EAST INDIA AFFAIRS.
On the first clay of the session hostile language was uttered by the retainers of government in the commons against the East India Company, and Lord North moved for a secret committee of thirteen to examine certain points, independently of the committee appointed last session, which was carried. In the course of seven days a report was made by this secret committee, recommending a bill to prevent the company from sending out certain supervisors whom it had selected to settle matters in India. It was at once seen that such a bill was only a preparatory measure for the interference of government in the administration of India, and therefore it excited the warmest opposition of many members. Several of the directors, sitting in parliament, declared that the report was hurried, irregular, and unconstitutional; and Burke, who was a holder of East India stock, maintained that the proposed bill would be a violation of the company’s charter, and the law of the land. “If,” said he, “we suffer this bill to pass we shall become the East India Company; the treasury bench will be the buyers, and on this side we shall be the sellers. The senate will become an auction-room, and the speaker an auctioneer.” The recommendation of the secret committee was, notwithstanding, adopted, and the bill was introduced.
During the progress of this bill, the East India directors petitioned against it, representing it as subversive of those rights and privileges which they held under their charter, which were purchased by their predecessors for a valuable consideration, and were confirmed to them by acts of parliament. The petition also complained of an erroneous calculation of expenses made by the committee, and stated that those of the commission would be defrayed by savings meditated, to the great benefit of the creditors. The petitioners, moreover, suggested that injurious consequences would arise from their being prohibited to transact their own affairs, in the want of means to fulfil their engagements with the public; claimed the benefit of the law; appealed to the faith of the nation for their chartered rights; and prayed to be heard by counsel. This latter prayer was granted, and it appeared from evidence that government had received nearly £2,000,000 annually from the company, while the company had received little more than six per cent, on their capital. The evidence given at the bar also served to establish the great delinquency of the company’s servants, and the need that existed of their being subject to supervision. At the same time it did not show that the company of itself was competent to redress these abuses, and the question was, whether the incompetency of the company warranted the interposition of parliament. Ministers acknowledged it to be a stretch of authority, but they justified it on the plea of cogent necessity—a necessity which took precedence of all other law. The company’s battle was fought in the commons by Burke, whose speech on this occasion attracted great attention. After observing that parliament took the state of the company’s trade into consideration, in 1767 for the maintenance of the public faith and public credit; for the increase of its commerce and revenues, and for the security of its stockholders—a bargain with which the eyes of the house were dazzled—he thus descanted on the distress of the company and the iniquity of the bill:—“The distress of the company,” said he, “arises from the improvidence of administration and the short-sightedness of parliament, in not forming for it a system of government suitable to its form and constitution. Or am I mistaken? Were the directors left without any effectual control over delinquent servants? Was the collection of the revenue left without any check? Was the tyranny of a double government, like our double cabinet, tolerated with a view of seeing the concerns of the company become an absolute chaos of disorder, and of giving to government a handle for seizing the territorial revenue? I know that this was the original scheme of administration, and I violently suspect that it never has been relinquished. If the ministry have no sinister view, if they do not mean by this unconstitutional step to extend the influence of the crown, they will now speak out, and explicitly declare their intentions: their silence may be justly construed into a confession of such a design, and they will thenceforth be considered as the determined enemies of the liberty of their country. God knows, that the places and pensions, and expectancies, furnished by the British establishment, are too powerful for the small remains of patriotism and public spirit that remain in our island. What then will become of us, if Bengal, if the Ganges, pour in a new tide of corruption? Should the evil genius of British liberty so ordain it, I fear this house will be so far from removing the corruption of the East, that it will be corrupted by it: I dread more from the infection of that place than I hope from the virtue of this house. Was it not the sudden plunder of the East that gave the final blow to the freedom of Borne? What reason have we to expect a better fate? I conjure you, by everything which man ought to hold sacred—I conjure you by the spirits of your forefathers, who so nobly fought and bled for the cause for which I now plead—I conjure you by what includes everything, by your country, not to yield to the temptations which the East, in the hands of the crown, holds out: not to sink into the gulf of corruption, and to drag after you your posterity and your country. I obtest heaven and earth, that in all places, and at all times, I have hitherto shoved by the gilded hand of corruption, and endeavoured to stem the torrent which threatens to overwhelm this land. On the whole, the bill is dangerous in itself, as being the first step towards the total invasion of the company’s territories in Bengal; and should we admit the motives which lead to it to be good, yet such a step is dangerous as a precedent. I do not, however, deny that the house has power to pass it, but you have not the right. There is a perpetual confusion in gentlemen’s ideas from inattention to this material distinction, from which, properly considered, it will appear that this bill is contrary to the eternal laws of right and wrong—laws that ought to bind all men, and, above all men, legislative assemblies.” Notwithstanding Burke’s eloquence, the bill was carried in the commons by an overwhelming majority, and it was also carried through the lords with little or no opposition. The two houses then adjourned for the Christmas recess.
