FOREIGN AFFAIRS.—BIRMESE WAR.
The general relations of Great Britain with other nations were tranquil during the year, although some alarms were entertained as to the intentions of her nearest neighbour on the European continent. The war with Birmah was, however costly and sanguinary and was the most prominent matter of public interest in the foreign relations of the British empire. It was in 1851 that the occasion for hostilities was given by the Birmese, and that the governor-general took measures for reprisal. Various acts of oppression and cruelty to British subjects were perpetrated by the authorities of Ava.*
* For a minute and extended account of the causes of both the wars with Birmah, see Nolan’s “History of the British Umpire in India and the East.” Virtue: City-road.
It was not, however, until 1852 that the conflict assumed a serious character, and that tidings reached the English public of this new Indian war. Early in January, 1852, the King of Ava pretended a willingness to settle the differences between him and the British by negotiations. By this means he succeeded in capturing a number of English residents at Rangoon, whom he subjected to indignity and suffering. Commodore Lambert, who commanded the naval expedition, blockaded the Birmese ports. The governor-general despatched from Calcutta, and the Governor of Madras, from the capital of that presidency, strong bodies of troops. Preparations of an extensive nature were made to bring the war to a speedy issue. Several officers of eminent ability, among them the great and good Havelock, afterwards Sir Henry, and the saviour of India, joined the force. By the 24th of February, six steamers left Bombay for Madras, where they embarked the troops destined for the Birmese campaign, under the command of General Godwin, viz., two European and four native regiments, with four corps of artillerymen, chiefly Europeans. These left Madras on the 29th of March, whilst at Calcutta the armament had been equally hastened. The last of the force despatched there left the Hoogly on the 25th of March, the total having been similar to the Madras force—two European and four native regiments, with their accompaniments of artillery, in four steamers and four transports. These amounted in the aggregate to about eight thousand men.
The 1st of April was the clay appointed for the ultimatum. A steamer was sent to Rangoon, to obtain the king’s reply. The English envoy found the river lined with stockades, and from thence a heavy fire was opened upon him; this was the only answer to the British ultimatum his Birmese majesty deigned to give.
Admiral Austin, with the Bengal force, arrived at this juncture, and at once attacked and conquered Martaban, so that, by the evening of the 5th of April, the British were masters of the place. The Madras troops arrived on the 7th, and the forces of the two presidencies proceeded up the river and attacked the stockades, which were defended by twenty-five thousand men.
Early in May, the British resolved upon attacking Bassein, sixty miles up one of the branches of the Irriwaddy. From that point, the Birmese commander contemplated an invasion of the British province of Arracan. After a desperate struggle, a very small number of British succeeded in storming the stockades and capturing the place.
While the English were engaged capturing Bassein, the Birmese attempted the reconquest of Martaban, but were repulsed with great slaughter, by a very small force, with little loss.
On the 5th of July, Prome was attacked: the conquest was easy, but the conqueror did not deem it necessary to garrison the place; consequently, as he retired to Rangoon, the enemy re-entered Prome.
The incompetency and inactivity of the British general caused July and August to pass uselessly. The whole army murmured. All the abuses of British military official routine prevailed, and the accounts which arrived in England excited, as tidings from India had so often done, much popular discontent. A popular writer thus criticised General Godwin’s conduct, and gave the following relation of his proceedings:—“The expected reinforcements having reached head-quarters, the force available amounted in the month of September to nearly twenty thousand men, in the highest state of efficiency, and quite large enough to have at once swept all before them to the very gates of the emperor’s palace. But this did not appear to be the view taken of the matter by General Godwin, who now made preparation for once more attacking Prome. In tire middle of this month, two regiments, a field-battery, with a detachment of sappers and miners, left Rangoon, followed within a few days by the general, and a party of artillerymen. They ascended the river without opposition until the 9th of October, when, as they approached the stockaded defences of the city, they were fired upon from many sides. The enemy’s gunnery was not of first-rate quality, and in less than two hours was entirely silenced, the ground being completely cleared of the opposing force by the shells thrown from the steamers. The troops were landed towards the evening, and, advancing at once upon a pagoda and the few remaining defences, carried everything before them at the point of the bayonet. Night fell before the town could be reached, and it was therefore not until the next morning that Prome was occupied for the second time by our troops. A large body of Birmese troops, amounting to upwards of six thousand men, were known to be posted within a few miles of the town, strongly entrenched behind stockades, and out of reach of our steamers, the artillery practice from which appears to have impressed them with a proper sense of our superiority in that arm of war. To have dislodged them with the force at his command would have been a matter of comparative ease; but so thought not General Godwin, who, fearful probably of terminating the war too quickly, determined to await the arrival of further troops before attempting any forward movement. He did not wait long, however; but within a day or two left for Rangoon, in search of the troops considered to be requisite for further operations. This reinforcement was dispatched towards the latter part of the month. By this time the Irriwaddy, which had been previously deep enough throughout for our largest steamers, sank so suddenly, and as it appears so unexpectedly, that several of the flotilla were left aground in the middle of the stream, with every prospect of having to remain there until the next rains should float them.”
The English general seemed to be unable to manage the large reinforcements which he had received, or to avail himself of the combinations which the activity of the governor-general made to facilitate the objects of the expedition.
The general resolved to attack Pegu again, which had been abandoned after a previous successful attack. The conquest was easy, and a garrison was established. This detachment was attacked in December by large numbers of the enemy. The garrison was hemmed in, and in the greatest danger; General Godwin, after failing to relieve the place, by ill-judged and inadequate measures, at last sent a strong force, which successfully encountered every obstacle, and dispersed the enemy.
On the 28th of December, 1852, Pegu and Martaban were “annexed” to British India by proclamation of the governor-general. When these tidings reached Ava, a revolution occurred, promoted by the emperor’s brother, with the design of propitiating the English, and making peace. The emperor was made a captive, and his brother ascended the musnid.
Meanwhile, the British forced the great pass between Arracan and Pegu, leading through it two hundred and fifty elephants sent from Calcutta to convey stores to the army under Godwin. Baffled and beaten, the Birmese troops fell back upon the capital early in the year 1853.
The British opened negotiations with the new sovereign, which were tediously protracted until May. An embassy was sent to the Birmese court, and the emperor had the folly and arrogance, after all the disaster and defeat experienced by the arms of Ava, to demand homage from the English envoys. The firmness of these gentlemen, and the fear of renewed hostilities, caused the sovereign to waive his claims to forms and ceremonies of abject submission, and the issue was peaceful. Cordial relations with the Birmese dominions were not however established, either at that juncture or subsequently: but the salutary fear of British power, caused by the war of 1851-2-3, prevented any violent interruption of good neighbourhood on the part of the Birmese.