FOOTNOTES:
[38] History of the Minority. History of the Repeal of the Stamp Act. Considerations on Trade and Finance. Political Register, &c., &c.
[39] Pages 6-10.
[40] Pages 9, 10.
[41] Page 9.
[42] Page 9.
[43] Page 6.
[44] Page 9.
| Total imports from the West Indies in 1764 | £2,909,411 |
| Exports to ditto in ditto | 896,511 |
| ———— | |
| Excess of imports | £2,012,900 |
In this, which is the common way of stating the balance, it will appear upwards of two millions against us, which is ridiculous.
[46] Page 6.
| 1754. | £ | s. | d. |
| Total export of British goods | value, 8,317,506 | 15 | 3 |
| Ditto of foreign goods in time | 2,910,836 | 14 | 9 |
| Ditto of ditto out of time | 559,485 | 2 | 10 |
| ———— | —— | —— | |
| Total exports of all kinds | 11,787,828 | 12 | 10 |
| Total imports | 8,093,479 | 15 | 0 |
| ———— | —— | —— | |
| Balance in favor of England | £3,094,355 | 17 | 10 |
| ———— | —— | —— | |
| 1761. | £ | s. | d. |
| Total export of British goods | 10,649,581 | 12 | 6 |
| Ditto of foreign goods in time | 3,553,692 | 7 | 1 |
| Ditto of ditto out of time | 355,015 | 0 | 2 |
| ———— | —— | —— | |
| Total exports of all kinds | 14,558,288 | 19 | 9 |
| Total imports | 9,294,915 | 1 | 6 |
| ———— | —— | —— | |
| Balance in favor of England | £5,263,373 | 18 | 3 |
| ———— | —— | —— |
Here is the state of our trade in 1761, compared with a very good year of profound peace: both are taken from the authentic entries at the custom-house. How the author can contrive to make this increase of the export of English produce agree with his account of the dreadful want of hands in England, page 9, unless he supposes manufactures to be made without hands, I really do not see. It is painful to be so frequently obliged to set this author right in matters of fact. This state will fully refute all that he has said or insinuated upon the difficulties and decay of our trade, pages 6, 7, and 9.
[48] Page 7. See also page 13.
[49] Pages 12, 13.
[50] Page 17.
[51] Page 6.
[52] "Our merchants suffered by the detention of the galleons, as their correspondents in Spain were disabled from paying them for their goods sent to America."—State of the Nation, p. 7.
[53] Pages 12, 13.
[54] Page 6.
[55] Something however has transpired in the quarrels among those concerned in that transaction. It seems the good Genius of Britain, so much vaunted by our author, did his duty nobly. Whilst we were gaining such advantages, the court of France was astonished at our concessions. "J'ai apporté à Versailles, il est vrai, les Ratifications du Roi d'Angleterre, à vostre grand étonnement, et à celui de bien d'autres. Je dois cela au bontés du Roi d'Angleterre, à celles de Milord Bute, à Mons. le Comte de Viry, à Mons. le Duc de Nivernois, et en fin à mon scavoir faire."—Lettres, &c., du Chev. D'Eon, p. 51.
[56] "The navy bills are not due till six months after they have been issued; six months also of the seamen's wages by act of Parliament must be, and in consequence of the rules prescribed by that act, twelve months' wages generally, and often much more are retained; and there has been besides at all times a large arrear of pay, which, though kept in the account, could never be claimed, the persons to whom it was due having left neither assignees nor representatives. The precise amount of such sums cannot be ascertained; but they can hardly be reckoned less than thirteen or fourteen hundred thousand pounds. On 31st Dec, 1754, when the navy debt was reduced nearly as low as it could be, it still amounted to 1,296,567l. 18s. 11¾d. consisting chiefly of articles which could not then be discharged; such articles will be larger now, in proportion to the increase of the establishment; and an allowance must always be made for them in judging of the state of the navy debt, though they are not distinguishable in the account. In providing for that which is payable, the principal object of the legislature is always to discharge the bills, for they are the greatest article; they bear an interest of 4 per cent; and, when the quantity of them is large, they are a heavy incumbrance upon all money transactions"
| Navy | £1,450,900 |
| Army | 1,268,500 |
| Ordnance | 174,600 |
| The four American governments | 19,200 |
| General surveys in America | 1,600 |
| Foundling Hospital | 38,000 |
| To the African committee | 13,000 |
| For the civil establishment on the coast of Africa | 5,500 |
| Militia | 100,000 |
| Deficiency of land and malt | 300,000 |
| Deficiency of funds | 202,400 |
| Extraordinaries of the army and navy | 35,000 |
| ———— | |
| Total | £3,609,700 |
[58] Upon the money borrowed in 1760, the premium of one per cent was for twenty-one years, not for twenty; this annuity has been paid eight years instead of seven; the sum paid is therefore 640,000l. instead of 560,000l.; the remaining term is worth, ten years and a quarter instead of eleven years;[59] its value is 820,000l. instead of 880,000l.; and the whole value of that premium is 1,460,000l. instead of 1,440,000l. The like errors are observable in his computation on the additional capital of three per cent on the loan of that year. In like manner, on the loan of 1762, the author computes on five years' payment instead of six; and says in express terms, that take 5 from 19, and there remain 13. These are not errors of the pen or the press; the several computations pursued in this part of the work with great diligence and earnestness prove them errors upon much deliberation. Thus the premiums in 1759 are cast up 90,000l. too little, an error in the first rule of arithmetic. "The annuities borrowed in 1756 and 1758 are," says he, "to continue till redeemed by Parliament." He does not take notice that the first are irredeemable till February, 1771, the other till July, 1782. In this the amount of the premiums is computed on the time which they have run. Weakly and ignorantly; for he might have added to this, and strengthened his argument, such as it is, by charging also the value of the additional one per cent from the day on which he wrote, to at least that day on which these annuities become redeemable. To make ample amends, however, he has added to the premiums of 15 per cent in 1759, and three per cent in 1760, the annuity paid for them since their commencement; the fallacy of which is manifest; for the premiums in these cases can he neither more nor less than the additional capital for which the public stands engaged, and is just the same whether five or five hundred years' annuity has been paid for it. In private life, no man persuades himself that he has borrowed 200l. because he happens to have paid twenty years' interest on a loan of 100l.
[59] See Smart and Demoivre.
[60] Pages 30-32.
[61] In a course of years a few manufacturers have been tempted abroad, not by cheap living, but by immense premiums, to set up as masters, and to introduce the manufacture. This must happen in every country eminent for the skill of its artificers, and has nothing to do with taxes and the price of provisions.
[62] Although the public brewery has considerably increased in this latter period, the produce of the malt-tax has been something less than in the former; this cannot be attributed to the new malt-tax. Had this been the cause of the lessened consumption, the public brewery, so much more burdened, must have felt it more. The cause of this diminution of the malt-tax I take to have been principally owing to the greater dearness of corn in the second period than in the first, which, in all its consequences, affected the people in the country much more than those in the towns. But the revenue from consumption was not, on the whole, impaired; as we have seen in the foregoing page.
| Total Imports, value, | Exports, ditto. | |||
| 1752 | £7,889,369 | £11,694,912 | ||
| 1753 | 8,625,029 | 12,243,604 | ||
| 1754 | 8,093,472 | 11,787,828 | ||
| ————— | ———— | |||
| Total | £24,607,870 | 35,726,344 | ||
| ————— | 24,607,870 | |||
| ———— | ||||
| Exports exceed imports | 11,118,474 | |||
| ———— | ||||
| Medium balance | £,706,158 | |||
| ———— | ||||
| Total Imports, value, | Exports, ditto. | |||
| 1764 | £10,818,946 | £16,104,532 | ||
| 1765 | 10,889,742 | 14,550,507 | ||
| 1766 | 11,475,825 | 14,024,964 | ||
| ————— | ———— | |||
| Total | £32,685,513 | 44,740,003 | ||
| ————— | 32,683,613 | |||
| ———— | ||||
| Exports exceed | 12,054,490 | |||
| ———— | ||||
| Medium balance for three last years | £4,018,163 | |||
[64] It is dearer in some places, and rather cheaper in others; but it must soon all come to a level.
[65] A tax rated by the intendant in each generality, on the presumed fortune of every person below the degree of a gentleman.
[66] Before the war it was sold to, or rather forced on, the consumer at 11 sous, or about 5d. the pound. What it is at present, I am not informed. Even this will appear no trivial imposition. In London, salt may be had at a penny farthing per pound from the last retailer.
[67] Page 31.
[68] Page 33.
[69] Page 33.
[70] Page 33.
[71] The figures in the "Considerations" are wrongly cast up; it should be 3,608,700l.
[72] "Considerations," p. 43. "State of the Nation," p. 33.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Page 34.
[75] The author of the "State of the Nation," p. 34, informs us, that the sum of 75,000l. allowed by him for the extras of the army and ordnance, is far less than was allowed for the same service in the years 1767 and 1768. It is so undoubtedly, and by at least 200,000l. He sees that he cannot abide by the plan of the "Considerations" in this point, nor is he willing wholly to give it up. Such an enormous difference as that between 35,000l. and 300,000l. puts him to a stand. Should he adopt the latter plan of increased expense, he must then confess that he had, on a former occasion, egregiously trifled with the public; at the same time all his future promises of reduction must fall to the ground. If he stuck to the 35,000l. he was sure that every one must expect from him some account how this monstrous charge came to continue ever since the war, when it was clearly unnecessary; how all those successions of ministers (his own included) came to pay it, and why his great friend in Parliament, and his partisans without doors, came not to pursue to ruin, at least to utter shame, the authors of so groundless and scandalous a profusion. In this strait he took a middle way; and, to come nearer the real state of the service, he outbid the "Considerations," at one stroke, 40,000l.; at the same time he hints to you, that you may expect some benefit also from the original plan. But the author of the "Considerations" will not suffer him to escape it. He has pinned him down to his 35,000l.; for that is the sum he has chosen, not as what he thinks will probably be required, but as making the most ample allowance for every possible contingency. See that author, p. 42 and 43.
[76] He has done great injustice to the establishment of 1768; but I have not here time for this discussion; nor is it necessary to this argument.
[77] Page 34.
[78] In making up this account, he falls into a surprising error of arithmetic. "The deficiency of the land-tax in the year 1754 and 1755,[80] when it was at 2s., amounted to no more, on a medium, than 49,372l.; to which, if we add half the sum, it will give us 79,058l. as the peace deficiency at 3s."
| Total | £49,372 |
| Add the half | 24,686 |
| ——— | |
| £74,058 |
Which he makes 79,058l. This is indeed in disfavor of his argument; but we shall see that he has ways, by other errors, of reimbursing himself.
[79] Page 34.
[80] Page 33.
[81] Page 43.
[82] Page 35.
[83] Page 37.
[84] Pages 37, 38.
[85] Pages 39, 40.
[86] Page 39.
[87] It is observable, that the partisans of American taxation, when they have a mind to represent this tax as wonderfully beneficial to England, state it as worth 100,000l. a year; when they are to represent it as very light on the Americans, it dwindles to 60,000l. Indeed it is very difficult to compute what its produce might have been.
[88] "Considerations," p. 74.
[89] "Considerations," p. 79.
[90] Ibid., p. 74.
[91] I do not here enter into the unsatisfactory disquisition concerning representation real or presumed. I only say, that a great people who have their property, without any reserve, in all cases, disposed of by another people, at an immense distance from them, will not think themselves in the enjoyment of freedom. It will be hard to show to those who are in such a state, which of the usual parts of the definition or description of a free people are applicable to them; and it is neither pleasant nor wise to attempt to prove that they have no right to be comprehended in such a description.
[92] Page 21.
[93] Here the author has a note altogether in his usual strain of reasoning; he finds out that somebody, in the course of this multifarious evidence, had said, "that a very considerable part of the orders of 1765 transmitted from America had been afterwards suspended; but that in case the Stamp Act was repealed, those orders were to be executed in the present year, 1766"; and that, on the repeal of the Stamp Act, "the exports to the colonies would be at least double the value of the exports of the past year." He then triumphs exceedingly on their having fallen short of it on the state of the custom-house entries. I do not well know what conclusion he draws applicable to his purpose from these facts. He does not deny that all the orders which came from America subsequent to the disturbances of the Stamp Act were on the condition of that act being repealed; and he does not assert that, notwithstanding that act should be enforced by a strong hand, still the orders would be executed. Neither does he quite venture to say that this decline of the trade in 1766 was owing to the repeal. What does he therefore infer from it, favorable to the enforcement of that law? It only comes to this, and no more; those merchants, who thought our trade would be doubled in the subsequent year, were mistaken in their speculations. So that the Stamp Act was not to be repealed unless this speculation of theirs was a probable event. But it was not repealed in order to double our trade in that year, as everybody knows (whatever some merchants might have said), but lest in that year we should have no trade at all. The fact is, that during the greatest part of the year 1755, that is, until about the month of October, when the accounts of the disturbances came thick upon us, the American trade went on as usual. Before this time, the Stamp Act could not affect it. Afterwards, the merchants fell into a great consternation; a general stagnation in trade ensued. But as soon as it was known that the ministry favored the repeal of the Stamp Act, several of the bolder merchants ventured to execute their orders; others more timid hung back; in this manner the trade continued in a state of dreadful fluctuation between the fears of those who had ventured, for the event of their boldness, and the anxiety of those whose trade was suspended, until the royal assent was finally given to the bill of repeal. That the trade of 1766 was not equal to that of 1765, could not be owing to the repeal; it arose from quite different causes, of which the author seems not to be aware: 1st, Our conquests during the war had laid open the trade of the French and Spanish West Indies to our colonies much more largely than they had ever enjoyed it; this continued for some time after the peace; but at length it was extremely contracted, and in some places reduced to nothing. Such in particular was the state of Jamaica. On the taking the Havannah all the stores of that island were emptied into that place, which produced unusual orders for goods, for supplying their own consumption, as well as for further speculations of trade. These ceasing, the trade stood on its own bottom. This is one cause of the diminished export to Jamaica, and not the childish idea of the author, of an impossible contraband from the opening of the ports.—2nd, The war had brought a great influx of cash into America, for the pay and provision of the troops; and this an unnatural increase of trade, which, as its cause failed, must in some degree return to its ancient and natural bounds.—3rd, When the merchants met from all parts, and compared their accounts, they were alarmed at the immensity of the debt due to them from America. They found that the Americans had over-traded their abilities. And, as they found too that several of them were capable of making the state of political events an excuse for their failure in commercial punctuality, many of our merchants in some degree contracted their trade from that moment. However, it is idle, in such an immense mass of trade, so liable to fluctuation, to infer anything from such a deficiency as one or even two hundred thousand pounds. In 1767, when the disturbances subsided, this deficiency was made up again.
[94] The disturbances have been in Boston only; and were not in consequence of the late duties.
[95] Page 24.
[96] "They are happy in having found, in your zeal for the dignity of this nation, the means of liquidating their claims, and of concluding with the court of France a convention for the final satisfaction of their demands; and have given us commission, in their names, and on their behalf, most earnestly to entreat your acceptance of their grateful acknowledgments. Whether they consider themselves as Britons, or as men more particularly profiting by your generous and spirited interposition, they see great reasons to be thankful, for having been supported by a minister, in whose public affections, in whose wisdom and activity, both the national honor, and the interests of individuals, have been at once so well supported and secured."—Thanks of the Canada merchants to General Conway, London, April 28, 1766.
[97] See the Convention itself, printed by Owen and Harrison, Warwick-lane, 1766; particularly the articles two and thirteen.
[98] Page 23.
[99] Page 46.
[100] Page 46.
APPENDIX.
So much misplaced industry has been used by the author of "The State of the Nation," as well as by other writers, to infuse discontent into the people, on account of the late war, and of the effects of our national debt; that nothing ought to be omitted which may tend to disabuse the public upon these subjects. When I had gone through the foregoing sheets, I recollected, that, in pages 58, 59, 60, I only gave the comparative states of the duties collected by the excise at large; together with the quantities of strong beer brewed in the two periods which are there compared. It might be still thought, that some other articles of popular consumption, of general convenience, and connected with our manufactures, might possibly have declined. I therefore now think it right to lay before the reader the state of the produce of three capital duties on such articles; duties which have frequently been made the subject of popular complaint. The duty on candles; that on soap, paper, &c.; and that on hides.
This increase has not arisen from any additional duties. None have been imposed on these articles during the war. Notwithstanding the burdens of the war, and the late dearness of provisions, the consumption of all these articles has increased, and the revenue along with it.
There is another point in "The State of the Nation," to which, I fear, I have not been so full in my answer as I ought to have been, and as I am well warranted to be. The author has endeavored to throw a suspicion, or something more, on that salutary, and indeed necessary measure of opening the ports in Jamaica. "Orders were given," says he, "in August, 1765, for the free admission of Spanish vessels into all the colonies."[101] He then observes, that the exports to Jamaica fell 40,904l. short of those of 1764; and that the exports of the succeeding year, 1766, fell short of those of 1765, about eighty pounds; from whence he wisely infers, that this decline of exports being since the relaxation of the laws of trade, there is a just ground of suspicion, that the colonies have been supplied with foreign commodities instead of British.
Here, as usual with him, the author builds on a fact which is absolutely false; and which, being so, renders his whole hypothesis absurd and impossible. He asserts, that the order for admitting Spanish vessels was given in August, 1765. That order was not signed at the treasury board until the 15th day of the November following; and therefore so far from affecting the exports of the year 1765, that, supposing all possible diligence in the commissioners of the customs in expediting that order, and every advantage of vessels ready to sail, and the most favorable wind, it would hardly even arrive in Jamaica, within the limits of that year.
This order could therefore by no possibility be a cause of the decrease of exports in 1765. If it had any mischievous operation, it could not be before 1766. In that year, according to our author, the exports fell short of the preceding, just eighty pounds. He is welcome to that diminution; and to all the consequences he can draw from it.
But, as an auxiliary to account for this dreadful loss, he brings in the Free-port Act, which he observes (for his convenience) to have been made in spring, 1766; but (for his convenience likewise) he forgets, that, by the express provision of the act, the regulation was not to be in force in Jamaica until the November following. Miraculous must be the activity of that contraband whose operation in America could, before the end of that year, have reacted upon England, and checked the exportation from hence! Unless he chooses to suppose, that the merchants at whose solicitation this act had been obtained, were so frightened at the accomplishment of their own most earnest and anxious desire, that, before any good or
evil effect from it could happen, they immediately put a stop to all further exportation.
It is obvious that we must look for the true effect of that act at the time of its first possible operation, that is, in the year 1767. On this idea how stands the account?
| 1764, Exports to Jamaica | £456,528 |
| 1765 | 415,624 |
| 1766 | 415,544 |
| 1767 (first year of the Free-port Act) | 467,681 |
This author, for the sake of a present momentary credit, will hazard any future and permanent disgrace. At the time he wrote, the account of 1767 could not be made up. This was the very first year of the trial of the Free-port Act; and we find that the sale of British commodities is so far from being lessened by that act, that the export of 1767 amounts to 52,000l. more than that of either of the two preceding years, and is 11,000l. above that of his standard year 1764. If I could prevail on myself to argue in favor of a great commercial scheme from the appearance of things in a single year, I should from this increase of export infer the beneficial effects of that measure. In truth, it is not wanting. Nothing but the thickest ignorance of the Jamaica trade could have made any one entertain a fancy, that the least ill effect on our commerce could follow from this opening of the ports. But, if the author argues the effect of regulations in the American trade from the export of the year in which they are made, or even of the following; why did he not apply this rule to his own? He had the same paper before him which I have now before me. He must have seen that in
his standard year (the year 1764), the principal year of his new regulations, the export fell no less than 128,450l. short of that in 1763! Did the export trade revive by these regulations in 1765, during which year they continued in their full force? It fell about 40,000l. still lower. Here is a fall of 168,000l.; to account for which, would have become the author much better than piddling for an 80l. fall in the year 1766 (the only year in which the order he objects to could operate), or in presuming a fall of exports from a regulation which took place only in November, 1766; whose effects could not appear until the following year; and which, when they do appear, utterly overthrow all his flimsy reasons and affected suspicions upon the effect of opening the ports.
This author, in the same paragraph, says, that "it was asserted by the American factors and agents, that the commanders of our ships of war and tenders, having custom-house commissions, and the strict orders given in 1764 for a due execution of the laws of trade in the colonies, had deterred the Spaniards from trading with us; that the sale of British manufactures in the West Indies had been greatly lessened, and the receipt of large sums of specie prevented."
If the American factors and agents asserted this, they had good ground for their assertion. They knew that the Spanish vessels had been driven from our ports. The author does not positively deny the fact. If he should, it will be proved. When the factors connected this measure, and its natural consequences, with an actual fall in the exports to Jamaica, to no less an amount than 128,460l. in one year, and with a further fall in the next, is their assertion very wonderful? The author himself is
full as much alarmed by a fall of only 40,000l.; for giving him the facts which he chooses to coin, it is no more. The expulsion of the Spanish vessels must certainly have been one cause, if not of the first declension of the exports, yet of their continuance in their reduced state. Other causes had their operation, without doubt. In what degree each cause produced its effect, it is hard to determine. But the fact of a fall of exports upon the restraining plan, and of a rise upon the taking place of the enlarging plan, is established beyond all contradiction.
This author says, that the facts relative to the Spanish trade were asserted by American factors and agents; insinuating, that the ministry of 1766 had no better authority for their plan of enlargement than such assertions. The moment he chooses it, he shall see the very same thing asserted by governors of provinces, by commanders of men-of-war, and by officers of the customs; persons the most bound in duty to prevent contraband, and the most interested in the seizures to be made in consequence of strict regulation. I suppress them for the present; wishing that the author may not drive me to a more full discussion of this matter than it may be altogether prudent to enter into. I wish he had not made any of these discussions necessary.