FOREIGN AFFAIRS—EUROPEAN RELATIONS.
France.—The relations of the United Kingdom with France, are not only more important in themselves than those which the former sustains with any other nation, but they influence the whole foreign policy of the British government. France is ascendant upon the continent notwithstanding the rivalry of Russia, and the policy of France often complicates the relations of England with other powers. This has arisen frequently from national jealousy, and as frequently from the sudden and extreme changes to which the government of France is liable in its form and principles. The revolution of 1848 brought France morally nearer to England. Louis Philippe had much difficulty in holding in rein the war spirit, which for, his own selfish and crooked policy, he had himself evoked. After that corrupt prince was driven from the throne by the people he had betrayed, a friendly feeling sprung up towards England. The moderate republican party regarded Great Britain as a land of freedom, and the natural ally of France. That party, however, maintained its ascendancy but for a short time. The Napoleonists, red republicans, priests, and peasants, united in the support of Charles Louis Napoleon Buonaparte. He was elected president of the republic, and 1851 witnessed, through his instrumentality, events of great magnitude, and which exercised potent influence upon the public mind and policy of England.
There can be no doubt that from the hour Louis Napoleon took his place in the National Assembly he had resolved, by the aid of the partizans of his name, the priests, and their agents connected with the press, to undermine the assembly, and hold it up to the ridicule and resentment of the country. The hostility of that body to universal suffrage, and the advocacy of that political theory by the Buonapartists, gave to the president of the French republic a popularity with the “reds,” which otherwise he never could have obtained.
In the latter part of 1850, a great review of troops took place at Sartory, during which cries, from many of the soldiers, of “Vive l’Empereur” were heard, and were encouraged by the generals in the Buonapartist interest. Some officers who repressed those exclamations, and others who refused to join in them, were dismissed by Louis Napoleon’s executive. These circumstances raised formidable debates in the assembly, and afterwards led to votes and demonstrations hostile to Louis Napoleon. On the other hand a large number of the representatives, who were indebted for their return chiefly to the priesthood, and what remained of a landed aristocracy, used every instrumentality they could bring into requisition to damage the executive, to lower the authority of the president, and to create a monarchical reaction. While they brought forth as a crime the fact that the soldiers had cried “Vive l’Empereur” they took every opportunity themselves to utter the party shouts of “Vivent les Bourbons!” or “Vivent les Orleans!” A singular circumstance exhibited the efforts of a large proportion of the assembly to bring about a monarchical reaction. During the prorogation a permanent committee was formed, in which a small minority of republicans was placed by the votes of the assembly. There were twelve reactionists; these men were found to be in constant communication with the two branches of the exiled Bourbons. Six of them spent most of the time of the prorogation at Wiesbaden, with the pseudo. court of the elder Bourbon branch; the other six went to England, and were constantly at Claremont with the Orleanist branch of the exregal house. As M. Flaudin taunted these sections of the assembly with desiring, they really purposed that Louis Napoleon should be a president fainéant, while yet permitted to retain the nominal functions of government. Louis Napoleon strengthened himself by a new ministry, in which the assembly, by a large majority, declared its want of confidence. M. Montalembert and some others, who were expected to vote on the side of the opposition, voted with the Buonapartists. This made it evident that a strong party among the priesthood deemed it the best policy to support Louis Napoleon, as the friend of the pope’s temporal power at Rome, and of the Roman Catholic religion in France. A very large number of the priests, and of the lay devotees, refused to trust Louis Napoleon as a friend of the church. They did not forget that his first public act, on arriving at the estate of manhood, was to create, or at all events aid in council, and in the field, an insurrection against the pope. Neither did they forget that, although a French army garrisoned Rome, to support the pope under the auspices of the president of the French republic, that the president in his less fortunate days had animadverted in severe terms upon the education and patriotism of the Roman Catholic clergy of France. He had in one of his works drawn invidious comparisons between them and the German clergy, much to the disadvantage of the former. The following was especially quoted by that section of the French clergy and laity who were unwilling to give the president a warm support:—“The clergy will cease to be ultramontane when they shall be obliged, as formerly, to distinguish themselves by learning, and to obtain their education from the same sources as the generality of’ citizens. Southern Germany, without contradiction, is the country in which the Roman Catholic clergy are the best instructed, the most tolerant, and the most liberal; and why are they so? Because the young men who in Germany destine themselves to the priesthood, learn theology in common with students destined for other professions. Instead of being from infancy sequestered from the world, and obtaining in ecclesiastical seminaries a spirit hostile to the society in the midst of which they have to live, they learn at an early age to be citizens, before being priests. The consequence is that the German Catholic clergy are distinguished by great enlightenment and ardent patriotism. There are no sacrifices which they are not ready to make for the triumph of liberty, and for the independence of Germany. In their eyes to be a priest is to teach morality and charity; is to make common cause with all the oppressed; to preach justice and toleration; to predict the reign of equality; and to teach men that political redemption must follow religious liberty. Let the education of the clergy be the same in France as it is in Germany, and it will produce the same results. By the union of priests and laymen there will be a double action which will be favourable to society; priests will become citizens, and citizens will become more religious. Then—but then only—we shall be happy to see, as in Germany, the ministers of religion at the head of education, teaching youth the morality of Christ, which destroyed slavery, taught men, that they are equal, and impressed on them that God has placed in their hearts faith and love, in order to believe in what is right, and to love one another.” *
* “Complete Works of the Emperor Napoleon III.,” vol. ii. Chapter on “The Clergy and the State.”
The espousal of the president’s cause by M. Montalembert, then recognised as the lay leader of the ultramontane party, decided many waverers, notwithstanding their affection for the elder Bourbons, and their horror of such liberal enunciations by Louis Napoleon.
When the president’s ministry of favourites was turned out by the vote of the assembly, he resorted to the extraordinary measure of forming a ministry of men who had no votes in that body. This he alleged was only a provisional ministry, but the assembly did not place faith in these assurances, and offered it every opposition. The new ministry were allowed to sit in the assembly as ministers, to answer any interpellations, or make any statements connected with their offices. This ministry remained in office until the 11th of April, when it gave place to that which it had provisionally succeeded, and which in its turn encountered the opposition of the assembly.
During the months of April and May petitions were got up in Paris, and the provinces, in favour of a revision in the constitution Of 1848. On the 28th of May the assembly was entitled, by its original constitution, to entertain the question of a general revision of the constitution of the state, but no alteration could take place unless approved by three-fourths of the entire votes. Motions for an alteration in the constitution were made by the Buonapartists, and supported in various details by the monarchists of both branches of the Bourbons. The great aim of these parties was the prolongation of the president’s official term, and the enacting of laws to prohibit and punish public banquets and public meetings of a political nature. For this purpose, and for any purpose of repression (as he had said in a speech at Djion), the assembly was always ready to respond to the demands of the president of the republic. Although so ready to uphold the ministry in their repressive measures there was a determination in the assembly to frustrate their power as the ministry of Louis Napoleon. This they soon effected by a formal vote of censure, for using improper influence in order to obtain from the provinces, through the medium of the public functionaries, petitions for a revision of the constitution.
The new ministry was still in the interest of the president of the republic. The assembly, which had been prorogued on the 10th of August, recommenced its duties on the 4th of November. Business began by a long “message” presented in the name of the president of the republic, the main feature of which, and that which excited most attention in the assembly, and in France, was a proposal to abolish the electoral law of the 31st of May, 1850, and to re-establish the electoral law of the 15th of March, 1849. The last named provided that all citizens of age, who have resided six months in the commune were electors. The law of May, 1850, abolished universal suffrage. That act of the legislature was a revolution; the assembly by passing it virtually abolished the constitution, which could be only legitimate as the act of a constituent assembly. The assembly was to a large extent elected under the influence of the priests, who struggled incessantly to accomplish a reactionary policy. From the moment that universal suffrage was abolished, the great mass of the people abetted the pretensions of the president of the republic, whose writings had always advocated universal suffrage. Thus the assembly secured the ascendancy of Louis Napoleon by the very means which they believed most efficacious in thwarting his power and restoring that of the Bourbons. When the reading of the message of the president of the republic terminated, the assembly presented a scene of strange agitation, which was rendered still more intense when the minister by whom the message was read, M. Thurigny, demanded “urgency.” A violent discussion ensued upon this demand. The discussion took its tone from the known ambition of Louis Napoleon Buonaparte, and his open attempts to tamper with the army. To prevent a coup d’état, of which many became apprehensive, the assembly began a struggle to obtain more direct power over the troops. A projet de loi was brought forward by the questors to that effect. The ministry and the Buonapartists demanded that the sole power over the army should be vested in the chief of the state—the president of the republic, and not in the president of the legislative assembly. General St. Arnaud, afterwards commander-inchief of the French army in the Crimea, was foremost in the interest of Louis Napoleon. It would be difficult to say which of the two parties, that consisting of the Buonapartists and the executive on the one hand, or the majority of the assembly on the other, was the more unconstitutional, faithless, and ambitious. The allegation of M. Cremieux was true, “the majority of the assembly had no great attachment to the republic. It incessantly invoked the constitution, which it every day trampled under foot. The assembly was afraid because it did not feel behind it that force which supported assemblies.” The assembly voted against the government by a large majority. The conflict between that body and the executive increased from day to day. Both parties contemplated a coup d’etat, and each proceeded to its execution characteristically. The assembly prepared a bill, the real object of which was to facilitate the impeachment of the president of the republic. Numerous causes for impeachment were provided, such as the president taking command of the armed force in person, inciting his own re-election to the presidency, or attempting to change the form of government. The most serious provision of this projet de loi, was that whenever the president of the republic was accused, “the accused immediately ceases his functions.” By the introduction of this project things were brought to a pass, between the assembly and the president of the republic, in which the power of one or other must perish. If Louis Napoleon permitted the project to become law his personal destruction would be effected by the legitimist majority. If he were not re-elected president of the republic, and descended into private life, he would be politically ruined, for he was heavily in debt, and no pecuniary resources were at his disposal sufficient for his maintenance as a public man. Then or never must he make some bold and comprehensive movement to countervail the majority of the assembly. The issue of this conflict has been presented by the author, in another of his works, with such brevity, that he cannot hope to offer a more complete condensation. It was as follows:—“On the 1st of December a proclamation was put forth dissolving the assembly, and calling upon the people by universal suffrage to accept a government identical with the scheme of Napoleon I. when first consul. The proclamation made known the desire of the president to surrender his position into the hands of the people, or to accept the headship of a new government on the plan he proposed, and resting on universal suffrage. These proclamations were posted on all the walls of Paris by dawn of the 2nd of December; all the leading men of the assembly were arrested; Paris was filled with troops. After struggles on the part of the assembly, and many casualties in the streets, the eventful day of the 2nd of December wore away. On the 3rd the people awoke from the stupefaction with which the suddenness of the coup struck them, and preparations were made by the republicans and red republicans for resistance. On the 4th that resistance was offered; barricades were erected, and every token of a fierce contest quickened into life. Whenever an opportunity occurred, the soldiery were assassinated, and the military retaliated with savage vengeance. Men, women, and children were swept from the streets by discharges of musketry and grape. By the night of the 4th, the conflict was over. The president ruled all things. The ‘ticket’ put to the electors was as follows:—‘The French people wills the maintenance of Louis Napoleon Buonaparte’s authority, and delegates to him the powers necessary to frame a constitution on the basis of his proclamation of the 2nd of December.’ This was to be carried by a simple affirmative or negative by all Frenchmen twenty-one years of age, in possession of their civil rights. On the 20th and 21st of December the ballot took place, and the result was that more than eight millions of men voted in the affirmative. The votes of the army were taken separately. The army in France voted almost unanimously for Buonaparte; in Algiers a large majority was against him. Before twelve months the empire was proclaimed.” *
* Nolan’s “History of the War against Russia,” vol. ii., chap, lxxvii. J. S, Virtue, City Road.
Events of domestic interest to France have been treated at this length under the head of our own foreign relations, because upon the event just related turned the European policy of England during many years. The closing events of 1851, in France, influence materially the foreign relations, and even the domestic policy, of England, while these sheets are passing through the press, at the close of 1859. Eight years have rolled away, and yet the power of Louis Napoleon in France, achieved by the revolution which he effected by the coup d’état of 1851, was the hinge upon which turned the foreign policy of the United Kingdom, even in 1860, not only in Europe, but in Asia, not only in the eastern but in the western hemisphere.
When the tidings arrived in England of the strange, sudden, and daring occurrences at Paris, men’s minds were greatly agitated. A conflict of opinion arose in parliament and throughout the nation. Some regarded the coup d’état as Montalembert regarded it in 1859, as a violation of conscience, a treason, a perjury, a sanguinary violation of the rights of the French people; others deemed it an advantage gained by order, and even freedom, over anarchy and the despotism of red republicanism; they spoke of it as Montalembert did in 1851, when he addressed his countrymen, and told them that “to vote against Louis Napoleon would be to declare in favour of the socialist revolution, the only thing which can at present succeed the existing government.” It will, however, belong to other chapters of this history to depict the effect upon English affairs, and English public opinion, of the policy and power of him who seized the reins of government, in France, with a hand as daring as that of his renowned uncle.