DEBATES ON THE RUSSIAN ARMAMENT.
Papers relative to the apprehended rupture between Great Britain and Russia were laid before the house on the 6th of February. This gave rise to several debates, in which the spirit of party was strongly displayed. On the 13th of February Mr. Grey loudly complained that ministers had not produced the preliminaries said to have been adjusted between the Russian and Turkish negociators; and that large sums had been unnecessarily spent in fitting out the armament. A week later Mr. Grey moved for a more ample production of papers regarding various portions of the recent diplomacy of ministers; arguing that the whole of the correspondence was necessary, if they wished to justify the steps they had taken. Pitt resisted the demand, conceiving that sufficient had been disclosed to make the house master of all the essential parts of the business, and asserting that confidence was due to the administration, until their capacity or integrity was impeached. The motion was negatived, but on the 29th of February the subject was revived by Mr. Whitbread, who moved the following resolutions:—“That no arrangement respecting Oczakow and its district appears to have been capable of affecting the political or commercial interests of this country, so as to justify any hostile interference on the part of Great Britain between. Russia and the Porte: that the interference for the purpose of preventing the cession of the said fortress and its district to the Empress of Russia has been wholly unsuccessful; and that his majesty’s ministers, in endeavouring, by means of an armed force, to compel the Empress of Russia to abandon her claim to Oczakow, and in continuing an armament after the object for which it was proposed had been relinquished, have been guilty of gross misconduct, tending to incur unnecessary expenses, and to diminish the influence of the British nation.” Many members took part in the debate which followed this motion, but the most remarkable speeches were delivered by those two great rivals, Pitt and Fox. After reviewing our foreign policy from the time of our joining Prussia, in order to prevent Holland becoming the prey of France, Fox said that we were standing forward the principals of every quarrel, the Quixotes of every enterprise, and the agitators in all the plots and disturbances that were every day arising in Europe. He said, if Oczakow was a place of no importance, ministers ought to be censured for having armed and protracted war on its account; and if it was an important place, they ought to be censured for disarming without having obtained repossession of it from the Turks. Fox argued that the Empress of Russia weald have granted better terms to the Turks if England had not interfered; and bitterly complained of Pitt’s reserve and secrecy with parliament. On the latter subject he remarked:—“This is what puts our constitution in danger. That the pride, the folly, the presumption of a single person shall be able to involve a whole people in disgrace is more than philosophy can teach mortal patience to endure. Here are the true weapons of the enemies of our constitution! Here may we search for the source of the present outpourings of seditious writings, meant either to weaken our attachment to the constitution by depreciating its value, or that loudly tell us we have no constitution at all. We may blame, we may reprobate such doctrines; but while we furnish those who circulate them with argumenta such as these, while the example of this day shows us to what degree the fact is true, we must not wonder that the purposes the seditious writings are meant to answer be but too successful. They argue that a constitution cannot be right where such things are possible; much less so when they are practised without punishment. Against the vain theories of men who project fundamental alterations upon grounds of mere speculative objection I can easily defend the constitution; but when they recur to these facts, and show me how we may be doomed to all the horrors of war by the caprice of an individual, who will not even condescend to explain his reasons, I can only fly to this house, and exhort you to rouse from your lethargy of confidence, into the active mistrust and vigilant control which your duty and your office point out to you.” But Fox had by his intrigues brought the country into danger from a war with Russia, more than Pitt had by his armament. Although the laws and constitution of this country entrust the exclusive right of treating with foreign potentates to the king, yet without the knowledge or participation of a single member in the house, Fox had sent an agent to St. Petersburgh to frustrate the objects for which a plenipotentiary from the crown was authorised to treat. And Fox succeeded in his design: it was through his influence that the czarina still obstinately refused to give up Oczakow, And yet Fox condemned ministers for not having succeeded in their negociations! On this subject Pitt’s biographer, Tomline, writes:—“It is to be presumed that Mr. Fox never would have had recourse to such a measure, if he had not entertained a confident hope, that, having already succeeded in rendering the Russian armament unpopular, he should overset Mr. Pitt’s administration, provided the empress could be prevailed on to persevere in her demands. That point he accomplished without difficulty, yet the result did not turn out as he expected—he defeated Mr. Pitt’s plan, and brought a certain degree of discredit and danger on his country, by effecting the aggrandisment of an unfriendly and powerful court, but his own personal ambition remained ungratified.” In his reply to Fox the minister exhibited a noble mind, in not making any use of his rival’s unjustifiable conduct: conduct which was more unconstitutional than Pitt’s rigid reserve, and which was to a certain extent, treasonable. In his reply Pitt defended his policy with great spirit. He asked whether any one conversant in politics could admit that the Turkish empire, being unable to defend itself against Russia and Austria, should be abandoned by the other European powers, every one of which was so visibly interested in the preservation of its independence: whether, if other European powers were indolent, or hindered by untoward circumstances from interfering. Great Britain could coolly leave Turkey to its fate? and whether a British ministry could look on with indifference, while her commerce in the Levant was threatened, and the maritime power of England, not only in the Mediterranean and Archipelago, but in every other sea, must receive a blow from the increase of shipping that would accrue to Russia and Austria, were they to become masters of European Turkey? The interest and honour of this country, he said, required us to pay vigilant attention to the political situation of the continental powers, lest the predominance of any one should destroy that equipoise which was essential to the safety of the whole. And it was evident, he remarked, that the ruin or depression of the Turkish empire would materially affect the balance of power in Europe. All the world knew that the object of Russia had long been to acquire exclusive authority in the Black Sea; and were the Russians to gain possession of its ports, a new naval power would arise, dangerous to all Europe, but especially so to Great Britain, whose safety and prosperity chiefly depended on the superiority of her fleets. It was certain, also, he said, that if Great Britain had not assumed a hostile disposition, the original demands of the court of Petersburgh would have been insisted on to the last, and Turkey would have been forced to submit to a dismemberment. As for Oczakow, he acknowledged that it was not a place of great importance, but as a fortress commanding the navigation of the Dniester, and a point to be gained by the empress in her system of ambition, it was worth some risks, and he conceived that he had done his duty by first attempting to secure this object to Turkey, and afterwards relinquishing it when it could only be obtained at the price of war. At the same time Pitt remarked, Oczakow might have been secured had it not been for the division and opposition in this kingdom; it was chiefly through Fox and his party that what had been done well, had not been done better. Party divisions in this country had encouraged the ambitious designs of Russia; and yet opposition now took merit to themselves for rendering negociations useless; which, but for their efforts, would have been attended with complete success. But he did not envy them their triumph: it was not a triumph over an enemy, but over the council of their king. Pitt concluded by a sarcastic reflection on Fox, which must have been keenly felt by him. In the summer of 1791, the czarina finding that the Whig party was averse to the Russian armament, directed her ambassador to request Fox to sit to Nollekens for a bust in white marble, in order that she might place it between the statues of Demosthenes and Cicero. In allusion to this Pitt said, that if he and his honourable friend Dundas were to go to St. Petersburg, he felt certain that neither of them should be found in any place of glory between two orators of antiquity! Fox replied, vindicating his conduct, and condemning the policy of ministers in the same unmeasured terms as before. But the sentiments of the house were against him and his party: Whitbread’s resolutions were all rejected, either without a division or by very large majorities. During these debates the same question was agitated in the house of lords; but Lord Fitzwilliam, who moved a similar resolution to that of Mr. Grey in the commons, was outvoted by a majority of eighty-nine against nineteen.