DISPUTE WITH RUSSIA.
In proposing to continue the additional number of seamen which had been engaged for the expected war with Spain, Pitt had said that there were circumstances in the present situation of Europe, which made it necessary to keep up a naval armament, for a time, of more than ordinary extent. This had reference to the warlike attitude of Russia. At the congress of Reichenbach, the defensive alliance had proposed to the Czarina that she should accede to the peace which they were negociating with Austria, and that all conquests should be restored. This she flatly refused; but subsequently, being deprived of lier ally, and seeing that it was at present impossible for her to subjugate Turkey to her sway, she offered to restore all her acquisitions, except the city and dependencies of Oczakow, an important place, commanding the mouth of the Dnieper, at a distance of less than two hundred miles off the Turkish capital. As this offer exhibited an inclination on the part of the Czarina to re-commence the war at some future period, the allies projected a more effectual interference, and on the 28th of March Pitt delivered a message from the king on the subject. His majesty acquainted his faithful commons, that his endeavours, in conjunction with his allies, to accomplish a pacification with Russia and the Porte had proved abortive; and that the consequences which might arise from the continuance of the war being important to his own interests, as well as those of his allies and to Europe in general, he judged it requisite, in order to add weight to his representations, to augment his naval forces, relying on the zeal and affection of the house of commons to make good such expenses as might be incurred. After delivering this message, Pitt moved an address to the king, thanking him for it, and promising him the support of the house. In doing so the minister represented, that, if Russia should be allowed to gather any material strength at the expense of Turkey, the effect would be injurious to the interests of all Europe; and that the interference of England was indispensable for the preservation of that balance of power, which all statesmen and men of all parties held to be essential for the security of Europe. This doctrine was very ancient, and had long been the doctrine of both Whig and Tory, but it was now despised by the opposition, who, to a man, became the champions of the Czarina. It was argued that it would be folly to sacrifice all the advantages of our immense trade with Russia for the sake of a Turkish fortress; that neither wisdom nor policy could justify Great Britain in going to war to preserve a barbarian power, which for the sake of religion, justice, and humanity ought to be utterly extirpated; and that, as we had received no injury from Russia, all hostile interference on our part was wholly unnecessary. On the other hand, it was argued by ministers that the aggrandisement of Russia at the expense of Turkey would injure both our commercial and political interests; and that the possession of Oczakow would facilitate the acquisition, not only of Constantinople, but of Alexandria and Lower Egypt. The address was carried, and several resolutions afterwards moved against the armament were rejected by large majorities. The armament therefore continued, and the Czarina was soon compelled to give up Oczakow with all her other acquisitions in Turkey, acquisitions which had cost her many thousand men to obtain.