.Criticism
[132].Cudworth
[57] n, [a]158] n.Custom
when strongest conceals itself, [24];
an ultimate principle of all conclusions from experience, [36], [127];
and belief, [39]-45;
gives rise to inferences of animals, [84].Definition
only applicable to complex ideas, [49];
need of, [131];
of cause, [60].Demonstrative
opp. intuitive, [20];
reasoning, [30];
confined to quantity and number, [131];
impossible to demonstrate a fact since no negation of a fact can involve a contradiction, [132].Descartes
[57] n.;
his universal doubt antecedent to study if strictly taken is incurable, since even from an indubitable first principle no advance can be made except by the faculties which we doubt, [116];
his appeal to the veracity of God is useless, [120] (v. Scepticism, [116]-132).Design
argument from, [105] f. (v. Providence).Divisibility
of mathematical and physical points, [124].Doubt
Cartesian, [116], [120] (v. Scepticism A).Epictetus
[34].Epicurean
philosophy, defence of, [102]-15;
denial of providence and future state is harmless, [104] (v. Providence).Euclid
truths in, do not depend on existence of circles or triangles, [20].Evidence
moral and natural, [70];
value of human, [82]-9 (v. Miracles).Evil
doctrine of necessity either makes God the cause of evil or denies existence of evil as regards the whole, [78]-81.Existence
external and perception, [118]-9 (v. Scepticism, B, [116]-32).Ex nihilo nihil
[132] n.Experience
(v. Cause A, [23]-33);
opposition of reason and experience usual, but really erroneous and superficial, [36] n.
Infallible, may be regarded as proof, [87] (v. Miracles);
all the philosophy and religion in the world cannot carry us beyond the usual course of experience, [113].Extension
[50];
a supposed primary quality, [122].Faith
[101], [132].Fiction
and fact (v. Cause C), [39] f.Future
inference to, from past, [29] (v. Cause A).General
ideas, do not really exist, but only particular ideas attached to a general term, [125] n.Geography
mental, [8].Geometry
propositions of certain, as depending only on relations of ideas not on existence of objects, [20];
gives no knowledge of ultimate causes: only applies laws discovered by experience, [27].God
idea of, [14];
no idea of except what we learn from reflection on our own faculties, [57];
theory that God is cause of all motion and thought, causes being only occasions of his volition, [54]-57;
by doctrine of necessity either there are no bad actions or God is the cause of evil, [78]-81.
Veracity of, appealed to, [120].
And creation of matter, [132] n.
v. Providence, [102]-115; Scepticism, [116]-132.Golden
age, [107].Gravity
[26].Habit
(v. Custom, Cause B).History
use of, [65].Human
nature, inconstancy a constant character of, [a]68].Ideas
A. Origin of, [11]-17.
Perceptions divided into impressions and ideas, [11]-12;
the mind can only compound the materials derived from outward or inward sentiment, [13] (cf. [53]);
all ideas resolvable into simple ideas copied from precedent feelings, [14];
deficiency in an organ of sensation produces deficiency in corresponding idea, [15]-16;
suspected ideas to be tested by asking for the impression from which it is derived, [17] (cf. [49]);
idea of reflection, [51];
general ideas, [a]135] n;
innate ideas, [19] n;
power of will over ideas, [53].
B. Association of, [18]-19.
Ideas introduce each other with a certain degree of method and regularity, [18];
only three principles of association, viz. Resemblance, Contiguity, and Cause or Effect, [19];
contrariety, [19] n;
production of belief by these principles, [41]-43.
C. Correspondence of ideas and course of nature, [44];
relations of ideas one of two possible objects of enquiry, [20];
such relations discoverable by the mere operation of thought, [20], [131];
no demonstration possible except in case of ideas of quantity or number, [131].Imagination
[11], [39];
and belief, [40].Impressions
all our more lively perceptions, [12];
the test of ideas, [17], [49].Incest
peculiar turpitude of explained, [12].Inconceivability
of the negative, [132] (cf. [20]).Inertia
[57] n.Inference
and similarity, [30], [115] (v. Cause).Infinite
divisibility, [124] f.Instances
multiplication of not required by reason, [31].Instinct
more trustworthy than reasoning, [45];
the basis of all experimental reasoning, [85];
the basis of realism, [118], [121].Intuitive
opp. mediate reasoning, [2].La Bruyere
[4].Liberty
(v. Necessity, [62]-97).
Definition of hypothetical liberty, [73].
Necessary to morality, [77].Locke
[4], [40] n, [50] n, [57] n.
His loose use of 'ideas,' [19] n;
betrayed into frivolous disputes about innate ideas by the School-men, [19] n;
distinction of primary and secondary qualities, [122].Malebranche
[4], [57] n..Man
a reasonable and active being, [4].Marriage
rules of, based on and vary with utility, [118].Mathematics
ideas of, clear and determinate, hence their superiority to moral and metaphysical sciences, [48];
their difficulty, [48].
Mathematical and physical points, [124] n.Matter
necessity of, [64];
creation of, [132] n (v. Scepticism A).Matter-of-fact
contrary of, always possible, [21];
arguments to new, based only on cause and effect, [22].Metaphysics
not a science, [5]-6;
how inferior and superior to mathematics, [48].Mind
mental geography, [8];
secret springs and principles of, [9];
can only mix and compound materials given by inward and outward sentiment, [13];
power of will over, [53].Miracles.
[86]-101.
Belief in human evidence diminishes according as the event witnessed is unusual or extraordinary, [89];
difference between extraordinary and miraculous, [89] n;
if the evidence for a miracle amounted to proof we should have one proof opposed by another proof, for the proof against a miracle is as complete as possible;
an event is not miraculous unless there is a uniform experience, that is a proof, against it, [90];
definition of miracle, [90] n;
hence no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle unless its falsehood would be more miraculous than the event it establishes, [91];
as a fact the evidence for a miracle has never amounted to proof, [92];
the passion for the wonderful in human nature, [93];
prevalence of miracles in savage and early periods and their diminution with civilization, [94];
the evidence for miracles in matters of religion opposed by the almost infinite number of witnesses for rival religions, [95];
value of human testimony diminished by temptation to pose as a prophet or apostle, [97];
no testimony for a miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much less to a proof, and if it did amount to a proof it would be opposed by another perfect proof, [98];
so a miracle can never be proved so as to be the foundation of a system of religion, [99];
a conclusion which confounds those who base the Christian religion on reason, not on faith, [100];
the Christian religion cannot be believed without a miracle which will subvert the principle of a man's understanding and give him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience, [101].Moral
evil (q.v.) [80].Moral science
[30];
inferior to mathematics, [48];
sceptical objections to, [126]-7.
Moral evidence easily combined with natural, [70].Motion
[50].Nature
design in, [105] f. (v. Providence),
and the course of our ideas, [44].
State of, a philosophical fiction, [a]151], [a]151] n.Necessary
connexion (v. Cause).Necessity
two definitions of, [75].
A. and Liberty, [62]-81;
the controversy is based on ambiguity, and all mankind have always been of the same opinion on this subject, [63];
our idea of the necessity of matter arises solely from observed uniformity and consequent inference, circumstances which are allowed by all men to exist in respect of human action, [64];
history and knowledge of human nature assume such uniformity, [65],
which does not exclude variety due to education and progress, [66];
irregular actions to be explained by secret operation of contrary causes, [67];
the inconstancy of human action, its constant character, as of winds and weather, [68];
we all acknowledge and draw inferences from the regular conjunction of motives and actions, [69];
history, politics, and morals show this, and the possibility of combining moral and natural evidence shows that they have a common origin, [70];
the reluctance to acknowledge the necessity of actions due to a lingering belief that we can see real connexion behind mere conjunction, [71];
we should begin with the examination not of the soul and will but of brute matter, [72];
the prevalence of the liberty doctrine due to a false sensation of liberty and a false experiment, [72] n;
though this question is the most contentious of all, mankind has always agreed in the doctrine of liberty, if we mean by it that hypothetical liberty which consists in a power of acting or not acting according to the determinations of our will, and which can be ascribed to every one who is not a prisoner, [73];
liberty when opposed to necessity, and not merely to constraint, is the same as chance, [74].
B. Both necessity and liberty are necessary to morality, this doctrine of necessity only alters our view of matter and so is at least innocent, [75];
rewards and punishments imply the uniform influence of motives, and connexion of character and action: if necessity be denied, a man may commit any crime and be no worse for it, [76];
liberty also essential to morality, [77].
Objection that doctrine of necessity and of a regular chain of causes either makes God the cause of evil, or abolishes evil in actions, [78];
Stoic answer, that the whole system is good, is specious but ineffectual in practice, [79];
no speculative argument can counteract the impulse of our natural sentiments to blame certain actions, [80];
how God can be the cause of all actions without being the author of moral evil is a mystery with which philosophy cannot deal, [81].Negative
inconceivability of, [132].Newton
[57] n.Nisus
[52] n, [60] n.Number
the object of demonstration, [131].Occasional causes
theory of, [55].Parallelism
between thought and course of nature, [44]-5.Perception
and external objects, [119] f. (v. Scepticism, Impression, Idea).Philosophy
moral, two branches of, abstruse and practical, [1]-5;
gratifies innocent curiosity, [6];
metaphysics tries to deal with matters inaccessible to human understanding, [6].
True, must lay down limits of understanding, [7] (cf. [113]);
a large part of, consists in mental geography, [8];
may hope to resolve principles of mind into still more general principles, [9].
Natural, only staves off our ignorance a little longer, as moral or metaphysical philosophy serves only to discover larger portions of it, [26];
academical, or sceptical, flatters no bias or passion except love of truth, and so has few partisans, [34];
though it destroy speculation, cannot destroy action, for nature steps in and asserts her rights, [34];
moral, inferior to mathematics in clearness of ideas, superior in shortness of arguments, [48].
Controversies in, due to ambiguity of terms, [62].
Disputes in, not be settled by appeal to dangerous consequences of a doctrine, [75].
Speculative, entirely indifferent to the peace of society and security of government, [104] (cf. [114]).
All the philosophy in the world, and all the religion in the world, which is nothing but a species of philosophy, can never carry us beyond the usual course of experience, [113].
Happiness of, to have originated in an age and country of freedom and toleration, [102].Points
physical, indivisible, [124] n.Power
[50] f, [60] n. (v. Cause D).Probability
[46] f. (v. Cause, B).Probable
arguments, [38], [46] n.Production
[50] n.Promises
not the foundation of justice, [a]257].Proof
[46] n, [86]-101 (v. Miracles, Demonstrative).Providence
[102]-115 (v. God).
The sole argument for a divine existence is from the marks of design in nature; must not infer greater power in the cause than is necessary to produce the observed effects, nor argue from such an inferred cause to any new effects which have not been observed, [105];
so must not infer in God more power, wisdom, and benevolence than appears in nature, [106];
so it is unnecessary to try and save the honour of the Gods by assuming the intractability of matter or the observance of general laws, [107];
to argue from effects to unknown causes, and then from these causes to unknown effects, is a gross sophism, [108].
From imperfect exercise of justice in this world we cannot infer its perfect exercise in a future world, [109];
we must regulate our conduct solely by the experienced train of events, [110];
in case of human works of art we can infer the perfect from the imperfect, but that is because we know man by experience and also know other instances of his art, [111]-112;
but in the case of God we only know him by his productions, and do not know any class of beings to which he belongs, [113];
and the universe, his production, is entirely singular and does not belong to a known species of things, [115].Punishment
requires doctrines of necessity and liberty, [76] (v. Necessity).Pyrrhonism
[126].Qualities
primary and secondary, [122].Quantity
and number, the only objects of demonstration, the parts of them being entirely similar, [131].Real
presence, [86].Reality
and thought, [44].Realism
of the vulgar, [118].Reason
(a) opp. intuition, [29];
opp. experience, [28], [36] n.
(b) Corrects sympathy and senses, [117].
No match for nature, [34].
Fallacious, compared with instinct, [45].
Of men and animals, [84] n.
(c) attempts to destroy, by reasoning, [124];
objections to abstract reasoning, [124] f. (v. Scepticism).
(d) Reasoning.
Two kinds of, demonstrative and moral, [30], [46] n, [132];
moral, divided into general and particular, [132];
produces demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities, [46] n.
Probable (v. Cause, [28]-32).Relations
of ideas, discoverable by the mere operation of thought, independently of the existence of any object, [20].Religion
a kind of philosophy, [113] (v. Miracles, Providence).Resemblance
[19], [41] (v. Similarity).Resistance
and idea of power, [53] n.Scepticism
A. antecedent to study and philosophy, such as Descartes' universal doubt of our faculties, would be incurable: in a more moderate sense it is useful, [116] (cf. [129]-30);
extravagant attempts of, to destroy reason by reasoning, [124].
No such absurd creature as a man who has no opinion about anything at all, [116];
admits of no answer and produces no conviction, [122] n. (cf. [34], [126], [128]).
B. As to the Senses, [117]-123.
The ordinary criticisms of our senses only show that they have to be corrected by Reason, [117];
more profound arguments show that the vulgar belief in external objects is baseless, and that the objects we see are nothing but perceptions which are fleeting copies of other existences, [118];
even this philosophy is hard to justify; it appeals neither to natural instinct, nor to experience, for experience tells nothing of objects which perceptions resemble, [119];
the appeal to the veracity of God is useless, [120];
and scepticism is here triumphant, [121].
The distinction between primary and secondary qualities is useless, for the supposed primary qualities are only perceptions, [122];
and Berkeley's theory that ideas of primary qualities are obtained by abstraction is impossible, [122], [122] n;
if matter is deprived of both primary and secondary qualities there is nothing left except a mere something which is not worth arguing about, [123].
C. As to Reason, [124]-130.
Attempt to destroy Reason by reasoning extravagant, [124];
objection to abstract reasoning because it asserts infinite divisibility of extension which is shocking to common sense, [124],
and infinite divisibility of time, [125];
yet the ideas attacked are so clear and distinct that scepticism becomes sceptical about itself, [125].
Popular objections to moral reasoning about matter of fact, based on weakness of understanding, variation of judgement, and disagreement among men, confuted by action, [126];
philosophical objections, that we only experience conjunction and that inference is based on custom, [127];
excessive scepticism refuted by its uselessness and put to flight by the most trivial event in life, [128].
Mitigated scepticism or academical philosophy useful as a corrective and as producing caution and modesty, [129];
and as limiting understanding to proper objects, [130];
all reasoning which is not either abstract, about quantity and number, or experimental, about matters of fact, is sophistry and illusion, [132].
D, In Religion (v. Miracles, Providence).Sciences
[132] (v. Reason, (d); Scepticism, C).Secret
powers, [39];
counteracting causes, [47], [67].Senses
outward and inward sensation supplies all the materials of thinking--must be corrected by reason, [117].
Scepticism concerning, [117] (v. Scepticism, B).Similarity
basis of all arguments from experience, [31] (cf. [115]).Solidity
[50];
a supposed primary quality, [122].Soul
and body, [52].Space
and time, [124] f.Species
an effect which belongs to no species does not admit of inference to its cause, [115] (cf. [113]).Stoics
[34], [79].Superstition
[6] (v. Providence).Theology
science of, [132] (v. God, Providence).Tillotson
argument against real presence, [86].Time
and space, [124] f.Truth
[8], [17] (v. Scepticism).Understanding
limits of human, [7];
operations of, to be classified, [8];
opp. experience, [28];
weakness of, [126] (v. Reason, Scepticism).Voluntariness
as ground of distinction between virtues and talents, [130].Whole
theory that everything is good as regards 'the whole,' [79] [80].Will
compounds materials given by senses, [13];
influence of over organs of body can never give us the idea of power; for we are not conscious of any power in our will, only of sequence of motions on will, [52];
so with power of will over our minds in raising up new ideas, [53].
Of God, cannot be used to explain motion, [57].
Freedom of (v. Necessity).