Lord Roberts' Message to the Nation

by Earl Frederick Sleigh Roberts Roberts

ADDITIONAL NOTE

ENGLEMERE, ASCOT, BERKS.
November 5, 1912.

To THE EDITOR OF THE "MANCHESTER GUARDIAN."

Sir,

My attention has been drawn to the leader in your issue of the 4th instant, in which you deal with a passage in my speech in Manchester. I am too much accustomed to adverse criticism in my efforts to arouse the nation to a sense of its unpreparedness for war to resent in any way the attacks of my opponents. But when a paper of such standing as that of the Manchester Guardian completely misconstrues what was certainly a salient passage in my speech, I feel bound, in justice to the cause which I have at heart, to explain my meaning more fully than was possible when I was dealing with the whole question of National Defence in relation to our position as a world-Power.

It is true that I pointed out the striking process by which Germany has developed from a loose congeries of petty federated States to the united Empire which arouses the admiration of the world to-day. Before 1866 the German States, under the scarcely-established leadership of Prussia, were surrounded on every side by jealous rivals or hostile neighbours, and it seemed doubtful whether the unity which was the dream of Stein in 1806, and of the Revolutionists in 1848, could ever be attained, except by a policy of blood and iron. Certain it is that Bismarck, the architect of united Germany, saw in the policy of successful war the only means of realizing German nationality, and of constructing the edifice of national greatness so firmly that it should stand "foursquare to all the winds that blow." The three hammer strokes of 1864, 1866, and 1870, were needed to achieve this result, but the strength and precision of those hammer blows were prepared by long years of patient, self-sacrificing labour, during which the German forces were made "as certain of victory as anything in human calculation can be made certain, by their superiority at every point." Of this process and development, inspiring the whole nation to manful effort and to individual sacrifice for the common fatherland, even if it be in preparation for death or victory on the battlefield, I said that "it is an excellent policy. It is, or should be, the policy of every nation prepared to play a great part in history." And I repeat that statement to-day, when the glorious achievements of the younger Nations in Arms have lent point to its truth, while they have established their claims to nationhood and the gratitude of hundreds of thousands of their kinsmen.

But to suggest that I am urging upon England that it should be her policy, first, to arm herself better than Germany, and then to make war on Germany, with or without a just cause, with or without even a quarrel, simply because England thinks herself at that moment able to win a war—this is a suggestion so strange and so repugnant to my mind that I am utterly at a loss to understand how it could be attributed to me, or elicited from my speech. A moment's reflection will show the vast difference between the position of Germany, with which I was dealing, and that of England to-day. While Germany, owing to her rapidly expanding population and vast economic development, is impelled to look for means of expansion in a world which is already for the most part parcelled out, we, on the other hand, do not require or seek another square mile of dominion. Our object must be to develop the resources of our Empire, commercially, industrially, and socially. But in order to be able to do so we must be in a position to defend ourselves successfully against aggression, and so to remove the temptation which a wealthy but ill-defended Empire must always offer to a strong and virile people, proud of its achievements and conscious of its fitness to fill a greater place amid the nations. My whole speech was directed, therefore—as are all my efforts—to impressing upon my fellow-countrymen the terrible danger which is involved in the present situation, in which we alone find ourselves, as a nation, untrained, unorganized, and unarmed, amid a Europe in which every people, not only great Powers like Russia, Germany, and France, but the smaller States—Bulgaria, Servia, Greece, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark—stand as armed nations, providing a balance of forces which, while it strengthens each one of them physically and industrially, makes for peace with honour—or for the triumph of the right.

Yours very truly,
ROBERTS, F.M.

PART II
THE TERRITORIAL FORCE

INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

The controversies raised by my Manchester speech prove that there is still much misapprehension, not always involuntary, in regard to the position of the National Service League towards the Territorial Force. I therefore insert in this place a statement of that position which I made in a speech delivered in the Mansion House in July last.

As an introduction to that speech I may be permitted to quote from a statement which, as President of the League, I published in the Times in January, 1912:

"It is not infrequently asserted that the League is hostile to the Territorials, that we have discouraged recruiting for them, and that, were our programme adopted, the Territorial Force would disappear. Nothing is further from the truth. From the date of its formation we have constantly praised the Territorial Force as an organization; we have again and again borne willing witness to the patriotism of those who joined its ranks.

Thus in 1908, Lord Milner, speaking at the annual dinner of the League on June 24, said: "Let us hold up high the standard of efficiency for the Territorial army as we have got it, and let us back up those who have originated that army and who are trying to make the best of it; let us back them up in all their efforts to make it as like a real army in training and in equipment as it is possible to make it. That, I believe, is the proper course for us to pursue."

In our official statement issued in February, 1909, these words occur: "The National Service League has consistently given the warmest support to the Territorial Force from its inception, recognizing the great superiority in organization and capabilities that this Force provides as compared with the old Volunteer Force."

And, during the past year (1911), in his volume, "Fallacies and Facts," the President of the League, whilst criticizing Lord Haldane's and Sir Ian Hamilton's deductions, allots the highest praise to the public spirit alike of employers and employees who support the Territorial movement.

In addition to this, our members have actively helped the Territorial Force by working on the County Associations and by obtaining recruits. We are represented on the majority of the County Associations, and nearly one-fourth of the members of these Associations are also members of the National Service League. Again, many of our members are enrolled in the Territorials, and Lord Haldane himself, speaking at the headquarters of the 6th City of London Rifles on December 1, 1911, said there were numbers of the National Service League who had assisted in the work of recruiting for the Territorial Force, and he "took this opportunity of thanking them."

Moreover, it is to be observed that the whole programme of the National Service League is now based on the maintenance and expansion of the Territorial Force. Our programme, far from involving the disappearance of that Force, or of any part of that Force, accepts it in its entirety. All that it does is to change the system of recruiting, and thus enable the training to be given before and not after war breaks out. Were the League's proposals adopted, not a single unit of the Territorial Force would be reduced, nor a man called upon to leave its ranks. The whole organization and personnel would be preserved, and their services would be invaluable in bridging the difficult period of transition from the old system to the new. The Territorial Force would be increased to an adequate strength, made efficient as a military machine, and would rest on the firm basis of universal military training of the manhood of the nation, instead of—as at present—on insufficient service given with difficulty by a patriotic minority.

The above, we trust, will be sufficient to dispose of the idea that there is, or ever has been, any antagonism on the part of the League towards the Territorial Force as a body. We contend that all able-bodied men should be trained in it.

But, whilst we have from the beginning praised the organization of this Force, whilst we have admired the patriotism and self-sacrifice of those who have joined it, and encouraged our members to support it, we do not conceal our opinion that, resting as it does on voluntary enlistment alone, it can never become a Force on which the country can rely for its protection in time of peril. Every year that passes emphasizes the correctness of this view. The Territorial Force is in the fourth year of its existence, and, despite the large measure of support given to it and the unwearied labour of one of the ablest War Ministers we have ever had, what is its condition? Its strength in round numbers should be 314,000. It is 264,000. All its members should do fifteen days' drill in camp every year. Only 155,300 have done so this year. It should have 11,300 Territorial Officers. It has only 9,500. Finally, 40 officers and 6,703 men were absent from camp this year without leave.

We ask any open-minded man whether a Force thus constituted is an army at all, much less an army to which this country can entrust its existence as a great Nation?

We do not bring these facts forward in order to discredit Lord Haldane's courageous efforts or to depreciate the patriotism of those now serving in the Force. We bring them forward simply in order to demonstrate the impossibility of constructing a defensive Army equal to this country's needs on a basis of voluntary enlistment. If Lord Haldane, backed by the hearty support of King and country, has failed—and by his own admission he has failed—who is likely to succeed?

Not many weeks ago this country was on the verge of a gigantic war. And it was a war which, if it had come, would have come unexpectedly and suddenly. What would have been our position? All the soothing fallacies which pass current in time of peace—the belief that our Expeditionary Force can at the same time be sent abroad and yet kept at home to cover the training of the Territorial Force; the belief that this Force is sure of six months' unmolested leisure in which it can fit itself for the serious business of war—would have been shattered in twelve hours. The Expeditionary Force—to be of any use at all—must have been despatched abroad without a day's delay; and, for the defence of these islands, we should have had to rely upon a handful of Regulars left behind in the depots as "unfit"; such of the Special Reserve as may not be required for the Expeditionary Force, and the National Reserve; but mainly upon a Territorial Force,[[1]] nominally 264,000 strong, untrained for war, and further weakened by a shortage of 1,800 officers!

Now, making every allowance for the immense resisting power which in moments of supreme peril nations and cities have occasionally derived from enthusiasm or despair, is it either fitting, we ask, or even prudent, that, in the twentieth century, Great Britain should repose her trust in so problematical and hazardous a presumption? For the transformation of the most heroic enthusiasm into an effective weapon of war demands time, exactly as the transformation of the Territorials into an efficient Army demands time. But when war comes it will come with great suddenness; the essential crisis will be on us in an instant, and for Great Britain—as Lord Salisbury in his latest utterances significantly warned us—the stake is not to be reckoned in millions of a war indemnity; the stake is our very existence as an Empire.

When Lord Haldane cites the exploits of untrained or semi-trained forces, when he speaks of "a whole nation springing to arms at the call of duty," he has his eyes fastened upon other circumstances and upon other times than ours. Under the conditions of modern war, discipline alone can confront discipline on a field of battle.

"We appeal to our countrymen to join us in our effort," I went on to say. "We appeal, above all, to the officers and men of the existing Territorial Force. We are working to insure that their sacrifice to patriotism should not be made futile, nor their devotion thrown away. We are working to make the Army to which they belong a reality—that is to say, a Home Army efficient and sufficient; an Army which shall always be ready to take up the defence of these islands, and leave our Regulars free and our Fleets free to fight our battles elsewhere. We ask them to assist us in our efforts to introduce a system of compulsory training, the only system under which the safety of the country can be secured and the Territorial Force made really effective."

[[1]] On June 17, 1908, Lord (then Mr.) Haldane said: "In the event of a great war breaking out ... the Territorials would be embodied, not for immediate fighting, if it could be avoided, but for their war training."