CONTINENTAL POLITICS.
While the cabinets of Petersburg, Vienna, and Berlin were occupied in dismembering Poland, and aggrandizing their dominions at the expense of that ill-fated country, France was making preparations to send a powerful fleet into the Baltic. This was evidently the forerunner of some ulterior design, although D’Aigullon, the prime minister of France, endeavoured to keep those designs from the public view. He was, however, unable to elude the vigilance, or to baffle the penetration of the British cabinet. After expatiating on the ambition of Russia, as well as the ties of honour and interest by which France was bound to assist Sweden, D’Aigullon was informed by Lord Stormont, the British ambassador, that, if France sent her ships into the Baltic, they would be followed by a British fleet. The presence of two fleets, he said, would have no more effect than a neutrality, and that, however the British cabinet might desire peace between England and France, it was impossible to foresee the consequences that might arise from accidental collision. This had some effect, for the squadron at Brest was countermanded; but soon after the French minister, in hopes of eluding observation, gave orders for the equipment of an armament at Toulon, under pretence of exercising the sailors of France in naval tactics. Discovering this, the British cabinet made vigorous demonstrations of resistance. The English ambassador was directed to declare that the objections made against a fleet of France occupying the Baltic, applied equally to the Mediterranean, and a memorial was presented to the French minister, accompanied by a demand that it should be laid before the king, and council. This was sufficient: the armament was countermanded and the sailors discharged.