CONCLUSION OF THE RUSSIAN WAR.
A.D. 1856
It will aid the consecutive narrative of events to relate the conclusion of the Russian war, and the home events connected with it, in the opening sections of this chapter.
The early winter months of 1856 were spent inactively by the opposing armies, and negotiations for peace were opened, chiefly through the instrumentality of Austria, backed by Prussia. France, however, it was suspected in England, had made overtures to Russia privately, the French emperor having maintained all through the struggle a separate and selfish policy while uniting with England to destroy the power of Russia in the Black Sea. It was to the interest of France to destroy Muscovite influence in the neighbourhood of the Mediterranean, and to limit the preponderating influence of the Russo-Greek church in Turkey. It was the especial interest of the emperor to compel the czar to recognise him as a great European sovereign, the de facto and de jure sovereign of the French, although not of the line of its legitimate kings. These objects were partly attained, and were obviously attainable as far as France or the emperor had any interest in prosecuting them. Once assured of this, his imperial majesty and his political coadjutors changed their tone (they could scarcely be said to change their policy) towards England. It was declared in France that England had sinister designs in keeping up hostilities; that she was desirous to use the power of France to lessen Russian power in Asia in the interest of the Anglo-Indian dominions. The question, too, was raised in France, how far it was for the advantage of that country to extirpate the naval power of Russia, which might be employed, possibly, in resisting the dominant navy of England. During the war, the French navy performed an inglorious part. It fought well when brought into action, but its operations were entirely subsidiary to those of England. France was jealous of this evident superiority, and from the fall of Sebastopol toiled incessantly to counteract and rival the naval power of England. Everything Russian was popular in France after the capture of southern Sebastopol—everything English was decried. The most mendacious statements, under official authority, were put forth, exaggerating the losses of the English navy and army, and lessening the computation of the losses of Russia and France. The French official journals described the loss of the Russian army at a quarter of a million of men. Lord Panmure, in his place in the British parliament, estimated it at half a million. His lordship, as war minister, was acquainted with the facts as regarded all the armies in the field, and no one ever impeached his truthfulness and moderation. During the two years and a quarter that the Crimean campaign lasted, out of an army, of which the average strength was 34,500, 20,800 died from all causes; but of these deaths only 5,000 occurred in action, or from wounds inflicted by the enemy. Two-thirds of the whole mortality arose from other causes more destructive than shot, bullet, or bayonet. An equal number of men of the same ages would, according to the average death-rate of the more healthy districts of England, have suffered a loss of only 610, in lieu of 20,000. While every credit is given to the war secretary for moderation and truth, his statistics are open to some strictures. They were thus commented upon by the author of this History, in his “History of the War against Russia.” *
* Vol. ii. p. 745.
“Lord Panmure’s statement referred to the army, but it did not include soldiers on board ship, nor the naval brigade, nor the marines. His lordship’s account does not agree with a corrected calculation from the various reports made from time to time. These bring up the computation to a figure higher by several thousands. This may be accounted for by several circumstances. His lordship’s lists excluded the commissary and hospital departments, also the army works and land-transport corps. Besides, his computations only begin with the encounter of the Bulganak, previous to which the sufferings of the soldiers in landing at Old Fort were so great, that on the short march to the bivouac of the Bulganak many men dropped out from cholera, dysentery, thirst, or weakness, who never rejoined their corps; and some of whom, it is to be feared, from the want of transport and ambulances, perished unaided where they fell. Forty thousand would be nearer the total loss than 23,000.”
Small as was the part taken by the navy of France in the war, her losses were great. The Moniteur de la Flotte published the returns of the casualties experienced by the French imperial navy during the expeditions to the Crimea, the Baltic, and Petropaulovski, in 1854, 1855, and 1856. The ships’ crews lost 11 officers and 144 seamen killed by the enemy’s fire, and 39 officers and 3,237 men who died of their wounds or from sickness—in all 50 officers and 3,381 men; the naval artillery corps had 2 officers and 31 non-commissioned officers and soldiers killed, and 3 officers and 231 non-commissioned officers who died of their wounds or from sickness—in all 5 officers and 262 men, and the marine infantry, 9 officers and 73 non-commissioned officers and men killed, and 12 officers and 1,057 non-commissioned officers and men who died of their wounds or from sickness—in all 21 officers and 1,130 men. Total—270 killed and 4,579 dead; in all 4,819. According to Marshal Vaillant, the French minister of war, France sent to the east 309,628 men, 41,974 horses, and 597,686 tons of stores; and brought back 227,125 men, 9.000 horses, and 126,880 tons of stores.
The result of the negotiations brought about by the chief German powers, and ardently desired by France, was a treaty of peace on the 30th of March, 1856. It was ratified on the 27th of April. Six months was fixed for the evacuation of Russian territories by the allies. The French army commenced its embarkation more than a fortnight before the ratification, as a sort of overt proof of the good will of the French emperor to his new ally and recent enemy. In less than three months, on the 5th of July, the whole of the French army had abandoned the soil of Russia, On the 8th of August the last French soldier left Constantinople on the homeward voyage. The British army was more easily removed from its smaller number and its greater transport power.
On the 23rd of April one of the grandest sights ever witnessed from the shores of England was presented at Portsmouth. Never were the waters of the Solent so crowded with “craft of all dimensions” as on that day. Notwithstanding the shameful failures of the English navy in the Pacific, and the dilatory proceedings of the Admiralty, which rendered the blockades in the White Sea so much less effective than they ought to have been—although the massacre of Sinope did take place, and “Old Charley” nursed his gout or drank his grog, when he ought to have been reconnoitering Sweaborg—still the Russian navy of the Euxine had perished rather than meet Dundas; the stores, granaries, and fisheries, were swept from the coasts of the Sea of Azoff; and not a ship of the enemy dare put to sea for two years in the Baltic. After all, Britannia did “rule the waves,” and was more able to rule them than ever. The fleet was assembled for her majesty’s personal review, and consisted of 240 steam vessels, including gun-boats, mortar-boats, and floating batteries. There were three vessels of 100 guns each, six of 91, an equal number of 80 guns, and vessels of every order; frigates, brigs, sloops, &c., had their proportionate numbers. The steam-power equalled that of 31,000 horses, and 3,000 guns were carried. The fleet, covering a space of twelve miles, was manned by 30,000 sailors and marines. On the 29th of April peace was proclaimed. The author of this work witnessed the proclamation in several parts of the metropolis, but the crowds were not such as the great city usually sent forth on occasions of magnitude. The fact was, England did not consider that the war had been prosecuted to its legitimate consequences, and felt that the French emperor had not pursued a direct and fair policy.
The return of the British troops was hailed with enthusiasm, and a review of a portion of them—especially the guards—by her majesty in Hyde Park, elicited unbounded enthusiasm from all classes of the people. Among the most exciting home incidents connected with the war was the distribution by her majesty, in Hyde Park, of the Victoria Cross—the badge of a new order of merit, bestowed for valour upon a number of gallant recipients.
Peace had scarcely been proclaimed when the country was irritated by tidings that Russia was endeavouring to evade its stipulations, and that France and Austria were playing into her hands. One of the terms of the treaty was that the Russian frontier should recede from the Danube. That crafty power had taken advantage of an erroneous French map, introduced by the French diplomatists at the conference, to deceive the allies as to the boundary agreed upon. After much negotiation and dispute, conducted as to England and Turkey on the one side and Russia on the other with intense acrimony, Russia was obliged to conform to the demands of the allies. Another stipulation of the treaty was the free navigation of the Danube. Russia endeavoured to seize upon the Isle of Serpents, off the Sulina mouth of the delta of that river. The island was a portion of the dominions of the sultan; an English naval officer secured the possession of it to the Turkish sovereign. France rendered little assistance to England in these disputes, and displayed sympathy with Russia and jealousy of British influence. The neutrality of the Black Sea, and the destruction of all naval arsenals on its Russian shores, or rivers communicating with its shores, was also a stipulation of the treaty which Russia evaded. Here also England by her firm diplomacy, almost unaided by France, constrained Russia to conform to the terms of the peace. Another article of the treaty referred to the emancipation of the sultan’s Christian subjects from all disabilities on account of their religion. This the sultan and the orthodox Turks evaded, and have continued to evade to the present time, although ostentatious proclamations in the spirit of the treaty were put forth by the sultan’s government, and engagements the most determinate were subscribed. The general conduct of the Christians of the empire was disloyal and dishonest; they sought, like the Russians and Turks, to obtain all the advantages of the treaty, and fulfil none of its obligations. The remaining among the articles of the treaty of chief importance regulated the liberties, and relations to the sultan, of the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia. Here also difficulties arose, fomented by the united policy of the French and Russian governments, who intrigued—with the Wallachs especially—to insist on acting in a manner hostile to the constitution assigned by the treaty for their government. These disputes continued for years after the termination of the war. England resisted the intrigues which France and Russia set on foot inimical to the interests of the sultan, but her diplomacy and influence were not so successful as in reference to the other terms of the treaty. The great powers played a part that was not great, after the peace.