FOREIGN AFFAIRS.—CHINA AND JAPAN.
A.D. 1858-1859
The foreign transactions of 1858 have been partly related in the last chapter; the conclusion of a peace with China, which was hailed with great satisfaction in Europe, was among those transactions. After the peace a work was published by Mr. Laurence Oliphant, who held a position on the civil staff of Lord Elgin, relating the events of the war. Mr. Oliphant had been distinguished as a traveller and writer, and his work upon the mission of Lord Elgin to the Eastern seas naturally excited very great attention. In that work it transpired that Sir Michael Seymour, the admiral commanding the British fleet in the Chinese waters, did not heartily co-operate with Lord Elgin. The admiral disapproved, or affected to disapprove, of the actively hostile proceedings of Lord Elgin. He was for carrying on the war by blockades and compromises, after the fashion desired by certain merchants in China and in England connected with the Chinese trade, who did not wish China thoroughly opened to all nations, or to all English merchants, and who desired to go on much in the old way—dealing and quarrelling with the Chinese alternately, enduring all insults except personal oppressions, the plunder of property, and the stoppage of trade; so that a restricted intercourse with the Chinese might continue available to these merchants, already in the trade and experienced in Chinese intrigue, but calculated to deter others from entering a field of commerce so hazardous and uncertain. With this British merchant-clique the Manchester party in England sympathized. This at first seemed inconsistent with the principles of that party, which involved free trade with all nations. The system adopted in China, however, was believed by many of the party to work well enough for the trade of Manchester. Many of that school, who did not think so, believed that a Chinese war would prove so expensive, and inflame the minds of the Chinese so much, that on the whole it was better to patch up a peace any how, or endure a troublesome peace, rather than have open hostilities. The general conviction in Lancashire that a war anywhere, great or small, was injurious to the trade of the district, had much to do with the inveterate objection of the northern politicians to a Chinese war. A considerable number of influential persons, in the middle and northern counties of England especially, adopted the peace principles as a religious dogma. They held that war, under any circumstance, for whatever purpose, offensive or defensive, was a sin, and they deemed it their duty to oppose whatever government went to war. On a vote connected with the Chinese war the government of Lord Palmerston was defeated, by a combination of the tory and the Manchester parties: the latter, acting conscientiously as opposed to war; the former, taking a party advantage of the situation, and voting against the government for doing what, in office, they would do themselves. These two parties were strengthened by Lord John Russell, then in opposition, and a small section of Whigs led by him, who, in a spirit as factious and still less honourable, joined the great conservative party to throw out the Palmerston ministry. Sir J. Pakington, a determined Tory, became first lord of the admiralty, and the other lords were of course of the same party, they had come into office by a vote adverse to the Chinese war and to the Palmerston government for lending any sanction to it.
When Admiral Sir Michael Seymour learned these facts, he thwarted Lord Elgin as much as he could in the naval operations, especially in the Peiho. This Lord Elgin and Mr. Oliphant declared; and the admiral admitted that his slowness to cany out the plenipotentiary’s requisitions arose partly from disapproval of the policy that functionary was sent out to enforce. In fact, Sir Michael knew that he would be backed by a tory admiralty, at the head of which was such a thorough-going party man as Sir J. Pakington, in adopting their policy, and thwarting a whig plenipotentiary. Sir Michael judged correctly; his very bad conduct was pronounced exemplary by the admiralty, and the queen’s plenipotentiary was hindered and affronted with impunity. That was not the first time a British admiral acted similarly, very much to the injury and peril of his country. In the history of the British empire in the East there are various exemplifications of admirals setting at defiance or impeding the authorities which they were bound in duty to obey.
The work of Lord Elgin was not destined to prove stable in China. The treaty was broken when the English minister, the Honourable Mr. Bruce—sent to Pekin for its ratification—appeared in the Peiho. Fortifications had been thrown up; the approach of the English and French envoys refused; their escorts were attacked; and after a desperate effort on the part of the small allied squadron to force its way up the Peiho, it was beaten back with terrible slaughter, by a large Tartar army defending the fortified obstructions raised against its progress. The British admiral, Hope, after displaying extraordinary gallantry, was terribly wounded. The allied French and English withdrew, and awaited reinforcements and the further orders of their governments. Those governments resolved to enforce the treaty, and conquer a passage to Pekin. Large forces, comparatively with those of former expeditions against the Chinese, were sent forth, and such was the attitude of affairs when the period to which this History is conducted closed.
The treaty of Lord Elgin with the Emperor of Japan did not work so smoothly as was expected, any more than that with China. The ratification of the treaty, was effected on the 11th of July, 1858; soon after, the Japanese government attempted to evade it by seeking to confine foreigners to a small island about ten miles from Yeddo, and to establish the same sort of surveillance over them as they formerly exercised at the Dutch settlement of Décima. They further sought to establish a new coin as the only one to be used in commercial dealings with foreigners, but at the same time forbidding its currency among the natives, so that all payments in the new coin would have to be exchanged at the government treasury for the old itzabon; and the relative values fixed by the government produced a depreciation of 66 per cent, on foreign coins, which, according to treaty, were to be received at their intrinsic value as metal. Mr. Alcock, the British consul-general, issued a protest, and stopped the trade. The calm and firm attitude he assumed had the desired effect. Soon after, a variety of dishonest and extraordinarily scandalous practices on the part of the British traders exasperated the Japanese people and government. The interference of the English consul to restrain the nefarious practices of his countrymen, and maintain the character of his country, restored matters to a peaceful aspect.
It is remarkable, that during the state of things recorded in the foregoing chapters, of British relations with China and Japan, that a large trade took place. The following is taken from an issue of the Chinese Telegraph at the close of 1859:—
“The aggregate amount of our trade with China, imports and exports, including those of India, in 1857, reached £22,122,469, although there was a cessation of the tea trade with Canton. Last year, even with the effects of the commercial panic of the previous year, and the stoppage of Canton trade, the aggregate commerce with China, British and Indian, was over £20,000,000, exclusive of any colonial trade, Australian, or with the Archipelago. In 1833, the declared value of the British manufactures exported to China was only £630,578; in 1840 it was as low as £524,198; and at the close of the war of 1842 it stood at £969,381. In a few years after the opening of the five new ports to foreign commerce, the value of British goods shipped had increased fully 50 per cent., while it has now nearly tripled in value.
“The import and consumption of tea in this country has more than doubled since the consular ports were thrown open. So also with silk. As we have formerly shown, the demand has been extensive, and China can supply enormous quantities. From a trivial export, silk has become the second great staple of shipment. Although our imports from China have hitherto consisted chiefly of three or four principal staples, there is no reason, looking at the extensive resources of that vast empire, why they should continue so restricted. Something has even been done of late years in this respect. Chinese wool has come in to some extent, having risen in some years to half a million of pounds; although, from its harsh quality, and mixed and dirty character, it is only fitted for coarse woollens, yet it is saleable at low prices. There are other drugs, besides camphor, rhubarb, and essential oils to be obtained thence. A demand has sprung up for sugar, and we can draw supplies from China as well as from Manilla. There are other spices too, besides cassia lignea, to be procured from China.
“In addition to the exports to Great Britain, China exports tea, silk, drugs, and sundries to the continent of Europe, North and South America, Australia, New Zealand, India, and the various settlements of the Eastern Archipelago. The Indian trade has now reached about £10,000,000 in value, one article, opium, constituting the chief export; and this, since the recent treaty, had increased in value by upwards of £1,500,000. The shipments of cotton from India to China would seem to be declining. Whether this arises from a greater demand from England, an increased home production in China, or the internal rebellion, we are not prepared to state. The American imports from China, since the opening of the five ports, have more than doubled in value.
“The British interest in the indirect trade is also worthy of notice. In addition to the large balance against us on the direct trade, we have to provide for that created by the excess of value in exports to Australia, America, &c., all of which are paid for by bills drawn on London. We may except a small portion remitted direct by Australia in gold. India forms the only exception. Her exports amount to over nine millions, while the imports are under one million. In this way we settle, indirectly, the balance of trade.”
The commerce with Japan was too imperfectly organized at the period when this History closes to afford reliable statistics. It was, however, considerable, especially in mineral productions. Gold, silver, copper, and iron abounded; and as the Portuguese and Dutch in former days enriched themselves by importing the precious metals from Japan, so it promised, in 1859, to be the Ophir of the Eastern seas, if not of the world. The war with China, and the opening of commercial relations with Japan, were not the only matters of interest in the relations of England to these countries. Russia opened a negotiation with the Japanese emperor, for the cession of a position upon a small island, which there was no doubt in England was intended as a point d’appui for Russian aggression. In China the same power made prodigious inroads, and it was believed in Great Britain and in India, that Russian agents and Russian material of war contributed to the defeat of Admiral Hope and his French allies in the Peiho.
The following communication from St. Petersburg contains interesting details relative to the extension of the Russian dominions in Asia:—“I have received an interesting letter from the harbour of Weg-Chaz-Weg, in the Yellow Sea, dated the 13th of July, 1858. It announces that Count Mouravieff Amoorski arrived there that day on board the steamer America, coming from Japan and Corea, to visit the coast of China. The port is in the neighbourhood of the Gulf of Pechelee. Colonel Boudgoski, chief of the commission for fixing the boundaries between the Russian possessions in Mantchouria and the celestial empire, is going to Pekin to obtain the approbation and definitive confirmation of the new limits of Russia in Asia. According to the new line, the entire coast of Mantchouria, on the Yellow Sea, and all that part of the country not hitherto claimed by any power, becomes a Russian possession. The territory acquired by the last treaty with China is thus considerably increased. All the southern part of the coast near Corea—that is to say, all under the same latitude as the Caucasian provinces, is supplied with a considerable number of excellent harbours. In fact, in no other country in the world is there to be found so many good harbours so near to each other; in fine, it is difficult to decide which is the best. The famous port of Sebastopol, and the Golden Horn in the Bosphorus, are inferior as compared with these bays and ports. The land on the borders of the coast is covered with virgin forests, in which are to be found oaktrees of nine feet in diameter. The writer of the letter adds that the sight of this gigantic vegetation filled him with amazement. It is expected that this newly-acquired territory will become of immense importance, the forests being situate so near such magnificent harbours. The labyrinth of bays, harbours, and islands is called the Gulf of Peter the Great, and the best port is named Vladiwosjok (Dominator of the East), because it is the cradle of the Russian fleet in the Pacific Ocean, and the commencement of Russian domination in the East. This letter was received at St. Petersburg through Pekin, and thence by a Chinese courier through Mongolia and Kiachta. This gives an idea of the celerity with which communications are transmitted between St. Petersburg, Pekin, and the Gulf of Pechelee.”
France had also designs of Oriental empire, which, however awkwardly prosecuted, had never been abandoned. Her efforts during 1857-8-9, in Cochin China, to establish a position there and make acquisitions of territory, were expensive and persevering, although not attended with the success which English and Russian enterprise has so generally secured.