The Philippines Past and Present

Peace and Prosperity.

This chance photograph showing General Emilio Aguinaldo as he is to-day, standing with Director of Education Frank L. Crone, beside a field of corn raised by Emilio Aguinaldo, Jr., in a school contest, typifies the peace, prosperity, and enlightenment which have been brought about in the Philippine Islands under American rule.

The Philippines Past and Present

By
Dean C. Worcester
Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine Islands 1901–1913;
Member of the Philippine Commission, 1900–1913
Author of “The Philippine Islands and Their People”

In Two Volumes — With 128 Plates
Volume I
New York
The Macmillan Company
1914
All rights reserved

Contents

Vol. I

ChapterPage
I.[View Point and Subject-Matter]1
II.[Was Independence Promised?]18
III.[Insurgent “Coöperation”]67
IV.[The Premeditated Insurgent Attack]127
V.[Insurgent Rule and the Wilcox-Sargent Report]152
VI.[Insurgent Rule in the Cagayan Valley]170
VII.[Insurgent Rule in the Visayas and Elsewhere]206
VIII.[Did We Destroy a Republic?]242
IX.[The Conduct of the War]270
X.[Mr. Bryan and Independence]295
XI.[The First Philippine Commission]301
XII.[The Establishment of Civil Government]325
XIII.[The Philippine Civil Service]360
XIV.[The Constabulary and Public Order]378
XV.[The Administration of Justice]400
XVI.[Health Conditions]408
XVII.[Baguio and the Benguet Road]449
XVIII.[The Coördination of Scientific Work]488

List of Illustrations

Vol. I

The Philippines Past and Present

Chapter I

View Point and Subject-Matter

It is customary in Latin countries for a would-be author or orator to endeavour, at the beginning of his book or his speech, to establish his status. Possibly I have become partially Latinized as the result of some eighteen years of residence in the Philippines. At all events it is my purpose to state at the outset facts which will tend to make clear my view point and at the same time briefly to outline the subject-matter which I hereinafter discuss.

As a boy I went through several of the successive stages of collector’s fever from which the young commonly suffer. First it was postage stamps; then birds’ nests, obtained during the winter season when no longer of use to their builders. Later I was allowed to collect eggs, and finally the birds themselves. At one time my great ambition was to become a taxidermist. My family did not actively oppose this desire but suggested that a few preliminary years in school and college might prove useful.

I eventually lost my ambition to be a taxidermist but did not lose my interest in zoölogy and botany. While a student at the University of Michigan I specialized in these subjects. I was fortunate in having as one of my instructors Professor Joseph B. Steere, then at the head of the Department of Zoölogy. Professor Steere, who had been a great traveller, at times entertained his classes with wonderfully interesting tales of adventure on the Amazon and in the Andes, Peru, Formosa, the Philippines and the Dutch Moluccas. My ambition was fired by his stories and when in the spring of 1886 he announced his intention of returning to the Philippines the following year to take up and prosecute anew zoölogical work which he had begun there in 1874, offering to take with him a limited number of his students who were to have the benefit of his knowledge of Spanish and of his wide experience as a traveller and collector, and were in turn to allow him to work up their collections after their return to the United States, I made up my mind to go.

I was then endeavouring to get through the University on an allowance of $375 per year and was in consequence not overburdened with surplus funds. I however managed to get my life insured for $1500 and to borrow $1200 on the policy, and with this rather limited sum upon which to draw purchased an outfit for a year’s collecting and sailed with Doctor Steere for Manila. Two other young Americans accompanied him. One of these, Doctor Frank S. Bourns, was like myself afterwards destined to play a part in Philippine affairs which was not then dreamed of by either of us.

We spent approximately a year in the islands. Unfortunately we had neglected to provide ourselves with proper official credentials and as a result we had some embarrassing experiences. We were arrested by suspicious Spanish officials shortly after our arrival and were tried on trumped-up charges. On several subsequent occasions we narrowly escaped arrest and imprisonment.

The unfriendly attitude of certain of our Spanish acquaintances was hardly to be wondered at. They could not believe that sensible, civilized human beings would shoot tiny birds, pay for eggs the size of the tip of one’s little finger more than hens’ eggs were worth, undergo not a few hardships and run many risks while living in the simplest of native houses on very inadequate food, unless actuated by some hidden purpose. At different times they suspected us of looking for gold deposits, of designing to stir up trouble among the natives, or of being political spies.

When Doctor Bourns came back with the American troops in 1908 and I returned as a member of the first Philippine Commission in 1909, this last supposition became a fixed belief with many of our former Spanish acquaintances who still remained in the islands, and they frankly expressed their regret that they had not shot us while they had the chance.

Over against certain unpleasant experiences with those who could not understand us or our work I must set much kind and invaluable assistance rendered by others who could, and did.

All in all we spent a most interesting year, visiting eighteen of the more important islands.[1]

Throughout this trip we lived in very close contact with the Filipinos, either occupying the tribunales, the municipal buildings of their towns, where they felt at liberty to call and observe us at all hours of the day and night, or actually living in their houses, which in some instances were not vacated by the owners during our occupancy.

Incidentally we saw something of several of the wild tribes, including the Tagbanuas of Palawan, the Moros of Joló, Basilan and Mindanao, and the Mangyans of Mindoro.

We experienced many very real hardships, ran not a few serious risks and ended our sojourn with six weeks of fever and starvation in the interior of Mindoro. While we would not have cut short our appointed stay by a day, we were nevertheless delighted when we could turn our faces homeward, and Doctor Bourns and I agreed that we had had quite enough of life in the Philippines.

Upon my arrival at my home in Vermont a competent physician told my family that I might not live a week. I however recuperated so rapidly that I was able to return to the University of Michigan that fall and to complete the work of my senior year. I became a member of the teaching staff of the institution before my graduation.

Little as I suspected it at the time, the tropics had fixed their strangely firm grip on me during that fateful first trip to the Far East which was destined to modify my whole subsequent life. I had firmly believed that if fortunate enough to get home I should have sense enough to stay there, but before six months had elapsed I was finding life at Ann Arbor, Michigan, decidedly prosaic, and longing to return to the Philippines and finish a piece of zoölogical work which I knew was as yet only begun.

Doctor Bourns, like myself, was eager to go back, and we set out to raise $10,000 to pay the expenses of a two-years collecting tour, in the course of which we hoped to visit regions not hitherto penetrated by any zoölogist.

Times were then getting hard, and good Doctor Angell, the president of the university, thought it a great joke that two young fellows like ourselves should attempt to raise so considerable a sum to be spent largely for our own benefit. Whenever he met me on the street he used to ask whether we had obtained that $10,000 yet, and then shake with laughter. One of the great satisfactions of my life came when, on a beautiful May morning in 1890, I was able to answer his inquiry in the affirmative.

He fairly staggered with amazement, but promptly recovering himself warmly congratulated me, and with that kindly interest which he has always shown in the affairs of young men, asked how he could help us. Through his kindly offices and the intervention of the State Department we were able to obtain a royal order from the Spanish government which assured us a very different reception on our return to the Philippines in August from that which had been accorded us on the occasion of our first visit to the islands.

There was now revealed to us a pleasing side of Spanish character which we had largely missed during our first visit. Satisfied as to our identity and as to the motives which actuated us, the Spanish officials, practically without exception, did everything in their power to assist us and to render our sojourn pleasant and profitable. Our mail was delivered to us at points fifty miles distant from provincial capitals. When our remittances failed to reach us on time, as they not infrequently did, money was loaned to us freely without security. Troops were urged upon us for our protection when we desired to penetrate regions considered to be dangerous. Our Spanish friends constantly offered us the hospitality of their homes and with many of them the offer was more than pro forma. Indeed, in several instances it was insisted upon so strongly that we accepted it, to our great pleasure and profit.

Officials were quite frank in discussing before us the affairs of their several provinces, and we gained a very clear insight into existing political methods and conditions.

During this trip we lived in even closer contact with the Filipino[2] population than on the occasion of our first visit. Our rapidly growing knowledge of Spanish, and of Visayan, one of the more important native dialects, rendered it increasingly easy for us to communicate with them, gain their confidence and learn to look at things from their view point. They talked with us most frankly and fully about their political troubles.

Fort San Antonio Abad, showing the Effect of the Fire from Dewey’s Fleet

This fort, which marked the southern and western end of the Spaninsh line of defences around the city of Manila, was bombarded by the United States Fleet as a preliminary to the successful assault of August 13, 1898, on the city. The photograph, although not taken until March, 1899, gives some idea of the havoc wrought by the shells which struck the outer wall. The chief damage was done when they exploded within the fort.

During this our second sojourn in the Philippines, which lengthened to two years and six months, we revisited the islands with which we had become more or less familiar on our first trip and added six others to the list.[3] We lived for a time among the wild Bukidnons and Negritos of the Negros mountains.

After my companion had gone to Borneo I had the misfortune to contract typhoid fever when alone in Busuanga, and being ignorant of the nature of the malady from which I was suffering, kept on my feet until I could no longer stand, with the natural result that I came uncommonly near paying for my foolishness with my life, and have ever since suffered from resulting physical disabilities. When able to travel, I left the islands upon the urgent recommendation of my physician, feeling that the task which had led me to return there was almost accomplished and sure that my wanderings in the Far East were over.

Shortly after my return to the United States I was offered a position as a member of the zoölogical staff of the University of Michigan, accepted it, received speedy promotion, and hoped and expected to end my days as a college professor.

In 1898 the prospect of war with Spain awakened old memories. I fancy that the knowledge then possessed by the average American citizen relative to the Philippines was fairly well typified by that of a good old lady at my Vermont birthplace who had spanked me when I was a small boy, and who, after my first return from the Philippine Islands, said to me, “Deanie, are them Philippians you have been a visitin’ the people that Paul wrote the Epistle to?”

I endeavoured to do my part toward dispelling this ignorance. My knowledge of Philippine affairs led me strongly to favour armed intervention in Cuba, where similar political conditions seemed to prevail to a considerable extent, and I fear that I was considered by many of my university colleagues something of a “jingo.” Indeed, a member of the University Board of Regents said that I ought to be compelled to enlist. As a matter of fact, compulsion would have been quite unnecessary had it not been for physical disability.

My life-long friend and former travelling companion, Doctor Bourns, was not similarly hampered. He promptly joined the army as a medical officer with the rank of major, and sailed for the islands on the second steamer which carried United States troops there. As a natural result of his familiarity with Spanish and his wide acquaintanceship among the Filipinos, he was ordered from the outset to devote his time more largely to political matters than to the practice of his profession. He did all that he could to prevent misunderstandings between Filipinos and Americans. He assisted as an interpreter at the negotiations for the surrender of Manila on August 13, 1898, after taking part in the attack on the city. Later he was given the rather difficult task of suppressing a bad outbreak of smallpox among the Spanish prisoners of war, which he performed with great success. He was finally made chief health officer of Manila, although he continued to devote himself largely to political matters, got numberless deserving Filipinos out of trouble, and rapidly increased his already wide circle of Filipino friends. Through his letters I was kept quite closely in touch with the situation.

Meanwhile I decided that the Philippines were not for me, asked for and obtained leave for study in Europe, and in December 1898 set out for New York to engage passage for myself and my family. I went by way of Washington in order to communicate to President McKinley certain facts relative to the Philippine situation which it seemed to me ought to be brought to his attention.

I believed that there was serious danger of an outbreak of hostilities between Filipinos and Americans, and that such a catastrophe, resulting from mutual misunderstanding, might be avoided if seasonable action were taken. I have since learned how wrong was this latter belief. My previous experience had been almost exclusively with the Visayans and the wild tribes, and the revolution against the United States was at the outset a strictly Tagálog affair, and hence beyond my ken.

President McKinley very kindly gave me all the time I wanted, displayed a most earnest desire to learn the truth, and showed the deepest and most friendly interest in the Filipinos. Let no man believe that then or later he had the slightest idea of bringing about the exploitation of their country. On the contrary, he evinced a most earnest desire to learn what was best for them and then to do it if it lay within his power.

To my amazement, at the end of our interview he asked me whether I would be willing to go to the islands as his personal representative.

I could not immediately decide to make such a radical change in my plans as this would involve, and asked for a week’s time to think the matter over, which was granted. I decided to go.

Meanwhile, the President had evolved the idea of sending out a commission and asked me if I would serve on it. I told him that I would and left for my home to make preparations for an early departure. A few days later he announced the names of the commissioners. They were Jacob Gould Schurman, President of Cornell University; Major-General Elwell S. Otis, then the ranking army officer in the Philippines; Rear-Admiral George Dewey, then in command of the United States fleet in Philippine waters; Colonel Charles Denby, who had for fourteen years served as United States Minister to China, and myself.

Colonel Denby was delayed in Washington by public business. Mr. Schurman and I reached Yokohama on the morning of February 13, and on arrival there learned, to our deep regret, that hostilities had broken out on the fourth instant. We reached Manila on the evening of March 4, but Colonel Denby was unable to join us until April 2. Meanwhile, as we could not begin our work in his absence, I had an exceptional opportunity to observe conditions in the field, of which I availed myself.

I served with the first Philippine Commission until it had completed its work, and was then appointed to the second Philippine Commission without a day’s break in my period of service.

The members of this latter body were William H. Taft of Ohio; Luke E. Wright of Tennessee; Henry C. Ide of Vermont; Bernard Moses of California, and myself. Briefly stated, the task before us was to establish civil government in the Philippine Islands. After a period of ninety days, to be spent in observation, the commission was to become the legislative body, while executive power continued to be vested for a time in the military.

This condition endured until the 4th of July, 1901, on which day Mr. Taft was appointed civil governor. On September 1, 1901, each of the remaining original members of the commission became an executive officer as well. Mr. Wright was appointed secretary of commerce and police; Mr. Ide, secretary of finance and justice; Mr. Moses, secretary of public instruction, and I myself, Secretary of the Interior. On the same day three Filipino members were added to the commission: Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, Sr. Benito Legarda and Sr. José R. de Luzuriaga.

Until the 16th of October, 1907, the Commission continued to serve as the sole legislative body. It is at the present time the upper house of the Philippine Legislature, the Philippine Assembly, composed of eighty-one elective members, constituting the lower house.

I have therefore had a hand in the enactment of all legislation put in force in the Philippine Islands since the American occupation, with the exception of certain laws passed during my few and brief absences.

As secretary of the interior it fell to my lot to organize and direct the operations of a Bureau of Health, a Bureau of Govermnent Laboratories, a Bureau of Forestry, a Bureau of Public Lands, a Bureau of Agriculture, a Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes, a Mining Bureau and a Weather Bureau. Ultimately, the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes and the Mining Bureau were incorporated with the Bureau of Government Laboratories to form the Bureau of Science, which continued under my executive control. The Bureau of Agriculture was transferred to the Department of Public Instruction in 1909.

I was at the outset given administrative control of all matters pertaining to the non-Christian tribes, which constitute, roughly speaking, an eighth of the population of the Philippines, and until my resignation retained such control throughout the islands, except in the Moro Province, which at an early day was put directly under the governor-general.

I participated in the organization of civil government in the several provinces of the archipelago, and myself drafted the Municipal Code for the government of the towns inhabited by Filipinos, as well as the Special Provincial Government Act and the Township Government Act for that of the provinces and settlements inhabited chiefly by the non-Christian tribes.

At the outset we did not so much as know with certainty the names of the several wild and savage tribes inhabiting the more remote and inaccessible portions of the archipelago. As I was unable to obtain reliable information concerning them on which to base legislation for their control and uplifting, I proceeded to get such information for myself by visiting their territory, much of which was then quite unexplored.

After this territory was organized into five so-called “Special Government Provinces,” some of my Filipino friends, I fear not moved solely by anxiety for the public good, favoured and secured a legislative enactment which made it my official duty to visit and inspect these provinces at least once during each fiscal year. I shall always feel indebted to them for giving me this opportunity to become intimately acquainted with some of the most interesting, most progressive, and potentially most important peoples of the Philippines.

When in 1901 I received the news that a central government was soon to be established, I was in the Sub-province of Lepanto on my first trip through the wilder and less-known portions of northern Luzon. During each succeeding year I have spent from two to four months in travel through the archipelago, familiarizing myself at first hand with local conditions.

I have frequently taken with me on these inspection trips representatives of the Bureaus of Forestry, Agriculture, Science and Health to carry on practical investigations, and have made it my business to visit and explore little known and unknown regions. There are very few islands worthy of the name which it has not been my privilege to visit.

The organization of an effective campaign against diseases like bubonic plague, smallpox, Asiatic cholera and leprosy in a country where no similar work had ever previously been undertaken, inhabited by people profoundly ignorant of the benefits to be derived from modern methods of sanitation, and superstitious to a degree, promptly brought me into violent conflict with the beliefs and prejudices of a large portion of the Filipino population.

A similar result followed the inauguration of an active campaign for the suppression of surra, foot and mouth disease, and rinderpest, which were rapidly destroying the horses and cattle.

From the outset I was held responsible for the enforcement of marine and land quarantine regulations, which were at first very obnoxious to the general public.

When the Pure Food and Drugs Act adopted by Congress for the United States was made applicable to the Philippines without any provision for its enforcement, this not altogether pleasant duty was assigned to me.

I did not seek appointment to the Philippine service in the first instance. The political influence at my command has never extended beyond my own vote. During a period of twelve years my removal was loudly and frequently demanded, yet I saw President Schurman, Colonel Denby, General Otis, Admiral Dewey, Commissioner Moses, Governor Taft, Governor Wright, Governor Ide, Governor Smith, Secretary Shuster, Commissioner Tavera, Commissioner Legarda and Governor Forbes, all my colleagues on one or the other of the Philippine commissions, leave the service, before my own voluntary retirement on September 15, 1913.

I had long expected a request for my resignation at any time, and had often wished that it might come. Indeed I once before tendered it voluntarily, only to have President Taft say that he thought I should withdraw it, which I did. I am absolutely without political ambition save an earnest desire to earn the political epitaph, “He did what he could.”

During my brief and infrequent visits to the United States I have discovered there widespread and radical misapprehension as to conditions in the Philippines, but have failed to find that lack of interest in them which is commonly said to exist. On the contrary, I have found the American public keenly desirous of getting at the real facts whenever there was an opportunity to do so.

The extraordinary extent to which untrue statements have been accepted at their face value has surprised and deeply disturbed me. I have conversed with three college presidents, each of whom believed that the current expenses of the Philippine government were paid from the United States Treasury.

The preponderance of false and misleading statements about the Philippines is due, it seems to me, primarily to the fact that it is those persons with whom the climate disagrees and who in consequence are invalided home, and those who are separated from the service in the interest of the public good, who return to the United States and get an audience there; while those who successfully adapt themselves to local conditions, display interest in their work and become proficient in it, remain in the islands for long periods during which they are too busy, and too far from home, to make themselves heard.

Incidentally it must be remembered that if such persons do attempt to set forth facts which years of practical experience have taught them, they are promptly accused of endeavouring to save their own bread and butter by seeking to perpetuate conditions which insure them fat jobs.

When I think of the splendid men who have uncomplainingly laid down their lives in the military and in the civil service of their country in these islands, and of the larger number who have given freely of their best years to unselfish, efficient work for others, this charge fills me with indignation.

The only thing that kept me in the Philippine service for so long a time was my interest in the work for the non-Christian tribes and my fear that while my successor was gaining knowledge concerning it which can be had only through experience, matters might temporarily go to the bad. It has been my ambition to bring this work to such a point that it would move on, for a time at least, by its own momentum.

I am now setting forth my views relative to the past and present situation in the islands because I believe that their inhabitants are confronted by a danger graver than any which they have before faced since the time when their fate wavered in the balance, while the question whether the United States should acquire sovereignty over them or should allow Spain to continue to rule them was under consideration.

Felipe Buencamino

Perhaps the most prolific writer on political subjects whom the Philippines have produced. He was at one time a member of Aguinaldo’s cabinet and accompanied Aguinaldo’s mother and son when they surrendered in order to obtain American protection.

It is my purpose to tell the plain, hard truth regardless of the effect of such conduct upon my future career. It has been alleged that my views on Philippine problems were coloured by a desire to retain my official position. Nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed, no man who has not served for long and sometimes very weary years as a public official, and has not been a target for numerous more or less irresponsible individuals whose hands were filled with mud and who were actuated by a fixed desire to throw it at something, can appreciate as keenly as I do the manifold blessings which attend the life of a private citizen.

I trust that I have said enough to make clear my view point, and now a word as to subject-matter. It is my intention to correct some of the very numerous misstatements which have been made concerning past and present conditions in the Philippines. I shall quote, from time to time, such statements, both verbal and written, and more especially some of those which have recently appeared in a book entitled “The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898–1912,” by James H. Blount, who signs himself “Officer of the United States Volunteers in the Philippines, 1899–1901; United States District Judge in the Philippines, 1901–1905.”

Judge Blount has indulged so freely in obvious hyperbole, and has made so very evident the bitter personal animosities which inspire many of his statements, that it has been a genuine surprise to his former associates and acquaintances that his book has been taken seriously.

It should be sufficiently evident to any unprejudiced reader that in writing it he has played the part of the special pleader rather than that of the historian. He has used government records freely, and as is usually the case when a special pleader quotes from such records, the nature of the matter which he has omitted is worthy of more than passing attention. I shall hope to be able to fill some of the gaps that he has left in the documentary history of the events which he discusses and by so doing, very materially to change its purport.

As public documents have been so misused, and as a new administration is bestowing on Filipinos political offices, and giving them opportunities, for which they are as yet utterly unprepared, thus endangering the results of years of hard, patient, self-sacrificing work performed by experienced and competent men, it becomes necessary to strike home by revealing unpleasant facts which are of record but have not heretofore been disclosed because of the injury to reputations and the wounding of feelings which would result from their publication. In doing this I feel that I am only discharging a duty to the people of the United States, who are entitled to know the truth if the present possibility of Philippine independence is to be seriously considered, and to the several Filipino peoples who are to-day in danger of rushing headlong to their own utter and final destruction.

At the outset I shall discuss the oft-asserted claim that the Filipino leaders were deceived and betrayed by American officials whom they assisted, and that this unpardonable conduct led to the outbreak of active hostilities which occurred just prior to the arrival at Manila of the first Philippine Commission.

I shall then show that these leaders never established a government which adequately protected life and property, or gave to their people peace, happiness or justice, but on the contrary inaugurated a veritable reign of terror under which murder became a governmental institution, while rape, inhuman torture, burying alive and other ghastly crimes were of common occurrence, and usually went unpunished. The data which I use in establishing these contentions are for the most part taken directly from the Insurgent records, in referring to which I employ the war department abbreviation “P.I.R.” followed by a number.

I next take up some of the more important subsequent historical events, describing the work of the first Philippine Commission, and showing in what manner the government established by the second Philippine Commission has discharged its stewardship, subsequently discussing certain as yet unsolved problems which confront the present government, such as that presented by the existence of slavery and peonage, and that of the non-Christian tribes. For the benefit of those who, like Judge Blount, consider the Philippines “a vast straggly archipelago of jungle-covered islands in the south seas which have been a nuisance to every government that ever owned them,” I give some facts as to the islands, their climate, their natural resources and their commercial possibilities, and close by setting forth my views as to the present ability of the civilized Cagayans, Ilocanos, Pampangans, Zambals, Pangasináns, Tagálogs, Bicols and Visayans, commonly and correctly called Filipinos, to establish, or to maintain when established, a stable government throughout Filipino territory, to say nothing of bringing under just and effective control, and of protecting and civilizing, the people of some twenty-seven non-Christian tribes which constitute an eighth of the population, and occupy approximately half of the territory, of the Philippine Islands.

I wish here to acknowledge my very great indebtedness to Major J. R. M. Taylor, who has translated and compiled the Insurgent[4] records, thereby making available a very large mass of reliable and most valuable information without which a number of chapters of this book would have remained unwritten. Surely no man who bases his statements concerning Filipino rule on the facts set forth in these records can be accused of deriving his information from hostile or prejudiced sources.

Of them, Major Taylor says:—

“No one reading the Insurgent records can fail to be impressed with the difference between the Spanish and the Tagálog documents. Many of the former are doubtless written with a view to their coming into the hands of the Americans, or with deliberate purpose to have them do so, and are framed accordingly. All Tagálog documents, intended only for Filipinos, say much that is not said in the Spanish documents. The orders of the Dictator[5] to his subjects were conveyed in the latter series of documents.”

[1] Cuyo, Palawan, Balabac, Cagayan de Joló, Joló proper, Basilan, Mindanao, Panay, Guimaras, Negros, Siquijor, Cebu, Bohol, Samar, Leyte, Masbate, Marinduque and Mindoro.

[2] I employ the noun Filipinos to designate collectively the eight civilized, Christianized peoples, called respectively the Cagayans, Ilocanos, Pangasináns, Zambalans, Pampangans, Tagálogs, Bicols and Visayans, or any of them; the adjective Filipino to designate anything pertaining to these peoples, or any of them; the noun Philippines to designate the country, and the adjective Philippine to designate anything pertaining to the country as distinguished from its people.

[3] Busuanga, Culion, Tawi Tawi, Tablas, Romblon and Sibuyan.

[4] I use the word “Insurgents” as a proper noun, to designate the Filipinos who took up arms against the United States, hence capitalize it, and the adjective derived from it.

[5] General Aguinaldo.

Chapter II

Was Independence Promised?

It has long been the fashion in certain quarters to allege, or to insinuate, that American consuls and naval officers promised the Insurgent leaders that the independence of the Philippines would be recognized by the United States. It has been claimed by some that the coöperation of the Insurgents in the military operations against Manila was sought for and secured. Others say that they were at least de facto allies of the United States, and that they were in the end shamelessly betrayed and wantonly attacked.

These are very serious charges. I shall prove, chiefly by the Insurgent records, that each of them is false. I ask the forbearance of my readers if, in the three chapters which I devote to these matters, I quote documentary evidence at length. When original documents or extracts from them tell a clear and reasonably concise story, I sometimes insert them bodily in the text. In other cases I give my own version of the facts which they set forth, but give the full text in foot-notes. In nearly all instances references are given to sources of documentary information. I greatly regret that Taylor’s narrative, with its very numerous supporting documents, is not readily accessible to the student of history. It ought to have been published, but never got beyond the galley-proof stage. In referring to it, I am therefore obliged to use the word Taylor followed by the letters and figures designating the page of this galley proof on which the passage referred to is found. Whenever possible I give the War Department numbers[1] of Insurgent documents, but in a few cases can give only the exhibit numbers assigned by Taylor in printing the documents.

As his exhibits are serially arranged it is easy to find any one of them. Copies of his work may be found in the War Department and in the office of the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary.

Referring to the charge that the Insurgents were deceived, even had deceit been practised as claimed, Aguinaldo would have had no just ground for complaint, for he himself not only frankly advocated its use, but deliberately employed it in his dealings with the Americans, as clearly appears in records hereinafter cited.[2] However, most Americans hold to a standard very different from his. Was it departed from in this instance?

Aguinaldo has specifically and repeatedly charged that Pratt and Dewey promised him the recognition of the independence of the Philippines by the United States.[3]

Judge Blount has referred to the “de facto alliance between the Americans and Aguinaldo,” and has dwelt at length on “promises, both expressed and implied,” which were subsequently repudiated by Consul Pratt, Admiral Dewey and Generals Anderson and Merritt, constantly suggesting, even when he does not specifically charge, bad faith on the part of these officers of the United States.[4]

The San Juan Bridge

This bridge is the one near which the first shot was fired when hostilities began between Americans and Filipinos.

On analyzing his statements we find that he is discreetly non-committal as to exactly what were the expressed promises, nor does he make it so plain as might be desired what legitimate inferences were deducible from the acts of the Americans in question. He quotes an alleged statement of General Anderson to the effect that:—

“Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman,[5] and Williams[6] did or did not give Aguinaldo assurances that a Philippino government would be recognized, the Phillippinos certainly thought so, judging from their acts rather than from their words. Admiral Dewey gave them arms and ammunition, as I did subsequently at his request.”[7]

Before discussing these charges I will briefly review certain historical facts, knowledge of which will be useful in considering them.

In August, 1896, an insurrection against Spain had broken out in the Philippines under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo, a resident of Cavite Viejo, who had been a school teacher, and was, at that time, gobernadorcillo[8] of his town.

It had been terminated by the so-called “Treaty of Biacnabató,” signed in Manila on December 15, 1897.

This document provided for the surrender of “Don Emilio Aguinaldo, Supreme Chief of the Insurgents in arms,” and Don Marciano Llanera and Don Baldomero Aguinaldo, his subordinates, together with their soldiers and arms.

“The Excellent Señor General in Chief” of the Spanish forces was to “provide the necessary means for supporting the lives” of those who surrendered before a certain fixed date.

In actual practice what was done was to agree to pay them $800,000[9] in three instalments, the first of $400,000, the second and third of $200,000 each.

Aguinaldo and certain other leaders were to take up their residence outside the islands. Their deportation was duly provided for, and Aguinaldo and twenty-six of his companions were taken to Hongkong, on the Spanish steamer Uranus; arriving there on December 31, 1897.

On January 2, 1898, $400,000 were deposited in the Hongkong Bank, to the credit of Aguinaldo and Co.

The Insurgent leaders remaining at Biacnabató had a meeting under the presidency of Isabelo Artacho, an Ilocano[10] who was the ranking officer in the absence of Aguinaldo, and requested that the second instalment, of $200,000, be paid to them. The Spanish governor-general, Primo de Rivera, acceded to their request, and they divided the money, although Aguinaldo denied their right to do so, claiming that it should have been sent to Hongkong.

The third payment of $200,000 was apparently never made. Primo de Rivera says that he turned over a check for $200,000 to his successor, General Augustin, in April, 1898; giving as his reason for refusing to pay it to the Insurgents that there seemed to him to be no prospect of its being equitably divided among those who were entitled to receive it under the agreement.

Aguinaldo and his associates claimed that certain reforms were promised by the Spanish government at the time the treaty of Biacnabató was negotiated, and as these measures were not put into effect, they organized a junta or revolutionary committee at Hongkong. It included in its membership a number of Filipino political exiles, then residing at that place.

The men who composed this organization soon fell to quarrelling and it became necessary to come to a definite understanding as to its aims. Under the arrangement finally reached, the junta, as a whole, was charged with the work of propaganda outside of the archipelago; with all diplomatic negotiations with foreign governments; and with the preparation and shipment of such articles as were needed to carry on the revolution in the Philippines. It was to be allowed voice by Aguinaldo’s government in any serious question which might arise abroad, and would aid that government in bringing the civil administration of the Philippines to the level of that of the most advanced nations.

Trouble soon arose among the former Insurgent leaders over the division of the funds deposited at Hongkong.

Taylor gives a trustworthy and concise account of the events of this period, and as it is of historic interest, and makes clear just how Aguinaldo came to go to Singapore, meet Pratt, and enter into negotiations with him, I quote extensive extracts from it.[11]

“From January 4 to April 4, Aguinaldo withdrew from the banks 5786.46 pesos in part interest on the money he had deposited. This was used to pay the expenses of himself and his companions in Hongkong. These expenses were kept at a minimum; the money was drawn and spent by him. If one of the men with him needed a new pair of shoes, Aguinaldo paid for them; if another wanted a new coat, Aguinaldo bought it. Minute accounts were kept, which are on file among his papers, and it is seen from them that his expenses were exceeding his income, which could only be 12,000 pesos a year, while he was living at the rate of 22,000, with constant demands being made upon him by men who came from the Philippines. Life was not easy under these conditions. Aguinaldo’s companions were entirely dependent upon him. Their most trivial expenses had to be approved by him, and he held them down with a strong hand. They were men living in a strange land, among a people whose language they did not speak, having nothing to do but quarrel among themselves, exiles waiting for a chance to return to their own country, which they watched with weary eyes while they guarded the embers by which they hoped to light the fires of a new insurrection.

“The men who had accompanied Aguinaldo to Hongkong were not the only Filipinos domiciled there; a number of men had taken refuge in that British colony after the events of 1872, and some of them at least had prospered. Some of them, like the members of the Cortes family, seem to have had almost no relations with the followers of Aguinaldo; some, like J. M. Basa, knew them and took part in some of the meetings of the governing groups, but were probably not admitted to their full confidence, as Aguinaldo and his immediate following wanted and were working for independence and independence alone, while the Filipinos who had long lived in Hongkong wanted to see the archipelago lost to Spain, but had no confidence in the ability of the country to stand alone or in the fitness of Aguinaldo and his following to direct the councils of a state. The character of the new refugees did not inspire confidence in these older men, who hoped for a protectorate by or annexation to the United States.

“On May 6, 1898, the consul-general of the United States there informed the State Department that D. Cortés, M. Cortés, A. Rosario, Gracio Gonzaga, and José Maria Basa (50), all very wealthy land-owners, bankers, and lawyers of Manila, desired to tender their allegiance and the allegiance of their powerful families in Manila to the United States, and that they had instructed all their connections to render every aid to the United States forces in Manila. On May 14 he forwarded statements of other Filipinos domiciled in Hongkong, not members of the junta, that they desired to submit their allegiance and the allegiance of their families in the Philippine Islands to the United States. One of Aguinaldo’s followers, writing somewhat later, spoke with bitterness of the rich old men who went about calling their companions ‘beggarly rebels,’ but these men were rich, and their names and their apparent adhesion to the cause represented by Aguinaldo would inspire confidence in him among men of property in the Philippines. They were, accordingly, not to be lightly alienated; therefore, at first, at least, no open break took place with them, but their attitude toward the leaders of the insurrection is shown by the fact that after the early summer of 1898 they took no, or very little, part in the insurgent movement, although they were living in Hongkong, the seat of the junta, which conducted the propaganda for the insurgent government of the Philippines.

“But, in fact, Aguinaldo had no just conception of the conditions and of the opportunities which were about to open before the Hongkong junta, for although war between Spain and the United States was imminent and a United States squadron was in Hongkong threatening Manila, Aguinaldo was chiefly concerned in finding how to avoid losing the money which had been received from the Spanish government as the price of his surrender. The importance of his presence near the Philippines in case of war did not occur to him, or if it did occur to him anything which he could obtain there from the aid of the United States probably seemed for the moment of little consequence compared with escaping from his wrangling companions with enough money to live on in Paris.

“Artacho, who had received 5000 pesos as his share of the second payment, arrived in Hongkong and on April 5 demanded 200,000 pesos of the insurgent funds, probably under the agreement that he should establish a company in Hongkong for the benefit of the former leaders and not merely of those who had accompanied Aguinaldo. But the leaders in Hongkong had denounced that agreement, and refused to pay. He then entered suit before the supreme court of Hongkong, calling upon Aguinaldo for an accounting of the trust funds deposited in his hands for the benefit of Artacho and others, and asked for an injunction restraining Aguinaldo or any member of the junta from handling or disposing of any part of said funds. He filed as evidence copies of the Biacnabató agreement and of the agreement made by the leaders on December 19. This suit was brought not merely in the name of Artacho, but in that of all the exiles who were described as living in exile in Hongkong in accordance with an agreement made with the Spanish Government. Artacho probably had adherents among these men, some at least of whom were utterly weary of waiting in Hongkong and of living upon what was doled out to them. Some at least saw no chance of any other fate than indefinite exile spent in dependence upon the inner group for even the means of existence.

“The suit was in equity, and called for an accounting for the trust funds which the complainant recognized were legally in the hands of Aguinaldo. It could be carried on only with great difficulty without his presence and without his account books. Meetings were held, and Artacho was denounced as attempting to extort blackmail, but he refused to yield, and Aguinaldo, rather than explain the inner workings of the Hongkong junta before a British court, prepared for flight. A summons was issued for his appearance before the supreme court of Hongkong on April 13, 1898, but he was by that time beyond its jurisdiction.

“He drew out the 50,000 pesos from the Chartered Bank, which had become due according to the terms of the deposit, and perhaps such other sums as could be drawn upon by check, engaged passage for Europe by way of Singapore for G. H. del Pilar, J. M. Leyba, and himself under assumed names, appointed V. Belarmino to succeed to his functions, and gave him checks signed in blank to draw the interest of the sums on deposit to provide for the support of the exiles. He gave as his reason for departure that he was going to remain under cover until Artacho could be bought off, but he intended to go far afield for this purpose, as he gave his destination as Europe and the United States.

“Aguinaldo and his companions probably sailed from Hongkong on April 8, 1898, and arrived in Singapore on April 21, after stopping in Saigon. War between the United States and Spain had been rendered inevitable by the resolution of Congress demanding that Spain should withdraw her forces from Cuba, and was declared on April 21. Although Aguinaldo and his followers did not appreciate the influence which conditions on the other side of the world might have upon the future of the Philippines, it happened that in Singapore at that time there was an Englishman named Bray who did. He had been a member of the civil service in India, and had lived for some years in the Philippines, but he had fallen upon evil days and was engaged in writing letters to the Singapore Free Press upon the Philippines, and in retailing such information as was in his possession concerning them to the United States consul-general in Singapore, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt, for transmittal to Commodore Dewey. Bray heard of the arrival of Aguinaldo and realized what could be done with him, and that if the matter were well handled it might be to his own advantage. He went at once to see Aguinaldo and informed him that the United States consul-general was anxious to see him. He went to the consul-general and informed him of the importance of Aguinaldo, and that he was in Singapore. Aguinaldo had to be persuaded to agree to a meeting. The consul-general was anxious for it, and it took place, according to Aguinaldo, on the night of April 22 (according to Pratt, on the morning of April 24). The statement made by Aguinaldo is probably correct. According to his account book, he paid $11 on April 23, 1898, for a telegram to the Hongkong junta concerning the negotiations ‘with America.’

“Aguinaldo knew but little English, Pratt knew no Spanish, so in their interview Bray acted as interpreter. An interpreter who is interested in the subject of the discussion may be a dangerous man. It is impossible to say what he told Aguinaldo. Certainly Pratt did not know; but whatever was said during these conversations it is within the limits of possibility that Pratt may have been made to say by the interpreter more than he intended, and that his statements of what would probably be granted by the United States Government and his expression of good wishes for the cause of Filipino independence may have been translated as assurances and as promises. Bray, who, according to his Filipino former friends, was apt to talk too much, may have talked too much on this occasion, and so the myth of the formal agreement between Aguinaldo on behalf of the Filipino insurgents and Pratt on behalf of the United States grew up, a fiction which Bray himself, with a natural desire to add to his own importance, did his best to circulate.

“Bray did not ask for his reward at the time, but probably reckoned upon making himself indispensable as an adviser, so that later he could make his own terms. For a time he wrote letters of advice to Aguinaldo, which may have had some influence upon the line of conduct which he adopted, and later was employed in furnishing from Hongkong news to various newspapers of events and conditions in the Philippines. His cablegrams shortly before the outbreak of hostilities between the United States and the insurgents were more picturesque than veracious, but they were apparently considered effective, as Aguinaldo ordered that he should be given $5000. He wanted more, but the Hongkong junta did not trust him, and he ceased to be in their employment.”[12]

As we shall see, Bray did not do all of the interpreting at Singapore, and we shall be able to determine with some accuracy what actually transpired there.

We can now consider understandingly the charges made against Pratt and Dewey.

It has been claimed over and over again, that Pratt promised Aguinaldo recognition of tile independence of the Philippines if he and his people would cooperate with the United States forces against Spain.

Aguinaldo himself made the charge in his “Reseña Verídica”[13] in the following words:—

“In this interview Consul Pratt told me that because the Spaniards had not complied with the agreement of Biac-na-bató, the Filipinos had a right to renew their interrupted revolution and advised me to take up arms anew against Spain, assuring me that America would give the Filipinos the greatest advantages (mayores ventajas). Then I asked the Consul what advantages the United States would concede to the Philippines, suggesting, when I had the proper opening, the propriety of making an agreement in writing, to which the Consul answered that he would report, by telegraph, on the subject to Mr. Dewey, who was the chief of the expedition against the Philippines, and who had ample powers from President McKinley.

“On the following day, between 10 and 12 in the morning, we again took up the matter, Consul Pratt saying that the admiral had answered my inquiry by saying that the United States would at least recognize the independence of the Philippine government under a naval protectorate, but that there was no necessity to put it in writing, as the words of the admiral and the American consul were sacred and would be fulfilled, not being like those of the Spaniards, and finally, that the Government of North America was a very honourable Government, a very just and very powerful one.”[14]

On April 27, 1908, Pratt telegraphed the Secretary of State as follows: —

“General Aguinaldo gone my instance Hongkong arrange with Dewey coöperation insurgents Manila.

“Pratt.”

On the 28th he wrote the Secretary, explaining how he had come to meet Aguinaldo, and stating just what he had done. He said:—

“At this interview, after learning from General Aguinaldo the state of an object sought to be obtained by the present insurrectionary movement, which, though absent from the Philippines, he was still directing, I took it upon myself, whilst explaining that I had no authority to speak for the Government, to point out the danger of continuing independent action at this stage; and, having convinced him of the expediency of cooperating with our fleet, then at Hongkong, and obtained the assurance of his willingness to proceed thither and confer with Commodore Dewey to that end, should the latter so desire, I telegraphed the Commodore the same day as follows, through our consul-general at Hongkong:—

Insurgent Prisoners

On the day of the Polo fight in provinces of Bulacan these Insurgent soldiers lay in a trench and fired into a charging company of American troops until the latter came in on top of them. They were taken prisoners, sent to Manila and humanely treated there. This photograph was taken as they were being marched down the railroad track to the Manila train.

“‘Aguinaldo, insurgent leader, here. Will come Hongkong arrange with Commodore for general cooperation insurgents Manila if desired. Telegraph.

“‘Pratt.’”

The Commodore’s reply read thus:—

“‘Tell Aguinaldo come soon as possible.

“‘Dewey.’”

Pratt adds:—

“I received it late at night, and at once communicated to General Aguinaldo, who, with his aide-de-camp and private secretary, all under assumed names, I succeeded in getting off by the British Steamer Malacca, which left here on Tuesday the 26th.

“Just previous to his departure, I had a second and last interview with General Aguinaldo, the particulars of which I shall give you by next mail.

“The general impressed me as a man of intelligence, ability, and courage, and worthy the confidence that had been placed in him.

“I think that in arranging for his direct cooperation with the commander of our forces, I have prevented possible conflict of action and facilitated the work of occupying and administering the Philippines.

“If this course of mine meets with the Government’s approval, as I trust it may, I shall be fully satisfied; to Mr. Bray, however, I consider there is due some special recognition for most valuable services rendered.

“How that recognition can best be made I leave to you to decide.

“I have, etc.”[15]

It will be noted that Pratt explained to Aguinaldo that he had no authority to speak for the government; that there was no mention in the cablegrams between Pratt and Dewey of independence or indeed of any conditions on which Aguinaldo was to coöperate, these details being left for future arrangement with Dewey; and that Pratt thought that he had prevented possible conflict of action and facilitated the work of occupying and administering the Philippines.

The particulars as to the second and last interview between Aguinaldo and Pratt were embodied in the following letter:—

“No. 213. Consulate-General of the United States.

“Singapore, April 30, 1898.

“Sir: Referring to my dispatch No. 212, of the 28th instant, I have the honor to report that in the second and last interview I had with Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo on the eve of his departure for Hongkong, I enjoined upon him the necessity, under Commodore Dewey’s direction, of exerting absolute control over his forces in the Philippines, as no excesses on their part would be tolerated by the American Government, the President having declared that the present hostilities with Spain were to be carried on in strict accord with modern principles of civilized warfare.

“To this General Aguinaldo fully assented, assuring me that he intended and was perfectly able, once on the field, to hold his followers, the insurgents, in check and lead them as our commander should direct.

“The general stated that he hoped the United States would assume protection of the Philippines for at least long enough to allow the inhabitants to establish a government of their own, in the organization of which he would desire American advice and assistance.

“These questions I told him I had no authority to discuss.

“I have, etc.,

“E. Spencer Pratt,

“United States Consul-General.”

In a subsequent communication written on July 28, 1898, Pratt made the following statement:—

“I declined even to discuss with General Aguinaldo the question of the future policy of the United States with regard to the Philippines, that I held out no hopes to him of any kind, committed the government in no way whatever, and, in the course of our confidences, never acted upon the assumption that the Government would cooperate with him—General Aguinaldo—for the furtherance of any plans of his own, nor that, in accepting his said cooperation, it would consider itself pledged to recognize any political claims which he might put forward.”[16]

What reason if any is there for denying the truth of this allegation?

I will give in full Blount’s statement as to what occurred at a meeting held at Singapore, to celebrate the early successes of Dewey and Aguinaldo, as it constitutes his nearest approach to a direct claim, that any one at any time promised independence:—

“First there was music by the band. Then followed the formal reading and presentation of the address by a Dr. Santos, representing the Filipino community of Singapore. The address pledged the ‘eternal gratitude’ of the Filipino people to Admiral Dewey and the honored addressee; alluded to the glories of independence, and to how Aguinaldo had been enabled; by the arrangement so happily effected with Admiral Dewey by Consul Pratt, to arouse eight millions of Filipinos to take up arms ‘in defence of those principles of justice and liberty of which your country is the foremost champion’ and trusted ‘that the United States... will efficaciously second the programme arranged between you, sir, and General Aguinaldo in this port of Singapore, and secure to us our independence under the protection of the United States.’

“Mr. Pratt arose and ‘proceeded, speaking in French,’ says the newspaper—it does not say Alabama French, but that is doubtless what it was—‘to state his belief that the Filipinos would prove and were now proving themselves fit for self-government.’ The gentleman from Alabama then went on to review the mighty events and developments of the preceding six weeks, Dewey’s victory of May 1st, ‘the brilliant achievements of your own distinguished leader, General Emilio Aguinaldo, cooperating on land with the Americans at sea,’ etc. ‘You have just reason to be proud of what has been and is being accomplished by General Aguinaldo and your fellow-countrymen under his command. When, six weeks ago, I learned that General Aguinaldo had arrived incognito in Singapore, I immediately sought him out. An hour’s interview convinced me that he was the man for the occasion; and, having communicated with Admiral Dewey, I accordingly arranged for him to join the latter, which he did at Cavite. The rest you know.’”[17]

Now, it happens that Dr. Santos himself forwarded his speech, and his version of Pratt’s reply thereto, in a letter to Aguinaldo, dated Singapore, June 9, 1898. As he served as interpreter, he, if any one, should know what Pratt said. After describing the change in tone of the Singapore Free Press, with which strained relations had formerly existed, and the subsequent friendliness of the editor of this paper and that of the Straits Times, he says that on the previous afternoon he went with the other Filipinos to greet Pratt. He continues:—

“This occasion was unusually opportune by reason of ours having been victorious and immediately after the cry of our worthy chief which found an echo in this colony. For this purpose 30 or more Filipinos—9 of the higher class, 15 musicians and the remainder of the middle class—went to greet Consul A., here, and on the invitation of Mr. Bray we ascended. He received us in his private office, and it was imposing to see that the only decoration was the American flag which covered the desk, and in its centre, a carved wooden frame holding the portrait of our worthy chief. He shook hands with all of us, and I introduced them all. We found there also, and were introduced to, the Editor of the Straits Times and the Free Press of here, and after being thus assembled, after a musical selection, I read the following speech in French:—

“‘His Excellency, The Consul General of the United States of America in Singapore:

“‘Your Excellency: The Filipinos of all social classes residing in this port, have come to greet Your Excellency as the genuine representative of the great and powerful American Republic in order to express to you our eternal gratitude for the moral and material support given by Admiral Dewey to our General Aguinaldo in his campaign for the liberty of eight million Filipinos. The latter and we ourselves hope that the United States, your nation, persevering in its humanitarian policy, will without cessation and (with) decided energy continue to support the programme agreed upon in Singapore between Your Excellency and General Aguinaldo, that is to say, the Independence of the Philippine Islands, under an American protectorate. Accept our cordial acknowledgments and congratulations on being the first one in accepting and supporting this idea which time and events have well developed to the great satisfaction of our nation. Finally, we request you, Most Excellent Sir, to express to your worthy President and the American Republic, our sincere acknowledgments and our fervent wishes for their prosperity. I have concluded.’

“The Consul replied hereto in French, in more or less the following terms:—

“‘You have nothing to thank me for, because I have only faithfully followed the instructions received from my Government; the fact of the sudden departure of your General will permit you to infer that I have done so. I shall in any case inform my Government of your good wishes and I thank you in its name. You know that your wishes are mine also, and for this reason at the last interview I had with Mr. Aguinaldo, I repeated to him that he should observe the greatest humanity possible in the war, in order that our army, our soldiers, our nation and all the other nations may see that you are humane and not savages, as has erroneously been believed.’

“After this there was enthusiastic applause for the Consul; he offered us all cigars, glasses of very fine sherry, and lemonade for the musicians and the majority. The toasts were offered with the sherry by your humble servant, Sres. Cannon, Enríquez, Celio, Reyes, the Consul, the editors of the Free Press, Straits Times and Mr. Bray. We drank to America and her humanitarian work of redemption; to the Philippines with America; we gave thanks to the Consul, to Mr. Bray as an important defender; we drank to the Free Press for taking such an interest in our affairs, and to the Straits Times (sarcastically); but I was very careful not to propose a toast to our general, which was done at the proper time by ‘Flaco’[18] when we gave three cheers; for the sake of courtesy we cheered for England, which had been so hospitable to us, and when everybody had become quiet, the Editor of the Straits Times took his glass in his hand and cried in a loud voice, ‘The Philippine Republic,’ to which we all responded. ‘Flaco’ disappeared a moment, and when he returned he brought with him the American flag, and formally presented it to us in French, which I interpreted to all in Spanish, as follows: ‘Gentlemen: The American Consul, with his deep affection for us, presents us this flag as the greatest and most expressive remembrance which he can give us. The red stripes stand for the generous blood of her sons, shed to obtain her liberty; the white stripes stand for her virginity and purity as our country; the blue background indicates the sky and each star represents a free and independent State; this is America, and the Consul is desirous that we also should have so glorious a history as hers and that it may be as brilliant as could be wished, securing peace with respect, and may God be our help and guide in securing liberty. Viva and with it our most sincere thanks for so signal a courtesy.’ Hereupon, to the surprise of everybody as no one expected it, the Consul requested that some Filipino airs be played which seemed to please him very much. Finally, about 6.15, we left, very well satisfied with the reception accorded us and the kindness of the Consul. Mr. Bray asked me for the text of my speech, which I insert above and I secured from the Consul his French text, which I enclose in my letter to Naning. Without anything further for the present, awaiting your reply and your opinion as to the above, as also orders and instructions for the future, I am,

“Yours, etc.

(Signed) “Isidoro de los Santos.”

To this letter Major Taylor has appended the following note:—

“(Note by Compiler.—In a letter written in Tagalog to Aguinaldo on June 6 by Santos he describes the American consul general as having cried out ‘Hurrah for General Aguinaldo, hurrah for the Republic of the Philippines’ and then, having apparently taken several drinks, he passed up and down the room waving the American flag before giving it to the assembled Filipinos (P.I.R., 406.7).)”[19]

This final statement does not present the representative of the United States government at Singapore in a very favourable light, but I take the facts as I find them. If now we compare the speech actually made by Dr. Santos with Blount’s version of it, we shall find that with the exception of the words “eternal gratitude” the passages which he encloses in quotation marks are not in the original at all. The glories of independence are not alluded to, nor is there so much as a suggestion that Aguinaldo had been enabled to arouse eight millions of Filipinos to take up arms, which he certainly had not done.

Dr. Santos in his speech did resort to a stereotyped Filipino procedure so very commonly employed that those of us who have dealt much with his people have learned to meet it almost automatically. It consists in referring to one’s having said just exactly what one did not say, and then if one fails to note the trap and avoid it, in claiming that because one did not deny the allegation one has admitted its truth.

Aguinaldo himself later repeatedly resorted to this procedure in his dealings with Dewey and others.

In the present instance Santos employed it rather cleverly when he expressed the hope that the United States would “continue to support the programme agreed upon in Singapore, between your Excellency and General Aguinaldo, that is to say, the independence of the Philippine Islands under an American protectorate.”

Now if this was agreed to, Aguinaldo later constantly violated his part of the agreement, for we shall see that he stated over and over again, in correspondence with members of the junta and others, that a protectorate would be considered only if absolute independence finally proved unattainable, but there is no reason to believe that any such agreement was made.

Dr. Santos read his speech to Mr. Pratt in French. Blount implies, whether rightly or wrongly I do not know, that Pratt’s knowledge of French was poor. At all events Pratt in his reply made not the slightest reference to the hope expressed by Santos that the United States would continue to support the programme which Santos said had been agreed upon between Pratt and Aguinaldo, and claim of a promise of independence based on these speeches must obviously be abandoned. There is no doubt that Pratt personally sympathized with the ambitions of the Filipino leaders, and openly expressed his sympathy on this and other occasions, but to do this was one thing and to have attempted to compromise his government would have been another and very different one. The shrewd Filipinos with whom he was dealing understood this difference perfectly well.

It is a regrettable fact that there exists some reason to believe that his sympathy was not purely disinterested. Aguinaldo claims that Pratt wished to be appointed “representative of the Philippines in the United States to promptly secure the official recognition of our independence” and that he promised him “a high post in the customs service.”[20]

It will be noted that several sentences and phrases in Blount’s statement are enclosed in quotation marks. From what were they quoted? The next paragraph in his book tells us:—

“Says the newspaper clipping which has preserved the Pratt oration: At the conclusion of Mr. Pratt’s speech, refreshments were served, and as the Filipinos, being Christians, drink alcohol, there was no difficulty in arranging as to refreshments.”[21]

The use of this clipping from the Singapore Free Press illustrates admirably Blount’s methods. The Free Press had at first displayed a marked coldness toward the insurgent cause, but its editor, Mr. St. Clair, was opportunely “seen” by Bray, who reported that as a result of his visit, both the editor and the paper would thereafter be friendly, and they were. In other words, the Free Press became the Singapore organ of the insurrection, and its editor, according to Bray, “a true and loyal friend” of Aguinaldo.

Typical Insurgent Trenches

The Insurgents built long lines of well-constructed trenches from which they could escape without exposing themselves to the fire of the American troops.

Blount claims to have made “an exhaustive examination of the records of that period.”[22] Why then did he use as evidence a newspaper clipping from an Insurgent organ, instead of Santos’s letter?

Blount endeavours to make capital out of the fact that Pratt forwarded to the State Department a proclamation which he says was gotten up by the Insurgent leaders at Hongkong and sent to the Philippines in advance of Aguinaldo’s coming. He says that it was headed “America’s Allies” and quotes from it as follows:—

“Compatriots: Divine Providence is about to place independence within our reach.... The Americans, not from mercenary motives, but for the sake of humanity and the lamentations of so many persecuted people, have considered it opportune, etc. [Here follows a reference to Cuba.] At the present moment an American squadron is preparing to sail for the Philippines.... The Americans will attack by sea and prevent any reënforcements coming from Spain; ... we insurgents must attack by land. Probably you will have more than sufficient arms, because the Americans have arms and will find means to assist us. There where you see the American flag flying, assemble in numbers; they are our redeemers!”[23]

The translation that he used is that given in Senate Document No. 62, L. 60, and is none too accurate. He allows it to be inferred that this proclamation was actually issued. It was not. Its history is as follows:—

On May 16, 1898, J. M. Basa, a Filipino, who had lived in Hongkong since 1872, on account of his connection with the troubles of that year, wrote letters[24] to a number of friends recommending the widest possible circulation of a proclamation enclosed therewith, as an aid to the American policy in the Philippines “in the war against the tyrannical friars and the Spaniards.”

With these letters there were sent two different proclamations, each beginning with the words “Fellow Countrymen.” The first, which is the one referred to by Blount, continues:—

“Divine Providence places us in a position to secure our independence, and this under the freest form to which all individuals, all people, all countries, may aspire.

“The Americans, more for humanity than for self-interest, attentive to the complaints of so many persecuted Filipinos, find it opportune to extend to our Philippines their protective mantle, now that they find themselves obliged to break their friendship with the Spanish people, because of the tyranny they have exercised in Cuba, causing all Americans, with whom they have great commercial relations, enormous damages.

“At this moment an American fleet is prepared to go to the Philippines.

“We, your fellow-countrymen, fear that you will make use of your arms to fire upon the Americans. No, brothers; do not make such a mistake; rather (shoot) kill yourselves than treat our liberators as enemies.

“Do not pay attention to the decree of Primo de Rivera, calling on you to enlist for the war, for that will cost you your lives: rather die than act as ingrates toward our redeemers, the Americans.

“Note well that the Americans have to attack by sea, at the same time avoiding reinforcements which may come from Spain; therefore the insurrection must attack by land. Perhaps you will have more than sufficient arms, as the Americans have arms, and will find the means to aid you.

“Whenever you see the American flag, bear in mind that they are our redeemers.”[25]

On the margin is written: “Viva, for America with the Philippines!”

Apparently what Basa here means by independence is independence from Spain, for it is known that he was in favour of annexation to the United States, and in the second proclamation we find the following:—

“This is the best opportunity which we have ever had for contriving that our country (all the Philippine Archipelago) may be counted as another Star in the Great Republic of the United States, great because of its wisdom, its wealth, and its constitutional laws.

“Now is the time to offer ourselves to that great nation. With America we shall have development in the broadest sense (of advancement) in civilization.

“With America we shall be rich, civilized and happy.

“Fellow patriots, add your signatures to those which have already been given. Explain to all our fellow countrymen the benefits of this change, which will be blessed by Heaven, by men and by our children.

“Viva America with the Philippines!!!”[26]

The letters were undoubtedly given to Aguinaldo for delivery on his arrival. They were never delivered, and it is reasonable to suppose, especially as Basa, who was a man of importance and means, was a member of the group who desired annexation to the United States, that Aguinaldo took the letters along in order to avoid a rupture with him and then quietly suppressed them. Obviously, however, he sent or gave a copy of the first one to Pratt, presumably without the written words: “Viva, for America with the Philippines!”

And now comes a bit of evidence as to what occurred at Singapore which I consider incontrovertible.

Aguinaldo returned promptly to Hongkong and on May 4, 1898, a meeting of the junta was held. The minutes of this meeting,[27] signed by each of the several Filipinos present, form a part of the Insurgent records which have come into the possession of the United States Government. They state among other things that:—

“The temporary Secretary read the minutes of the preceding meeting, which were approved. The temporary President reported that D. Emilio Aguinaldo had just arrived from Singapore and it became necessary for him to take possession of the office to which he has been elected.”

After the transaction of some further business Aguinaldo was summoned, appeared at the meeting, and was duly installed as President. Then:—

“The President described the negotiations which took place during his absence in Singapore with the American Consul of that English colony. Both agreed that the President should confer with the Admiral commanding the American squadron in Mirs Bay, and if the latter should accept his propositions, advantageous, in his judgment, to the Philippines, he would go to said country in one of the cruisers which form the fleet for the purpose of taking part in the present events. And as he did not find the Admiral, he thought it well to have an interview with the American Consul of this colony on the day of his arrival, but was not satisfied with such interview.

“Considering the critical conditions in the Philippines at present, he begged the committee to discuss the advisability of his going to said islands with all the leaders of prominence in the last rebellion residing in this colony, in case the Admiral gave them an opportunity to do so.”

Note that there is here absolutely not one word of any promise of independence made to Aguinaldo by Pratt or any one else. Is it conceivable that Aguinaldo in describing “the negotiations which took place during his absence in Singapore with the American Consul of the English Colony” would, by any chance, have failed to inform his associates in Hongkong of such an extraordinary and fortunate occurrence as the promising by Mr. Pratt and Admiral Dewey that the United States would recognize Philippine independence?

Sandico[28] thought that Aguinaldo ought to go, for—

“From conferences which he had with the Admiral of the American fleet and with the American Consul in this colony, he believed that under present conditions it was absolutely necessary for the President to go to the Philippines, since, according to the American Consul, Manila had been taken by said fleet, and a provisional government was now being formed in that capital. The intervention of the President in the formation of that government is undoubtedly essential, since his prestige, which everybody recognizes, would evidently prevent dissensions among the sons of the country, and it would be possible thereby to obtain a perfect organization both for the military and civil evolution of that country.

“Srs. Garchitorena[29] and Apacible[30] expressed themselves in similar terms. Notwithstanding the previous remarks, the President insisted that he considered it reckless for him to go to the Philippines without first making a written agreement with the Admiral, as it might happen, if he placed himself at his orders, that he might make him subscribe to or sign a document containing proposals highly prejudicial to the interests of the country, from which might arise the following two very grave contingencies:

“1st. If he should accept them, he would undoubtedly commit an unpatriotic act, and his name would justly be eternally cursed by the Filipinos.

“2d. If he should refuse, then the break between the two would be evident.

“And to avoid this sad dilemma, he proposed to the committee that the four parties (?) of the insurgents now here, under charge of the competent chiefs authorized in writing by him, should go to the Philippines to intervene, after a conference with the Admiral, in these important questions; such means, in his opinion, should be first employed to ascertain in an authentic manner what the intentions of the United States in regard to that country are; and if his intervention is absolutely necessary, he would not object to go at once to the Philippines, endeavouring by all the means in his power to remedy the critical condition of the country, to which he had offered, and always would willingly offer, to sacrifice his life.”

Why adopt means to learn from the admiral what the intentions of the United States were in regard to the Philippines if both he and Pratt had already promised recognition of independence?

“Srs. Sandico, Garchitorena, Gonzaga[31] and Apacible replied that they were fully convinced the Admiral of the American squadron would furnish the President all the arms which he might desire, since the former was convinced that the fleet could do nothing in the Philippines unless it were used in conjunction with the insurgents in the development of their plans of war against the Spanish government.... The authority to treat which the President desired to give to the other chiefs, without reflecting at all upon their personal qualifications, they did not believe would be as efficacious as his personal intervention which is necessary in grave affairs, such as those the subject of discussion; there would be no better occasion than that afforded them to insure the landing of the expeditionary forces on those islands and to arm themselves at the expense of the Americans and to assure the situation of the Philippines in regard to our legitimate aspirations against those very people. The Filipino people, unprovided with arms, would be the victims of the demands and exactions of the United States; but, provided with arms, would be able to oppose themselves to them, struggling for independence, in which consists the true happiness of the Philippines. And they finished by saying that it made no difference if the Spanish government did demand the return of the ₱400,000, and if the demand were allowed in an action, since the object of the sum would be obtained by the Admiral furnishing the Filipinos the arms which they required for the struggle for their legitimate aspirations.”

Here, then, was a definite plan to obtain arms from the Americans to be used if necessary “against those very people” later.

“The President, with his prestige in the Philippines, would be able to arouse those masses to combat the demands of the United States, if they colonized that country, and would drive them, if circumstances rendered it necessary, to a Titanic struggle for their independence, even if they should succumb in shaking off the yoke of a new oppressor. If Washington proposed to carry out the fundamental principles of its constitution, there was no doubt that it would not attempt to colonize the Philippines, or even to annex them. It was probable then that it would give them independence and guarantee it; in such case the presence of the President was necessary, as he would prevent dissensions among the sons of the country who sought office, who might cause the intervention of European powers, an intervention which there was no reason to doubt would be highly prejudicial to the interests of the country.... What injury could come to the Philippines, even if we admitted that the Admiral would not give arms to the President on account of his refusal to sign a document prejudicial to the country, after he had taken all means to provide for her defence? None. Such an act of the President could not be censured, but, on the other hand, would be most meritorious, because it would be one proof more of his undoubted patriotism.”

Not one word of any promise of independence do we find in this remarkable document. On the contrary it furnishes conclusive proof that no such promise had been made and that the future relations between Filipinos and Americans were still completely uncertain.

Inside View of Insurgent Trenches at the Bagbag River

And now comes some direct evidence. Bray and St. Clair, the latter the editor of the Insurgent organ in Singapore, were present on the occasion when independence was said to have been promised by Pratt. Bray subsequently declared in the most positive terms that it was promised. St. Clair wrote him a letter taking him roundly to task for this claim, in the following very interesting terms:—

“I felt it to be my duty to let Pratt know that you still hold that you and Santos have evidence that will controvert his, (and) he was, of course, extremely disappointed, because he (is) quite aware of what took place in Spanish, and as to turning of his conversation into a pretense of agreement he knows nothing. He says very truly: ‘My own party, the Democrats, will say if they read this book—If this man takes it upon himself to be a Plenipotentiary without authority, we had better not employ him any more—I frankly cannot understand your action, as to its unwisdom I have no doubt at all.’

“Admiral Dewey goes home, it is believed, to advise the President on Naval and Colonial Affairs, he knows exactly what did take place and what did not, and I should know if he had any ground to think that the slightest promise was made by Pratt to Aguinaldo he would declare it unauthorized and decline to sanction it. I am certain Pratt reported what he supposed took place accurately; he had no surety on what you might have said, naturally.

“And, curiously, you never mentioned to me anything of the agreement as having taken place then, nor in the paper you communicated to me was there any mention of one, nor did Pratt know of any. It is only more recently that the fiction took shape. ‘The wish father to the thought,’ or the statement repeated till it has become believed by the—,[32] this is common.

“Now I would like to urge you, from the practical point of view, to drop any such foolishness. The vital thing, and nothing else counts, is what Dewey said and did when he at last met Aguinaldo. That, that, that, is the thing, all else is empty wind.

“Supposing that Pratt and Wildman had covered inches of paper with ‘Clauses’ and put on a ton of sealing wax as consular seals, what, pray, to any common sense mind would all that have been worth? Nothing!! Nothing!! And yet, where is the agreement, where is the seal? Where are there any signatures? And if you had them—waste paper—believe me, that all this potter about Pratt and Wildman is energy misdirected. The sole thing to have impressed upon the public in America would be the chaining of Dewey and Aguinaldo together as participants in common action; you surely comprehend this means! Think and think again; it means success as far as it is possible. The other work is not only lost, but does not gain much sympathy, especially this criticism of the conduct of American troops; things may be true that are not expedient to say. Sink everything into Dewey-Aguinaldo coöperation, that was on both sides honest even if it did not imply any actual arrangement, which, of course, Dewey himself could not make. That here you have the facts,—undenied—incontrovertible.”[33]

The following letter of Bray to Aguinaldo, dated January 12, 1899, seems to me to throw much light on the question of how these claims relative to the promised recognition of Filipino independence sometimes originated and were bolstered up:—

“With regard to your proclamation, there is still a trump card to be played. Did you not say that the basis of any negotiation in Singapore was the Independence of the Philippines under an American protectorate? This is what Consul Pratt telegraphed and to which Dewey and Washington agreed; as I figured up the ‘price’ of the telegram, I know very well what occurred, and I am ready to state it and to swear to it when the proper time comes. There are five of us against one in the event of Consul Pratt receiving instructions to deny it. Furthermore, Mr. St. Clair knows what happened and I am certain that he also would testify. St. Clair still has the rough draft as an historical relic, and St. Clair is a true and loyal friend of yours, as is your humble servant.”[34]

The utter unscrupulousness of Bray is shown by his claim that St. Clair would confirm his false statements, made as it was after receiving St. Clair’s letter above quoted.

But Bray did not wait for Aguinaldo to play this trump card. He tried to play it himself by cabling Senator Hoar, on the same day, that as the man who introduced General Aguinaldo to the American government through the consul at Singapore he was prepared to swear that the conditions under which Aguinaldo promised to cooperate with Dewey were independence under a protectorate.[35]

Let us now trace Aguinaldo’s subsequent movements, and see what promises, if any, were made to him by Wildman and Dewey. He had returned to Hongkong with two companions, all travelling under assumed names. Only his most trusted friends among the members of the junta were at first allowed to know where he was living.

His situation was a difficult one. It was necessary for him to come to some sort of a temporary arrangement with Artacho, if he was to avoid legal difficulties, and to reëstablish himself with some of his companions, who had accused him of deserting with the intention of going to Europe to live on money which belonged to them. When harmony had been temporarily restored through the good offices of Sandico, Aguinaldo had an interview with Consul General Wildman. He has since claimed that Wildman, too, promised him independence, but the truth seems to be that he himself said he was anxious to become an American citizen. This being impossible, he wanted to return to the Philippines and place himself under Dewey’s orders. He wanted to help throw off the yoke of Spain, and this done, would abide by the decision of the United States as to the fate of the Philippines.[36]

Any claim that Aguinaldo had been promised independence by Wildman, or, indeed, that the latter had been allowed to know that the Filipinos desired it, seems to me to be negatived, not only by Wildman’s own statements, but by a letter from Agoncillo to Aguinaldo written on August 5, 1908, in which he says:—

“The American consul left my house to-day at 3 o’clock, as I had requested an interview with him before his departure, and I was unable to go to the Consulate on account of the swelling of my feet. From our conversation I infer that independence will be given to us. I did not, however, disclose to him our true desires.... Said consul approved my telegram to McKinley, which has been sent to-day through him, a copy of which is herewith enclosed. If they accept our representative in the commission, we may arrive at a friendly understanding, and it will enable us to prepare for the fight in case they refuse to listen to our request. On the other hand, if at the very beginning they refuse to admit our representative, we will at once be in a position to know what should be done, i.e. to prepare for war.”[37]

On May 4, 1898, the Hongkong junta voted that Aguinaldo ought to go to the Philippines, and go he did. It would seem that he at first gave up the idea of joining Dewey, for on May 11 he wrote a cipher letter, giving minute directions for the preparation of signals to assist his ship in making land, by day or by night, at Dingalan Bay on the east coast of Luzon; directing the capture of the town of San Antonio, just back of Capones Islands, in Zambales, and ending with the words: “We will surely arrive at one of the two places above mentioned, so you must be prepared.”

Something led him again to change his mind, and he finally sailed on the McCulloch.

In his “Reseña Verídica” written later for political purposes, Aguinaldo has definitely claimed that Dewey promised him that the United States would recognize the independence of the Filipino people. I will let him tell his own story, confronting his statements with those of the admiral.

“May 19, 1898.

“The McCulloch started at eleven o’clock on the morning of the 17th of May for the Philippines; we anchored, between twelve and one o’clock on the afternoon of the 19th, in the waters of Cavite, and immediately the launch of the Admiral—with his aid and private secretary—came to convey me to the Olympia, where I was received, with my aid, Sr. Leyva, with the honors of a general, by a section of marine guards.”[38]

Relative to this matter, Admiral Dewey has testified:[39]

“The Chairman. You, of course, never saluted the flag?

Admiral Dewey. Certainly not; and I do not think I ever called Aguinaldo anything but Don Emilio; I don’t think I ever called him ‘General.’

The Chairman. And when he came on board ship was he received with any special honors at the side?

Admiral Dewey. Never.”

The “Reseña Verídica” continues:—

“The Admiral received me in a salon, and after greetings of courtesy I asked him ‘if all the telegrams relative to myself which he had addressed to the Consul at Singapore, Mr. Pratt, were true.’ He replied in the affirmative, and added, ‘that the United States had come to the Philippines to protect its natives and free them from the yoke of Spain.’

He said, moreover, that ‘America was rich in territory and money, and needed no colonies,’ concluding by assuring me, ‘to have no doubt whatever about the recognition of Philippine independence by the United States.’ Thereupon he asked me if I could get the people to arise against the Spaniards and carry on a rapid campaign.”[40]

As we have seen, Dewey sent only one telegram to Pratt about Aguinaldo. It merely directed that the latter be sent.

“I then expressed to him my profound acknowledgment for the generous help which the United States was giving the Filipino people, as well as my admiration for the magnificence and goodness of the American people. I also stated to him that ‘before leaving Hongkong, the Filipino Colony had held a meeting, at which was discussed and considered the possibility that—after defeating the Spaniards—the Filipinos might have a war with the Americans, if they should refuse to recognize our independence, who were sure to defeat us because they should find us tired out, poor in ammunitions and worn out in the war against the Spaniards,’ requesting that he pardon my frankness.

“The Admiral replied that he ‘was delighted at my sincerity, and believed that both Filipinos and Americans should treat each other as allies and friends, clearly explaining all doubts for the better understanding between both parties,’ and added that, ‘so he had been informed, the United States would recognize the independence of the Filipino people, guaranteed by the word of honor of the Americans,—more binding than documents which may remain unfulfilled when it is desired to fail in them as happened with the compacts signed by the Spaniards, advising me to form at once a Filipino national flag, offering in virtue thereof to recognize and protect it before the other nations, which were represented by the various squadrons then in the Bay; although he said we should conquer the power from the Spaniards before floating said flag, so that the act should be more honourable in the sight of the whole world, and, above all, before the United States, in order that when the Filipino ships with their national flag would pass before the foreign squadrons they should inspire respect and esteem.’

“Again I thanked the Admiral for his good advice and generous offers, informing him that if the sacrifice of my life was necessary to honor the Admiral before the United States, I was then ready to sacrifice it.

“I added that under such conditions I could assure him that all the Filipino people would unite in the revolution to shake off the yoke of Spain; that it was not strange that some few were not yet on his side on account of lack of arms or because of personal expediency.

“Thus ended this first conference with Admiral Dewey, to whom I announced that I would take up my residence at the Naval Headquarters in the Cavite Arsenal.”[41]

Further on, in the same document, Aguinaldo advances the claim that on the occasion of the visit of General Anderson and Admiral Dewey the latter again promised him independence.

He says:—

“In the same month of July, the Admiral, accompanied by General Anderson, presented himself, and after greetings of courtesy said to me: ‘You have seen confirmed all of what I promised and said to you. How pretty your flag is. It has a triangle, and it looks like Cuba’s. Will you give me one as a reminder when I return to America?’

“I replied to him that I was convinced of his word of honour and that there was no necessity whatever to draw up in documentary form his agreements, and as for the flag, that he could count on it, even at that very moment.

“Dewey continued: ‘Documents are not complied with when there is no honour, as has happened with your agreement with the Spaniards, who have failed in what was written and signed. Trust in my word for I hold myself responsible that the United States will recognize the independence of the country. But I recommend to you [plural.—TR.] to keep everything which we have talked about and agreed upon with a great deal of secrecy for the present. And, moreover, I entreat you [plural.—TR.] to be patient if our soldiers should insult some Filipino, because, as volunteers, they are yet lacking in discipline.’”[42]

Admiral Dewey has testified as follows, concerning the recognition of Philippine independence by him:—

“The Chairman. You remember the question of your recognizing his republic was a good deal discussed and you wrote me a letter, which I read in the senate. Of course, I am only asking now about what you said in the letter. There was no recognition of the republic?

“Admiral Dewey. Never. I did not think I had any authority to do it and it never occurred to me to do it. There was a sort of a reign of terror; there was no government. These people had got power for the first time in their lives and they were riding roughshod over the community. The acts of cruelty which were brought to my notice were hardly credible. I sent word to Aguinaldo that he must treat his prisoners kindly, and he said he would.”

General Henry W. Lawton

This photograph was taken by the author at General Lawton’s Manila residence, two months before his death.

He has further testified that he never as much as heard of independence until the appearance of Aguinaldo’s proclamation of June 15, 1898:—

“Admiral Dewey.... Then when I heard that our troops were coming I asked him to withdraw his troops from Cavite and make room for our men. He demurred at this, but finally withdrew and established headquarters across the bay at a place called Bacoor, from which place on the 15th of June he sent me a proclamation declaring the independence of the Philippines.

“The Chairman. Was that the first?

“Admiral Dewey. That was the first intimation; the first I had ever heard of independence of the Philippines.

“The Chairman. He had said something to you—

“Admiral Dewey. Not a word. He had done what I told him. He was most obedient; whatever I told him to do he did. I attached so little importance to this proclamation that I did not even cable its contents to Washington, but forwarded it through the mails. I never dreamed that they wanted independence.”

Remembering that Admiral Dewey was not being interrogated as to the statements of the “Reseña Veridica,” it will be seen that he has, nevertheless, covered them fully.

It was my good fortune to be long and intimately associated with Admiral Dewey while serving on the first Philippine commission. He always grew indignant when the subject of any promises relative to independence said to have been made by him was so much as mentioned, and gave to the commission in writing the following:—

“The statement of Emilio Aguinaldo, under date of Sept. 23, published in the Springfield Republican, so far as it relates to reported conversations with me, or actions of mine, is a tissue of falsehood. I never, directly or indirectly, promised the Filipinos independence. I never received Aguinaldo with military honors, or recognized or saluted the so-called Filipino flag. I never considered him as an ally, although I did make use of him and the natives to assist me in my operations against the Spaniards.”[43]

As Dewey’s allegations flatly contradict those of Aguinaldo, we must choose between the two. While I have no doubt as to where the choice will fall, I will now submit some additional matter of interest. Let us first consider the history of the “Reseña Verídica” in which Aguinaldo makes the charges above quoted. On September 12, 1899, Buencamino wrote of it to Apacible in Hongkong, saying:—

“This work is entitled ‘Reseña Verídica de la Revolución Filipina’ in which Don Emilio relates in detail his acts with Admiral Dewey. It has been distributed to the Consuls and you are ordered to reprint it there translated into English and send some copies to the United States, even though only a thousand, if you deem it advisable. Send copies also to Europe, Señor Agoncillo taking charge of the publication. If the Agent you may have selected for the United States should still be there, it would be advisable for him to take a copy of the pamphlet with him for its publication.

“This is an order of the Government which I take pleasure in transmitting to you for due execution.”[44]

But there was a change of heart about giving the pamphlet to the consuls, for under date of September 30 Buencamino wrote:—

“We have not distributed them here in order that Otis may not counteract the effects that we desire to produce with this publication, through his usual machinations. Nor do we believe it advisable to make this pamphlet public in those colonies before your arrival in the United States.”[45]

To this letter he added in cipher the following postscript to Pablo Ocampo, in charge of Aguinaldo’s correspondence in Manila:—

“At last moment—Nota bene:

“Don’t deliver any copy of the ‘Reseña Verídica’ to the Consuls, even though it was so directed in the beginning of the letter. All except one, which is for you, will be sent to Hong-kong, Don Pedro de la Viña being bearer of the same, as also of the other documents. The copy intended for you is neither to be divulged nor published, for strict reserve is required until those which are being sent arrive at their destination.”[46]

The reason for preserving such secrecy relative to this document until it could reach its destination and work its harm is of course obvious. Its statements were so outrageously false that they would have been instantly and authoritatively contradicted had it been issued seasonably at Manila.

The truth is that Aguinaldo’s claim that he had been promised independence was a gradual growth. Let us trace it.

On May 21, he wrote a circular letter to “My dear brother,” inviting the recipients and their companions to meet him at once, and arrange the best way to entrap all the enemy in their homes.

In this he says that he has promised the American admiral that they will “carry on modern war” and adds: “Even if a Spaniard surrenders, he must be pardoned and treated well, and then you will see that our reputation will be very good in all Europe, which will declare for our independence; but if we do not conduct ourselves thus, the Americans will decide to sell us or else divide up our territory. As they will hold us incapable of governing our land, we shall not secure our liberty, rather the contrary; our own soil will be delivered over to other hands.”[47]

In this letter, written on the very day of the interview at which he subsequently claimed that Admiral Dewey had promised independence, does he make any claim that this had occurred? No, he very distinctly implies the contrary. Is it believable that if he could truly have said “The United States, through its representatives Dewey and Pratt, has promised to recognize our independence” he would have failed to do so when this would instantly have secured him the vigorous support which he was then uncertain of obtaining? I think not.

In this letter Aguinaldo specifically directs that deceit be employed and that Spanish officers be treacherously attacked. The practising of deceit was a carefully considered part of the insurgent policy. In a letter from Hongkong dated July 21, 1898, Agoncillo writes as follows to Mabini:[48]—

“the time will come when disguises must be set aside and we will see who is deceiving whom. The statements made by some of the commanders of the fleet here to Don Emilio and myself were to the effect that the exclusive purpose of the Government at Washington with regard to the Filipinos, is to grant this country independence, without any conditions, although I said to myself that such a purpose was too philanthropical. Don Emilio knew what I thought then, and I still think the same; that is to say that we are the ones who must secure the independence of our country by means of unheard of sacrifices and thus work out its happiness.”[49]

Aguinaldo himself frankly advocated the use of deceit. He practised what he preached. Simeon Villa, one of his companions on his subsequent flight through Northern Luzon, before he finally took refuge at Palanan, kept a diary, which constitutes an official record of this long journey. In it he has inserted some bits of history of other days, of which none is more interesting than his account of the beginning of hostilities against the Spaniards, in August, 1896. From it we learn that Aguinaldo, who was known to the friar of his town to be both a mason and a chief of the Katipúnan, was in danger during August, and on the night of the 29th of that month called a meeting of all the compromised persons of the place, who agreed that on the following day he should “make representations to the governor of the province.” Villa says that he was greatly beloved by the governor and his wife. Early on the following morning, he “presented himself to the governor, and in the name of the people of Cavite Viejo, offered him their respects and their loyalty to Spain,” at the same time asking a garrison of a hundred men for his town, which the governor promised to send at once if the captain-general approved.

That afternoon he reported the results of his efforts to his fellow-conspirators, “and told them that then was the opportune moment for rising against the Spaniards.” He initiated the uprising himself the next morning.[50]

Could deceit be more deliberately practised or treachery more frankly employed?

I have indulged in this digression to show that Aguinaldo could hardly have complained had the methods which he used against others been employed against him. He was never deceived by the Americans, but his claims relative to independence grew rapidly, and he was soon deceiving his own people.

On May 24th, he issued no less than four proclamations. One of these, doubtless intended to be seen by Americans, made no mention of Independence, but said:[51]—

“The great powerful North American nation has offered its disinterested protection to secure the liberty of this country.”

In another proclamation, doubtless intended for a different use, he made the statement that the great North American nation had come to give decisive and disinterested protection, “considering us as sufficiently civilized and capable of governing ourselves.”[52]

On June 5, having practically gained control of Cavite Province, he felt strong enough to announce that independence would be proclaimed on June 12, and on that date he did proclaim it in a decree.

Feeding Filipino Refugees

Before the Insurgent troops retired from Paranñaque near Manila, they plundered their own people and left them without food. Our army fed them. This photograph shows a typical scene when food distribution was about to begin.

The Admiral of the American Squadron, with the commanders and officers of his command, was invited to the ceremonies, but none of them went. As it was important for Aguinaldo to have some one there to pose as a representative of the United States, he utilized for this purpose a certain “Colonel” Johnson, an ex-hotel keeper of Shanghai, who was running a cinematograph show. He appeared as Aguinaldo’s chief of artillery and the representative of the North American nation.[53]

Even as late as October 3, 1898, Agoncillo in a memorandum addressed to President McKinley did not claim that independence had been promised, but said:—

“As soon as the Spanish-American war began, the American representatives and officials in Singapore, Hongkong and Manila, invited the natives of the Philippines to assist the American arms, which they did gladly and loyally, as allies, with the conviction that their personality would be recognized, as well as their political, autonomous and sovereign rights.”[54]

In it he does, however, claim that the organization of a government independent of America and Spain was accomplished with the tacit consent of the admiral commanding the fleet and with that of the general and military and political commanders of the United States of North America in the Philippines.

“Who, knowing these facts, not only did not object but accepted them as a consummated legal act, and maintained official relations with the new organization, making use thereof in its subsequent actions and for the subsequent development of the campaign, which was consequently brought to such a happy end.”[55]

This is a second illustration of the stereotyped insurgent procedure of announcing a policy and then claiming that failure to attack it meant acquiescence in it. Admiral Dewey says that he did not even read this proclamation. There was no reason why he should have done so, as it did not deal with matters which he was authorized to settle. He had no instructions relative to the recognition of new governments, and he sent this document to Washington without comment, as he should have done.[56]

Apropos of this claim that American officers tacitly recognized the Insurgent government, certain passages from an unsigned document in the handwriting of Mabini, prepared about July 15, 1898, are of interest. Mabini, speaking of the attitude of the Americans, says, “Notwithstanding all this and in spite of their protestations of friendship, they have always refused to recognize that government.” Also, “If they persist in refusing to recognize our government, we shall see ourselves compelled to come to an agreement with any other government that will consent to recognize us on friendly terms.”[57]

This statement is certainly sufficiently specific as to whether Americans had recognized the Insurgent government on or before the date when it was written.

Let us now consider the relations between Aguinaldo and General Anderson.

Blount attempts to make much of a cablegram, sent by the latter, in which, after describing the Filipinos, he adds, “The people expect independence.” Blount says:—

“That cablegram of July 22nd, above quoted, in which the commanding general of our forces in the Philippines advises the Washington Government, ‘The people expect independence’ is the hardest thing in the public archives of our government covering that momentous period for those who love the memory of Mr. McKinley to get around. After the war with the Filipinos broke out, McKinley said repeatedly in public speeches, ‘I never dreamed they would turn against us.’”[58]

If there is nothing harder than this to get around the memory of President McKinley will not suffer, as the important thing is not what Aguinaldo had led his people to expect, but what the American officials had promised him. The President was certainly not bound to believe that the Filipinos would turn against us even if they did then expect independence. Blount has seen fit to leave unmentioned certain other facts which are very pertinent in this connection.

Apparently sometime during September, 1898, Sandico made the following statement in a letter to Aguinaldo:—

“I also have to inform you that Señores Basa, Cortés and Co. have congratulated the Government of the United States upon the capture of Manila, stating at the same time that now that Filipino soil had been soaked with American blood, the Islands must remain American. I believe that a telegram should be sent immediately, to counteract that sent by them.”[59]

Probably Sandico did not know that on August 15, 1898, Agoncillo had transmitted another telegram to President McKinley through Consul-General Wildman, reading as follows:—

“Agoncillo, my Commissioner and Ambassador-Extraordinary, representing the provisional government of the Philippine Islands, in its name and the name of its President, Emilio Aguinaldo, congratulates you on the successful termination of the war, and commends the occupancy of Manila. I assure the United States of the allegiance and unquestioning support of our people, and petition that we be granted one or more representatives on the commission that is to decide the future of our Islands.”[60]

It would appear, therefore, that the President had more information on this subject than was transmitted by General Anderson!

Not only did the latter passively refrain from recognizing Aguinaldo’s pretensions, but on July 22, 1898, he wrote to him as follows:—

“I observe that your Excellency has announced yourself Dictator and proclaimed martial law. As I am here simply in a military capacity, I have no authority to recognize such an assumption. I have no orders from my government on the subject.”[61]

The effort to keep Americans in ignorance of the true state of affairs was kept up until further deception was useless. Consul Williams, for instance, wrote on June 16, 1898:—

“For future advantage, I am maintaining cordial relations with General Aguinaldo, having stipulated submissiveness to our forces when treating for their return here. Last Sunday, 12th, they held a council to form provisional government. I was urged to attend, but thought best to decline. A form of government was adopted, but General Aguinaldo told me today that his friends all hoped that the Philippines would be held as a colony of the United States of America.”[62]

Yet on Sunday, June 12, Aguinaldo had in reality proclaimed the independence of the Philippines. Few Americans at this time knew any Spanish and none understood Tagalog, so that it was comparatively easy to deceive them. What Consul Williams reported was what Aguinaldo considered it expedient to have him believe.

The following undated letter from Aguinaldo to Mabini, supposed to have been sent at this time, is of especial interest in this connection:—

“My dear Brother: I do not want to go there [where the addressee is] until after the visit of the American Consul, because I do not wish the negotiations to end in an ultimatum, and in order that you may tell him all that is favourable for the cause of our Nation. I charge you with the task of giving him a reply, and if he should ask about me tell him that since the time of his last visit there I have not recovered from my illness. If anything important should happen we can communicate with each other by telegraph, using a code in matters that require secrecy.”[63]

In a letter supposed to have been written during November, 1898, prepared for Aguinaldo’s signature and addressed to Señor McKinley, President of the Republic of the United States of North America, but apparently never sent, Aguinaldo renews the charge[64] previously made in his “Reseñia Verídica,” that Pratt and Dewey promised independence. It need not be further discussed.

The climax was finally reached in an official protest against the Paris Treaty written by Agoncillo in Paris on the 12th of December, 1898, in which occurs the following:—

“The United States of America, on their part, cannot allege a better right to constitute themselves as arbitrators as to the future of the Philippines.

“On the contrary, the demands of honour and good faith impose on them the explicit recognition of the political status of the people, who, loyal to their conventions, were a devoted ally of their forces in the moments of danger and strife. The noble general Emilio Aguinaldo and the other Filipino chiefs were solicited to place themselves at the head of the suffering and heroic sons of that country, to fight against Spain and to second the action of the brave and skilful Admiral Dewey.

“At the time of employing their armed coöperation, both the Commander of the Petrel and Captain Wood in Hongkong, before the declaration of war, the American Consuls-General Mr. Pratt in Singapore, Mr. Wildman, in Hongkong, and Mr. Williams in Cavite, acting as international agents of the great American nation, at a moment of great anxiety offered to recognize the independence of the Filipino nation, as soon as triumph was obtained.

“Under the faith of such promises, an American man-of-war, the McCulloch was placed at the disposal of the said leaders and which took them to their native shores; and Admiral Dewey himself, by sending the man-of-war; by not denying to General Aguinaldo and his companions the exacting of his promises, when they were presented to him on board his flag-ship in the Bay of Manila; by receiving the said General Aguinaldo before and after his victories and notable deeds of arms, with the honours due the Commander-in-Chief of an allied army, and chief of an independent state; by accepting the efficacious coöperation of that Army and of those Generals; by recognizing the Filipino flag, and permitting it to be hoisted on sea and land, consenting that their ships should sail with the said flag within the places which were blockaded; by receiving a solemn notification of the formal proclamation of the Philippine nation, without protesting against it, nor opposing in any way its existence; by entering into relations with those Generals and with the national Filipino authorities recently established, recognized without question the corporated body and autonomous sovereignty of the people who had just succeeded in breaking their fetters and freeing themselves by the impulse of their own force.”[65]

It will be noted that the claim constantly grows. The commander of the Petrel Captain Wood, Consul Wildman and Consul Williams are now included among those alleged to have promised independence, and it is claimed that Aguinaldo was received with the honours due the chief of an independent state when he visited Admiral Dewey, whereas his own original claim was that he was received with the honours due a general, which is quite a different matter.

The First Philippine Commission

This photograph taken in the room where the commission held its hearings is the only one ever obtained which shows all the members. From left to right: the author, Colonel Charles Denby, President Jacob Gould Schurman, Mr. John R. MacArthur, Secretary to the Commission, Admiral George Dewey and General E.S. Otis.

As a matter of fact, American officers usually addressed and treated Aguinaldo as a general. The extent to which they were able to use his organization to further the ends of their government will be set forth later.

In a letter to Wildman, dated August 7, 1898, Aguinaldo admits that there is no agreement, but says that he cannot tell the peoples that it does not exist, “fearing that I may not be able to restrain the popular excitement.”[66] He begs Wildman to use his influence on his government so that it will realize the inadvisability of deciding the fate of the people “without considering their will duly represented by my government.” Is it conceivable that, if there had been any ground for claiming a promise of independence, Aguinaldo would have failed to mention it at this time?

We may summarize the well-established facts as follows:—

Consul-General Pratt was, or professed to be, in hearty sympathy with the ambition of the Filipino leaders to obtain independence, and would personally have profited from such a result, but he refrained from compromising his government and made no promises in its behalf.

Admiral Dewey never even discussed with Aguinaldo the possibility of independence.

There is no reason to believe that any subordinate of the Admiral ever discussed independence with any Filipino, much less made any promise concerning it.

Neither Consul Wildman nor Consul Williams promised it, and both were kept in ignorance of the fact that it was desired up to the last possible moment.

It is not claimed that either General Anderson or General Merritt made any promise concerning it.

The conclusion that no such promise was ever made by any of these men is fully justified by well-established facts.

Aguinaldo himself carefully refrained at the outset from saying, in any document which Americans could read, that independence had been promised, and advanced this claim only when the growing strength of his land force had given him confidence. He repeated it, with increasing emphasis, as his army increased in size, ultimately openly threatening war if his pretensions were not recognized. In doing this, he was merely carrying out a carefully prearranged plan, agreed upon by the Hongkong junta.

And now let us examine the claim that the insurgents were our “faithful allies” and “coöperated” with us in the taking of Manila. We shall find that this subject richly repays investigation.

[1] Beginning with the letters “P.I.R.”

[2] See pp. 53, 55, 68.

[3] See pp. 27, 47, 49, 63 of this book for repetitions and variations of this charge of Aguinaldo.

[4] See p. 31 of his book, “The American Occupation of the Philippines,” in referring to which I will hereafter use the word Blount, followed by a page number.

[5] U. S. Consul General Rounseville Wildman of Hongkong.

[6] U. S. Consul O. F. Williams of Manila.

[7] Blount, p. 43.

[8] A term, more or less corresponding to mayor, then applied to the ranking municipal officer of a pueblo or town.

[9] Eight hundred thousand Mexican dollars, the actual value of which constantly fluctuated.

[10] The Ilocanos are one of the eight civilized peoples who collectively make up the Filipinos. They number 803,942, and inhabit certain provinces in northern Luzon.

[11] I have not felt at liberty to correct spelling, capitalization, punctuation or grammar in quotations, except in the case of perfectly evident printer’s errors. It should be remembered that the results of Taylor’s work were left in the form of galley proof.

[12] Taylor, 42 F Z-43 F Z.

[13] For the history of this document, see [p. 51].

[14] P.I.R., 1300.2.

[15] Senate Document 62, part 1, Fifty-fifth Congress, Third Session, P. P. 341 et seq.

[16] Senate Document 62, part 1, Fifty-fifth Congress, Third Session; also P.I.R., 496.

[17] Blount, pp. 11–12.

[18] Pratt.

[19] P.I.R., 516. 4.

[20] “The Consul—after telling me that, before arriving in Hongkong harbor, a launch would be sent by the Admiral to secretly take us to the North American squadron, a secrecy which pleased me also, as it would avoid giving publicity to my acts—then advised me that I should appoint him the representative of the Philippines in the United States to promptly secure the official recognition of our independence. I answered that whenever the Philippine government should be formed, I would nominate him for the office he desired, although I considered that but small recompense for his aid, and that in case of our having the good fortune to secure our independence I would bestow upon him a high post in the customs service besides granting the commercial advantages and the participation in the expenses of the war which the Consul asked for his Government in Washington, since the Filipinos agreed in advance to what is here stated, considering it a proper testimonial of gratitude.”—P.I.R., 1300. 2.

[21] Blount, p. 12

[22] Blount, pp. 8–9.

[23] Ibid., p. 9.

[24] The following is one of them:—

“H. Kong, May 16, 1898.

“Señor Don Jose Enrique Basa:

“My Dear Enrique: As an aid to the American policy in the Philippines,—America being the most liberal and humanitarian nation in the world,—I earnestly recommend the widest possible circulation of the proclamation which I send herewith in order that the Americans may be supported in the war against the tyrannical friars and the Spaniards who have connived with them, and that public order, so necessary under the present conditions, be preserved.

“Thy relative, twenty-six years an emigrant.

(Signed) “J. M. Basa.”

—P.I.R., 1204–10.

[25] P.I.R., 1204–10.

[26] Ibid., 1204–10.

[27] P.I.R., 53–2.

[28] Teodoro Sandico, an influential Tagálog leader, who spoke English well and afterward served as a spy while employed by the Americans as an interpreter.

[29] Señor Garchitorena was a wealthy Tagálog of Manila, and, at this time, a prominent member of the Hongkong junta.

[30] Dr. Galicano Apacible, a very intelligent and rather conservative Tagálog physician. After Aguinaldo left Hongkong, he was the leading member of the junta.

[31] Sr. Graco Gonzaga, a prominent Filipino lawyer of the province of Cagayan.

[32] There is an illegible word in the original.

[33] P.I.R., 406–5.

[34] P.I.R., 398. 9.

[35]

“Hongkong, 12 Jan. 1899,—2 P.M.

“Senator Hoar, Washington.

“As the man who introduced General Aguinaldo to the American government through the consul at Singapore, I frankly state that the conditions under which Aguinaldo promised to cooperate with Dewey were independence under a protectorate. I am prepared to swear to this. The military party suborned correspondents are deceiving the American nation by means of malevolent lying statements. If your powerful influence does not change this insensate policy there will be a hopeless conflict with the inevitable results disastrous for the Americans.

“Bray.”

—P.I.R., 853–4.

[36] “Then Aguinaldo had an interview with the United States consul in Hongkong, in which he told him that he was anxious to become an American citizen, but this being impossible, he desired to be allowed to return to the Philippines and place himself under the orders of Commodore Dewey. According to the brother of that Consul, who certainly must have had opportunities for knowing the facts in the case, he made no demands for independence, but said that he hoped that the Americans would not leave the Filipinos to their fate, but would annex the Philippines and protect them against the Spaniards. He promised the Consul that he would fight with the Americans and not attempt to foment a revolution against the United States. His highest expressed aim was to throw off the Spanish yoke, and, that once accomplished, he would abide by the decision of the United States as to the ultimate disposition of the Philippines. If Aguinaldo had expressed his real intentions of obtaining arms and using them only for his own purposes, and, if he found it expedient, against the United States, it is not to be thought that he would have been returned to the Philippines on a United States vessel.”—Taylor, 44 F Z.

[37] P.I.R., 471. 7.

[38] P.I.R., 1300. 2.

[39] Admiral Dewey’s testimony, from which I quote extracts, will be found in Senate Documents, Vol. 25.57 Congress, 1st session, pp. 2928, 2941.

[40] P.I.R., 1300.2.

[41] P.I.R., 1300.2.

[42] Taylor, 4 MG., E.

[43] Report of the Philippine commission to the President. January 31, 1900. Vol. I, p. 121.

[44] P.I.R., 396. 3.

[45] Ibid., 396. 3.

[46] P.I.R., 461.4.

[47]

“My Dear Brother: I inform you that we arrived here in Cavite at eleven o’clock and disembarked at four o’clock in the afternoon after our conference with the American Admiral. Everything appears to be favourable for obtaining our independence. I cannot say more on that subject as it would take too long.

“I have no other object in writing this except to ask you and your companions to meet at once and arrange the best way to entrap all the enemy in your town, employing deceit, for instance, make a present of whatever you think best to the chiefs successively and then at once enter the houses and attack them, or if not this, do what you think best. Show valor and resolution, brothers, the hour has arrived for the Philippines to belong to her sons and not to them, only one step and we shall reach Independence; be constant, brothers, and be united in feelings, do not imitate those who show two faces, whatever such people do sooner or later they will be slaves. Respect foreigners and their property, also enemies who surrender.

“I want you to know that in respect to our conduct I have promised the American Admiral and other nations, that we shall carry on modern war. Even if a Spaniard surrenders, he must be pardoned and treated well and then you will see that our reputation will be very good in all Europe which will declare for our Independence; but if we do not conduct ourselves thus the Americans will decide to sell us or else divide up our territory as they will hold us incapable of governing our land, we shall not secure our liberty; rather the contrary; our own soil will be delivered over to other hands.

“Therefore, my brethren, I urge that we strive to unite our efforts, and let us fire our hearts with the idea of vindicating our country. Many nations are on our side.”

—P.I.R., 12. 1.

[48] Mabini was a Tagálog paralytic of exceptional ability. In my opinion he was the strongest man whom the revolution produced.

[49] P.I.R., 451. 1.

[50] Extract from the Journal of Simeon Villa.

“The memorable month of August, 1896, arrived. Aguinaldo was ‘master’ of the Cavite Lodge. Moreover, he was a member of the ‘Katipúnan’ Society and the chief of the many members who were in the pueblo of Cavite Viejo. What was to be done? Aguinaldo, not knowing what to do, and mindful of the fact that the curate there knew positively that he was not only a mason, but also the chief of the Katipúnans of his pueblo, considered it expedient on the night of August 29 to at once call a meeting of all the compromised persons in his town. Aguinaldo made clear to them their grave situation.

“They all agreed that on the following day Aguinaldo, their chief, should make representations to the Governor of Cavite; so he went away very early the following morning, presented himself to the governor, and in the name of the people of Cavite Viejo offered him their respects and their loyalty to Spain, at the same time requesting him to condescend to send to his town a garrison of 100 men for its security. The governor replied that he would first consult the captain-general, and if the proposition was approved he would send the garrison at once.

“As Aguinaldo was greatly beloved by the governor and his wife, they offered him wine and sweetmeats. As soon as this was over he took his leave and returned happy to his town. On arrival in the town he assembled all the compromised persons and informed them of the brilliant result of his efforts. Continuing, he told them that then was the opportune moment for rising in arms against the Spaniards. To this they unanimously replied by saying it was terrible, because no arms were available, and that for this reason it would certainly prove to be a disaster for them.

“But Aguinaldo, in company with his godfather, the lamented Candido Tirona, insisted on convincing them with their strong arguments. They made them understand that Spanish cruelty would annihilate them without fail, and for no other reason than that they were members of the Katipúnan.

“As it happened, at that very time there were two ‘Guardia Civil’ soldiers in the court-house. So at about 2 o’clock in the morning, Aguinaldo and Tirona went directly to the court-house. Arriving there, these two determined insurgent chiefs intimated to the guards that they should surrender their equipments. These replied that it was impossible, and said they would die first. Instantly a struggle ensued between the four men, which lasted nearly an hour. But it resulted in favor of the insurgent chiefs who succeeded in taking the guns and cartridges. Once in possession of these armaments, the two chiefs, accompanied by a number of the town people, directed themselves to the convent in order to capture the curate. Very unfortunately for them, the curate was no longer there when they arrived; he had made his escape. While the struggle was going on with the guards in the court-house, he received the news and fled at once by embarking in a native boat.

“The insurgent chiefs then returned to the court-house and immediately prepared a communication to all the municipal captains in the provinces of Cavite, Batangas and Laguna, inviting them to at once rise against Spain, and stating that their own town of Cavite Viejo was already freed from slavery.

“Each one of these communications was sent out by a mounted courier, so that before the expiration of many hours all the towns in Cavite Province were informed of what had taken place in Cavite Viejo.

“On the following day some of the towns took up arms. At the same time Aguinaldo, in company with many people from his town, marched on Imus in order to attack the Spanish troops who were there. When he arrived in Imus the people of this town at once joined him and they all went to the convent, in which were the friars and the soldiers of the ‘Guardia Civil.’ Just as he arrived at the atrium of the Church his companions did not wish to follow him, for fear that the soldiers were occupying the church tower. So Aguinaldo advanced alone until he reached the door of the convent. Once here, he called his companions to aid him. But these were not so determined as he was, and only about five responded. When these got to where Aguinaldo was, he commenced breaking in the door which was soon open. They went upstairs, but they found nobody, since the friars and soldiers had crossed over to the treasury building.

“Aguinaldo’s companions were now numerous, because the others followed him when they saw that nothing happened to those who went up into the convent; and all of these went immediately to the treasury building, in which were the friars and soldiers whom they were hunting. When they reached it they found the doors closed, so they could not pass. Aguinaldo ordered the house burned. Those in hiding inside the house were without any other remedy and had to surrender; but meanwhile some of them had been burned to death, among these a lieutenant of the ‘Guardia Civil.’ By this victory Aguinaldo succeeded in taking 17 rifles and two 2½ pounder guns.”

—P.I.R., 869.

[51]

“My Beloved Countrymen: I accepted the agreement of peace proposed by Don Pedro A. Paterno after his consultation with the Captain-General of the islands (Philippines), agreeing in consequence thereof to surrender our arms and disband the troops under my immediate command under certain conditions, as I believed it more advantageous for the country than to continue the insurrection, for which I had but limited resources, but as some of the said conditions were not complied with, some of the bands are discontented and have not surrendered their arms. Five months have elapsed without the inauguration of any of the reforms which I asked in order to place our country on a level with civilized people—for instance, our neighbor, Japan, which in the short space of twenty years has reached a point where she has no reason to envy any one, her strength and ascendency being shown in the last war with China. I see the impotence of the Spanish Government to contend with certain elements which oppose constant obstacles to the progress of the country itself and whose destructive influence has been one of the causes of the uprising of the masses, and as the great and powerful North American nation has offered its disinterested protection to secure the liberty of this country, I again assume command of all the troops in the struggle for the attainment of our lofty aspirations, inaugurating a dictatorial government to be administered by decrees promulgated under my sole responsibility and with the advice of distinguished persons until the time when these islands, being under our complete control, may form a constitutional republican assembly and appoint a president and cabinet, into whose hands I shall then resign the command of the islands.

“Emilio Aguinaldo.

Given at Cavite, May 24, 1898.”

—P.I.R. 206.6.

[52] “The great North American nation, the cradle of genuine liberty and therefore the friend of our people oppressed and enslaved by the tyranny and despotism of its ruler, has come to us manifesting a protection as decisive as it is undoubtedly disinterested toward our inhabitants, considering us as sufficiently civilized and capable of governing ourselves and our unfortunate country. In order to maintain this high estimate granted us by the generous North American nation we should abominate all those deeds which tend to lower this opinion, which are pillage, theft, and all sorts of crimes relating to persons or property, with the purpose of avoiding international conflict during the period of our campaign.”—P.I.R., 43. 3.

[53] Of this extraordinary occurrence Taylor says:—

“Invitations to the ceremony of the declaration of independence were sent to Admiral Dewey; but neither he nor any of his officers were present. It was, however, important to Aguinaldo that some American should be there whom the assembled people would consider a representative of the United States. ‘Colonel’ Johnson, ex-hotel keeper of Shanghai, who was in the Philippines exhibiting a cinematograph, kindly consented to appear on this occasion as Aguinaldo’s Chief of Artillery and the representative of the North American nation. His name does not appear subsequently among the papers of Aguinaldo. It is possible that his position as colonel and chief of artillery was a merely temporary one which enabled him to appear in a uniform which would befit the character of the representative of a great people upon so solemn an occasion!”—Taylor, 26 A J.

[54] P.I.R., 451.4.

[55] P.I.R., 451.4.

[56] See [p. 50].

[57] “They are aware that a Government has been established here from the beginning: first the Dictatorial, and afterwards, when several provinces had been freed from Spanish domination, there was implanted in the same a proper organization, and thus a new Government was established in the form best adapted to the principles of liberty; but notwithstanding all this and in spite of their protestations of friendship, they have always refused to recognize that government.

“The things they request involve the recognition of a right which we cannot and ought not to grant, unless they recognize our Government and unless the limits of the powers of both sides be defined. If they wish us to recognize them in Cavite, let them recognize our rights in Parañaque.

“The United States are our creditors more than any other nation; not only are they due the gratitude of the Filipino people, but also they should be allowed to profit by the advantages this people can grant them without loss of our legitimate right to a free and independent life. Therefore we are disposed to make a treaty or convention with them. They will be no longer able to allege the lack of national character, for in the near future there is to be assembled the Revolutionary Congress composed of the Representatives of the provinces.

“They should understand that they have come to make war on the Spaniards; that the Filipinos have risen in arms against the same enemy to achieve their liberty and independence; and that in consequence they cannot exercise dominion over us without violation of international law. If they persist in refusing to recognize our Government, we shall see ourselves obliged to come to an agreement with any other government that will consent to recognize us on friendly terms.”—P.I.R., 58.

[58] Blount, p. 24.

[59] P.I.R., 416. 1.

[60] Ibid., 102. 5.

[61] Senate Document 208, 1900, p. 9.

[62] Taylor, 26 A J.

[63] P.I.R., 5. 10.

[64] “Going to Singapore, I had several interviews with the Consul of the United States, Mr. Spencer Pratt, who informed me that the war was directed against Spain only and that in addition your action in the Philippines had as an object the independence of my beloved country.

“The Commander of the MacCulloch telegraphed me also from Hongkong, offering in the name of Commodore Dewey, to take me to Cavite, in order to raise the Filipinos against Spain.

“Without any written treaty, counting only upon the sacred word of American citizens, I went to Hongkong, embarked on the MacCulloch and a few days later had the honor to make the acquaintance of the victorious Commodore Dewey, who likewise informed me that he had come to make war against Spain, that he had annihilated the fleet of Admiral Montojo and that the United States desired to give the Philippines their independence.”—P.I.R., 441.2.

[65] P.I.R., 102. 1.

[66] P.I.R., Books C-1.

Chapter III

Insurgent “Coöperation”

I have previously[1] called attention to the minutes of a session of the Hongkong junta held on May 4, 1898, from which it indirectly appears that the Filipino leaders at that time hoped to secure arms at the expense of the Americans and purposed to attack them later if it seemed advisable.

The treacherous policy then outlined was never departed from by Aguinaldo and his associates, who sailed for Manila with their eyes wide open, knowing full well that they had been promised nothing; prepared to match their wits against those of Admiral Dewey, and intent on deceiving him and on securing from him arms to be used first against the Spaniards and later against the Americans, after they had been employed to help bring about the downfall of Spain.

There exists a significant circular signed “J.M.B.”[2] believed to have been an outright forgery, both from its tenor and from the fact that the signature “J.M.B.” is not in the handwriting of Basa’s letter hereinbefore quoted.

It contains the following statements:—

“The true patriots have organized a committee to which I belong, naming Aguinaldo as President and Agoncillo as Vice-President. The latter and three others have commenced diplomatic negotiations with the Admiral and American Consul, and we infer that they are trying to make colonies of us, although they said they would give us independence. The Committee deemed it advisable to simulate belief, at the same time equipping ourselves with arms.

“We have accepted arms offered by the Admiral which will be disembarked in the Philippines by the squadron.

“A part of our forces will aid the Americans by fighting with them in order to conceal our real intentions, and part will be held in reserve. If America triumphs and proposes a colony, we shall reject such offer and rise in arms.

“A separate expedition will disembark at whatever point may be considered suitable.

“José Alejandrino embarked with the American squadron in order to give secret instructions to the Chiefs.

“Be very cautious about this exceedingly delicate point; you will communicate with prudent and intelligent chiefs who will recognize the gravity of the subject.”[3]

Here, then, in a faked-up letter on which Basa’s initials were forged in order to gain the prestige of his name for this treacherous plan, we have definitely set forth the purpose of the Filipinos to deceive the Americans by allowing a part of the Insurgent force to fight with them, and then to attack them.

Reference has already been made to Agoncillo’s advice to Aguinaldo, given under date of August 26, 1898, to the effect that friendly relations should be maintained with the Americans until the diplomatic negotiations at Paris should end; that an effort should be made to find out the future status of the islands “by deceitful means,” and that confidence should never be put in the Americans.

Aguinaldo put the whole matter in a nutshell in a postscript to this letter, saying:—

“You should issue an order commanding that all our chiefs should employ a policy of friendship toward the Americans until our status is defined; but said order should be confidentially given. Try to mislead them.”[4]

Bray also very strongly advised awaiting the results of the Paris conference.[5]

Blount claims that the Filipinos hoped that the Treaty of Paris would leave their country to them as it left Cuba to the Cubans,[6] and adds that having helped us take the city of Manila, they “felt that they had been ‘given the double cross,’” “believed that the Americans had been guilty of a duplicity rankly Machiavellian, and that was the cause of the war.”[7]

The quotations already given from Insurgent records show plainly that the principal thing for which the Filipinos were waiting was the ousting of Spain from the Philippines by the United States; those which follow show that war was by no means inevitable as a result of a a decision at Paris adverse to Filipino hopes, for the question of whether a United States protectorate, or even annexation to the United States, might be considered, was left open to a very late date.[8]

It has been claimed not only that the Insurgents whipped the Spaniards without our assistance, but whipped them so thoroughly that Spanish sovereignty had practically disappeared from the islands at the time Manila surrendered. It has further been alleged that “decrepit” Spain “could not possibly have sent any reinforcements to the Philippines. Besides, the Filipinos would have ‘eaten them up.’”[9]

But the Filipinos had fought Spain before and were by no means sanguine. Their more intelligent and reasonable men clearly foresaw that they could not win unaided. Señor Antonio Regidor was at the time residing in London. He was a Filipino of unusual intelligence and exceptionally good education. He took a keen interest in the situation, and on July 28, 1898, telegraphed Agoncillo as follows:—

“In the name of the Filipinos, you should immediately send a telegraphic message to MacKinley, requesting him not to abandon the islands, after having fought as brothers for a common cause. Pledge him our unconditional adhesion, especially of well-to-do people. To return to Spain, in whatever form, would mean annihilation, perpetual anarchy. Filipinos en masse should visit the consuls at Hongkong, Singapore. London commerce support it. Influence Aguinaldo to accept American flag, flying it everywhere, thus obliging them to remain.”[10]

This leaves no room for doubt as to Regidor’s views, but Agoncillo did not share them. He replied on July 29:—

“Provisional government’s aspiration is independence. Make this campaign.”[11]

Regidor was not to be persuaded. On July 30 he replied as follows, addressing his communication to Basa:

“America vacillating as to remaining fears conflicts later with natives international question other difficulties necessary to encourage her all of you submit united unconditionally raising American flag great demonstrations necessary to influence outside opinion show islands resolved united America high circles advise in view present circumstances only feasible programme is protectorate.”[12]

Obviously, Agoncillo was somewhat impressed by this cablegram, for on August 1 in a letter to Aguinaldo he made the following statements and inquiries:—

“If the American troops leave us alone there, the questions which will arise are these: Have we sufficient arms to maintain the war against Spain in order to secure our independence? If the other nations are opposed to our independence and wish that we should continue under the Spanish sovereignty, have we sufficient strength to wage a war and obtain victory over Spain and over them in the future? If you think that we have not sufficient strength to fight against them, should we accept independence under the American protectorate? And if so, what conditions or advantages should we give to the United States? You should carefully consider the preceding questions, and I suggest that you should, in a confidential manner, consult them with your cabinet-in-banc, as well as with your private secretary and military chiefs of rank; and your decision be notified to our representatives abroad in order that they may know what they must do in their negotiations. You will see from the telegram addressed to me by Regidor that he suggests to me to send a message to MacKinley requesting him not to abandon us, and to submit to them [the U. S.] unconditionally. As I do not agree with him and as I cannot take any action which is against the instructions of the government, I replied to him that the only desire of our government is independence. This may be seen from the enclosed telegram. On account of this reply, he was, I think, somewhat offended, as he afterwards sent a telegram to Joviales [Basa] instead of to me. The latter, upon receiving the telegram, convened all the boastful patriots, and they adopted a resolution to send a message to MacKinley requesting annexation. Fortunately, in the meeting there was present Dr. Justo Lucban, who protested against such measure. In view of this protest, they again agreed that I should be present in the meeting, since I am the representative of our government. At the meeting where I was present, I pointed out the inadvisability of their resolution, stating, as one of the reasons, that we should await your instructions in regard to the matter before sending any message of that character. So the message was not sent; but I was later informed that Basa had, after all, sent it yesterday, because he believed that it would not injure our cause. Upon learning this, I was carried away by passion and went so far as to say to Basa the following: ‘Many of us, especially myself, think ourselves to be wise, without being so; politicians for what we hear from others; we claim to be patriots, but we are only so in words; we wish to be chiefs, but none of us act in a way worthy of a chief.’ To this he did not reply. Perhaps his conscience accused him of an act of treachery, since we agreed in the meeting to await your letter. What union can you expect from this people?”[13]

Note that the Basa here referred to is the man whose initials were forged on the letter quoted on [page 67].

The Second Philippine Commission

From left to right: General Luke E. Wright, Professor Dean C. Worcester, Professor Bernard Moses, Judge William H. Taft, and Judge Henry C. Ide.

In the course of the above-mentioned letter Agoncillo came back once more to the question of independence under a protectorate and made it very clear that at this late day he did not know whether this was or was not what the Filipinos desired.[14]

On August 21, Apacible obviously did not think that it would be an easy matter to escape from Spanish domination, much less that the islands were already rid of it, for he wrote to Mabini that the United States were likely again to deliver the Filipinos into the hands of Spain. He said that “if events will be what their telegrams indicate, we have a dark and bloody future before us. To be again in the hands of Spain will mean a long and bloody war, and it is doubtful whether the end will be favourable to us... Spain free from Cuba and her other colonies will employ her energy to crush us and will send here the 150,000 men she has in Cuba.”[15] Apacible thought that the best thing was independence under an American protectorate.

On August 7, 1898, Aguinaldo warned Agoncillo that in the United States he should “not accept any contracts or give any promises respecting protection or annexation, because we will see first if we can obtain independence.”[16]

Even annexation to the United States was not excluded by Aguinaldo from the possible accepted solutions, for in outlining the policy of the Philippine government to Sandico on August 10, 1898, he wrote:—

“The policy of the government is as follows: 1st. To struggle for the independence of ‘the Philippines’ as far as our strength and our means will permit. Protection or annexation will be acceptable only when it can be clearly seen that the recognition of our Independence, either by force of arms or diplomacy, is impossible.”[17]

On August 26, 1898, Aguinaldo was still ready to consider annexation if necessary.[18] He was apparently not sanguine at this time as to the result of a continued struggle with Spain. At all events, he wanted the help of the Americans if such a struggle was to come, and desired to know on what terms it could be had.[19]

Meanwhile the Filipinos in Hongkong who favoured annexation made themselves heard.

On July 18, 1898, Consul-General Wildman wrote from that place:—

“I believe I know the sentiments of the political leaders and of the moneyed men among the insurgents, and, in spite of all statements to the contrary, I know that they are fighting for annexation to the United States first, and for independence secondly, if the United States decides to decline the sovereignty of the Islands. In fact, I have had the most prominent leaders call on me and say they would not raise one finger unless I could assure them that the United States intended to give them United States citizenship if they wished it.”[20]

We have already noted the action of Basa and the Cortez family who insisted that the Islands must remain American,[21] and that of Agoncillo, who cabled President McKinley in Aguinaldo’s name and his own, congratulating him on the outcome of the war, commending the occupation of Manila, and assuring the people of the United States of the allegiance and unquestioning support of the Filipinos,[22] but it is to be feared that the sending of this cablegram was only one more move in the Insurgent game of deceit.

There were annexationists in Manila as well as in Hongkong.[23] Indeed we know that some of the strongest and best of the Filipinos there were in favour of it.

Felipe Buencamino, writing in 1901, said:—

“In June of 1898, Don Cayetano Arellano[24] addressed to Don Felipe Buencamino and Don Ambrosio Rianzares Bautista a letter written from the town of Pagsanján, province of Laguna, in reply to one addressed to him by those two gentlemen. In this letter Don Cayetano outlined the idea of union with the United States and said: ‘Avoid all doing and undoing, and when America has established a stable order of affairs, then it will be time enough to make laws.’ Mabini, whose influence at that time was in the ascendant in Aguinaldo’s government, paid no heed to this wise advice. In October of 1898, while the Philippine government was established in Malolos, and before congress had promulgated a Philippine constitution, Messrs. Arellano and Pardo[25] still more earnestly advocated union with America, the first as secretary of foreign affairs and the latter as chief diplomat. Their plan consisted in asking the United States to acknowledge the independence of the country under a protectorate through the mediation of General Otis, and this plan was accepted at a cabinet meeting by Don Emilio Aguinaldo. But on the following day Sandico came and told Aguinaldo that he had had a conference with the Japanese consul and had been told by him: ‘that if Aguinaldo would support absolute independence the Japanese Government would help.’ Aguinaldo believed Sandico’s story (which turned out to be absolutely false) and did not carry out the resolution adopted by the cabinet. Messrs. Arellano and Pardo, after this affront, separated themselves from the Malolos government. Aguinaldo told me afterwards that he had received a letter from Agoncillo, dated Washington, assuring him that a majority of the American people were inclined to acknowledge the independence of the Philippines and of Cuba.”[26]

But annexationists were not confined, in the Philippines, to the vicinity of Manila.

As late as September 6 Consul Williams reported that a delegation from four thousand Visayan soldiers, a delegation which also represented southern business interests, had come to him and pledged loyalty to annexation.[27]

Clearly, then, the situation early in September was as follows: All were agreed that the assistance of the United States was necessary in getting rid of Spanish sovereignty.

Under the plan of Aguinaldo and his followers friendly relations were to be maintained with the United States, if possible, until Spain was ousted from her Philippine territory, and then they were to “show their teeth,” and see “who was deceiving whom,” resorting to “force of arms” if necessary. Protection or annexation would be accepted only when it could be clearly seen that the recognition of independence, won either by force of arms or by diplomacy, was impossible.

Other influential and patriotic Filipinos favored annexation to the United States or a United States protectorate, but their views were in the end ignored by Aguinaldo and his following, and as the latter had the guns their ideas prevailed.

The Treaty of Paris, which terminated Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines, was signed on December 10, 1898. It is important to bear this date in mind later, when considering the Insurgent records relative to the preparations which were so carefully made for attacking the American troops.

And now let us consider the actual facts as to the coöperation alleged to have been asked by Americans and given by Filipinos. The following points are not in dispute:—

Pratt asked Aguinaldo to coöperate with Dewey.

Aguinaldo was taken to Manila with the understanding that he would do so.

Dewey assisted Aguinaldo by destroying the main Spanish fleet; by bringing him and his associates back to the Philippines; by furnishing them arms and ammunition; by blockading Manila and by keeping at a safe distance the Spanish mosquito fleet, which would have made dangerous, or impossible, the landing of the arms subsequently imported by the Insurgents.

Aguinaldo successfully attacked the Spanish garrisons in the provinces and used the arms and ammunition captured, or brought in by deserters, to equip a force which surrounded and attacked Manila, drove large numbers of people into the walled city, thus rendering the position of the Spanish garrison very difficult in the face of a possible bombardment, and prevented this garrison from betaking itself to the provinces, as it might otherwise have done, leaving Manila to shift for itself.

Aguinaldo was powerless to take the place by assault.

It lay at the mercy of Dewey’s guns, and it would have been possible for the Admiral to take it at any time, but he could not at first have garrisoned it with United States forces, and never thought of attempting to use Insurgent forces for this purpose.

Did Dewey really want or need Aguinaldo’s help? Let us consider his testimony on the subject:—

“Senator Carmack. You did want a man there who could organize and rouse the people?

“Admiral Dewey. I didn’t want anybody. I would like to say now that Aguinaldo and his people were forced on me by Consul Pratt and Consul Wildman; I didn’t do anything—

“Senator Carmack. Did they have any power to force him upon you?

“Admiral Dewey. Yes; they had in a way. They had not the official power, but one will yield after a while to constant pressure. I did not expect anything of them; I did not think they would do anything. I would not have taken them; I did not want them; I did not believe in them; because, when I left Hongkong, I was led to suppose that the country was in a state of insurrection, and that at my first gun, as Mr. Williams put it, there would be a general uprising, and I thought these half dozen or dozen refugees at Hongkong would play a very small part in it.”[28]

The picture of the poor admiral, busy getting his fleet ready for battle, pestered by officious consuls on the one hand and by irresponsible Filipinos on the other, is pathetic; but it had its humorous features, which were not lost on the Admiral himself. I quote the following:—

“Senator Patterson. Was there any communication between you and Pratt in which the matter of a written pledge or agreement with Aguinaldo was discussed with reference to the Philippine Islands?

“Admiral Dewey. No.

“Senator Patterson. What became of the correspondence, Admiral, if you know?

“Admiral Dewey. It is all in the Navy Department. When I turned over my command my official correspondence was all sent to the Navy Department. “Senator Patterson. You retained all of your letters from any United States officials?

“Admiral Dewey. No; they went to the Department.

“Senator Patterson. I mean you did not destroy them.

“Admiral Dewey. No; I did not destroy them.

“Senator Patterson. And you turned them over to the Navy Department?

“Admiral Dewey. Yes; our regulations require that. I may say that for my own information I kept copies of certain telegrams and cablegrams. I don’t think I kept copies of Mr. Pratt’s letters, as I did not consider them of much value. He seemed to be a sort of busybody there and interfering in other people’s business and I don’t think his letters impressed me.

“Senator Patterson. He was the consul-general?

“Admiral Dewey. Yes; but he had nothing to do with the attack on Manila, you know.

“Senator Patterson. I understand that.

“Admiral Dewey. I received lots of advice, you understand, from many irresponsible people.

“Senator Patterson. But Pratt was the consul-general of the Government there?

“Admiral Dewey. Yes; he was consul-general.

“Senator Patterson. And he communicated with you, giving you such information as he thought you might be interested in, and among other information he gave you was this concerning Aguinaldo?

“Admiral Dewey. I don’t remember; no, I really don’t remember his telling me anything about Aguinaldo more than that cablegram there, and I said he might come. And you see how much importance I attached to him; I did not wait for him.

“Senator Patterson. What you said was: ‘Tell Aguinaldo to come as soon as possible.’

“Admiral Dewey. Yes; but I did not wait a moment for him.

“Senator Patterson. Yes; but there was a reason for that.

“Admiral Dewey. I think more to get rid of him than anything else.

“Senator Carmack. Rid of whom?

“Admiral Dewey. Of Aguinaldo and the Filipinos. They were bothering me. I was very busy getting my squadron ready for battle, and these little men were coming on board my ship at Hongkong and taking a good deal of my time, and I did not attach the slightest importance to anything they could do, and they did nothing; that is, none of them went with me when I went to Mirs Bay. There had been a good deal of talk, but when the time came they did not go. One of them didn’t go because he didn’t have any toothbrush.

“Senator Burrows. Did he give that as a reason?

“Admiral Dewey. Yes; he said, ‘I have no toothbrush.’”[29]

However, Dewey ultimately yielded to the pressure exercised on him by Pratt and Wildman, and allowed Aguinaldo and some of his associates to be brought to Manila. Having them there he proposed to get assistance from them, not as allies, but as a friendly force attacking a common enemy, in its own way.

The Return of Mr. Taft

This photograph, taken on the occasion of the return of Mr. Taft to the Philippines after his appointment as secretary of war, shows him in a stand on the Luneta reviewing the procession organized in his honor, in which thousands of Filipinos participated.

Let us continue with his testimony as to cooperation between Aguinaldo and the naval forces of the United States:—

“Senator Patterson. Then, Admiral, until you knew that they were going to send land forces to your assistance you thought there was a necessity to organize the Filipinos into land forces, did you?

“Admiral Dewey. No; not a necessity.

“Senator Patterson. You thought it might prove of value to you?

“Admiral Dewey. I testified here, I think, in a way that answers that. I said to Aguinaldo, ‘There is our enemy; now, you go your way and I will go mine; we had better act independently.’ That was the wisest thing I ever said.

“Senator Patterson. But you stated that you were using these people and they were permitted to organize, that you might use them.

“Admiral Dewey. They were assisting us.

“Senator Patterson. Very well, they were to assist you. Did you not either permit them or encourage them—I do not care which term you use—to organize into an army, such as it was, that they might render you such assistance as you needed?

“Admiral Dewey. They were assisting us, but incidentally they were fighting their enemy; they were fighting an enemy which had been their enemy for three hundred years. “Senator Patterson. I understand that, Admiral.

“Admiral Dewey. While assisting us they were fighting their own battles, too.

“The Chairman. You were encouraging insurrection against a common enemy with which you were at war?

“Admiral Dewey. I think so. I had in my mind an illustration furnished by the civil war. I was in the South in the civil war, and the only friends we had in the South were the negroes, and we made use of them; they assisted us on many occasions. I had that in mind; I said these people were our friends, and ‘we have come here and they will help us just exactly as the negroes helped us in the civil war.’

“Senator Patterson. The negroes were expecting their freedom—

“Admiral Dewey. The Filipinos were slaves, too.

“Senator Patterson. What were the Filipinos expecting?

“Admiral Dewey. They wanted to get rid of the Spaniards; I do not think they looked much beyond that. I cannot recall but I have in mind that the one thing they had in their minds was to get rid of the Spaniards and then to accept us, and that would have occurred—I have thought that many times—if we had had troops to occupy Manila on the 1st day of May before the insurrection got started; these people would have accepted us as their friends, and they would have been our loyal friends—I don’t know for how long, but they would have been our friends then.

“Senator Patterson. You learned from Pratt, or Wildman, or Williams, very early, did you not, that the Filipinos wanted their own country and to rule their own country; that that is what they were expecting?

“Admiral Dewey. I heard from Williams that there was an insurrection there against the Spaniards. The Spaniards were very cruel to them, and I think they did not look much beyond getting rid of them. There was one, Dr. Rizal, who had the idea of independence, but I don’t think that Aguinaldo had much idea of it.

“Senator Carmack. Then what useful purpose did the Filipino army serve; why did you want the Filipino army at all?

“Admiral Dewey. I did not want them.

“Senator Carmack. Did you not want the Filipino forces?

“Admiral Dewey. No, not really. It was their own idea coming over there. We could have taken the city at any moment we had the troops to occupy it.”

Admiral Dewey has made the following statements relative to the importance of Aguinaldo’s military operations:—

“Then he began operations toward Manila, and he did wonderfully well. He whipped the Spaniards battle after battle, and finally put one of those old smoothbore guns on a barge, and he wanted to take this up—wanted me to tow it up so he could attack the city with it. I said, ‘Oh, no, no; we can do nothing until our troops come.’ I knew he could not take the city without the assistance of the navy, without my assistance, and I knew that what he was doing—driving the Spaniards in—was saving our own troops, because our own men perhaps would have had to do that same thing. He and I were always on the most friendly terms; we had never had any differences. He considered me as his liberator, as his friend. I think he had the highest admiration for us because we had whipped the Spaniards who had been riding them down for three hundred years.

“Senator Patterson (continuing). You sent this short dispatch to the Secretary of the Navy:—

“‘Aguinaldo, the revolutionary leader, visited the Olympia yesterday. He expects to make general attack on May 31. Doubt his ability to succeed. Situation remains unchanged.’

“Do you recall that visit?

“Admiral Dewey. Yes.

“Senator Patterson. He came to tell you, did he, that he was going to make a general attack, and you—

“Admiral Dewey. Yes.

“Senator Patterson. And you doubted his ability to succeed?

“Admiral Dewey. And he wanted me to assist him. He wanted me to tow one of his guns up into position. I knew he could not take the city; of course he could not.

“Senator Patterson. Did you urge that he should not make the attack?

“Admiral Dewey. I do not remember that; very likely I did.

“Senator Patterson. And was he not persuaded or restrained by you from doing so?

“Admiral Dewey. I do not remember; but it is very likely. I did not want to see a lot of them killed unnecessarily, because I knew they could not take that walled city. They had no artillery, and they could not take it, I knew very well, and I wanted the situation to remain as it was until our troops came to occupy it.

“Senator Patterson. But you found that whenever you expressed a strong objection to anything being done at that time that Aguinaldo yielded to your request?

“Admiral Dewey. Up to the time the army came he did everything I requested. I had not much to do with him after the army came.”[30]

But Dewey’s influence over Aguinaldo was not sufficient to prevent his looting, as the following extracts from his testimony show:—

“Senator Patterson. Is that what you mean when you say he looted—that he made reprisals for his army, took provisions and whatever was necessary? That is what you meant?

“Admiral Dewey. That is one part of it.

“Senator Carmack. This was taking provisions for the use of the army?

“Admiral Dewey. That is one thing he did.

“Senator Carmack. You said you did not object to that at the time?

“Admiral Dewey. No. It would have been useless; he got beyond me very soon—he got out of my hands very soon.[31]

“Senator Carmack. You said yesterday you suspected that Aguinaldo took the lion’s share of the provisions that were gathered for the army. What was the ground upon which you made that accusation?

“Admiral Dewey. Because he was living in Malolos like a prince, like a king, in a way that could only have come about by his taking the lion’s share. Then, in regard to his looting, I repeat what I said yesterday. He began within forty-eight hours after he landed in Cavite to capture and take everything he wanted. I know these things of my own knowledge, because I saw the loot brought in; and I know that every dollar that was taken from the workingmen at the navy-yard was taken at the threat of death.[32]

“Senator Patterson. Do you believe in this proclamation he was uttering falsehoods to the Filipino people?

“Admiral Dewey. Yes; I do absolutely. I think he was there for gain—for money—that independence had never up to that time entered his head. He was there for loot and money. That is what I believe, since you ask me my belief; I believe that implicitly.[33]

“Senator Patterson. And you found nothing to cause any doubt as to his loyalty up to the time until after Manila surrendered?

“Admiral Dewey. His loyalty to whom?

“Senator Patterson. To you and to the cause for which he was fighting?

“Admiral Dewey. I began to suspect he was not loyal to us about the time our troops arrived, when he demurred at moving out of Cavite to make room for our troops.

“Senator Patterson. Do you mean by that that you feared that he was commencing to think more of independence than the success of the American cause?

“Admiral Dewey. Yes.”[34]

We have seen to what extent Aguinaldo coöperated with the marine forces of the United States. Now let us examine the claim that he cooperated with the land forces after their arrival.

One of the things which the Insurgents are said to have accomplished was the maintenance of an effective land blockade which prevented the entrance of provisions, and produced a very serious food shortage. Both Otis and Dewey have stated that they did this, but we learn from the Insurgent records how erroneous was this conclusion.[35]

The landing of the American troops for the attack on Manila was not actively opposed by the Filipinos, but it was narrowly and distrustfully watched.

Necessary transportation requested by General Anderson was ultimately furnished by Aguinaldo, but only grudgingly after a three weeks’ delay, and as a result of threats that it would be seized if not voluntarily supplied.

The necessary positions in the trenches around Manila from which to make the attack on that city were, in part at least, yielded to the Americans by the Filipinos upon the request of the former.

The Insurgents twice informed the Spaniards in advance of projected American attacks.

They carried out their own attack on the city without regard to the plans, or the requests, of the Americans. They secretly treated with the Spaniards in the endeavour to secure the surrender of the city to themselves.

After the capitulation to the Americans had been agreed upon, and on the very morning of the day of the surrender, they endeavoured to push home an attack. Disregarding the request that they keep out of the final assault, they crowded into the city with, and after, the American troops. They fired on Spanish soldiers on the city wall while a flag of truce was flying, provoking a return fire which killed and wounded American soldiers.

They demanded for themselves Malacañang palace and other buildings and a share in “the war booty.” They promptly looted the parts of the city which they occupied, and ultimately retired from their positions within the city limits on the evening of their last day of grace after being warned by General Otis that if they did not do so they would be driven out.

I will now quote from the records in support of these statements.

The following is the programme of “coöperation” outlined to Aguinaldo by Bray in a letter dated June 30, 1898:—

“I am very anxious to receive the news of the capitulation of Manila and I hope that General Augustín will be obliged to turn over his sword to you in person and not to the Americans. You are by right entitled to it and I should like to see it so from a political standpoint, as I am of the opinion that you should declare the independence of the Philippines before the arrival of General Merritt, appointed by the President to be Governor with full powers to establish a provisional government.

Any attempt on the part of the Americans to garrison the interior towns with their troops or any other act which might be construed as a conquest, should meet with resistance.

“After having written these lines, I had another conference with Mr. St. Clair of the Free Press, who sent for me regarding the question of independence. He has had a consultation with the Supreme Judge of this place, and he is of opinion that you should proclaim independence at once, notwithstanding what Admiral Dewey and Consul Williams say against it, and this should be done before General Merritt can arrive. A Government having been thus constituted in due form, the Americans would have no right to invade the Philippines without committing a violation of international law. They are no longer fighting against the Spaniards against whom they declared war. The advice of Consul Williams to delay this, is a diplomatic play to gain time until the arrival of General Merritt, because he is well aware of the false position said General would find himself in. The key to the situation is now in your hands; do not permit any one to take it away from you. The Americans have done nothing but bombard and destroy the Spanish fleet on the high seas; they have not conquered any land, but in the meantime the control of the Philippines has passed by conquest from the hands of the Spaniards and the Americans have no right to enter further. Under certain conditions and guarantees, permit the landing of American troops; but be very careful, they must not be permitted to land until they execute an agreement with the duly constituted government of the Philippines, respecting all its institutions, and they must under no pretext whatever be permitted to garrison any place except the municipal limits of Manila, Cebú, and Iloílo, and even therein care should be observed ... You must not permit a single soldier to land without having these guarantees.”[36]

When General Anderson, with the first United States troops of occupation, arrived at Manila Bay, Aguinaldo did not call on him, as an “ally” might have been expected to do. Later, however, Admiral Dewey and General Anderson went to see Aguinaldo, but without any of the ceremony of an official military call, the Admiral saying to General Anderson:—

“Do not take your sword or put on your uniform, but just put on your blouse. Do not go with any ceremony.”[37]

And they went in that way.

On July 4, 1898, General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo definitely requesting his coöperation in the following words:—

“For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations with you, and to have you and your force coöperate with us in the military operations against the Spanish forces.”[38]

On July 5 Aguinaldo replied, thanking General Anderson for the

“amicable sentiments which the natives of these islands inspire in the Great North American nation,”[39]

Governor-general James F. Smith with a Bontoc Igorot Escort

Up to the time of Governor-general Smith, no governor-general had ever penetrated the land of the Luzon head-hunters. He crossed Bontoc and Ifugao, in company with the author, in 1907. This photograph shows him on the crewst of the Polis range, at the boundary line between these two sub-provinces, sixty-four hundred feet above the sea.

and also for his desire to have friendly relations with the Filipinos and treat them with justice, courtesy and kindness. There is, however, not a word relative to coöperation in his reply, and Anderson apparently never renewed his request for coöperation in military operations.

On July 6 he wrote to Aguinaldo again, saying:—

“I am encouraged by the friendly sentiment expressed by Your Excellency in your welcome letter received on the 5th instant, to endeavour to come to a definite understanding, which I hope will be advantageous to both. Very soon we expect large additional land forces, and it must be apparent to you as a military officer that we will require much more room to camp our soldiers and also store room for our supplies. For this I would like to have Your Excellency’s advice and coöperation, as you are best acquainted with the resources of the country.”[40]

To this letter there was no reply. However, in a letter dated July 9, 1898, to the Adjutant-General of the United States Army, General Anderson says of Aguinaldo:—

“When we first landed he seemed very suspicious, and not at all friendly, but I have now come to a better understanding with him and he is much more friendly and seems willing to coöperate. But he has declared himself Dictator and President, and is trying to take Manila without our assistance. This is not probable, but if he can effect his purpose he will, I apprehend, antagonize any attempt on our part to establish a provisional government.”[41]

Evidently, however, coöperation, even in the matter of getting necessary transportation, did not materialize, for on July 17 S. R. Jones, Chief Quartermaster, wrote Aguinaldo as follows:—

“We will want horses, buffaloes, carts, etc., for transportation, bamboo for shelter, wood to cook with, etc. For all this we are willing to pay a fair price, but no more. We find so far that the native population are not willing to give us this assistance as promptly as required. But we must have it, and if it becomes necessary we will be compelled to send out parties to seize what we may need. We would regret very much to do this, as we are here to befriend the Filipinos. Our nation has spent millions in money to send forces here to expel the Spaniards and to give good government to the whole people, and the return we are asking is comparatively slight.

“General Anderson wishes you to inform your people that we are here for their good, and that they must supply us with labor and material at the current market prices. We are prepared to purchase five hundred horses at a fair price, but cannot undertake to bargain for horses with each individual owner.”

Aguinaldo sent this letter by a staff officer to General Anderson inquiring whether it was sent by authority of the latter, who then indorsed on it in a statement that it was. Nevertheless, Major Jones reported on July 20 that it was impossible to secure transportation except upon Aguinaldo’s order and that the natives had removed their cart wheels and hidden them, from which it is to be inferred that the transportation requested had not been furnished.

Obviously General Anderson was informed that Aguinaldo had given orders against furnishing the transportation desired, for on July 21 he wrote the Adjutant-General of the Army as follows:—

“Since I wrote last, Aguinaldo has put in operation an elaborate system of military government, under his assumed authority as Dictator, and has prohibited any supplies being given us, except by his order. As Go this last, I have written to him that our requisitions on the country for horses, ox carts, fuel, and bamboo (to make scaling ladders) must be filled, and that he must aid in having them filled.”

On July 23 General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo as follows:—

“General: When I came here three weeks ago I requested Your Excellency to give what assistance you could to procure means of transportation for the American Army, as it was to fight the cause of your people. So far we have received no response.

“As you represent your people, I now have the honor to make requisition on you for five hundred horses and fifty oxen and ox carts. If you cannot secure these I will have to pass you and make requisition directly on the people.

“I beg leave to request an answer at your earliest convenience.

“I remain with great respect, etc.”[42]

To this letter, Aguinaldo replied as follows:—

“Replying to your letter of yesterday, I have the honor to manifest to Your Excellency that I am surprised beyond measure at that which you say to me in it, lamenting the non-receipt of any response relative to the assistance that you have asked of me in the way of horses, carabaos, and carts, because I did reply through the bearer that I was disposed to issue proper orders whenever you advised me of the number of these, giving me notice in advance.

“I have sent orders to the nearest provinces in order that within the shortest time possible horses be brought for sale, but I cannot assure Your Excellency that we will have the number of 500 that you need, because there are not many horses in this vicinity, owing to deaths from epizoötic diseases in January, February, and March last.

“Whenever we have them collected, I shall have the pleasure to advise Your Excellency.

“I have also ordered to be placed at my disposal 50 carts that I shall place at your disposition when you need them, provided you give me previous notice four days in advance.”[43]

General Anderson replied:—

“Your favour of the 26th ultimo in relation to requisitions for cattle, horses, etc., is satisfactory I regret that there should have been any misunderstanding about it. The people to whom we applied even for the hiring of carromatas, etc., told our people that they had orders to supply nothing except by your orders. I am pleased to think that this was a misapprehension on their part.”[44]

From this series of communications it appears that it took three weeks, and a very direct threat to seize transportation, to bring about Aguinaldo’s promise of assistance in securing it. What help had he given, meanwhile, in other matters?

On July 14, 1899, General Anderson wrote asking him to assist American officers in making reconnaissance of the approaches to Manila, and to favor them with his advice.[45]

On July 19, 1899, he again wrote Aguinaldo asking him to allow Major J. F. Bell,[46] who was gathering information for General Merritt, to see maps, and further requesting him to place at Bell’s disposal any available information about the force of the enemy and the topography of the country.[47]

On July 21 he wrote again asking for passes for a Lieutenant E. I. Bryan and party, who were making a reconnaissance.[48]

Such records as I have been able to find do not show what response, if any, Aguinaldo made to these several requests, but General Anderson’s original views as to the willingness of the Insurgents to coöperate with him underwent an early change, for on July 18, 1898, in a letter to the Adjutant-General of the United States Army he makes the following statement:—

“The Insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, has declared himself Dictator and self-appointed President. He has declared martial law and promulgated a minute method of rule and administration under it.

“We have observed all official military courtesies, and he and his followers express great admiration and gratitude to the great American republic of the north, yet in many ways they obstruct our purposes and are using every effort to take Manila without us.

“I suspect also that Aguinaldo is secretly negotiating with the Spanish authorities, as his confidential aide is in Manila.”[49]

This suspicion was entirely justified, as we shall see later.

On July 24 Aguinaldo wrote a letter to General Anderson in effect warning him not to disembark American troops in places conquered by the Filipinos from the Spaniards without first communicating in writing the places to be occupied and the object of the occupation.[50]

Aguinaldo’s assumption of civil authority on July 15, 1899, did not pass unnoticed. On July 21 General Anderson wrote the Adjutant-General of the army concerning it:—

“His assumption of civil authority I have ignored, and let him know verbally that I could, and would, not recognize it, while I did not recognize him as a military leader. It may seem strange that I have made no formal protest against his proclamation as Dictator, his declaration of martial law, and publication and execution of a despotic form of government. I wrote such a protest, but did not publish it, at Admiral Dewey’s request, and also for fear of wounding the susceptibilities of Major-General Merritt, but I have let it be known in every other way that we do not recognize the Dictatorship. These people only respect force and firmness. I submit, with all deference, that we have heretofore underrated the natives. They are not ignorant, savage tribes, but have a civilization of their own; and although insignificant in appearance, are fierce fighters, and for a tropical people they are industrious. A small detail of natives will do more work in a given time than a regiment of volunteers.”

Because he was invited as general rather than as president, Aguinaldo refused to attend a parade and review on the 4th of July. This fact is, in itself, an answer to his claim that the Americans were tacitly recognizing his pretensions.

After referring to this incident, Blount says:—

“On subsequent anniversaries of the day in the Philippines it was deemed wise simply to prohibit the reading of our declaration before gatherings of the Filipino people. It saved discussion.”[51]

This statement is incorrect. I myself was present the following year when the declaration was read on the Luneta to a considerable gathering of Filipinos among whom were many school children, and it has often been read since.

The landing of American troops at Parañaque and their going into camp near that town on July 15 caused much excitement, and a lively interchange of telegrams between Insurgent officers followed.[52]

They were suspicious of the intentions of the Americans,[53] and trouble soon began.

On July 16 General Noriel telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:—

“An American has come here who says that he is a Colonel of the Army whom we should obey; and that it is your desire. We did not listen to him, awaiting your order.”

On the back of the telegram is written the following:—

“Reply.—You should not obey. What this American Colonel says is a lie. Be cautious so as not to be deceived. You should require from him proof. Be always vigilant, but upright, also all of the officers and soldiers must be strict and not timid.”[54]

Obviously there was no real coöperation between American and Filipino troops at this time. General Anderson ignored General Aguinaldo’s request for information as to places where American troops were to land in Filipino territory and the objects of disembarking them.

The Americans proceeded with their plans for the attack upon Manila, and it became desirable to occupy some of the Insurgent trenches. On July 29 Arévalo telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:—

“In conference with General Greene I asked for an official letter, a copy of which I send you: ‘Headquarters 2nd Brigade, U. S. Expeditionary Forces, Camp Dewey, near Manila, July 29th, 1898. El Señor Noriel, General de Brigade. Sir: In pursuance of our conversation of yesterday and the message which Captain Arévalo brought to me during the night, I beg to inform you that my troops will occupy the intrenchments between the Camino Real and the beach, leaving camp for that purpose at 8.00 o’clock this morning. I will be obliged if you will give the necessary orders for the withdrawal of your men. Thanking you for your courtesy, I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant, F. V. Greene, Brigadier General, commanding.’”[55]

This clear direct declaration of intention by General Greene is the actual transaction referred to by Blount as “Jockeying the Insurgents out of their trenches.” He bases his statements concerning the matter on a newspaper report.

The attitude of the army officers in the matter of obtaining permission to occupy the trenches needed in preparing for the assault on the city could not have been more correct.

On August 10 General Merritt gave the following emphatic instructions relative to the matter:—

“No rupture with Insurgents. This is imperative. Can ask Insurgent generals or Aguinaldo for permission to occupy their trenches, but if refused not to use force.”

On the same day General Anderson wrote to Aguinaldo, asking permission to occupy a trench facing blockhouse No. 14, in order to place artillery to destroy it. The permission was granted on the following day.

During the early part of August, Aguinaldo seems to have avoided conferences with American officers. On the second of the month Mabini wrote him how he had put off Admiral Dewey’s aid with a false statement that he did not know Aguinaldo’s whereabouts.[56]

The landing of American troops at Parañaque for the assault on Manila led to the concentration of Insurgent troops at the neighbouring town of Bacoor.[57]

On August 8 Fernando Acevedo[58] wrote to General Pío del Pilar that the Americans were going to attack the next day and that,—

“It is requisite and necessary before their attack takes place to-morrow, that you to-morrow or to-night annihilate them, sparing none, for the way they have deceived us, and will again without fail, in the contract signed by Sr. Emilio; and convince yourself, my friend, that it is necessary to do this; and when it is done the whole world will wonder and say that we have done well, and will not be able to give out that the people here are fools spending the time sucking their fingers.”[59]

Governor-general Forbes in the Wild Man’s Country

Mr. Forbes has made frequent trips through the wild man’s country in Northern Luzon, and knows it from end to end. Its people know and like him. This photograph shows a crowd of Ifugaos welcoming him on his arrival at Banaue in May, 1913. They are clapping their hands over their heads in true Ifugao fashion.

Worse yet, information was sent to the Spaniards of the proposed American attack on the 13th instant, as is shown by the following letter:—

“(Battalion of Cazadores, No. 2. Expeditionary. Office of the Lieutenant-Colonel. Private.)

“Señor Don Artemio Ricarte:[60]

“My Dear Sir: I have received to-day your kind letter giving warning of the attack on Manila, and I thank you for your personal interest in me, which, on my part, I reciprocate. I assure you that I am yours, most truly and sincerely,

“Luis Martinez Alcobendas.

“Singalon, August 10, 1898.”[61]

According to Taylor, this was not the first occurrence of this sort. He says:—

“The officers of the United States Army who believed that the insurgents were informing the Spaniards of the American movements were right. Sastrón has printed a letter from Pío del Pilar, dated July 30, to the Spanish officer commanding at Santa Ana, in which Pilar said that Aguinaldo had told him that the Americans would attack the Spanish lines on August 2 and advised that the Spaniards should not give way, but hold their positions. Pilar added, however, that if the Spaniards should fall back on the walled city and surrender Santa Ana to himself, he would hold it with his own men. Aguinaldo’s information was correct, and on August 2 eight American soldiers were killed or wounded by the Spanish fire.”[62]

Taylor continues:—

“And yet Aguinaldo claimed to be an ally of the Americans. It is not probable that these were the only two such letters written. Aguinaldo had by this time found out that although he could defeat the scattered Spanish detachments, he could not defeat the Spanish force holding the lines of Manila. He did not want the Americans in the Philippines. They were in his way, and he had already made up his mind that if they did not give him what he wanted, he would drive them out by force. He saw very early that it was extremely improbable that he should obtain from them what he wanted; accordingly all losses both among Spaniards and Americans would, from Aguinaldo’s point of view, inure to his benefit. The best possible thing for him would be to hold his own force intact while they wore each other out. The Spanish losses, small as they were, occurred in front of the American lines, not in front of the Filipinos. There is no reason, accordingly, for believing that the Filipinos suffered heavily. To arrange that the Spaniards should inflict losses upon the Americans, while he saved his own men, showed ingenuity on the part of Aguinaldo; but it was decidedly not the conduct of an ally.”[63]

The feeling toward the American troops at this time is further shown by a telegram from General Pío del Pilar, sent from San Pedro Macati on August 10, 1898:—

“Commandant Acebedo writes that the Spaniards are about to surrender because they want to turn over the place; the Americans want them to leave only the batteries and say that they will station themselves in said batteries. It appears that they want to deceive us; they do not want to give us arms, and if they do not give us arms, we shall attack them and drive them out. I await your reply.”[64]

This is perhaps not quite the kind of coöperation that Admiral Dewey and Generals Anderson and Merritt had expected.

The truth is that the Insurgents were determined to capture Manila for themselves, not only because of the “war booty,” for which they were hungry, but because of the status which they felt that the taking of the capital of the Philippines would assure them. The great importance which they attached to this plan is shown in communications written by Agoncillo, Aguinaldo and others.[65]

Of conditions at this time, Taylor says:—

“On July 7, Aguinaldo appointed Artemio Ricarte and Pantaleón García to negotiate the surrender of Manila by the Spaniards to him (Exhibit 155). On July 5 Pantaleón García was planning to enter Manila by way of Tondo or of Santa Cruz (P.I.R., 243.7). On the 9th Aguinaldo ordered that rice should be gathered from the towns of Manila Province for the use of his troops in the decisive attack upon Manila which he intended making in a few days (P.I.R., 1087. 5).

“Aguinaldo, finding that his chance of obtaining Manila for himself was growing steadily less, now determined to force himself into the city with the Americans and demand a consideration for the assistance he had rendered them during the siege. It is true he had assisted them, but his assistance had not been intentional. It was the result of the operations he was carrying on for his own ends. The operations of the Filipinos and the Americans were against Spain as a common enemy of both; but the operations were not joint operations, and although their purpose was a common purpose, it was not a mutual one. On August 8 Aguinaldo appointed General Ricarte commander in the operations about Manila, ordered him to respect the property of all foreigners, and told him that in case his troops succeeded in entering Manila they were to carry their flag and plant it there (P.I.R., 703. 2). Judging from an unsigned draft of a letter, he must have warned the foreign consuls in Manila about the same time to gather under the protection of their flags all of their fellow-citizens who had not taken refuge on the vessels in the bay, so that when his troops entered the city no foreign lives would be taken, and no foreign property would be injured. The earnestness with which he urged that all foreigners not Spaniards should take steps to identify themselves and their property shows that he considered the persons and property of Spanish civilians as fair booty of war.”[66]

There was certainly no need of Insurgent assistance in the assault on Manila.

The reports which reached Aguinaldo that the surrender of Manila had been agreed upon in advance were correct, as is shown by the following testimony of Admiral Dewey:

“Senator Patterson. When did you reach an understanding with the Spanish commander upon the subject,[67]—how long before the 12th or 13th of August?

“Admiral Dewey. Several days before.

“Senator Patterson. To whom did you communicate the arrangement that you had?

“Admiral Dewey. General Merritt and, of course, all of my own captains—General Merritt, and I think a council of officers on board of one of the steamers. I think there were several army officers present when I told the General that; and I may say here that I do not think General Merritt took much stock in it.

“Senator Patterson. What statement did you make to them, Admiral, in substance?

“Admiral Dewey. That the Spaniards were ready to surrender, but before doing so I must engage one of the outlying forts. I selected one at Malate, away from the city.[68] They said I must engage that and fire for a while, and then I was to make a signal by the international code, ‘Do you surrender?’ Then they were to hoist a white flag at a certain bastion; and I may say now that I was the first one to discover the white flag. We had 50 people looking for that white flag, but I happened to be the first one who saw it. I fired for a while, and then made the signal according to the programme. We could not see the white flag—it was rather a thick day—but finally I discovered it on the south bastion; I don’t know how long it had been flying there when I first saw it.”[69]

On August 12, the day before Manila surrendered, Buencamino telegraphed Aguinaldo, urging him in the strongest terms to attack that night so that Americans might be obliged to ask him to stop, with the result that the Insurgents would be included in the official negotiations. He further advised Aguinaldo that he must not suspend his attack because the Americans suspended theirs.[70]

General Anderson tells us that, on the evening of August 12, he received an order from General Merritt to notify Aguinaldo to forbid the Insurgents under his command from entering Manila. This notification was delivered to Aguinaldo that night, and was received by him with anger.[71]

On the following morning the Insurgents actually made an independent attack of their own, as planned.[72] It promptly led to trouble with the Americans, and at 8 A.M. Aguinaldo received a telegram from General Anderson sternly warning him not to let his troops enter Manila without the consent of the American commander on the south side of the Pasig River.[73]

Aguinaldo apparently took no action in response to this request, except to direct General Riego de Dios, who was at Cavite, to go with Buencamino without losing a moment and ask for an explanation, in writing if possible.[74]

At 10.50 A.M. he telegraphed General Anderson saying that his troops were being forced, by threats of violence, to retire from positions which they had taken, and asking Anderson to order his troops to avoid difficulty with the Insurgent forces. Aguinaldo said that he had directed his men to aid the American forces if the latter are attacked by a common enemy, but was discreetly silent on the subject of their entering Manila.[75]

Fifteen minutes later, at 11.05, he received a reply to his telegram to General Riego de Dios, in which that officer communicated the views of Araneta[76] and Buencamino, who had been unable to find General Anderson. This important communication follows:—

“Most urgent. Araneta and Buencamino having been consulted in regard to your telegram of to-day, they confirm capitulation, and in regard to the telegraphic note of General Anderson they are of the opinion, first that we should continue hostilities while we ask for an explanation; second, that explanation should be in the following terms: Inquire reason for note and ask why our troops are not to enter Manila without permission of the American commander; third, in case the (terms of?) capitulation is given as the reason, to answer that we do not suspend our attempt to enter Manila. Its capitulation is not favourable to our independence. General Anderson is not here. General Merritt is probably in Manila. Only Admiral Dewey is in the Bay. We ask authorization to express our explanation in the proposed terms and to have a conference with Admiral Dewey in order to have our claims reach General Merritt.”[77]

An endorsement written by Mabini and signed by Aguinaldo on the above paper reads:—

“I authorize every assertion of right, but state that we believe that we have the right to enter Manila without permission as we have a part in the surrender of the Spaniards. They would not have surrendered if our troops had not cut off their retreat to the interior. Besides but for us the landing of troops would have cost them much blood. Obtain an answer as soon as possible in order to lay a protest before the consuls in case it is necessary.”[78]

Naturally, trouble followed. At 1.30 P.M. General Ricarte telegraphed to Aguinaldo:—

“Americans wish to put us out. Give directions.”[79]

Apparently about the same hour he wired more at length, as follows:—

“Most urgent. American troops rearguard our trenches. Mabolo and San José warn us that they will fire on us when the time comes. Impossible to remain there without disagreeing with them. Since 5 o’clock this morning we have been furiously attacking. Americans firing incessantly, Spaniards silent. No losses yet.”[80]

At 3.52 he wired again:—

“General Pío del Pilar informs me of the following: ‘Come here, if possible, as our soldiers at the barrio of Concepción are not allowed to go out and we are prohibited to move on any farther. We it was who succeeded in capturing that place. Come here or there will be trouble, since they are driving me away, and refusing to listen to what I say.’ I am at this very moment going to aforesaid place.”[81]

At 5 P.M. another was sent by Ricarte to Aguinaldo as follows:—

“Colonel San Miguel arrived here from Ermita. Regional Exposition, Agricultural College and other buildings are ours. Our flag flies already at Ermita. Colonel Agapito Donzón with his troops is in the Pérez building, Paco. Colonels Julian Ocampo and Isidoro Tolentino are in the convent of Ermita. All houses without flag are guarded by our soldiers.”[82]

At 6.15 P.M. he telegraphed as follows:—

“I inform you that the chiefs of our troops have reported to me that our flag at Singalong church (visita) was removed by the Americans and they hoisted theirs instead, not allowing us to approach thereto. General Pío del Pilar is at present at the barrio of Concepción. Americans prohibited him to move on any farther. How can he enter Manila?”[83]

No attention was paid to General Anderson’s request that the Insurgent troops should not enter Manila without permission. They crowded forward with and after the American forces. Coming out on Bagumbayan drive, they found American and Spanish troops confronting each other but not firing, the former on the drive, the latter on the neighbouring city wall. A flag of truce was waving from the south bastion, nevertheless the Insurgents fired on the Spanish forces, provoking a return fire which killed and wounded American soldiers. Of this incident General Greene has said:—

“At this point the California regiment a short time before had met some insurgents who had fired at the Spaniards on the walls, and the latter, in returning the fire, had caused a loss in the California regiment of 1 killed and 2 wounded.”[84]

The Philippine Supreme Court

From left to right, Justice Moreland, Justice Johnson, Justice Torres, Chief-Justice Arlleano, Justice Mapa, Justice Carson, and Justice Trent.

Some of these matters must have come to the attention of General Anderson, for he sent Aguinaldo a telegram, received by the latter at 6.35 P.M., as follows:—

“Dated Ermita Headquarters 2nd Division 13 to Gen. Aguinaldo. Commanding Filipino Forces.—Manila, taken. Serious trouble threatened between our forces. Try and prevent it. Your troops should not force themselves in the city until we have received the full surrender then we will negotiate with you.

“Anderson, commanding.”[85]

It appears that the Insurgent troops took the suburb of Santa Ana, and captured Spanish and Filipino officers and men.[86]

In view of the known facts, how absurd becomes the following contention of Aguinaldo, advanced in his “Reseña Verídica:—

“Our own forces could see the American forces land on the beach of the Luneta and of the Paseo de Santa Lucía. The Spanish soldiers, who were on the walls of the city, drew the attention of every one because they did not fire on the former, a mystery which was explained at nightfall of that day, by the news of the capitulation of the place by General Señor Jáudenes[87] to the American General, Mr. Merritt, a capitulation which the American Generals claimed for themselves, an infraction of what had been agreed upon with Admiral Dewey, in regard to the formation of plans for the attack and taking of Manila by the two armies, American and Filipino, together and in combination.

“This inexplicable line of conduct on the part of the American officers was made clearer by the telegrams, which General Anderson addressed to me, from Maytubig on the said 13th day, requesting that I should order our troops not to enter Manila, which request was refused, inasmuch as it was contrary to what was agreed upon, and to the high ends of the Revolutionary Government, which, on taking upon itself the immense work of besieging Manila, during the two months and a half, sacrificing thousands of lives and millions in material interests, could not surely have done so with any object other than that of capturing Manila and the Spanish garrison which with firmness and tenacity defended that place.”[88]

On August 14 Aguinaldo telegraphed General Anderson as follows:—

“My troops, who have been for so long besieging Manila, have always been promised that they could appear in it, as you know and cannot deny, and for this reason, and on account of the many sacrifices made of money, and lives, I do not consider it prudent to issue orders to the contrary, as they might be disobeyed against my authority. Besides, I hope that you will allow the troops to enter because we have given proofs many times of our friendship, ceding our positions at Parañaque, Pasay, Singálon and Maytubig. Nevertheless, if it seems best to you, and in order to enter into a frank and friendly understanding and avoid any disagreeable conflict before the eyes of the Spaniards, I will commission Don Felipe Buencamino and others, who will to-day go out from our lines and hold a conference with you, and that they will be safe during the conference.”[89]

Aguinaldo and his associates pressed the demand for joint occupation. On August 13 Admiral Dewey and General Merritt informed the government that since the occupation of Manila and its suburbs the Insurgents outside had been insisting on this, and asked how far they might proceed in enforcing obedience in the matter.

They were informed by a telegram dated August 17 that the President of the United States had directed:—

“That there must be no joint occupation with the Insurgents. The United States in the possession of Manila city, Manila bay and harbor must preserve the peace and protect persons and property within the territory occupied by their military and naval forces. The insurgents and all others must recognize the military occupation and authority of the United States and the cessation of hostilities proclaimed by the President. Use whatever means in your judgment are necessary to this end.”[90]

This left the military and naval commanders no option in the premises, and in any event dual occupation was out of the question because of the lawlessness of the Insurgent troops.

At this very time they were looting the portions of the city which they occupied, and as is abundantly shown by their own records were not confining their attacks to Spaniards, but were assaulting their own people and raiding the property of foreigners as well.[91] The continuation of such a condition of affairs was manifestly impossible.

The Insurgents promptly demanded their share in the “war booty,” and asked certain other extraordinary concessions as follows:—

“(4) Our sacrifices in coöperating in the siege and taking of Manila being well known, it is just that we should share in the war booty.

“(5) We demand for our use the palace of Malacañang and the Convents of Malate, Ermita and Paco or San Fernando de Dilao.

“(6) We demand that the civil offices of Manila be filled by North Americans and never by Spaniards; but if General Merritt should require some Filipinos we should be pleased if he will grant our President, Don Emilio Aguinaldo, the favour of recommending select and skilled Filipinos. The jurisdiction of the authorities of Manila shall not be recognized beyond the municipal radius.

“(7) The American forces shall not approach nor penetrate our military positions without permission of the respective commanders thereof and shall evacuate all the positions which they occupy at the present time beyond the municipal radius; Spaniards who pass our lines without permission of the commander will be considered as spies.

“(10) Lastly we state clearly that our concessions and petitions do not signify on our part that we recognize the sovereignty of North America in these islands, as they are made necessary by the present war.”[92]

Under the instructions of the President these demands could not be acceded to. Nor could they have been acceded to had there been no such instructions. In this connection the following extract from General Jáudenes’s cablegram for June 8th to his home government is highly significant:—

“Population of suburbs have taken refuge in walled city from fear of outrages of insurgents, preferring to run risks of bombardment, which has not yet begun.”[93]

It would seem that the population of the suburbs did not have a high idea of Insurgent discipline.

That their apprehensions were not groundless is shown by a passage in a letter sent the following day to Governor-General Augustin by Buencamino:—

“Manila being surrounded by land and by sea, without hope of assistance from anywhere, and Señor Aguinaldo being disposed to make use of the fleet in order to bombard, if Your Excellency should prolong the struggle with tenacity, I do not know, frankly, what else to do other than to succumb dying, but Your Excellency knows that the entrance of 100,000 Indians,[94] inflamed with battle, drunk with triumph and with blood, will produce the hecatomb from which there will not be allowed to escape either women, children, or Peninsular friars,—especially the friars; and, I believe that the rights of humanity, imperilled in such a serious way, should be well considered by Your Excellency, for however dear glory and military duty may be, although worth as much or more than existence itself there is no right by which they should be won at the cost of the rights of humanity, and the latter outweigh every consideration and all duty.”[95]

Don Felipe knew his own people. He also knew, none better, what they had in mind at this time.

As it was the Insurgent forces made the most of such opportunity as they had, and their own records show it.

In the suburbs of Manila they sacked and committed outrages, threatening people with their arms, and this was still going on a week after the fall of Manila.[96]

General Pío del Pilar was believed to be responsible for much of this misconduct, and Mabini proposed that as it was necessary for him to leave the vicinity of Manila, and they could not remove him by force, he be promoted.[97]

Some time during this month Sandico wrote Aguinaldo as follows:—

“The Americans have already heard of the frequent cases of kidnapping (dukut) occurring in Tondo, San Sebastián and San Miguel. Last night some of ours were surprised in the act of kidnapping a person. I have also heard that many persons are asking for contributions of war. I tell them[98] that you know nothing of all this and that if some persons are kidnapped it is due to the hate of the natives for the Spanish spies and secret police, which is great.”[99]

Evidently Sandico continued to interest himself in the matter of preventing disorder, for on September 24, 1898, he wrote Aguinaldo from Manila as follows:—

“By authority of General Don Pío del Pilar and accompanied by the War Auditor, Señor Urbano, we entered a prison where the individuals Mariano de la Cruz and Mariano Crisóstomo were kept. They were almost prostrated. They had lately been released from Bilibid where they had been confined for political crimes. On being asked the reason for their imprisonment they began by showing us their bodies from which blood still issued as the result of the barbarous treatment received from Major Carmona who, by the way, is the same person of whom I spoke to you in one of my previous letters; I declared to you then that he had assaulted, revolver in hand, a man in the middle of one of the most frequented streets of the suburb of Paco on pure suspicion.

“The prisoners in question stated that if they admitted the accusations made against them it was for fear of greater punishments promised by said Major. The officer of the guard took the liberty of striking with his fist the one who dared to express himself so.

“Before such a spectacle Major Bell found himself forced to tell them that brutal acts are not precisely a recommendation for a country that wished to be free and that they, the Americans, do not arrest any one without just cause.[100]

“I take the liberty of calling your attention to the matter in question and other abuses in order that the measures you may think fit be adopted to remedy this evil. In fact, we are making a target of ourselves in the sight of all nations, especially so in that of the Americans who note any act of ours and judge us secretly now in order to do so later in public. To make light of this is to plant a seed of future injury to us, because many will desire to place themselves under the protection of the American flag, seeing that ours refuses to defend the citizens’ individual rights.

“I, for my part, ask that Major Carmona be arrested together with his accomplices in the matter so that it may serve as a lesson not only for him but also for those who think like him.”[101]

Obviously Sandico’s protest of September 24 did not produce the desired result, for on September 28 he wrote Aguinaldo a long letter complaining that in Manila personal security did not exist, people were being tortured and murdered, kidnapping and theft were very frequent, and these abuses were being committed by Filipino officers and men. Some of the things which had come to his knowledge were of such a nature that he preferred to speak to Aguinaldo privately about them.[102]

Murder, pillaging, torture of prisoners, kidnapping, theft—these are not pleasant things, but they continued to occur, and Aguinaldo, who apparently desired to prevent them, was powerless to do so. He did not dare discipline General Pío del Pilar, nor remove him from the vicinity of Manila, and the soldiers of that officer continued to work their will on their own unfortunate and helpless people.

Aguinaldo at first flatly refused to direct the disorderly Insurgent forces to leave Manila. The American commander showed great forbearance and negotiations continued.

On August 16, 1898, the Diplomatic Commission (Buencamino and Gregorio Araneta) telegraphed Aguinaldo that a clause in a proposed agreement requiring prior permission of Insurgent officers before American troops could pass or approach their lines had greatly displeased General Anderson who declined to treat until after the withdrawal of Noriel’s troops from Manila.[103]

An Unsanitary Well

This is a typical old-style well, with the family washing going on beside it. Under such circumstances infection of the well water invariably resulted.

A Flowing Artesian Well

There is no way in which the water from such a well can become infected. More than eight hundred fifty have been sunk, and the death rate in some towns fortunate enough to possess them has fallen off fifty per cent, as a result.

Aguinaldo’s reply, sent on August 17, 1898, shows that he had already made up his mind to fight the Americans, for it contains the following significant words: “The conflict is coming sooner or later and we shall gain nothing by asking as favours of them what are really our rights.”[104]

While negotiations were pending General Merritt sent Major J. F. Bell to Aguinaldo with a letter and also with a memorandum in which were the words:—

“In case you find Aguinaldo inclined to be generous in his arrangements with us, you may communicate to him as follows: ...”

There follow six paragraphs, of which the third is of special importance. It reads as follows:—

“(3) That I have every disposition to represent liberally the Government at Washington, which I know is inclined to deal fairly with him and his people; but not knowing what the policy of that Government will be, I am not prepared to make any promises, except that in the event of the United States withdrawing from these islands care will be taken to leave him in as good condition as he was found by the forces of the Government.[105]

Relative to the italicized portion of this statement Major Bell says:—

“I was pressed to explain further just what meaning General M. meant to convey by the underscored portion of this remark, but I replied that I had repeated the language General M. had used to me, and I preferred they should seek any further explanation from him, lest I might unwittingly fall into error if I undertook to explain his meaning myself. Their lack of definiteness and my unwillingness to comment upon the language seemed to arouse their apprehensions and suspicions. They have been trying ever since to obtain in writing some definite promise on this subject.”[106]

Aguinaldo ordered that the machinery of the water works be started up at once, a thing which was very necessary as Manila was suffering from lack of water. I should be glad if I could leave this matter here, but I cannot, for Major Bell elsewhere makes the further statement:—

“Attention is invited to General Merritt’s promise made known to Aguinaldo by me verbally, namely, that in the event of the United States withdrawing from these islands, care would be taken to leave Aguinaldo in as good condition as he was found by the forces of the Government. From a remark the General made to me I inferred he intended to interpret the expression ‘forces of the Government’ to mean the naval forces, should future contingencies necessitate such an interpretation.”[107]

Let us hope that Major Bell misunderstood General Merritt’s intention. If this is not the case, I must say in all frankness that in my opinion it was General Merritt’s intention to indulge in sharp practice.

Obviously, the American naval forces did not find Aguinaldo in any “condition,” in the sense in which General Merritt uses the term. On the contrary, they brought him from Hongkong and assisted him in starting a revolution. The negotiations in question were relative to the positions held by the Insurgents at the time the negotiations took place, and General Merritt’s promise could not legitimately be interpreted to refer to anything else.

Had Aguinaldo accepted his offer, a most embarrassing situation would have resulted. General Merritt was obviously not authorized to make such a proposition in the first instance, and the only honourable course left open to him would have been to advise Washington of his improper action and beg the Government to support him in it and thus save the honour of the country.

Fortunately, Aguinaldo did not act upon the promise nor accept the offer. On the contrary, he promptly and indignantly denied that he was committed to anything, and sought to impose new conditions which were not acceded to.

Meanwhile some one doubtless got hold of General Merritt and called his attention to the fact that in making this offer he had grossly exceeded his authority, for in his reply to Aguinaldo’s protest General Merritt says:—

“So far as any promises as to what should be done in the event of a conclusion of a treaty between the United States and Spain are concerned, it is utterly impossible for me as the military representative only of the United States to make any promises such as you request. As you have already been informed, you may depend upon the good will of the Americans out here and the Government, of which you already know the beneficence, to determine these matters in the future.”[108]

Coming, as this statement did, after the offer made in the memorandum hereinbefore referred to, it must have aroused the suspicions of Aguinaldo and his associates, and in my opinion Merritt’s conduct in making such a proposal in the first instance was inexcusable.

Before he could terminate the negotiations which followed he was called away, and turned this matter, together with other unfinished business, over to his successor, General E. S. Otis.

On August 31, 1898, the latter official wrote to Aguinaldo as follows:—

“General Aguinaldo, Bacoor:

“Referring to promise made by General Merritt to reply to your letter of August 27 within four days, I desire to state that he was unexpectedly ordered away and had not opportunity to reply. Being unacquainted with the situation, I must take time to inform myself before answering, which I will do at the earliest opportunity.

“Otis.”

On September 8 General Otis wrote Aguinaldo a long letter fully discussing the whole situation in the light of the complete information which he had meanwhile obtained. Since so much has been made of this incident by Blount and others, I invite attention to the following extracts from General Otis’s letter, which embody a fair and judicial statement of the conditions which existed:—

“You designate certain lines within the suburbs of the city of Manila, to which you promise to retire your troops, and name as conditions precedent: First, protection to your shipping by the United States Navy, and the free navigation of your vessels within the waters in United States occupation; second, restitution to your forces of all positions which are now occupied by your troops, in the event that treaty stipulations between the United States and Spain surrender to the last-named government the territory occupied by the former; and thirdly, that United States troops now occupying positions beyond the lines you name shall retire within the same.

“A discussion of your proposition to hold, jointly, with the United States Government, the city of Manila, involves consideration of some of the other concessions you desire to be made, and to that I will at once refer. I wish to present the matter, in the first instance, in its legal aspect, although, from remarks contained in former correspondence, I am of the opinion that you are fully aware how untenable the proposition is. The United States and Spain were and are belligerent parties to a war, and were so recognized by the civilized world. In the course of events the entire city of Manila, then in full possession of Spanish forces, was surrendered to the first-named belligerent power. The articles of agreement and capitulation gave the United States Government full occupancy of the city and defences of Manila, and that Government obligated itself to insure the safety of the lives and property of the inhabitants of the city to the best of its ability. By all the laws of war and all international precedents the United States authority over Manila and its defences is full and supreme, and it cannot escape the obligations which it has assumed.

“But conceding, as you do, the strictly legal right of my Government to hold and administer the affairs of the city of Manila and its suburbs (I thus conclude from expressions contained in former correspondence and from my appreciation of your intellectual attainments), you base your proposition—a joint occupation—upon supposed equitable grounds, referring to the sacrifices your troops have made and the assistance they have rendered the American forces in the capture of Manila. It is well known they have made personal sacrifices, endured great hardships, and have rendered aid. But is it forgotten that my Government has swept the Spanish navy from the seas of both hemispheres; sent back to Spain the Spanish army and navy forces, recently embarked for your destruction, and the secure holding of the Philippine possessions; that since May 1 last its navy has held the city of Manila at its mercy, but out of consideration of humanity refused to bombard it, preferring to send troops to demand surrender, and thereby preserve the lives and property of the inhabitants? Is it forgotten that the destruction of the Spanish navy and the retention of Spanish armed men in its European possessions has opened up to you the ports of the Island of Luzon and held Spain helpless to meet its refractory subjects?

“Apart from all legal and equitable considerations, and those having their origin in personally conceived ideas of justice, I wish respectfully to call your attention to the impracticability of maintaining a joint occupation of Manila and its suburbs, and in this I know that I shall have the approval of your excellent judgment. It would be extremely difficult to prevent friction between our respective forces, which might result in unfortunate consequences, labor as we may for continued harmonious relations. Located in close proximity, irresponsible members of our organizations, by careless or impertinent action, might be the means of inciting grave disturbances; and in this connection I call to your attention the recent shooting affair at Cavite, which still requires investigation. There might also arise conflict of authority between our subordinate officers. Even now, within precincts in entire actual possession of our troops, I find that permits are given to citizens, who are styled local presidents, to make arrests, to carry arms, etc., in violation of our instructions and authority, and that several cases of kidnapping have taken place. In pursuance of our obligations to maintain, in so far as we can, domestic tranquillity, our officers have arrested suspected parties, and they have asserted (with what element of truth I know not) that the insurgent forces are the offenders. I have declined to accept their statements, as I prefer to believe the contrary, although it would appear that officers connected with those forces have issued the permits to which I allude. Such interference with our administration of civil affairs must eventually result in conflict.

“... And here permit me to remark upon a view of the subject you have advocated in support of the plea for dual occupation of the city’s suburbs. Your forces, you say in substance, should have a share in the booty resulting from the conquest of the city, on account of hardships endured and assistance rendered. The facts on which you base your conclusion granted, your conclusion, under the rules of war which are binding on my Government, does not follow, for it has never recognized the existence of spoils of war, denominated ‘booty,’ as have many European governments. No enemy’s property of any kind, public or private, can be seized, claimed by, or awarded to, any of its officers or men, and should they attempt to appropriate any of it for their individual benefit, they would be very severely punished through military tribunals, on which have been conferred by law very sweeping jurisdiction. The enemy’s money and property (all that is not necessary to be expended in administering local affairs in the enemy’s territory) must be preserved for final arbitrament or settlement by and between the supreme authorities of the nations concerned. My troops cannot acquire booty nor any individual benefit by reason of the capture of an enemy’s territory. I make this comment, believing that you hold erroneous opinions in respect to individual advantages which occupation bestows.

“I request your indulgence while I briefly consider the concessions you ask us to make as conditions precedent to the retirement of your forces to the lines indicated by your note of the 27th ultimo.

“The first is: Protection to your shipping and free navigation to your vessels. Neither the extent of protection nor the limit of free navigation you request is understood. Certainly you could not mean protection on the high seas, or in the ports not in the rightful possession of the United States. That, as you are fully aware, could only be effected by treaty, or guarantee, following international recognition of the belligerent rights of the Philippine revolutionary government. While the existing armistice continues, the United States are in rightful possession, in so far as the navigable waters of the Philippine Islands are concerned, only of the bay of Manila and its navigable tributaries. Within the same all vessels of trade and commerce and the war vessels of recognized national powers sail freely as long as the sovereignty of my Government is not assailed nor the peace of the locality threatened. In this respect, whatever concessions are extended by way of relaxation of trade restrictions, incident to war, to the citizens of these islands will be extended to all alike, and discrimination in this regard is neither intended nor permitted. Admiral Dewey exercises supervision over all naval matters, and they are in no way related to the duties conferred upon me by law. Nor would it avail should I seek his consent for greater latitude of action, for even if disposed to grant special concessions he could not do so, and I doubt if the supreme authority of my Government could now, under the prevailing truce with Spain, invest him with the requisite powers to do so and at the same time preserve its international obligations.

“The second concession named by you is restitution of positions in the city of Manila to your forces, in case the treaty of peace remands to Spain the territory surrendered under the late capitulatory articles; and the third and last is a promise to retire our troops within the lines indicated by you, as the lines on which you desire your troops to remain permanently. These propositions, having a kindred nature, may be considered together, and, indeed, have already been impliedly answered. From previous statements of facts and logical conclusions made and stated in this communication, concerning the nature of the obligations resting on the United States with regard to the territory to which they have the legal right of possession under contracting articles with Spain, it is evident that neither in law or morals can the concessions be made. I would be powerless to grant them in any aspect of the case, being nothing more than an agent to carry out the instructions of the executive head of my Government and not being vested with discretionary power to determine matters of such moment. In the present instance I am not only powerless to accede to your request, but have been strictly enjoined by my Government, mindful of its international promises and national honour, which it has never broken nor sacrificed, not to accede joint occupation of the city and suburbs of Manila and am directed specially to preserve the peace and protect persons and property within the territory surrendered under the terms of the Spanish capitulation. These mandates must be obeyed.

“Thus have I endeavoured with all candor and sincerity, holding nothing in reserve, to place before you the situation as understood by me, and I doubt not by the Republic which I represent. I have not been instructed as to what policy the United States intends to pursue in regard to its legitimate holdings here, and hence I am unable to give you any information on the subject. That it will have a care and labor conscientiously for the welfare of your people I sincerely believe. It remains for you, beneficiaries of its sacrifices, to adopt a course of action which will manifest your good intentions and show to the world the principles which actuate your proceedings.

“It only remains for me to respectfully notify you that I am compelled by my instructions to direct that your armed forces evacuate the entire city of Manila, including its suburbs and defences, and that I shall be obliged to take action with that end in view within a very short space of time should you decline to comply with my Government’s demands; and I hereby serve notice on you that unless your troops are withdrawn beyond the line of the city’s defences before Thursday, the 15th instant, I shall be obliged to resort to forcible action, and that my Government will hold you responsible for any unfortunate consequences which may ensue.

“In conclusion, I beg to inform you that I have conferred freely with Admiral Dewey upon the contents of this communication and am delegated by him to state that he fully approves of the same in all respects; that the commands of our Government compel us to act as herein indicated, and that between our respective forces there will be unanimity and complete concert of action.”

An Unimproved Street in the Filipino Quarter of Manila

The condition of the streets formerly made it impossible to remove night-soil and garbage from this district, and cholera was rampant there when this photograph was taken.

This calm and temperate discussion of the situation, coupled with the firm statement of intention with which it closed, produced a decided effect on Aguinaldo. Concerning the events to which it led, General Otis has made this statement:—

“On September 13, a commission sent by Aguinaldo and consisting of three members, one of whom was the treasurer and another the attorney-general of the insurgent government, called for the purpose of discussing the subject of my letter of the 8th. They asked me to withdraw it and simply request in writing that the insurgent troops retire to the line designated by General Merritt, which I refused to do, stating that unless they withdrew as directed we would be obliged to resort to force. They then asked that I withdraw the letter and issue a request unaccompanied by any threat to use force, as Aguinaldo was fearful that he would be unable to remove his troops upon a demand. To which I replied that the letter of the 8th instant would stand. They then said that as the demands of that letter must remain unchanged, the insurgents would withdraw as directed therein, but that if I would express in writing a simple request to Aguinaldo to withdraw to the lines which I designated—something which he could show to the troops and induce them to think that he was simply acting upon a request from these headquarters—he would probably be able to retire his men without much difficulty; that, of course, they themselves understood the direction to withdraw, which would be obeyed, and thereupon repeated their desire to obtain a note of request, whereupon I furnished them with the following:—

“‘Office U. S. Military Governor in the

“‘Philippine Islands,

“‘Manila, P. I., September 13, 1898.

“‘The Commanding General of the Philippine Forces:

“‘Sir: Referring to my communication of September 8, I have the honour to inform you that I have had a most agreeable conversation with certain gentlemen who are in the interests of your revolutionary government upon the matters therein contained. We have discussed at length the complications now existing, which will exist, and will doubtless increase, while our troops continue to occupy jointly certain districts of the city of Manila. I have urged upon them the necessity of the withdrawal of your troops in order that the friendly relations which have always been maintained by and between them and the forces of the United States Government may be perpetuated. I am sure that the gentlemen fully appreciate my sentiments and will clearly report them to you. May I ask you to patiently listen to their report of our conversation?

“‘It is my desire that our friendly intercourse and mutual amicable relations be continued; that they be not jeopardized if we can by consistent action avoid it, and such, I am certain, is the desire of yourself and associates.

“‘May I ask, therefore, that you withdraw your troops from Manila?

“‘Permit me to add in conclusion that I have that confidence in your ability and patriotism which will lead you to accede to this request.

“‘I am, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

(Signed) “‘E. S. Otis,

“‘Major-General, U. S. V.,

“‘United States Military Governor in the Philippines.’

“In reply to which, on the 16th, the following was received:—

“‘Malolos, Bulacan, September 16, 1898.

“‘The Commanding General of the American Forces:

“‘My Dear Sir: Referring to your esteemed communication, dated the 13th instant, I have the honour to inform you that I have given appropriate orders that my troops should abandon their most advanced positions within some of the suburbs, and that they should retire to points where contact with yours would be more difficult, in order to avoid all occasion for conflict.

“‘I hope that by these presents you will be fully convinced of my constant desire to preserve amicable relations with the American forces, even at the risk of sacrificing a part of the confidence placed in my government by the Philippine people.

“‘A consideration of my many occupations will serve to excuse me for not having answered with the promptness desired.

“‘Your very respectful servant,

(Signed) “‘Emilio Aguinaldo.’

“On the evening of the 15th the armed insurgent organizations withdrew from the city and all of its suburbs, as acknowledged by their leaders, excepting from one small outlying district. This certain agents of Aguinaldo asked on the previous day to be permitted to retain for a short time, on the plea that the general officer in command[109] would not obey instructions, and they proposed to remove his men gradually by organizations and thereafter to punish him for his disobedience. The withdrawal was effected adroitly, as the insurgents marched out in excellent spirits, cheering the American troops.”[110]

I have given the facts thus fully for the reason that this is the one instance I have found in which a promise was made, fortunately in the form of an offer which was not accepted, and then withdrawn. It has seemed to me that the reasons why General Merritt should never have made it, and why General Otis could not possibly have renewed it, should be fully set forth.

On September 7, 1898, General Otis had cabled to Washington that Admiral Dewey and he considered conditions critical, and that the number of armed Insurgents in the city was large and rapidly increasing. He stated that on the 8th he would send a notification to Aguinaldo that unless the latter’s troops were withdrawn beyond the line of the suburbs of the cry before September 15 he would be obliged to resort to forcible action and that the United States would hold Aguinaldo responsible for any unfortunate consequences which might ensue.

Aguinaldo still hoped to obtain recognition of his government by the United States, but did not consider such recognition probable, and pushed preparations to attack if a favorable opportunity should offer.

Before occupying ourselves with these preparations, let us briefly review the results of our investigations as to Insurgent coöperation with the American forces up to this time.

Taylor has made the following excellent summary of the case:—

“Up to this time Aguinaldo had continued a desultory warfare with the Spanish troops in Manila. That none of his attacks were very serious is shown from the Spanish reports of casualties; but although he had failed to secure the surrender of the city to himself, he had kept its garrison occupied and within their works. The American force on land was now strong enough to begin offensive operations. So far the relations between the Americans and Aguinaldo had not been really friendly. They were in his way, and yet he could not break with them, for he hoped to use them for the attainment of the designs which he had by this time frankly declared. The Americans had listened to these declarations, and had not answered them, nor was it possible to answer them. The American forces were there under the instructions of the President to make war on Spain and to establish a military government in the Philippines. Aguinaldo had declared himself a dictator and the Philippines independent. To have recognized him in his civil capacity, to have dealt with him in his civil capacity, would have meant a recognition of his government by the military commander in the field—a thing impossible and unlawful. Officers of the United States forces are not empowered to recognize governments; that function is reserved to the President of the United States; and in this case he, in his orders to the Secretary of War, dated May 19, copies of which were forwarded to General Merritt for his guidance, informed him that the army of occupation was sent to the Philippines ‘for the twofold purpose of completing the reduction of the Spanish power in that quarter and of giving order and security to the islands while in the possession of the United States.’ These instructions contemplated the establishment of a military government in the archipelago by military officials of the United States.

“it is true that in spite of the date of these instructions General Merritt in San Francisco had received no copy of them on August 28, three days after the departure of General Anderson, and what that officer knew of them could only have been what General Merritt remembered of the contents of an unsigned copy of them shown him at the White House, but they were in accordance with the practice of the United States Government in occupying conquered territory, that practice General Anderson well knew, and his relations with Aguinaldo were guided by it.

“It has been claimed that Aguinaldo and his followers received the impression at this time from their conversation with American officers that the United States would undoubtedly recognize the independence of the Philippines, and that the cooperation of the insurgents was due to this impression. There was no cooperation. That he attempted in vain to secure the surrender of Manila to himself was not cooperation. That he refrained from attacking the Americans and occasionally permitted them to be furnished supplies, for which they paid, was not cooperation. The fact that for a time their plans and his plans were parallel does not mean cooperation. Aguinaldo was forced by the exigencies of the situation, by the necessity of strengthening his hold upon the people, by the necessities of his operations against the Spaniards, to make Spaniards and natives alike believe that all that he did was with the aid of the Americans by whom he would be supported in all his acts. He needed their support, and if he could not obtain that he needed the appearance of their support for the attainment of his ends; and this he was forced to purchase by compliance, or apparent compliance, with their demands. But his compliance with them, as all American officers serving there well knew, was never willing, was never complete, and was never given except under pressure. It is true that writers upon the subject, speaking with the confidence which is born of insufficient and incomplete information, assure their readers that any government but that of the United States, any colonial administrators but Americans, would have been able to obtain the hearty cooperation of Aguinaldo and his followers by judicious concessions to them at this time. The only concession which would have obtained that hearty cooperation would have been the recognition of the independence of the Philippines under a United States protectorate, of Aguinaldo clothed with the plenitude of the powers of the Katipúnan as dictator, and a promise to promptly withdraw from the islands. This promise the Government of the United States could not make. Until the ratification of a treaty of peace with Spain the insurgents of the Philippine Islands were rebellious subjects of Spain, and with them, except as fighting men, no relations could be had.

“No report of operations or returns of strength were rendered by Aguinaldo at this or any other time to any American commander, and no American commander ever rendered such returns to him. At the time of General Merritt’s arrival, and until Manila was occupied by the Americans, the insurgents and United States troops were united solely by the fact that they had Manila as a common objective. Conditions were such that the Americans, in order to obtain its surrender, had to avoid doing anything which might cause the insurgents to attack them and perhaps make terms with Spain; while Aguinaldo and his followers, in order to accomplish the surrender of Manila to themselves, had to maintain such relations with the Americans as would induce the Spaniards to believe that their fleet was at his disposal,[111] and also such apparent harmony and cooperation with them in the execution of their plans that the recalcitrant among the Filipinos would be forced to believe that the Americans would in all ways use their forces to support Aguinaldo in the attainment of his desires.

“General Merritt saw this and the necessity for immediately taking such steps as would lead to his occupation of Manila. With the arrival of the third expedition he was able to pass through the insurgent lines between Camp Dewey and Manila, for he had sufficient force to accept no refusal from Aguinaldo.

“In his report he said that the insurgents had obtained positions of investment opposite the Spanish lines along their full extent, and that on the bay front their lines ran within 800 yards of San Antonio Abad. The approaches to the beach and village of Pasay were in their possession.

“‘This anomalous state of affairs, namely, having a line of quasi-hostile native troops between our forces and the Spanish position, was, of course, very objectionable, but it was difficult to deal with owing to the peculiar conditions of our relations with the insurgents.... As General Aguinaldo did not visit me on my arrival nor offer his services as a subordinate military leader, and as my instructions from the President fully contemplated the occupation of the islands by the American land forces, and stated that “the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants,” I did not consider it wise to hold any direct communication with the insurgent leader until I should be in possession of the city of Manila, especially as I would not until then be in a position to issue a proclamation and enforce my authority in the event that his pretensions should clash with my designs. For these reasons the preparations for the attack on the city were pressed and the military operations conducted without reference to the situation of the insurgent forces. The wisdom of this course was subsequently fully established by the fact that when the troops at my command carried the Spanish entrenchments, extending from the sea to the Pasay road on the extreme Spanish right, we were under no obligation, by prearranged plans of the mutual attack, to turn to the right and clear the front still held by the insurgents, but were able to move forward at once and occupy the city and the suburbs.’”[112]

All that the Insurgents and the Americans ever had in common was an enemy. They each fought that enemy in their own way. There was no coöperation. On the part of the Insurgents there was treachery. I will submit further evidence of this fact.

[1] P. 39.

[2] For J. M. Basa.

[3] P.I.R., 507–7.

[4] P.I.R., 477. 1.

[5] “Until the Philippine question is finally decided, you would do well in not having any controversy with the Americans. After having secured the extinction of Spanish control for good, you may then liquidate accounts with the United States in the event that they wish to control in the interior; but in the meantime, let what will occur, do not allow yourself to have any controversy with them. Matters are in a very delicate state at the present time.”—P.I.R., 398. 3.

In a postscript to the same letter Bray says:—

“America is a great nation and does not wish that conditions be dictated to her. I am more than ever convinced that you must be patient and await what they propose, without opposing their wishes and insanities, before the questions before the Paris Congress are definitely settled and the islands ceded by Spain; then there would still be time to show your teeth if they try to govern the country. I would not object at present to them taking up their residence there and acting in the capacity of guard for good government, placing our trust for the future in Providence which will never abandon the Philippines.”—P.I.R.

[6] Blount, p. 283.

[7] Ibid., p. 283.

[8] See p. 74.

[9] “Both Spanish fleets had been destroyed and Spain had but one left to protect her own coast cities. The death knell of her once proud colonial empire had sounded. Decrepit as she was, she could not possibly have sent any reinforcements to the Philippines. Besides, the Filipinos would have ‘eaten them up.’”—Blount, p. 127.

[10] P.I.R., 471.4.

[11] Ibid., 471.4.

[12] Ibid., 450. 2.

[13] P.I.R., 471.4.

[14] “You should not forget what I have stated at the beginning of this letter; because I am of the opinion that those questions should be well considered by all of you. If our people desire independence under the American protectorate, it is necessary that our representatives to the United States be given instructions as to the conditions which we should grant to the United States. The peace negotiations are in full blast, and it is probable that we will be rather late in sending our representatives. Therefore, if you agree to independence under a protectorate, you should recommend it at once. I leave it, however, to your care, as you are better qualified than myself concerning the conditions of our country.”—P.I.R., 471.4.

[15] “My Dear Friend: ... The last telegrams from Europe which Felipe will send you by this mail are alarming for our future. The preliminaries of peace are announced. The demand of America is, annexation of Porto Rico and the Ladrone Islands, independence of Cuba under an American protectorate and an American coaling station in the Philippines. That is, they will again deliver us into the hands of Spain. On the other hand, all the powers will unite to prevent the annexation of the Philippines, according to the telegrams of Regidor; the American cabinet hesitates about including us in the negotiations for peace from fear of a conflict with us and the Filipinos in Europe advise us to send a message to America giving our unconditional adhesion. If events will be what these telegrams indicate, we have a dark and bloody future before us. To be again in the hands of Spain will mean a long and bloody war, and it is doubtful whether the end will be favourable to us. The treaty of peace sanctioned by the other powers will assure the dominion of Spain. Spain free from Cuba and her other colonies will employ all her energy to crush us and will send here the 150,000 men she has in Cuba. I do not think that the Filipinos will again submit to their tyrants and there will be a long and bloody war. And on account of the treaty the other powers will aid Spain to completely dominate us and place all possible obstacles in our way to prevent shipment of arms and all kinds of revolutionary labours. In view of all this and bearing in mind the present urgency of the matter, it is necessary for that government to establish and publish its policy. We believe that the best for us and the only feasible one, if we want to establish negotiations with America, is independence under an American protectorate.”—P.I.R., 453.3.

[16] “The policy which you will pursue in the United States is the following one:—

“Make them understand that whatever may be their intention towards us, it is not possible for them to overrule the sentiments of the people represented by the government, and they must first recognize it if we are to come to an agreement. Still do not accept any contracts or give any promises respecting protection or annexation, because we will see first if we can obtain independence. This is what we shall endeavour to secure; meanwhile, if it should be possible to do so, still give them to understand in a way that you are unable to bind yourself but that once we are independent, we will be able to make arrangements with them.”—P.I.R., Books C-1.

[17] P.I.R., 5. 7.

[18] In a letter written on that date to Agoncillo he says:—

“Notwithstanding, I enclose you the credentials as requested; thereby you will see that in addition to your representing us at Washington, you may assist the commission they have formed for the purpose of determining the future condition of the Philippines.

“But you must act in such manner that they may not be able to say that we have accepted the said commission, because it is my wish to protect [protest? D. C. W.] at all times against their being charged with determining our destiny. You must bear in mind that the policy of the government is to obtain absolute independence, and if perchance we should know by the course of events that such cannot be the case, we will then think of protection or annexation.”—P.I.R., Books C-1.

[19] On August 30, 1898, Aguinaldo wrote Agoncillo:—

“It is said that General Merritt is going away to take part in the work of the Commission. On this account it is important that you proceed as quickly as possible to America, in order to know what takes place. If perchance we should go back to Spanish control, ask them to help us as the French helped them during their own revolution and ask also the terms.”—P.I.R., Books C—1.

[20] Taylor, 18 AJ.

[21] See [p. 61].

[22] Ibid.

[23] Some time during August, 1898, Sandico wrote a letter to Aguinaldo of which the postscript reads as follows:—

“P.S.—If you think of appointing me as Delegate to Manila, please send me my credentials. There are also annexationists here [i.e., in Manila.—D. C. W.].”—P.I.R., 416. 3.

[24] Now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. He is a man of excellent character, high attainments and great ability. He held important legal positions under the Spanish government. In October, 1898, he was appointed Secretary of Foreign Relations of the “Philippine Republic,” but never served as such officer. He was given the degree of Doctor of Law by Yale University in 1904.

[25] Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, one of the most brilliant living Filipinos. He had spent many years in Paris, was a talented physician, and under American rule served for more than seven years as a member of the Philippine Commission.

[26] Taylor, 55 AJ.

[27] Taylor, 26 AJ.

[28] Senate Documents, Vol. 25, Fifty-seventh Congress, First Session, p. 2969.

[29] Senate Documents, Vol. 25, pp. 2931–2932.

[30] Senate Documents, Vol. 25, p. 2956.

[31] Ibid., p. 2966.

[32] Ibid., p. 2966.

[33] Senate Documents, Vol. 25, p. 2955.

[34] Ibid., p. 2952.

[35] The following passage is an extract from an unsigned order dated July 22, 1898:—

“For the preservation of peace and good order in the community and to put an end to the acts of those who within and without the city of Manila and in the neighboring provinces not under the control of the Spanish Government, are evading the orders issued by these Headquarters, and in view of the large number of those who are storing and monopolizing food and other most necessary articles, under the pretence of desiring to sell them to the Americans, but whose real intention is to ship them secretly to Manila where they receive higher prices for their merchandise, without regard for the injury they are doing the cause of our independence, I have seen fit to decree the following: ...” P.I.R., 45.5 and 125.3.

Relative to this matter, Taylor says:—

“The defection of Buencamino and Pilar had opened the road to Aguinaldo, but at first the blockade was not effective. There were too many natives there with friends and relations in Aguinaldo’s camp to make him desire to subject the city to the hardships of an effective siege. And, furthermore, he did not have the force, nor did his men have the necessary discipline, to prevent the ingress of supplies. It was not until the first part of July that the price of provisions increased. It was at no time found necessary by the authorities to take over all the stores of provisions in the city. Indeed, there seems to have been a fairly steady traffic in supplies between Manila and the country to the north. It was a traffic in which it has been charged that certain Spanish officers of rank made large sums. Aguinaldo permitted it, and on July 26, 1898, signed an order directing that food should be sent into Manila from the north to prevent starvation in the city, and ordered the heads of the towns in the vicinity not to interfere with this traffic (P.I.R., 1087–4). The entrance of food supplies was confined to the northern line, for then it would not be known to the Americans who, after July 30, occupied the entrenchments in front of San Antonio Abad. It was not expedient for them to see too much of Aguinaldo’s methods.”—Taylor, 14 AJ.

[36] P.I.R., 398. 2.

[37] Senate Document 331, p. 2976, 1902.

[38] P.I.R., 102–10.

[39] P.I.R., Books C-1.

[40] P.I.R., 102–10.

[41] Ibid.

[42] P.I.R., 102. 10.

[43] Ibid., Books C-1.

[44] Ibid., 102–10.

[45] P.I.R., 102–10.

[46] Now a major-general.

[47] P.I.R., 102–10.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid.

[50] “Debtor to the generosity of the North Americans, and to the favors we have received through Admiral Dewey and (being) more desirous than any other person of preventing any conflict which would have as a result foreign intervention, which must be extremely prejudicial, not alone to my nation, but also to that of Your Excellency, I consider it my duty to advise you of the undesirability of disembarking North American troops in the places conquered by tho Filipinos from the Spanish, without previous notice to this government, because as no formal agreement yet exists between the two nations the Philippine people might consider the occupation of its territories by North American troops as a violation of its rights.

“I comprehend that without the destruction of the Spanish squadron the Philippine revolution would not have advanced so rapidly. Because of this I take the liberty of indicating to Your Excellency the necessity that before disembarking, you should communicate in writing to this government the places that are to be occupied and also the object of the occupation, that the people may be advised in due form and (thus) prevent the commission of any transgression against friendship.”—P.I.R., Books C-1.

[51] Blount, p. 59.

[52] On July 15 General Noriel telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:—

“Urgent. Received a telegram from the captain adjutant, who is in Parañaque, of the following tenor: ‘I inform your excellency that two cascos of armed Americans have arrived at this point. I await orders from Your Excellency.’ Which I hasten to communicate to Your Excellency for the proper action.”—P.I.R., 849.

Later on the same day Arevalo telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:—

“Lieutenant-Colonel Duboce with three hundred men waiting for more troops from Cavite, and also orders, but not to attack.”—P.I.R., 849.

[53] Captain Torres telegraphed Aguinaldo on July 15 as follows:—

“I have read all your telegrams and carried out the same, and I incidentally questioned them about their purposes, [they] replying that they will aid; let time demonstrate it. They also intend to encamp over here at Parañaque. I will report to you any occurrence.”—P.I.R., 69.6.

[54] P.I.R., 69. 5.

[55] Ibid., 849.

[56] “Admiral Dewey’s Aide was here to-day. I told him I was ignorant of your whereabouts and, if he had no objection, he might talk with me as I am your representative; but he said that he could not do so, as he had orders to speak with you personally, about something very important. He then departed.”—P.I.R., 1179. 5.

[57] The following telegram was addressed to the President or the Secretary of War by Sulpicio at Bacoor, on August 8, 1898:—

“Last night I received a telegram from General Noriel, asking for 100 cavanes of rice which he needs immediately, since he has ordered to send him all the troops here on account of the landing of Americans in Parañaque. General Mascardo will send him the troops which are here. There are 56 bundles [of rice.—TR.] deposited in this storehouse.”—P.I.R., 1179. 5.

[58] This man’s record is not known to me. Apparently he was an officer in the Spanish army, for he is later reported as surrendering to the Insurgents at Santa Ana on August 13, 1898. See footnote 4, p. 104.

[59] Taylor, 33 AJ.

[60] Artemio Ricarte was one of the ranking Insurgent generals directing operations against Manila.

[61] P.I.R., 1087. 5.

[62] Taylor, 30 AJ.

[63] Taylor, 30 AJ.

[64] P.I.R., 849.

[65] On August 2, 1899, Agoncillo wrote Mabini:—

“I send Don Emilio the information I have been able to obtain here, in order that in view thereof you [plural] may consider the best solution of our present political problem, which is an exceptional case in history. In my opinion, the most critical moment, which I call agonizing, whether correctly or not I know not, is the capture of Manila, where General Merritt will constitute a provisional government, in compliance with the instructions from his Government. It is unnecessary to recommend that you observe great tact, great prudence, when this event occurs. Ascertain the real wishes of the people in this conflict and the war resources at our disposal and those which you may count on during the struggle until its termination.”

—P.I.R., 451.3.

In his document entitled “Means for Attaining Filipino Independence” Aguinaldo had written:—

“VIII. Exterior attack. Above everything the Revolutionists must occupy all Manila including the Walled City with the object and purpose that the nation possessing the Philippines according to the decision of the Powers will be forced to come to an understanding with the Filipinos to avoid the shedding of blood.”—P.I.R., 457. 5.

[66] Taylor, 29 AJ.

[67] That is, the surrender of Manila.

[68] Fort San Antonio A′bad.

[69] Senate Documents, Vol. 25, p. 2943.

[70] “I must tell you that I feel as you should feel in regard to our government not having officially participated in the capitulation of Manila. Accordingly the war must be continued with Spain, because, if we attack to-night, the Americans, acting upon the request of the Spaniards and foreigners in addition to those who took part in the capitulation, will have to ask us to suspend operations; hence we shall be included in the negotiations and this will work to our advantage.

“To-night at 2 A.M. you will attack without fail in order that we may be included in the capitulation which the Americans made to-day. You must not stop the attacks because they do, and this is also the opinion of our partisans among the foreigners.”—P.I.R., 1179. 5 & 427. 5.

[71] “Our Rule in the Philippines,” The North American Review, 1900, No. 170.

[72] General Ricarte to Aguinaldo, August 12, 1898, 11.15 P.M.:

“Have received the telegram from your honourable person regarding attack at four o’clock in the morning, although we will make the attack anyway. I have directed Gen. Pío Del Pilar begin firing cannon at the hour set. At the present time we are making preparations and will also give orders to the chiefs of the columns.”—P.I.R., 849.

[73]

“August 13, 1898.

“Dated. Camp Dewey 13. To General Aguinaldo. Commanding Philippine Forces, Bacoor: Do not let your troops enter Manila without the permission of the American commander on this side of Pasig river. You will be under our fire.

“Anderson, Brig. General.”

—P.I.R., 102–10.

[74] “Copy: Gen. Riego, Cavite: Have just received a note from Gen. Anderson saying to me he does not permit my troops to enter Manila without permission from the American commander on this side of the Pasig River. They will be under his fire. Go with Señor Buencamino and ask for an explanation, in writing if possible, as to the motive for said note, without losing a moment. August 13, ’98. E.A.”

—P.I.R., 849.

[75] “I received a telegram. My interpreter is in Cavite. In consequence of this I have not answered until now. My troops are forced by yours, by means of threats of violence, to retire from positions taken. It is necessary to avoid conflict, which I should lament, that you order your troops that they avoid difficulty with mine, as until now they have conducted themselves as brothers to take Manila. I have given strict orders to my chiefs that they preserve strict respect to American forces and to aid them in ease they are attacked by a common enemy.”

[76] Gregorio Araneta, later a member of the Philippine Commission and Secretary of Finance and Justice. He was Secretary of Justice under the Malolos government, and was also secretary of the Insurgent Congress. He was at this time a bright young lawyer of good ability and character.

[77] P.I.R., 849.

[78] Ibid.

[79] P.I.R., 849.

[80] Ibid., 849.

[81] Ibid., 1179. 5.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Ibid.

[84] Report of War Dept., 1898, Vol. I, part 2, p. 69.

[85] Taylor, Exhibit 739.

[86] The following two telegrams were sent by General Pio del Pilar to Aguinaldo at 9.30 P.M.:—

“I inform you that the Bayambang troops who have presented themselves before me when we entered Santa Ana this afternoon, are: 4 lieutenants, 171 soldiers with their respective rifles and ammunitions, Major Fernando Acevedo, Captain Licerio Geronimo, 1 Spanish lieutenant, and 1 prisoner by the name of Enrique Flores. All of them I put under your orders.”—P.I.R., 1179.5.

“Very urgent. I inform you of the capture made by my soldiers: 2 lieutenants of the Marine Corps, 2 lieutenants of the Spanish Infantry, 52 soldiers. Rifles about 400. I put them under your orders and await your instructions.”—P.I.R., 1179. 5.

[87] The Spanish Governor-General.

[88] P.I.R., 1300. 2.

[89] Taylor, 58 HJ.

[90] Ibid., 59.

[91] See footnote 2, p. 108.

[92] P.I.R., Books C-1.

[93] Taylor, 15 AJ.

[94] The word Indios, here translated “Indians,” means Malayan Filipinos of pure blood as distinguished from mestizos or people of mixed blood.

[95] P.I.R., 918. 2.

[96] The following telegram was sent by Colonel José to Aguinaldo:—

“Urgent. August 20, 1898: Colonel López reports that our troops are still sacking and committing outrages in Malate, Paco and Ermita, even menacing people with their arms. Urge you to take proper measures to stop these abuses.”—P.I.R., 1167. 3.

[97] Extract from a letter of August 20, 1899, from Mabini to Aguinaldo:

“Señor López, your adjutant, arrived and told me of many complaints regarding the behaviour of the soldiers. He says that our officers carry off many horses, some of them belonging to foreigners. If the foreigners should enter a protest against such doings, I do not know what will be thought of our government.

“It is also absolutely necessary that a stop should be put to the passes, and that the tax on merchandise entering Manila, should no longer be exacted. It is absolutely necessary, if you think well of it, for us to promote General Pío, and make him your second in command. It is necessary for him to leave the vicinity of Manila, as we cannot remove him by force; and do not reprimand him.

“If you approve, I will write a Decree, but I reflect that nothing will succeed, if our commanders are not obliged to comply.”

—P.I.R., 472. 13.

[98] I.e. the Americans.

[99] P.I.R., 458. 8.

[100] Major J. F. Bell accompanied Sandico on this trip.

[101] P.I.R., 1166. 12.

[102] “I regret very much to have to inform you that as long as personal property is not respected here in Manila especially, by some of our men, as long as personal security does not exist and as long as prisoners are tortured, we cannot hope to deserve the confidence of the other governments. Murders, thefts of carriages and horses, are very frequent here, as is kidnapping, ...

“Sergeant Barcena, of the Fifth Company of the Second Zone, that is the zone of General Pío del Pilar, informed me that the cruel officers of that Zone, were Major Carmona and a lieutenant who was formerly a barber.

“I know that the Government has ordered that private persons and property be respected and has withdrawn from the military the power of trying civilians; but in view of the fact that notwithstanding this restriction some of them continue to discharge powers of which they have been divested, I find it necessary to call your attention thereto, in order that more energetic measures may be adopted so that other nations may not be led to believe that our government is very weak.

“In the jurisdiction of the Americans, I have surprised small groups of officers, who devote themselves to summoning persons before them and arresting them. These groups can be found in Binondo, Tondo and Trozo. I have used all friendly measures to secure their dissolution, but if they continue their conduct, I shall be obliged to turn them over to the American authorities, although I inform you that I shall not make use of such measures, until diplomatic means are exhausted.

“I understand very well that in endeavouring to stop the abuses committed by our officers and by the Filipinos who claim to belong to us, in Manila, I expose myself to becoming a victim of their vengeance; nevertheless, this does not terrify me, because my duty to the country requires it.

“I beg of you that if you take any steps against Major Carmona and the barber lieutenant, to be very careful and call General Pío del Pilar and come to an understanding with him as to the mode of punishment of these officers ....

“I have discovered grave cases which are occurring in the Presidio of Manila, which I propose to relate to you when I shall have the honor to see you personally. The Americans are already aware of these cases, and are working in their own interest untiringly.

“I could tell you a good many other things, but I do not do so on account of lack of time, and because I wish to reserve them until I can speak to you privately. In the meantime, order me as you will, etc.”

—P.I.R., 416. 7.

[103] “General Anderson received us very well, but in the proposed agreement the clauses requiring the prior permission of our commanders before American troops could pass or approach our lines displeased him very much. Gen. Anderson refuses to treat until after the withdrawal of Noriel’s troops. I think it prudent to yield. This telegram is in amplification of another which, at the request of Gen. Anderson, we sent through his telegraph station to your excellency.”—P.I.R., 849.

[104] “It is impossible to order General Noriel to fall back because if we order it they will ask the same thing from General Pío and we shall get nothing ourselves. And the worst is that after we have evacuated Manila and its environs they will follow us up to our new positions to take them too without our being able to obtain from them any formal statement of the concession signed in duo form. Tho conflict is coming sooner or later and we shall gain nothing by asking as favours of them what are really our rights. We shall maintain them as long as we are able, confiding in Providence and in Justice. I confirm my last telegram. Tell General Anderson that we shall hold a meeting of the council of Government in order to decide. Please return here soon with your companions. I inclose the map which I hope you will return.”—P.I.R., 427. 1.

[105] Senate Document No. 208, p. 22.

[106] Ibid., p. 23.

[107] Ibid., p. 26.

[108] Senate Document No. 208, p. 24.

[109] Pío del Pilar.

[110] Report of the War Department, 1899, Vol. I, part IV, pp. 5–10.

[111] See Buencamino’s letter to Jáudines, p. 108.

[112] Taylor 36 AJ. et seq.

Chapter IV

The Premeditated Insurgent Attack

It will be remembered that the minutes of the session of the Hong Kong junta at which Aguinaldo reported the result of his negotiations with Pratt and received his instructions relative to the trip to Manila, recorded the fact that there would be no better occasion for the expeditionary forces “to arm themselves at the expense of the Americans,” and that provided with arms the Filipino people would be able to oppose themselves to the United States and combat their demands if they attempted to colonize the country.[1]

The possible, if not the probable, desirability of attacking the United States troops was, it is evident, clearly foreseen from the beginning. Active preparations for doing this now soon began.

Although Insurgent officers in full uniform freely visited Manila at all times, Aguinaldo wrote on October 1 to his commander in Laguna Province that he must not permit Americans there without passes. He was to get rid of them civilly, but he was to keep them out and inform all authorities there of his instructions.

On August 24 an American soldier was killed and others were wounded in Cavite by Insurgent troops who fired from behind. An Insurgent officer in Cavite at the time reported on his record of services that he—

“took part in the movement against the Americans on the afternoon of the 24th of August, under the orders of the commander of the troops and the adjutant of the post.”

This shows that the movement was ordered, but the Insurgents promptly realized that it was ill advised.

On August 28 General Llanera was reported to be preparing for operations against the Americans. He was ordered to suspend his preparations. The same day General P. Mercado Rizal, commanding in Laguna Province, wrote Mabini asking whether they were to consider the Americans as their allies or their enemies. He wanted to know whether the war was to stop or continue becoming more furious. This not because he desired to ask questions about the secrets of the government, but because he wished to prepare the minds of the people for the future. Mabini’s answer has not been found.

An Improved Street in the Filipino Quarter of Manila

The construction of such streets and drains makes it possible successfully to combat disease.

We have already noted that on August 8 Fernando Acevedo wrote General Pío del Pilar recommending that he attack and annihilate the American troops; that on August 10 Pilar wrote Aguinaldo suggesting that the Americans be attacked, and that on August 17 Aguinaldo stated” “The conflict is coming sooner or later.”[2]

At this time Sandico entered the service of the Americans as an interpreter and acted as a spy, endeavouring to keep his people fully informed relative to the plans and acts of his employers. Incidentally he endeavoured to convince the latter that the barbarities really committed by Insurgent officers and troops in Manila were perpetrated by enemies of the Insurgent cause who wished to discredit it.

In a letter dated September 21, 1898, Apacible says that the conflict will come sooner or later and asks Aguinaldo if it would not be better for them to provoke it before the Americans concentrate their troops.[3]

On September 10 General Garcia reported to Aguinaldo that on the previous night the Americans had attempted to push back his line at San Lazaro, and that morning had concentrated and penetrated the Insurgent territory, making a reconnaissance through the fields about Sampaloc. Aguinaldo put an endorsement on this communication saying that he had long since ordered that the Insurgent line should not be passed. He instructed Garcia to throw troops in front of the Americans at Sampaloc, and order them to leave, and to warn the bolo men. Obviously, little more was needed to provoke an Insurgent attack.[4]

An unsigned draft of an order in Aguinaldo’s handwriting dated Malolos, September 13 (?), 1898,[5] shows how tense was the situation while the question of withdrawal of the Insurgent forces from the city of Manila was under consideration. It contains instructions for General Pío del Pilar, General P. Garcia and General Noriel or Colonel Cailles. Their purpose is hardly open to doubt.

General Pío del Pilar was directed:—

“To have a detachment posted in the interval from the branch of the river of Paco in a northerly direction to the bridge and so on up to the Pasig river in the direction of Pandacan, the river serving as a line until the suburb of Panque is reached which will be under our jurisdiction. Proceed to execute this order on its receipt, posting detachments where they are necessary and trenches will be made without loss of time working day and night. Do not rest for by doing so we may lose the opportunity; beg of the troops to assist in the formation of intrenchments. Matters have a bad aspect, we especially expect something Wednesday and Thursday, the 15th and 16th of this month. The danger is imminent on the mentioned days, also in the time that follows.

“Keep strict vigilance at all hours. In case you receive orders to leave that place, do not do so on any account without my orders, happen what may....

“Concentrate all your forces in Santa Ana before the day arrives.

“Warn your soldiers against firing at random as the Spaniards did, if possible have them calculate the number of their antagonists and how much ammunition there is in comparison with the number of the attacking force, in fact, there are occasions when each shot fired kills as many as four men.

“I hope you will see to the execution of these instructions and that you will maintain the honour of the Philippines by your courage and in no way permit your rights to be trampled underfoot.”[6]

General Garcia was instructed as follows:—

“On Wednesday, the 14th of this month, you will post detachments in the points indicated by lines on the enclosed plan. On receipt of this and as soon as you learn its contents, proceed secretly to determine the most suitable places to post detachments and immediately post our troops and have intrenchments made employing day and night in this work. Beg this of our soldiers.”[7]

The instructions to Noriel or Cailles read as follows:—

“At eight o’clock in the morning of Wednesday, the 14th, withdraw your command from the town of Malate as indicated on the enclosed plan, from the bridge in Singalong and in a straight line from there to the branch of the river in Paco will be the line of our jurisdiction even though we may not be of one mind in the matter. On receipt of this proceed to determine the most suitable places to post our troops even if they are not supplied with batteries; on posting the detachments give instructions to have intrenchments made immediately without resting, especially on the days of the 15th and 16th. Since affairs have a serious aspect, do not lose vigilance and be on the alert at all times....

“Concentrate all the forces and have a call to arms in Cavite so that all the troops may be in Pasay on Wednesday night.

“In case the Americans attempt to order you out do not leave your posts, happen what may, but exercise prudence and be prepared leaving them to give the provocation. Answer them that you have no instructions given you with regard to what they ask.”[8]

Obviously the maintenance of peace at this time hung by a very slender thread. On September 14 the governor of Cavite telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:—

“Most urgent. I desire to know from you the result of the ultimatum. Advise me if we must prepare our troops for action to-morrow. I await a reply.”[9]

But war was not to begin at this time. On September 23 Bray wrote to Aguinaldo advising him to maintain a defensive attitude until the result of the negotiations at Paris should become known, giving way to the Americans and not showing his teeth. He could take the offensive later if advisable and should have little difficulty in settling accounts with the American soldiers.[10]

Bray suggested the possibility of an alliance between the American and the Spanish soldiers if a conflict should arise before the departure of the latter.[11]

Meanwhile preparations for the attack progressed. During September, Sandico wrote Aguinaldo suggesting the urgent necessity of reorganizing the “masons” and the Katipúnan,[12] and that all be furnished with knives, to be kept hidden so that they might be “ready for any event.”

In spite of efforts to keep the Insurgent soldiers in hand, feeling among them ran high, and they wanted to fight.[13] On November 30, 1898, General Mascardo telegraphed from San Fernando to Aguinaldo asking if he might begin firing in order to prevent the American troops from disembarking, and Aguinaldo promptly answered in the affirmative.[14]

On December 5 Malvar telegraphed from Lipa that according to a despatch from Batangas, American divers were working unceasingly and that a subordinate had ordered that they be fired on if they attempted to land. Aguinaldo replied that he did not mind their working at sea, but that they must not be allowed to land under any circumstances.[15]

On December 6 Sandico telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:—

“The difficulty of last night at the San Juan picket with the American troops has been adjusted without prejudice. Our preparations ought to continue. Awaiting orders.”[16]

San Juan was where the firing commenced on February 4, 1899.

On December 9 Cailles wired Aguinaldo as follows:—

“Report to you that there are 3000 Americans in front of our position at Singalong. I do not know what they wish; if they enter Pineda I open fire.”[17]

By this time the Insurgents had made up their minds that the Americans, who had been bearing their insults in silence, were cowards. Aguinaldo’s indorsement on this telegram reads:—

“Answered: Nevertheless the 3000 American soldiers are few against my Colonel and his 300 soldiers, and I believe you have more than that number. E.A., Dec. 12, 1898.”[18]

Relative to the insults which were at this time showered upon Americans, Taylor has made the following statement:[19]—

“Fortune had been good to Aguinaldo and his associates in the eight months during which the United States had prevented Spain from relieving her beleaguered garrisons in the Philippines, and she might still be kind. The men about Aguinaldo who had risen farthest and fastest could not endure the thought of having to accept subordinate positions in a government not directed by themselves. The halberdiers at the door of the palace of the president saluted them as the halberdiers at the doorway of his lordship the governor-general in Manila had struck the marble steps with their halberds at the coming of the Spanish generals. They swaggered down the streets of Malolos, clashing their swords behind them, and they knew that if they won, the Philippines would be divided into fiefs which they, as dukes and marquises, would hold in feudal tenure from a Malay potentate. They were confident. They held Luzón. They held the people. They had no intention of returning to office stools or to the life of outlaws and hunted men. The United States force in Manila was small and America was far. It was true that they might have to fight for the prize which they had seized, but the military leaders about Aguinaldo were confident of winning in case they fought. They believed the Americans were afraid of them and would be easily beaten. American soldiers had been seized and had been insulted by the followers of Aguinaldo and no resort had been made to force. The Americans had been ordered to avoid bringing on an engagement and had obeyed. It is also probable that many of the insults to which they had been subjected were not appreciated by them. A tall soldier from western America paid no attention to the insults hurled at him in a language which he did not understand. And yet the small excited Filipinos might retire feeling that the American had tamely submitted to insult worse than a blow.”

By the middle of December, Aguinaldo had placed in position in the vicinity of Manila all of the field guns in his possession.

The Treaty of Paris was signed on December 10. It provided for the termination of Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines. This was what the Insurgents had been waiting for, and thereafter things moved rapidly. It is obvious that an attack was definitely planned for at this time, for on December 21, Commandant F. E. Rey telegraphed Aguinaldo that the second chief of the second zone of Manila had directed him to assist by entering that city as soon as they opened fire against the American troops.[20]

On the following day Cailles reported that he had occupied blockhouse No. 12, which was within the American lines, and added the following significant statement:—

“The order of yesterday was, on hearing the first shots from Santa Ana, for my whole force to hurl themselves on the American line of trenches, and to follow the living to Manila. The dead can lie with the dead. Yesterday we were content waiting for the arming of the San Quintin.”[21]

San Quintin’s Day was the anniversary of the Sicilian vespers, the massacre of the French in Sicily in 1268. Obviously the Insurgents were planning something similar for Manila.

For some reason the attack was not made as planned, but there was no intention of abandoning it. Within fifteen days of January 1 some 40,000 Filipinos left Manila. Why? On January 7, Aguinaldo wrote to Señor Benito Legarda at Manila, saying:—

“I beg you to leave Manila with your family and come here to Malolos, but not because I wish to frighten you—I merely wish to warn you for your satisfaction, although it is not yet the day or the week.”[22]

Many details of the plan of attack have come into our possession. Doctor Manuel Xeres Burgos wrote Aguinaldo during January relative to a plan for an uprising of the prisoners in Bilibid Prison, saying that it should by all means come “before the movement is begun anywhere else,” and calling attention to the necessity of stationing men to prevent the American soldiers near by in the Zorilla theatre from coming to the rescue. On the back of this letter there is a sketch plan showing where bolo men were to be stationed, ready to attack these soldiers.[23]

Disinfecting by the Acre

During the last cholera epidemic chemical fire engines were used to disinfect whole native sections of Manila.

In his message to Congress dated January 1, 1899, Aguinaldo said:—

“I consider arguments unnecessary in support of the proposed amendments, every one knows that our newborn Republic now has to fight for its existence against giants in ambition and in power.”[24]

An unsigned letter addressed to Apacible on January 4, 1899, contains the following statement:—

“It appears that conflict with the Americans is imminent and inevitable. Several of their vessels with thousands of soldiers commanded by General Miller were sent to Iloilo on December 20th last to take that port together with the whole of Visayas and Mindanao.”[25]

On January 4 the following significant telegram was sent out:—

“Circular Telegram from the Secretary of the Interior to Provincial Presidents, wherever there may be Telegraphic Service, to be communicated to the Local Chiefs of each Town.

“Malolos, January 4, 1899, 9.35 A.M.

“To the Provincial President of the Province of Pangasinán:

“Hasten the preparation of all the towns in order to oppose the American invasion. See that all the inhabitants prepare their bolos and daggers; also that in each street and barrio national militia is organized, each six of whom should be commanded by a corporal, each thirteen by a sergeant, each twenty-six by a second lieutenant, each fifty-two by a first lieutenant, and each one hundred and four by a captain, directing that the soldiers of the national militia elect their own officers, informing all that upon our attitude depends our salvation.

Lingayen, January 4, 1899.”

There is a note thereon which reads:—

“Communicate this to all of the local chiefs, and to the commanding general.”

(Signed by initials which are illegible, but evidently those of the Provincial President.)[26]

On January 5, 1899, Aguinaldo issued a proclamation which contains the following statement:—

“The said generals accepted my concessions in favor of peace and friendship as indications of weakness. Thus it is, that with rising ambition, they ordered forces to Iloilo on December 26, with the purpose of acquiring for themselves the title of conquerors of that portion of the Philippine Islands occupied by my govermnent.

“My government cannot remain indifferent in view of such a violent and aggressive seizure of a portion of its territory by a nation which has arrogated to itself the title, ‘champion of oppressed nations.’ Thus it is that my government is ready to open hostilities if the American troops attempt to take forcible possession of the Visayan Islands. I announce these rights before the world, in order that the conscience of mankind may pronounce its infallible verdict as to who are the true oppressors of nations and the tormentors of human kind.

“Upon their heads be all the blood which may be shed.”[27]

Three days later this proclamation, which was rather dangerously like a declaration of war, was reissued with a significant change in the last one of the passages quoted, the words “attempt to take forcible possession of any part of the territory submitted to its jurisdiction” being substituted for the words “attempt to take forcible possession of the Visayan Islands.”

On January 8, 1899, at 9.40 P.M., Sandico telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:—

“Note.—In consequence of the orders of General Rios to his officers, as soon as the Filipino attack begins the Americans should be driven into the Intramuros district and the Walled city should be set on fire.”[28]

Preparations for the attack, which was to begin inside the city of Manila, were now rapidly pushed to conclusion. I quote Taylor’s excellent summary of them:—

“After Aguinaldo’s proclamation of January 5 the number of organizations charged with an attack within the city increased rapidly and it is possible that those which had been formed during Spanish rule had never been disbanded. Sandico’s clubs for athletic exercises and mutual improvement formed a nucleus for these bodies and the directing boards of the popular committees took up the work of recruiting, while some of the members became officers of the militia or sandatahan. On January 6 the commander of militia in Trozo, Manila, reported that 1130 soldiers had been enrolled by the popular committee. On January 7 Bonifacio Arévalo forwarded to the head of the central committee a list of the officers of the battalion which had just been organized in Sampaloc for the defence of their liberties. Apparently about the same time J. Limjap submitted to Sandico a project for arming the prisoners in Bilibid Prison with the arms of the American soldiers quartered in the Zorrilla Theatre across the street. He said:—

“‘Jacinto Limjap having been proclaimed commander of the volunteers of the penitentiary, I ask you to authorize the creation of a disciplinary battalion and the provisional appointments of officers for 600 sandatahan, or militia, ready to provide themselves by force with the American rifles in the Zorrilla Theatre.’

“He followed by a statement of the officers desired. It was not difficult for him to obtain volunteers there to rob, to burn, to rape and to murder. These were the crimes for which they were serving sentences. The political prisoners had been released....

“On January 18 Sandico approved of the officers for the first battalion organized by the committees of Sampaloc; on January 27 he approved those of the second battalion. By January 22 two battalions had been organized in Quiapo. At least one regiment of eight companies was raised in Binondo, for on January 23 its commander forwarded a roll of the officers to Aguinaldo for his approval.... On January 25 T. Sandico, at Malolos, submitted for approval the names of a number of officers of the territorial militia in the city of Manila. On January 30, 1899, a roll of four companies just organized in Malate was forwarded approved by T. Sandico, and on the same day the committee of Trozo, Manila, applied to T. Sandico for permission to recruit a body for the defence of the country. The regiment of ‘Armas Blancas’ had already been raised in Tondo and Binondo. It was in existence there in December, 1898, and may have been originally organized to act against Spain. On February 2 all officers of the territorial militia in Manila reported at Caloocan, in accordance with orders of Sandico, for the purpose of receiving their commissions and taking the oath to the flag. A man who took part in this ceremony wrote that a multitude of men were present in uniform, and that the oath was administered by Gen. Pantaleón García. There is no reason for believing that this is a complete statement of sandatahan organized in Manila by the end of January, and yet this statement gives a force of at least 6330 men. General Otis said that this force had been reported to him as being 10,000 men. It is probably true that only a small number of them had rifles; but armed with long knives and daggers they could have inflicted much damage in a sudden night attack in the narrow and badly lighted streets of Manila. On January 9, 1899, Aguinaldo wrote his instructions for the sandatahan of Manila. Members of this body were to enter the houses of the American officers on the pretext of bringing them presents. Once in they were to kill. The sentinels at the gates of the barracks were to be approached by men dressed as women and killed. The gates of the barracks held and as many officers as possible treacherously murdered, the sandatahan were to rise throughout the city, and by attacking in the rear the United States troops on the outer line were to aid in opening a way for Aguinaldo’s force. To further increase the confusion and perhaps to punish the natives who had not joined them, the sandatahan were to fire the city.

“It is a fair deduction from Luna’s orders for an uprising in Manila, from Aguinaldo’s instructions for the sandatahan, from other documents among the papers of the insurgents and from what was done in Manila on February 22 that Aguinaldo and his advisers about the middle of January, 1899, drew up a plan of attack upon Manila which would, if carried out, have inflicted a severe blow upon the Americans. It was not carried out, but that was not the fault of Aguinaldo or of Luna.

“It is true that the instructions were general; but that particular instructions were given by Aguinaldo himself for the murder of General Otis is shown by his note on the back of a document presented to him.[29]

“... And then there was nothing abhorrent to Aguinaldo and the men about him in beginning a war by the murder of the commanding general on the other side.

“... Aguinaldo and all his followers have declared that on February 4 the Americans attacked the unsuspecting Filipinos who were using their utmost efforts to avoid a war. And yet here in Aguinaldo’s own handwriting is the record of the fact that on January 10, 1899, he ordered the murder of the American commander.

“The attack which Aguinaldo was preparing to deliver upon and in Manila was not to be a mere raid such as the bandits of Cavite were in the habit of making upon the defenceless towns. The plan was a piece of calculated savagery in which murder and outrage were considered means to accomplish a purpose. The servants were to kill their employers; organized bands, dressed in the dress of civilians, living in the city of Manila under the government of the Americans, in many cases employed by the Americans, were to suddenly fall upon the barracks of the American soldiers and massacre the inmates; all Americans in the streets were to be killed, the city was to be fired and its loot was to be the reward of loyalty to Aguinaldo. If this plan had been carried out no white man and no white woman would have escaped. The reinforcements from the United States would have arrived to find only the smoking ruins of Manila. Buencamino had warned General Augustín what the fate of Manila would be if taken by a horde of Indians drunk with victory. That fate was now deliberately planned for the city. Aguinaldo planned to occupy the capital not as it had been occupied by the Americans. He planned to take it as Count Tilly took Magdeburg.

“The authors of this plan were not savages. Mabini, Sandico, and Luna, Asiatics educated in European schools, were men of trained and subtle minds. With them cruelty and assassination was not a matter of savage impulse but of deliberate calculation; with them assassination was employed as an effective addition to political propaganda, and murder as an ultimate resource in political manoeuvres.”[30]

Some portions of Aguinaldo’s instructions to the sandatahan are particularly worthy of perpetuation, as they illustrate his ideas as to the conduct which should be observed by cultured, patriotic, honourable and very humane men, who were not cruel:—

“Art. 3. The chief of those who go to attack the barracks should send in first four men with a good present for the American commander. Immediately after will follow four others who will make a pretence of looking for the same officer for some reason and a larger group shall be concealed in the corners or houses in order to aid the other groups at the first signal. This wherever it is possible at the moment of attack.

“Art. 4. They should not, prior to the attack, look at the Americans in a threatening manner. To the contrary, the attack on the barracks by the sandatahan should be a complete surprise and with decision and courage. One should go alone in advance in order to kill the sentinel. In order to deceive the sentinel one of them should dress as a woman and must take great care that the sentinel is not able to discharge his piece, thus calling the attention of those in the barracks. This will enable his companions who are approaching to assist in the general attack.

“Art. 5. At the moment of the attack the sandatahan should not attempt to secure rifles from their dead enemies, but shall pursue, slashing right and left with bolos until the Americans surrender, and after there remains no enemy who can injure them, they may take the rifles in one hand and the ammunition in the other.

“Art. 6. The officers shall take care that on the tops of the houses along the streets where the American forces shall pass there will be placed four to six men, who shall be prepared with stones, timbers, red-hot iron, heavy furniture, as well as boiling water, oil and molasses, rags soaked in coal oil ready to be lighted and thrown down, and any other hard and heavy objects that they can throw on the passing American troops. At the same time in the lower parts of the houses will be concealed the sandatahan, who will attack immediately. Great care should be taken not to throw glass in the streets, as the greater part of our soldiers go barefooted. On these houses there will, if possible, be arranged, in addition to the objects to be thrown down, a number of the sandatahan, in order to cover a retreat or to follow up a rout of the enemy’s column, so that we may be sure of the destruction of all the opposing forces.

“Art. 7. All Filipinos, real defenders of their country, should live on the alert to assist simultaneously the inside attack at the very moment that they note the first movement in whatever barrio or suburb, having assurance that all the troops that surround Manila will proceed without delay to force the enemy’s line and unite themselves with their brothers in the city. With such a general movement, so firm and decided against the Americans, the combat is sure to be a short one, and I charge and order that the persons and goods of all foreigners shall be respected and that the American prisoners shall be treated well.

“Art. 9. In addition to the instructions given in paragraph 6, there shall be in the houses vessels filled with boiling water, tallow, molasses and other liquids, which shall be thrown as bombs on the Americans who pass in front of their houses, or they can make use of syringes or tubes of bamboo. In these houses shall be the sandatahan who shall hurl the liquids that shall be passed to them by the women and children.

“Art. 10. In place of bolos or daggers, if they do not possess the same, the sandatahan can provide themselves with lances and arrows with long sharp heads, and these should be shot with great force in order that they may penetrate well into the bodies of the enemy, and these should be so made that in withdrawal from the body the head will remain in the flesh.

“Art. 12.... Neither will you forget your sacred oath and immaculate banner; nor will you forget the promises made by me to the civilized nations, whom I have assured that we Filipinos are not savages, nor thieves, nor assassins, nor are we cruel, but on the contrary, that we are men of culture and patriotism, honourable and very humane.”[31]

Aguinaldo enjoined order on his subordinates.[32]

The Filipinos were now ready to assume the offensive, but desired, if possible, to provoke the Americans into firing the first shot. They made no secret of their desire for conflict, but increased their hostile demonstrations and pushed their lines forward into forbidden territory. Their attitude is well illustrated by the following extract from a telegram sent by Colonel Cailles to Aguinaldo on January 10, 1899:—

“Most urgent. An American interpreter has come to tell me to withdraw our forces in Maytubig fifty paces. I shall not draw back a step, and in place of withdrawing, I shall advance a little farther. He brings a letter from his general, in which he speaks to me as a friend. I said that from the day I knew that Maquinley (McKinley) opposed our independence I did not want any dealings with any American. War, war, is what we want. The Americans after this speech went off pale.”[33]

Aguinaldo approved the hostile attitude of Cailles, for there is a reply in his handwriting which reads:—

“I approve and applaud what you have done with the Americans, and zeal and valour always, also my beloved officers and soldiers there. I believe that they are playing us until the arrival of their reinforcements, but I shall send an ultimatum and remain always on the alert.—E. A. Jan. 10, 1899.”[34]

On this same day Aguinaldo commissioned Feliciano Cruz and Severino Quitiongco to assassinate General Otis.[35]

On January 13 Noriel and Cailles telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:—

“We desire to know results of ultimatum which you mention in your telegram, and we also wish to know what reward our Government is arranging for the forces that will be able first to enter Manila.”

This telegram is endorsed in Aguinaldo’s handwriting:

“As to the contents of your telegram, those who will be the heroes will have as their rewards a large quantity of money, extraordinary rewards, promotions, crosses of Biak-na-bató, Marquis of Malate, Ermita, Count of Manila, etc., besides the congratulations of our idolizing country on account of their being patriotic, and more, if they capture the regiments with their generals, and, if possible, the chief of them all who represents our future enemies in Manila, which (lot?) falls to you, or, better said, to General Noriel and Colonel Cailles.

“The ultimatum has not been sent, but it will be within a few days.

(Signed) “E. A.

“Malolos, Jan. 14, 1899.”[36]

An Old-style Provincial Jail

Lieutenant Gilmore, of the United States Navy, and his fellow prisoners were detained in this building for a time.

On January 14, 1899, the people at Aparri shouted: “Death to the Americans,” and held a review to celebrate the rupture of friendly relations with the United States.[37]

At this time Aguinaldo had a dream about a victorious attack upon Manila and telegraphed it to some of his officers. General García replied from Caloocan on January 17 that the dream would come true as soon as the conflict with the Americans began.[38]

In January 21, 1899, Aguinaldo was still not quite ready, and ordered that the Filipino soldiers in the walled city keep on good terms with the Americans, in order to deceive them, “since the hoped-for moment has not yet arrived.”[39]

The Insurgents grew surer and surer that the Americans were cowards,[40] and openly boasted that when the attack began they would drive them into the sea.

On January 21 General Otis wrote to Admiral Dewey that:—

“The insurgents will not now permit us to cross their lines and have been very insulting to our officers, calling to them that very shortly they will give us battle. My best information is that they have fully determined to attack both outside and within the city before our additional troops arrive, and the least spark may start a conflagration.”[41]

As the date of the proposed attack drew near, the work of strengthening the Insurgent positions around Manila was pushed with all possible speed.[42]

About the middle of January General Otis stationed the First Nebraska Regiment upon the high ground at Santa Mesa for sanitary reasons. Of conditions at this time, and of the circumstances leading to the actual outbreak of hostilities Taylor says:—

“During the latter part of January General Otis was informed on good insurgent authority that the insurgents meditated an attack upon those troops, and he was advised to remove them, as in their exposed position they would kill them all. General MacArthur, under whose command the regiment was, placed two guns in position there, as it was fully expected that the insurgents would direct their attack upon that point, as in fact they did. On February 4, 1899, the tents of the regiment covered the ridge, and its outposts extended along the San Juan River, a small stream which formed part of the line of delimitation between the Americans and the insurgents.

“For some days before the outbreak of hostilities the pressure of the insurgents was constant along this position, so constant indeed that in the light of subsequent events it indicated a premeditated purpose on the part of some one in the insurgent army to force a collision at that point. On February 2 General MacArthur, commanding the Second Division of the Eighth Army Corps, wrote to the commanding general of the Filipino troops in the third zone in front of him that—

“‘An armed party from your command now occupies the village in front of blockhouse No. 7, at a point considerably more than a hundred yards on my side of the line, and is very active in exhibiting hostile intentions. This party must be withdrawn to your side of the line at once. From this date if the line is crossed by your men with arms in their hands they must be regarded as subject to such action as I may deem necessary.’

“Colonel San Miguel, who commanded at San Juan del Monte, replied upon the receipt of this communication that the action of his troops was foreign to his wishes and that he would give immediate orders for them to retire. At about half past 8 on the night of February 4 a small insurgent patrol entered the territory within the American lines at blockhouse No. 7 and advanced to the little village of Santol in front of an outpost of the Nebraska regiment. This was the same point from which the insurgents had been compelled to retire on February 2. An American outpost challenged, and then as the insurgent patrol continued to advance the sentinel fired, whereupon the insurgent patrol retired to blockhouse No. 7, from which fire was immediately opened upon the Americans. This fire spread rapidly down the American and insurgent lines and both forces at once sprang to arms.”[43]

General Otis’s account of the opening of active hostilities follows:—

“On the night of February 2 they sent in a strong detachment to draw the fire of our outposts, which took up a position immediately in front and within a few yards of the same. The outpost was strengthened by a few of our men, who silently bore their taunts and abuse the entire night. This was reported to me by General MacArthur, whom I directed to communicate with the officer in command of the insurgent troops concerned. His prepared letter was shown me and approved, and the reply received was all that could be desired. However, the agreement was ignored by the insurgents and on the evening of February 4 another demonstration was made on one of our small outposts, which occupied a retired position at least 150 yards within the line which had been mutually agreed upon, an insurgent approaching the picket and refusing to halt or answer when challenged. The result was that our picket discharged his piece, when the insurgent troops near Santa Mesa opened a spirited fire on our troops there stationed.

“The insurgents had thus succeeded in drawing the fire of a small outpost, which they had evidently labored with all their ingenuity to accomplish, in order to justify in some way their premeditated attack. It is not believed that the chief insurgent leaders wished to open hostilities at this time, as they were not completely prepared to assume the initiative. They desired two or three days more to perfect their arrangements, but the zeal of their army brought on the crisis which anticipated their premeditated action. They could not have delayed long, however, for it was their object to force an issue before American troops, then en route, could arrive in Manila.”[44]

Thus began the Insurgent attack, so long and so carefully planned for. We learn from the Insurgent records that the shot of the American sentry missed its mark. There was no reason why it should have provoked a hot return fire, but it did.

The result of the ensuing combat was not at all what the Insurgents had anticipated. The Americans did not drive very well. It was but a short time before they themselves were routed and driven from their positions.

Aguinaldo of course promptly advanced the claim that his troops had been wantonly attacked. The plain fact is that the Insurgent patrol in question deliberately drew the fire of the American sentry, and this was just as much an act of war as was the firing of the shot. Whether the patrol was acting under proper orders from higher authority is not definitely known.

In this connection the following telegram sent by Captain Zialcita from Santa Ana on February 4, 1899, at 9.55 P.M., to Major Gray, San Juan del Monte, is highly interesting:

“I received the telegram forwarded from Malolos. General Ricarte is not here. I believe (that if the) Americans open fire we shall attack. Will ask instructions (of) Malolos.”[45]

This looks as if Zialcita at least knew that something was to be done to draw the American fire.

Aguinaldo’s first statement relative to the opening of hostilities is embodied in a general order dated Malolos, February 4, 1899, and reads in part as follows:—

“Nine o’clock P.M., this date, I received from Caloocan station a message communicated to me that the American forces, without prior notification or any just motive, attacked our camp at San Juan del Monte and our forces garrisoning the blockhouses around the outskirts of Manila, causing losses among our soldiers, who in view of this unexpected aggression and of the decided attack of the aggressors, were obliged to defend themselves until the firing became general all along the line.

“No one can deplore more than I this rupture of hostilities. I have a clear conscience that I have endeavoured to avoid it at all costs, using all my efforts to preserve friendship with the army of occupation, even at the cost of not a few humiliations and many sacrificed rights.

“... I order and command:—

“1. Peace and friendly relations between the Philippine forces and the American forces of occupation are broken, and the latter will be treated as enemies, with the limits prescribed by the laws of war.

“2. American soldiers who may be captured by the Philippine forces will be treated as prisoners of war.

“3. This proclamation shall be communicated to the accredited consuls of Manila, and to congress, in order that it may accord the suspension of the constitutional guarantees and the resulting declaration of war.”[46]

Aguinaldo’s protestations relative to his efforts to avoid hostilities are absurd, in view of his own instructions concerning the attack to be made simultaneously within and without the city of Manila.

There is other correspondence which throws light on the situation which existed immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities. On January 25, 1899, Agoncillo cabled from Washington to Apacible in Hongkong: “Recommend you await beginning American aggression, justifying our conduct nations.”[47]

Apacible apparently did not take this view of the matter, for on January 31 he wrote to Aguinaldo that the Senate in Washington would take final vote upon the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain on February 6, and said:—

“It is urgently necessary for America to answer us immediately before the ratification of the treaty. A conflict after the ratification of the treaty would be unfavorable to us in public opinion.”[48]

Obviously this letter might be interpreted as a recommendation that hostilities begin before February 6 if America did not answer meanwhile. It was evidently well understood in Hongkong that Aguinaldo’s receipt of Apacible’s letter might cause war to begin, for on February 3, 1899, Bray, anticipating the outbreak of hostilities of the following day, cabled Senator Hoar at Washington as follows:—

“Receive caution news hostilities Manila discredited here denied Filipino circles supposed political move influence vote Senate to-day any ease insignificant skirmish due intentional provocation.

“Bray.”[49]

The extracts from the Insurgent records above quoted leave no escape from the conclusion that the outbreak of hostilities which occurred on February 4, 1899, had been carefully prepared for and was deliberately precipitated by the Filipinos themselves.

Blount says:—

“It would be simply wooden-headed to affirm that they ever expected to succeed in a war with us.”[50]

It may have been wooden-headed for the Filipinos to expect this, but expect it they certainly did. We have seen how they held their soldiers in check until after Spain had been ousted from the Philippines by the Treaty of Paris as they had originally planned to do. It now only remained to carry out the balance of their original plan to get rid of the Americans in one way or another.

General Otis states that “when Aguinaldo had completed his preparations for attack he prepared the outlines of his declaration of war, the full text of which was published at Malolos on the evening, and very shortly after, hostilities began. This declaration was circulated in Manila on the morning of February 5.”[51]

The Insurgents brought down upon themselves the punishment which they received on February 4 and 5.

Blount has stated[52] that if the resolutions of Senator Bacon introduced on January 11, 1899, had passed, we never should have had any war with the Filipinos. The resolutions in question concluded thus:—

“That the United States hereby disclaim any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said islands except for the pacification thereof, and assert their determination when an independent government shall have been duly erected therein entitled to recognition as such, to transfer to said government, upon terms which shall be reasonable and just, all rights secured under the cession by Spain, and to thereupon leave the government and control of the islands to their people.”

I must take issue with Blount as to the effect which these resolutions might have had if passed. The Insurgents felt themselves to be fully competent to bring about such pacification of the islands as they deemed necessary. At the time the resolutions were presented in the Senate their soldiers were straining at the leash, ready to attack their American opponents upon the most slender excuse. Aguinaldo himself could not have held them much longer, and it is not impossible that they got away from him as it was. They would have interpreted the passage of the Bacon resolutions as a further evidence of weakness, and hastened their attack. As we have seen, “war, war, war” was what they wanted.

Blount has endeavoured to shift the responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities to the United States by claiming that certain words italicized by him in what he calls the “Benevolent Assimilation Proclamation” were necessarily, to the Insurgents, “fighting words.” The expressions referred to have to do with the establishment of United States sovereignty and the exercise of governmental control in the Philippine Islands.

These words were not “fighting words,” the Insurgent policy being, as I have shown by the records, to consider the acceptance of a protectorate or of annexation in the event that it did not prove possible to negotiate absolute independence, or probable that the American troops could be driven from the islands.

The growing confidence of the Insurgents in their ability to whip the cowardly Americans, rather than any fixed determination on their part to push a struggle for independence to the bitter end, led to their attack.

[1] See p. 41.

[2] P.I.R., 427. 1.

[3] “The insolent commentary of the American Consul here, if it is true, clearly shows the intention of America to impose her will upon us by force. In this case, the conflict will come sooner or later. Would it not be better for us to provoke the conflict while the Americans have not as yet concentrated their troops there? Or would it be better to wait for the results of the Congress of Paris? This question should be answered immediately by the committee on foreign relations of the Congress of representatives and the decision should be sent at once to us so that we can proceed according to your instructions.”—P.I.R., 453. 11.

[4] “I gave an order long ago not to permit our line to be passed, and to say frankly that it was by my order. To be prepared to defend our rights you are ordered to place troops in front of American position at Sampaloc and to tell them plainly to leave, to warn the Sandatahan [bolo men.—D. C. W.] and get everything ready; you must warn the commanders of the zones about Manila. Do not forget, whenever in doubt.”—P.I.R., 849.

[5] P.I.R., 88. 9.

[6] P.I.R., 88. 9.

[7] Ibid.

[8] P.I.R., 88. 9.

[9] Ibid., 849.

[10] “Until the decision of the Paris Congress is known, all of us here are of the opinion that you should maintain a defensive attitude regarding the Americans, giving way to them with regard to Manila and its suburbs or in anything they may wish, although apparently only, and not show them your teeth. After the decision of the Congress is known, you may take the offensive if advisable, and according to the information we may have of the American soldiers it should not be difficult for you and your army to settle accounts with them.”—P.I.R., 398. 6.

[11] “If you and the Americans should happen to come in conflict before the departure of the Spanish soldiers, it might happen that the Yankees would enter into an alliance with them to combat the Filipinos. Think well over this.”—P.I.R., 398. 6.

[12] “It is also of urgent necessity, Señor President, to reëstablish committees in all the suburbs and that the masons and the Katipúnan be reorganized, and it is advisable that all be provided with knives ready for any event, but it is proper that these arms be hidden.”—P.I.R., 466. 9.

[13] “Our soldiers are always desirous of fighting in order to bring affairs to an end, as they are very resentful with regard to the evacuation of the suburbs mentioned.”—P.I.R., Books C–1.

[14] “Most urgent. Have received telegraphic order from War Dept., which says: ‘Prevent American troops from disembarking.’ In case they insist what am I to do? May I begin firing?”

This telegram was indorsed by Aguinaldo:—

“Answered affirmatively December 1, 1898.”—P.I.R., 849.

[15] “Most urgent. According to despatch from Captain detached at Batangas, American divers are working unceasingly. He says that he ordered them to be fired on in case they try to land. Await your reply.”

Aguinaldo’s reply ran as follows:—

“I do not mind their working at sea, but you must under no conditions allow them to land troops; be brave for the sake of your Tagálog heart. Approve your action.”—P.I.R., 1179. 2.

[16] P.I.R., 849.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

[19] 56 AJ.

[20] “We are constantly alarmed here by American troops who wish to come within the military line. To-day received word from second chief, second zone, Manila, that as soon as they opened fire against the American troops I assist by entering Manila. I have no orders in this matter; I await your directions.”—P.I.R., 849.

[21] P.I.R., 849.

[22] Taylor, 70 AJ.

[23] “It is absolutely necessary that an order be received here permitting the uprising of those in prison before the movement is begun anywhere else; in the prison the word shall be given at the moment the bugle sounds retreat; it is indispensable that some of our party be prepared in the vicinity of the Iris bridge, San Pedro street and Dulumbrayan bridge, in order to prevent the Americans quartered in the Pennsylvania barracks (Zorilla theatre) from aiding those in the prison.”—P.I.R., 73. 3.

[24] P.I.R., 40. 8.

[25] Ibid., Books C–1.

[26] Ibid., 1141. 3.

[27] P.I.R., 1186. 10.

[28] Ibid., 849.

[29] See p. 733.

[30] Taylor, 68–69 AJ.

[31] P.I.R., 206–207.

[32] “Above all I expect that you will respect the persons and goods of private persons of all nationalities, including the Chinese; that you will treat well the prisoners and grant life to those of the enemy who surrender. And that you be on the sharp lookout for those traitors and enemies who, by robbery, will seek to mar our victory.”

[33] P.I.R., 849.

[34] Ibid.

[35] For the document on which this statement is based see p. 733.

[36] P.I.R., 849.

[37] Taylor, 81 AJ.

[38] “In reply to your telegram concerning your dream of entering Manila after four hours of combat. I have the honour to inform you for myself and the officers and soldiers under my command that your dream will come true as soon as the conflict with the Americans begins, since we shall advance at any cost.”—P.I.R., 849.

[39] On January 21, 1899, the commander of the fourth zone, Caloocan, wired Aguinaldo that:

“Julian Santo, commander of the territorial militia of Trozo, informs me that 400 native soldiers of the Spanish army to-day incorporated in his militia. He lives in the walled city, and he wants to know your opinion upon the present situation, since the Americans want to hold them as prisoners or confine them in Bilibid prison.”

(Indorsed, handwriting of Aguinaldo:) “Tell the Filipino soldiers in the walled city affiliated to our cause that they must keep on good terms with the Americans, in order to deceive them, and prevent their confining them, since the hoped-for moment has not yet arrived.”—P.I.R., 849.

[40] On January 20, 1899, a correspondent wrote to one of the Insurgents abroad:

“In some places (in Manila) there have been fights with bolos between Filipinos and Americans who wanted to tear down the proclamation of our president while the people defended it with their bolos. They say that it amuses them to see the Americans run when they draw their knives. It is said that some 10,000 servants have gone on strike. Some Americans have already disappeared by the method of ‘dukut’ but it will not be proper to publish this in my opinion.”—P.I.R., 980. 82.

[41] Taylor, AJ. 73.

[42] (Telegram received by E. Aguinaldo:)

“To the President of the Republic, Malolos, from the Provincial Governor of Manila, San Juan del Monte, Jan. 29, 1899, 10.25 A.M.: I yesterday visited the military road in process of construction, Santa Ana to Pineda. Tomorrow it will be sufficiently completed to permit passage, and in two days after it will be finished. Considering opening another military road direct from Caloocan to San Juan. Desire authority.

(Endorsed, handwriting of Aguinaldo:) “Telegram received. I am very much satisfied, and in the name of the government I congratulate you and the presidents of Santa Ana and Pineda with their inhabitants for their efforts for the public good. You are authorized to open another military road from Caloocan to San Juan del Monte, and I want you to endeavor to finish it this week, as I am certain you will.”—P.I.R., 849.

(Telegram received by E. Aguinaldo:)

“To the Secretary of the Interior, Malolos, from Sah Juan del Monte—Received Feb. 3, 1899 from the Provincial Governor Manila: Road marked out; work began Wednesday. I shall put forth every effort to finish by middle of the coming week.”—P.I.R., 849.

[43] Taylor, 73 AJ.

[44] Taylor, 73 AJ.

[45] P.I.R., 2018.

[46] Ibid., 1090. 5.

[47] P.I.R., 453. 4.

[48] P.I.R., 453. 2.

[49] P.I.R., 493. 12.

[50] Blount, p. 190.

[51] Taylor, 86 AJ.

[52] Blount, p. 175.

Chapter V

Insurgent Rule and the Wilcox-Sargent Report

The Good Book says, “By their fruits ye shall know them, whether they be good or evil,” and it seems proper to apply this test to the Insurgents and their government.

The extraordinary claim has been advanced that the United States destroyed a republic in the Philippines and erected an oligarchy on its ruins. Various writers and speakers who have not gone so far as this have yet maintained that Aguinaldo and his associates established a real, effective government throughout the archipelago during the interim between his return and the outbreak of hostilities with the United States.

In summarizing conditions on September 15, 1898, Judge Blount says:[1]—

“Absolute master of all Luzon outside Manila at this time, with complete machinery of government in each province for all matters of justice, taxes, and police, an army of some 30,000 men at his beck, and his whole people a unit at his back, Aguinaldo formally inaugurated his permanent government—permanent as opposed to the previous provisional government—with a Constitution, Congress, and Cabinet, patterned after our own,[2] just as the South American republics had done before him when they were freed from Spain, at Malolos, the new capital.”

He refers to our utter failure to understand “what a wonderfully complete ‘going concern’ Aguinaldo’s government had become throughout the Philippine Archipelago before the Treaty of Paris was signed.”[3]

He bases his claim as to the excellent state of public order in the Insurgent territory at this time on a report of Paymaster W. E. Wilcox and Naval Cadet L. R. Sargent of the United States Navy, who between October 8 and November 20, 1898, made a long, rapid trip through northern Luzon, traversing the provinces of Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac, Pangasinán, Nueva Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Isabela, Cagayan, South Ilocos and Union, in the order named, thence proceeding to Dagupan and down the railroad through Pangasinán, Tarlac, Pampanga and Bulacan to Manila.

He says that these gentlemen found the authority of Aguinaldo’s government universally acknowledged, the country in a state of perfect tranquillity and public order,[4] with profound peace and freedom from brigandage and the like.[5]

Now if it be true that Aguinaldo established complete machinery of government throughout all of Luzon outside of Manila for all matters of justice, taxes and police, so that life and property were safe and peace, tranquillity and justice assured, we may well dispense with quibbling as to whether the proper name was applied to such government. But did he?

Let us examine with some care the history of the Wilcox-Sargent trip, and see if we can gain further light from other sources relative to the condition of public order in the territory which they traversed.

I propose, for the most part, to let the captured Insurgent records speak for themselves, as it is fair to assume that Insurgent officers were at no pains to represent conditions as worse than they really were. In view of the fragmentary character of these records, we may also assume that the complete story would be still more interesting and instructive than the one which I have been able to reconstruct.

Retreat at Bilibid Prison, Manila

Messrs. Sargent and Wilcox were almost everywhere hospitably received, and were entertained with dinners and dances after the inimitable fashion of the hospitable Filipino everywhere. They gained a very favourable impression of the state of public order in the provinces through which they passed for the reason that from the very start their trip was strictly personally conducted. They saw exactly what it was intended that they should see and very little more. Their progress was several times interrupted for longer or shorter periods without adequate explanation. We now know that on these occasions the scenery so carefully prepared in advance for them had become a little disarranged and needed to be straightened up. Facts which I will cite show that most shocking and horrible events, of which they learned nothing, were occurring in the territory through which they passed.

For a considerable time before their departure American visitors had been carefully excluded from the Insurgent territory, but the Filipino leaders decided to let these two men go through it to the end that they might make as favourable a report as possible. How carefully the way was prepared for American visitors is shown by the following telegram:—

“San Pedro, Macati,

“July 30, 1898.

“To the Local Presidente of Pasig:

“You are hereby informed that the Americans are going to your town and they will ask your opinion [of what the people desire.—Tr.] You should answer them that we want a republican government. The same answer must be given throughout your jurisdiction.

(Signed) “Pío Del Pilar,

“General of the Second Zone.”[6]

Now General Pilar had an uncomfortable way of killing people who did not obey his orders, and under the rules of the Insurgent government he was abundantly justified in so doing. His suggestions as to what visiting Americans should be told or shown would be likely to be acceded to. Certainly this seems to have been the case in the present instance, for on the same day General Noriel reported as follows:[7]

“President R. G., Bacoor, from Gen. Noriel, Pineda, July 30, 12.10 P.M.: I inform your excellency that some commissioners of the American admiral are making investigations in the region around Pasay as to the wishes and opinion of the people as to the government. To-day I received a statement from some, giving the answer: ‘Free government under American protectorate [copy mutilated, two or three words missing here] the President.’”

Blount quotes with approval Admiral Dewey’s statement made shortly after the return of Wilcox and Sargent that in his opinion their report “contains the most complete and reliable information obtainable in regard to the present state of the northern part of Luzon Island.”[8] This was true.

The admiral might have gone further and said that it contained practically the only information then obtainable in regard to conditions in the territory in question, but as I shall conclusively show it was neither complete nor reliable.

Judge Blount in describing the experiences of Messrs. Wilcox and Sargent naïvely makes the statement that:

“The tourists were provided at Rosales by order of Aguinaldo with a military escort, ‘which was continued by relays all the way to Aparri.’”[9]

It certainly was!

Very little Spanish was then spoken in Nueva Vizcaya, Isabela or Cagayan. What opportunity had these two men, ignorant as they were of the native dialects, to learn the sinister facts as to what had been and was occurring in the territory which they visited?

No one can fail to be delighted with Filipino hospitality, which was lavishly bestowed upon them everywhere, and it is only natural that they should have reported favourably upon what they saw. It was about this time that an order was issued[10] that fronts of buildings should be whitewashed, streets cleaned and fences repaired with a view to showing every one, and especially travellers through the territory of the Insurgents, that they were “not opposed to a good such as a refined and civilized people should have.” Doubtless the report of the two men from Dewey’s fleet was made in the best of faith. I will now endeavour to show what were some of the actual conditions in the territory through which they passed.