The History of England in Three Volumes, Vol.III. / From the Accession of George III. to the Twenty-Third Year of the Reign of Queen Victoria

by Edward Farr; E. H. Nolan

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.—THE ALLIANCE WITH FRANCE, THE WAR WITH RUSSIA.

As the events of 1853 upon the Danube and in Asia Minor became known in Western Europe, the bonds of amity between the two great Western nations were drawn more closely, and it was finally resolved to unite with Turkey in war against the haughty and sanguinary autocrat of the North.

As before related, the British parliament met on the 30th of January. It was anxious, if possible, to avert war. Whatever the events which fill up the measure of national calamities, it was felt that war was, of all, the most terrible. Still, the parliament and nation felt the truth of language directed by Lord Palmerston against Mr. Bright: “War is a calamity; but there is a greater calamity than war—national dishonour!” This was the sentiment of the nation, and of its representatives in parliament assembled. Fiery debates filled up the interval until war was actually proclaimed, and then her majesty put forth her manifesto of hostilities, with the unanimous support of a mighty people.

On the 8th of February the Russian ambassador withdrew from the British court, and the British ambassador was ordered from St. Petersburg. During the month of February troops continued to embark for Malta and for the Bosphorus. Sad were the scenes of parting which were then witnessed throughout the British Isles; more especially in the great metropolis, through or from which a large proportion of the number of troops sent proceeded. It was most touching to witness the battalions of glorious men, attended by sympathizing crowds, passing along our great thoroughfares to the expressive music of their bands—“We are going Far Away,” “Love Not,” “Cheer, Boys, Cheer,” “The Girl I left behind Me,” and other popular pieces, which suggested the sad but gallant emotions that filled the breasts of our brave. Her majesty took leave of her guards with touching tokens of her confidence, hope, and yet sorrow, for the need that arose of their services; they responded by the most enthusiastic demonstrations of loyalty and devotion. Yet, after all, it was but a demonstration of ten thousand men, which the ministry thought would exercise a decisive moral influence upon the proceedings of the czar. Mr. Gladstone was great with indignant and pompous eloquence upon the glory of this achievement.

The troops landed on the shores of the Bosphorus unprovided with almost all the great essentials of a modern army. The Duke of Newcastle and Mr. Sidney Herbert, upon whom the arrangements mainly devolved, were unequal to the task. Lord Hardinge presided at the Horse Guards—a man of party prejudices, and who was ever willing to sacrifice the interests of the army to family influence and political considerations. Lord Raglan was nominated to the command in chief—an officer who had never commanded a brigade in the field, and found himself destitute of the chief qualitities necessary in a commander of an army in a campaign. These proceedings passed before war was proclaimed. It was supposed that the mere demonstration would effect the end really in view—to cause the czar to recede somewhat in his demands. At last war was proclaimed. On the 29th of March this august solemnity took place. The people hailed it with pleasure, for it was felt that, however undesirable the event, it had been impolitically delayed. France made a similar declaration. The two great Western nations went to war with the Muscovite for the integrity of the Ottoman empire.

On April the 21st, her majesty proclaimed a day of fast and humiliation, which was observed by the whole nation on the 26th. A French journal observed, that “seldom was a sublimer spectacle presented to the world than a mighty nation, which had buckled on its armour for war, humbling itself before the Almighty, and appealing to his power and protection with one voice.” Such were the leading home incidents preparatory to the great struggle in which great nations battled for ascendancy. Preparations still went on in England for the struggle, which was so soon to ensue in all its sanguinary earnestness. The estimates, which parliament was asked to vote for 1854, beginning on the 1st of April, were utterly inadequate to to the crisis; they were—

Proposed Vote. Increase. For the Army.... 6,287,488 262,470 „ Navy.... 7,487,948 1,202,455 „ Ordnance 3,854,878 792,311 £17,630,314 £2,257,236

These estimates were of course the occasion of much parliamentary discussion, the feeling of the house being in favour of a larger vote. The chancellor of the exchequer, Mr. Gladstone, hoped by this “bit by bit” preparation for the war to show his majesty the czar British desire for peace; and expected to conciliate him by showing how few regiments we were willing to raise, and the modicum of expense wo contemplated. All who knew the habit of thought in Asiatic nations—and Russia is essentially an Asiatic nation—were aware that this parsimonious war-making would have a contrary effect: the czar understood it as a token of a commercial disgust to war, and a dread of adding to the national debt, and he was encouraged to proceed. That such was the feeling at St. Petersburg private letters at the time, and subsequently, abundantly established.

The naval preparations for the war made better progress than those of the army. A fleet was fitted out, the most magnificent the world ever saw, and was committed to the command of Vice-admiral Sir Charles Napier. Rear-admirals Chads and Plumridge were also appointed to important commands under Sir Charles. This fleet was exercised daily off Portsmouth by Admiral Chads, especially in gunnery, who had obtained great celebrity in that department of a naval officer’s qualifications. The Russian fleets had paraded about the Gulfs of Bothnia and Finland the preceding autumn, and the usual boastings were heard through the Russo-German organs of the press, and from the friends of Russia in the London clubs. In consequence of these boastings, the public were very anxious for the dispatch of the Baltic fleet as early as possible in the spring, and the 11th of March was fixed upon.

The powerful fleet under Sir Charles Napier’s command was reviewed by her majesty on the 7th of March. It consisted of sixteen war steamers; of which two, the Duke of Wellington and the Royal George were, three-deckers, while three carried admirals’ flags—Sir Charles Napier’s in the Duke, Admiral Chads’ in the Edinburgh, and Admiral Plumridge’s in the Leopard. The Euryalus, screw-steamer, was subsequently added.

The second division, under Vice-admiral Corry, which afterwards joined Sir Charles Napier, consisted of—seven ships of the line, four screw ships, and twelve steam frigates, sloops, &c.

Sir Charles Napier stated publicly, and personally assured the author of this History, that his fleet was badly manned as to the quality of the men, and inadequately as to the numbers on board. The proportion of skilled seamen was altogether beneath what the necessities of the fleet required, and exposed it to great danger. The admiral went so far as to aver, that had the Russian fleet the courage to come out, so unskilfully manned were his ships, that the enemy might have secured an easy conquest. This statement excited strong protests and contradictions, and has been always regarded with indignation by the gallant men who walked the decks of these proud ships of war.

It may be here a suitable place to state the force and the arrangement of the troops ultimately constituting the British expeditionary army in Turkey. It was of course subjected to various modifications afterwards, but the following is an accurate representation of the divisional arrangement of the army, and its constituent regiments:—

First Division.—Lieut.-gen. the Duke of Cambridge. First Brigade (under the command of Major-general Bentinck).—Grenadier Guards, 3rd battalion; Coldstream Guards, 1st battalion; Scots Fusilier Guards, 1st battalion. Second Brigade (under the command of Major-general Sir Colin Campbell).—42nd Royal regiment, or “Royal Highland Watch;” 78th regiment (Rosshire Buffs); 93rd, or Sutherland regiment.

Second Division.—Lieut.-gen. Sir De Lacy Evans. First Brigade (under the command of Major-gen. Pennefatuer).—30th regiment; 55th regiment; 95th regiment (a new regiment). The old 95th served throughout the Peninsula and at Waterloo. Second Brigade (under the command of Brigadier-general Adams).—41st regiment (Welsh); 47th regiment (The Lancashire); 49th regiment (The Princess Charlotte’s).

Third Division.—Lieut.-gen. Sir Richard England. First Brigade (under the command of Brigadier-general Ryhe).—1st regiment (The Royal regiment, formerly called Royal Scots); 28th regiment (North Gloucester), during the present century this regiment has been Irish; 38th regiment (1st Staffordshire). Second Brigade (under the command of Brigadier-general Sir J. Campbell).—44th regiment (East Essex), during the present century this regiment has been an Irish one; 56th regiment (West Essex); 68th regiment (Durham Light Infantry).

Fourth Division.—Lieut.-gen. Sir George Cathgakt. First Brigade (under the command of the senior Lieut.-col., as Brigadier).—20th regiment (East Devonshire); 21st regiment (Royal North British Fusiliers); 1st battalion Rifle Brigade. Second Brigade (under the command of the senior Lieut.-col., as Brigadier).—63rd regiment (West Suffolk); 46th regiment (South Devonshire): 57th regiment (West Middlesex).

Fifth, or Light Division.—Lieut.-gen. Sir George Brown. First Brigade (under the command of Brigadier-general Goldie).—Royal Rifle Brigade, 2nd battalion; 7th Royal Fusiliers; 23rd Royal Welsh Fusiliers; 33rd regiment (Duke of Wellington’s own). Second Brigade (under the command of Brigadier-general Buller.)—19th regiment (1st York, North Riding); 77th regiment (East Middlesex; 88th regiment Connaught Rangers).

Cavalry Division.—Lieut.-gen. the Earl of Luoan. First Brigade, Heavy (under the command of Brigadiergen. the Hon. J. Scarlett).—1st (Royal) Dragoons; 2nd (Royal) Dragoons (Scots Greys); 4th Dragoon Guards (Royal Irish); 5th Dragoon Guards (commonly called Green Horse); 6th Dragoons (Inniskillens). Second Brigade, Light (under the command of Major-gen. the Earl of Cardigan).—4th Light Dragoons (Queen’s own); 8th King’s Royal Irish Hussars; 11th Hussars (Prince Albert’s own); 13th Light Dragoons; 17th Lancers.

It was finally agreed upon between the two Western governments, that England should furnish 30,000 men, and France 70,000. It was then thought that an allied force of 100,000 men in support of a Turkish army equally numerous, would be sufficient to drive the armies of the czar out of the Principalities.

Leaving for a while the din of preparation, and the dispatch of troops, it is necessary to return to the operations of the Turks upon the Danube. It is not suitable to this History to record all the victories gained by the Osmans, it is only necessary to observe, that they were almost uniformly victorious, and fought with dazzling bravery. The grand struggle, however, on the part of the Turks was in the defence of Silistria. Against that place a powerful Russian army, under its ablest artillerists and engineers, was directed. The Turks were few and badly provided, but they were encouraged by the presence of various British officers of the most heroic mould. Among these none was more distinguished than Captain Butler, who perished from a wound received in the defence, while beside the gallant British General Cannon (Behram Pasha), by whom the garrison of Silistria had been reinforced.

There was something mysterious about the policy pursued during the siege of Silistria. The place was driven to the utmost straits, although Omar Pasha was at the head of a large army at Shumla, and the Western allies were at Varna. The latter declared that they were unable to move from want of those campaigning appliances, which a French army has not been usually known to stand in need of either before or since. Omar Pasha said he could not move for want of beasts of burden, and from strategical reasons; although he supplied the allies in Bulgaria with pack animals and 500 arobas, or carts, from Shumla, and no reason could be seen why he did not push on his troops to the relief of the beleaguered and endangered city. At last he sent a portion of his troops forward, and Russia was destined to undergo a signal humiliation. When the troops of Omar Pasha sent to relieve the place advanced for that purpose, the Russians had so completely invested it against the approach of a relieving army that there seemed no hope of accomplishing that object. The Turkish army was not strong enough to fight a pitched battle, and cause the Russians to raise the siege. It was of the last importance that the drooping, wearied, and dispirited garrison should be relieved by fresh men. This exploit was accomplished by the genius and promptitude of one heroic man—General Cannon, bearing the Turkish title of Behram Pasha. He commanded the light division of the Turkish army. He caused letters to be written to the officers of the garrison, laying down a plan by which they were to co-operate with him in entering the city at a certain hour, by a certain point. These letters he managed should fall into the hands of the Russians. They accordingly prepared in great strength to defeat the stratagem they had, as they supposed, so opportunely discovered. The British general made a long detour, and after a night of forced marching he came upon an opposite part of the city, an entrance by which the Russians could not have supposed possible, and to the joy and wonder of the garrison, the best division of the Turkish army, with its best general at the head, marched into the city. From that hour the contest was no longer dubious. The Russians saw that the prize was carried from their grasp. They at last raised the siege, to be pursued by Cannon and other British officers, at the head of their gallant Turks, from victory to victory, until the baffled and beaten Muscovite fled through the Principalities he had so boastingly invaded, and so ruthlessly plundered and oppressed. To General Cannon’s skill and courage the raising of the siege of Silistria, the grand turning-point of the campaign, is to be attributed. The conception of the plan, the peril of the attempt, and the glory of the achievement were all his own.

Contemporaneously with the war on the Danube, operations were conducted in Asia Minor, but no British or French troops were sent there at any period of the war.

During the closing months of 1853, the Russians organized a powerful army to drive the Turks out of Asia, but the Circassians and other tribes of the Caucasus were in arms against Russia, and fought so gallantly and perseveringly, that the troops of the czar were unable to effect anything until late in the summer of 1854. The Turks organized an army for the defence of their Asiatic possessions, and committed it to the command of Jazif Pasha, an utterly incompetent man and bigoted Mohammedan. Under him was another officer, of like character, Selim Pasha, who experienced defeat at the hands of far inferior forces of the enemy. A number of Polish and Hungarian officers, who had fought in the Hungarian revolution of 1848, were sent to assist the Turkish Muchir in forming and disciplining an army. Some of these men became Mohammedans, and obtained substantial rewards and honours; others, refusing to renounce the profession of Christianity, were not allowed to hold real authority, but acted as a species of aides-de-camp of high rank, and counsellors of the pashas. Among the foreign officers of this description was a native of the west of England, named Guyon, a man of rare genius, and as rare bravery. He had taken part in the Hungarian revolution, and as the despotic power of Austria was sacred in the eyes of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the British ambassador at Constantinople, and all revolutionists, however honourable their cause, were hateful to his lordship, Guyon met with no countenance or support from him. The personal prejudices and predilections of the noble ambassador were always in the ascendant, and often were sufficiently strong to injure the cause of Turkey and the allies. Guyon was, however, raised to the rank of pasha, and got the surname of Kurschid. The native pashas set his advice and authority at defiance, plundered the troops, the people, and the government, and acted more like the allies of Russia than generals or dignitaries of Turkey. Such a state of tilings in the Turkish army encouraged the Russians, and they advanced, notwithstanding the embarrassments created by the intrepid raids of the mountaineers of the Caucasus, under the enterprising Schamyl and his lieutenants. The Polish officers in the Turkish service were jealous of the superior skill and chivalrous heroism of Guy on. Indeed, throughout the war in Asia, the English officers who acted there were opposed with envenomed rancour by the Poles who happened to serve in the same cause with them, and one or two Germanized-Hungarians joined in this anti-British feeling. But for Guyon the Turkish army would have been annihilated before the autumn of 1854, and yet the mendacious Muchir and his Feriks laid the blame of every defeat upon the European officers, but especially upon the best and the bravest of them all—the dauntless and noble-hearted Guyon.

During August, 1854, the Russians advanced, with the design of attacking Erzerum. The Turkish pashas were too much intent upon plundering every one within the range of their power to offer any effectual resistance. Hungarian, German, and Polish officers, especially the two latter, were equally zealous in quarrelling with one another. Guyon alone, among the officers of superior rank in the Turkish service, displayed activity, intelligence, foresight, and spirit; but he was thwarted by the other Europeans, and insulted and defied by the Turkish Muchir, Feriks, and Beys. Again and again he pointed out the sure road to victory, and the fact that the Turks were superior in numbers and resources to their foes: his counsel was despised, delays were interposed, when no alternative but the ostensible adoption of his plans remained, and the result was the almost total dispersion of the Turkish armies, and the imminent danger of Erzerum, and even Kars, falling into the hands of the enemy without a struggle. This state of things continued until Lieut.-colonel (afterwards Major-general Sir Fen wick Williams, Bart.) Williams appeared upon the scene as the commissioner of her Britannic majesty. In that character he was invested with an authority poor Guyon could not claim, and without which the latter officer struggled in vain. Colonel Williams, like Guyon, was an object of the insatiable jealousy of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who gave him no support, and, in spite of the entreaties—and, at last, of the commands—of the English minister for foreign affairs, thwarted Colonel Williams in every conceivable way. Supported, however, by the decision, perseverance, and intelligence of Lord Clarendon, the English commissioner held his ground in spite of the coldness, and even opposition, of the ambassador, and was enabled to re-organize the dispersed armies of the Porte, to place Kars and Erzerum in conditions of defence, and to throw such obstructions in the way of the Russians, then flushed with success, as retarded their advance, until the fall of Sebastopol decided virtually the fortunes of the war.

Leaving the struggle in Asia in the position above noticed, it is necessary to turn once more to Turkey in Europe.

When the conquering Turks drove the flying Russians before them through the Principalities, the Austrians marched in and took possession of the quarters abandoned by the fugitives. Interposing between the victors and the vanquished, the Austrians rendered valuable services to the Russians, and, perhaps, preserved their army from total destruction. Without the knowledge of the Western allies, Austria concluded a convention with the Porte for the occupation of the Provinces. There were many circumstances to prove that the French government was privy to this design, and a special policy on the part of France began to develop itself. Whatever the motives of that policy, it had, for its effect, a concert with the Austrians in exercising a domination over the Roman Provinces far more intolerable than that from which Turkish valour had delivered them. The oppressed Romans sought and obtained the sympathy of the English; but both Austria and France were jealous of that sympathy, and dreaded the dissemination of English constitutional opinions. Austria, ever the foe of freedom, barred out, as it were, English intercourse and views, in virtue of the power she obtained by her convention of occupation with the sultan. The policy of Austria was also vacillating and indeterminate. At one time she would appear ready to join the fortunes of the allies, and immediately after direct her endeavours to secure the Russian frontier from the assault of the allied armies. It was generally believed that Russia was more vulnerable from the confines of Podolia, and by a campaign carried into Poland, than elsewhere. Austria dreaded the appearance of French and English uniforms in too close proximity to Russian Poland; nor was Prussia less timid of that phenomenon; for both were apprehensive of a general rising of Poland against her tripartite oppressors. At one time Austria was said to be willing to join in the war and march across the Russian frontier in the rear of an allied invasion, provided England and France backed the movement by a certain amount of force. As the Western nations could not, or would not, march an amount of troops in that direction, such as Austria deemed necessary in consequence of the vulnerability of her own frontier line, she declined the peril, and satisfied herself with holding the Dacian Provinces in the name of the sultan; but, for her own purposes, Austria had designs upon Moldavia and Wallachia, and when the war was brought to a termination, could with difficulty be persuaded to withdraw her troops from them, and did not retire until public opinion, in England and France, was expressed in terms of resentment and menace. Such was, in brief, the history of the success of Turkey upon her own European frontier, and of the quality of the help afforded by Austria to Turkey and the allies during the war.

Another sphere of action now demands attention. The allied fleets entered the Bosphorus immediately upon the slaughter of Sinope. Still, as war was not declared, they confined their action to keeping the Russian ships of war blockaded in their own harbours. One Russian vessel, the Vladimir, gallantly broke the blockade; scoured the Black Sea; and, in spite of the allied cruisers, inflicted severe injury upon Turkish shipping all around the coasts of the Black Sea to the very entrance of the Bosphorus, escaping back to Sebastopol with impunity. Throughout the war, the enterprising and daring captain of the Vladimir performed feats worthy of the reputation of any navy in the world. It became necessary for the allies to send a flag of truce to Odessa, the bearers were treacherously fired upon. This exasperated the allies, and Odessa was bombarded. The admirals endeavoured to spare the commercial portions of the place, it being a free port; the destruction of the defences was, in consequence, only partially effected, while much damage was nevertheless inflicted upon the city itself. After the bombardment, the Muscovites, with great activity, repaired and strengthened the defences, so that the bombardment was little more than an empty demonstration of power. It displayed, however, the skill of the allied squadrons; for one of the most scientific and beautiful naval operations of the war was accomplished. The ships fired while in motion; circling round the place; delivering their broadsides as they passed; and, by their rapidity of movement, gave little chance to the batteries on shore to inflict any damage.

The British and French navies held possession of the Black Sea, incurring little loss. The destruction of the British frigate Tiger was, however, an incident which caused much regret in England. In certain operations in shallow water near Odessa, the ship went aground, and was captured. The Russians, vindictively and cowardly, continued to fire upon it while any living object was seen upon its decks. Few acts were ever perpetrated, by even the most barbarous enemy, more at variance with the laws of war, and the instincts of honour, gallantry, and generosity. The allied armies continued most uselessly to linger on the shores of the Bosphorus and at Varna, until the season proper for military operations had passed away. Never was an expedition more unprofitable. The Turks were allowed to battle against the whole power of Russia upon the Danube without the slightest help, while two large armies were within forty miles of them. In England, suspicions of treachery were entertained. Some believed that the Aberdeen government was unwilling to weaken the power of Russia; others believed that France and Austria had covert designs, and were unwilling to prosecute the war. It was not until the middle of September that the allies acted in concert. In the meantime, Russia fomented disturbances in the Greek provinces of Turkey, and invited the Greeks of independent Greece to invade the sultan’s territory. The troops of the padishaw suppressed revolt with sanguinary effect, and drove the Greek sympathizers across the borders. The allied fleets landed detachments of troops in Greece, and compelled neutrality.

At last the period arrived for the decisive movement of the allied armies, and it was resolved to invade the territory of Russia, and destroy her great naval and military arsenals on the Black Sea. For this purpose the troops were embarked at Varna and other places, and escorted by the fleets to the Crimea. A landing was effected at Old Fort without opposition. The allies began their march towards Sebastopol, skirmishing as they proceeded. Eupatoria, a port and city in the Crimea, was also seized by the allies, and put in a state of defence on the land side, so as to be held by a garrison against any army likely to be sent to recover it.

The armies, arriving at the river Alma, found the heights which commanded its passage occupied by the enemy in great force. A battle ensued; the first of the war in which the British and French were engaged together. The allies were successful. The Russians were completely defeated; and had the French consented to pursue them, it is possible that the Russian army might have been cut off. The British distinguished themselves greatly at the battle of the Alma. The second division, under the chivalrous Sir De Lacy Evans, bore the brunt of the combat on the British lines. His division was ably assisted by Sir Richard England, who was left in support, and without orders from his chief. He, with his guns, hastened to the aid of Sir De Lacy Evans, and distinguished himself by his courage, promptitude, and presence of mind. The Duke of Cambridge commanded the first division, with Sir Colin Campbell as his senior brigadier. His royal highness displayed in this, his maiden battle, the skill and courage for which all who had served under him had given him credit, and which he was destined to evince still more signally on the bloody slopes of Inkerman.

The allies, in consequence of the want of carriage and other appliances of a campaign, lingered for days on the site of their victory before they resumed their march against the great citadel. On arriving at the north side, it was deemed by the allied commanders desirable and feasible to effect a flank march to the south side. Curiously, at the same juncture, the Russian army, under Prince Menschikoff, attempted another flank march from the south to the north. The wings of the hostile armies came into collision; many Russians were slain or made prisoners. Neither army had any idea of the strategy of the other, and both were surprised at the partial rencontre. Arriving at the south side, Balaklava was made the basis of the allied operations: the British occupying the right, and facing, of course, the left defence. The Honourable General Cathcart advised an immediate assault upon the place, which was very indifferently defended in that direction; but General Burgoyne, the chief officer of British engineers, and the commanderin-chief, were alike opposed to it. General Evans, and other officers of high authority, were against the plan of General Cathcart as rash. Those officers still retain the opinions which then influenced the decision arrived at. It was determined to besiege the place, and conquer it by regular approaches. The Russians, who were so dispirited that it is questionable whether they would have resisted an immediate assault with any vigour, took heart and threw up defences. A young officer of engineers, named Todtleben, conceived the idea of vast erections of earthworks, and the Russians were set to defend the place with pick and mattock more strenuously than by artillery or musketry. The result was a protracted defence. The Russians plied the spade and shovel with astonishing vigour and perseverance, and Todtleben proved himself equal in genius to the exigency. The Russians were reinforced; confidence took the place of despair, and the city was defended with desperate hardihood and energy. Besides the garrison, there was a Russian army in the field upon the Tchernaya, and the heights by which it was commanded. Such was the state of affairs, with occasional skirmishing and gunnery, up to the 26th of October, when the too celebrated battle of Balaklava was fought, and the British generals incurred the imputation of folly, such as seldom has been laid to the account of military chiefs, and the British army gained a reputation for chivalrous valour which will live when even the stupidity which made the occasion of its display is forgotten. It would be impossible, within the limits of this work, to give the details of such a battle. There were redoubts thrown up in the plain beyond the heights of Balaklava, which were garrisoned by Turks. The worst possible generalship was displayed by the British commander-in-chief in occupying these redoubts with small bodies of troops far from any support. The Russians attacked and conquered the redoubts; Sir Colin Campbell, at the head of a body of infantry, took up a position in the plain. The Earl of Lucan and the British cavalry advanced beyond that position. The Russians occupied a gorge between two hills, flanked with field-pieces, a line of horse artillery in front, and guns of position placed Upon the heights so as to rake the ground upon which an attacking force must approach. To draw the British to attack them in this strong position, was the strategy of the Russian general. He succeeded. The cavalry were ordered to charge; the order was conveyed from Lord Baglan to Lord Lucan by Captain Nolan. The lieutenant-general has been censured for obeying the command; but he had no discretion allowed him; it was in writing—it was distinct—and the officer who delivered it, coming directly from Lord Baglan, must have known what the latter really intended. It has been universally believed that Captain Nolan used insulting language to the Earl of Lucan, taunting him with cowardice. This is untrue; the author of this history can declare so upon the authority of the noble lord himself. Captain Nolan did point to the enemy and the captured guns borne by them from the Turkish redoubts, and directed the general’s attention to the duty of their recapture. The Earl of Lucan had no alternative but to obey, more especially as the cavalry had been much criticised by anonymous writers from the camp. The Earl of Lucan ordered the light brigade of his division to charge, and advanced the heavy brigade to its support as far as it could be brought for such a purpose. Some of the regiments of the heavy brigade advanced so far as to be under the fire of the enemy’s guns. The light brigade was commanded by the Earl of Cardigan, who led it into action in the most gallant style. Whoever has read Tennyson’s poem, “The Six Hundred,” will have perused the most graphic and striking description of the exciting scene which followed. The brigade moved on, losing the gallant Nolan before it had reached the charge; he was the first who fell. It is commonly supposed that he led the charge. This is not so; he rode at a little distance from the line when the shot took effect, which deprived the army of one of its ablest and bravest cavalry officers. In this terrible charge, the charge of six hundred men against an army in position, with its flanks defended by strong batteries on elevated positions, there was no flinching. The gallant leader has told the author of this work that various officers shouted, brandished their swords, and were excited; that if any effort were required on the part of the commander, it was to keep the men cool and the lines regular as they galloped forward to the terrific encounter. The charge was made, how gallantly the whole world admits. The wonder is that any escaped. Probably, hardly any would, had not Colonel Sewell, at the head of the Royal Irish Hussars, thought of the peril of the Russian cavalry wheeling from the flanks and blocking up the way of return. He immediately turned his rear and found this danger in actual existence. He charged the Russian cavalry, and, with the aid of a handful of French horsemen, kept open the way for the return of those who had dashed,

“With fetlock deep in blood,”

their fiery steeds through the lines of the enemy. The leader and a portion of his gallant band escaped. It has been said of the Earl of Cardigan that “he was the first in and the first out.” This is simply not true. He entered the Russian lines at the head of his men, and when his brigade was broken in pieces upon the guns and lines of the enemy, he, as a fragment of the shattered mass, like other fragments, turned to re-form and act as duty then might dictate. He rode slowly from the Russian lines under the fire of the enemy, and joined the rest of the survivors, who received him with cheers. The Earl of Lucan, with the heavy brigade, rendered the retreat of the light brigade possible. The Russian cavalry swept down in masses, approaching the British infantry, by whose fire they were deterred from charging. They approached the cavalry camp; General Scarlett was ordered, with a portion of the heavy brigade, to charge them. It was a gallant and glorious deed. Lord Raglan, who witnessed it from the heights, declared, in his despatch, that he had rarely seen such a splendid charge of cavalry, and that it was so made as never for a moment to leave success in doubt. The Russians retired to their positions and kept there, but the redoubts were held by them. Had Lord Raglan advanced his infantry, an action of a more general and scientific character would have ensued, and an opportunity might have been made available for inflicting a defeat upon the enemy which would have relieved Balaklava of his vicinity. Such was the opinion of various officers of authority, and Sir De Lacy Evans, who had as good opportunities as any general to form a judgment upon the occasion, and was as competent as any officer in Europe to do so, expressed, in conversation with the author of this History, the same opinion.

The men and horses of the British army were now suffering severely from the climate, and from various privations, which the bad commissariat arrangements, and the want of energy and capacity on the part of the commanderin-chief, entailed upon them. November opened gloomily in every way upon the besiegers. Its first event of importance was the battle of the Little Inkerman, as it was called among the soldiers. The Russians attempted a surprise upon the dangerous and exposed post of the second division, which was fortunately commanded by Sir De Lacy Evans. The result was the most scientifically-fought battle of the war. General Evans, not hampered by the interference of a commander-in-chief, whose only title to command him was that conferred by his social rank and favour with the ministry, had full scope for his own superior powers. The Russians were repulsed with great slaughter and with little loss to their victors. The French offered assistance tardily, but their aid was declined—good generalship won the battle. The men of the second division knew how to obey the commands of a general whom they trusted, and to follow a leader himself the bravest of the brave.

The battle of the Little Inkerman was soon followed by that called, par excellence, the battle of Inkerman. The morning of the 5th of November dawned mistily and dimly over the plateau before Sebastopol, and along the dark course of the Tchernaya. The Russians ascended stealthily against the flank of the British. A terrible battle ensued. The English, surprised, fought in their great-coats; although otherwise imperfectly dressed, and some without shoes or shakos. Evans, who would have been at the head of his second division, was ill on board ship at Balaklava, and his place was nobly filled by General Pennefather. At the sound of the cannon booming heavily over the plateau of Balaklava, Evans rose from his sick bed and hurried to the front of battle, where he remained during the terrible morning of conflict which opened that eventful day. The English were all but overpowered, although they fought as Englishmen—as probably no men ever before fought—with a tenacious obstinacy that yielded to no force, with a chivalrous dash and daring which contemned all odds. The Duke of Cambridge, probably, escaped greater danger than any British officer on the field. For a time he rode along the line encouraging his men, the fire of the advancing columns of the Russians directed upon him; nearly all around him were killed or wounded. It was a critical and awful moment: the Russians were gaining the summit of the ascent; they would there have had room to deploy, and the British would have been in danger of being driven from their intrenchments, and the allied armies of being forced back upon the sea. Fortunately the French, who were engaged in watching the manoeuvres of Liprandi in the valley beneath, at last came to the assistance of their allies, and fell upon the Russian flanks. The British at the same moment received supplies of ammunition, of which they had been in need through the wretched management of everything that depended upon head-quarters; their ranks rallied and poured deadly volleys of Minié bullets upon the masses of the enemy struggling with the French. The slopes of the plateau were strewn with dead, and slippery with gore; the Russians, foiled everywhere, retreated. The French, fresh for pursuit, would not pursue unless the weary guardsmen led the van. Canrobert, the successor of Arnaud in command of the French army, complimented the British, but did not act heartily with them. The services of Sir Richard England at Inkerman have been generally overlooked by British writers. England was not favourable to the agents of the press, and he showed this feeling in a manner which offended that class. This was unwise, both for himself, his division, and the service. Were it not for that circumstance, the valuable services of that general would have become better known to the public. When the battle of Inkerman began, England occupied a position to the left of the English lines, near to a ravine which separated them from those occupied by the French. Leaving a portion of his troops under the command of one of his brigadiers, he dispatched the rest under Brigadier Campbell to the right, and himself followed. His opportune arrival supported the divisions exposed to attack; and as their several detachments moved to the more immediate theatre of conflict, England’s troops occupied the ground from which they had been removed, and which would have been exposed to the enemy. It is remarkable that the plan of the Russian generals was to make the principal attack upon the extreme left of the British, so as to separate the English left from the French right. The officer in charge of the attacking column missed his way, delay was thus caused as well as the plan of assault totally deranged; possibly, to these circumstances may be attributed the failure of the Russian attack of the 5th of November.

After this battle, Sir De Lacy Evans strongly recommended Lord Raglan to change his position. He was influenced in offering this advice by the total inadequacy of the English army, numerically, to occupy such extended lines, and by the suffering of the army from ill health, climate, and deficient supplies, personal and military. This letter of the general has been much misrepresented in the London clubs, and among coteries unfriendly to the general’s liberal parliamentary policy. It was, however, the opinion of Sir De Lacy that, unless reinforcements arrived in numbers far superior to what was then probable, the British would be unable to hold their ground; and, notwithstanding the actual issue, such advice was sound, and based upon facts and probabilities.

After the battle of Inkerman, the condition of the British army became truly horrible, so that the closing winter months of 1854 were such as tried the fortitude of the British troops and their hardihood of endurance to the uttermost. It would be in vain to attempt to portray, upon these pages, sufferings which excited the wonder and sympathy of all nations, or to depict the patriotism and enduring devotion to duty by which such protracted miseries were sustained. Great numbers perished of cold, hunger, and sickness; and the cholera, which ravaged the encampments of Gallipoli and Varna, pursued the army to the trenches before Sebastopol. The Russians also suffered much, and bore it as good, hardy, and loyal soldiers; but they had the shelter, hospitals, and supplies of the city. The troops on the Tchernaya were relieved by the garrison of the city, and supplied from its almost exhaustless stores. The Russian armies had the whole power of the empire in their rear; but, notwithstanding the herculean efforts made by the czar to recruit and feed his armies, the drain of life was terrible, from causes similar to those by which the English were swept away in such numbers. The French army was far better organized and more honestly administered than the armies of England and Russia, and the loss of life during 1854, after the landing in the Crimea, was less than was experienced by the British or Russians. The cholera, however, took greater effect upon the Turks, French, and Muscovites, than upon the British. At Gallipoli and Varna this was strikingly exemplified. In the Dobrudscha, upon the Danube, the division of General Espineau was nearly destroyed by the pestilence.

During the whole period to which this relation of events refers, the allied fleets were masters of the Turkish waters, from the gates of the Dardanelles to the Sea of Azoff. When the fleets conveyed the armies to Old Fort and Eupatoria, they appeared before Sebastopol; and the Russians, fearing that the enterprise of the British might penetrate the harbour, sunk their fleet in two lines, so as to bar its entrance and prevent their capture. This bold measure did much to prolong the defence. It also mortified the allies, who were thus prevented from taking naval prizes, and from conquering the place, or very much promoting its conquest by naval artillery. The Russians reserved some of their most efficient vessels behind the range of sunken ships, and with those they commanded the flanks of the besiegers, causing much waste of life, and obstructing seriously the progress of the siege.

The naval force of the czar in the Black Sea was estimated very differently by various writers. A number of statements were put forth, all professing to be authentic. We select two, and our readers will be able to judge for themselves the probable statistics. Haxthausen represents the Black Sea fleet as consisting of three divisions, each of which comprised ordinarily 1 three-decker, 2 two-deckers (among the last two ships mounting each 84 guns), 6 frigates, 1 corvette, and 4 smaller vessels. Mr. Danby Seymour is more precise, and furnishes us with what purports to be a complete list of the Russian naval force in the Euxine in 1854, viz.:—20 ships of the line, 7 frigates, 5 corvettes, 12 brigs, 9 schooners, 7 cutters, 2 yachts, 1 bombard, 30 steamers, 28 gun-boats, and 30 transports.

The British fleet consisted of the Britannia, Trafalgar, Vengeance, Rodney, Betterophon, Queen, Lynx, Sphynx, Tribune, Sampson, Terrible, Furious, Retribution, Highflyer, Spiteful, Cyclops, Vesuvius, Albion, Arethusa, London, Sanspareil, Agamemnon, Firebrand, Triton, Niger, constituting a most powerful navy. At that juncture, so great were the maritime resources of England, that a naval authority thus reported concerning her resources:—“From our ships in reserve and building, we could form a naval force far surpassing that which any other nation in the world can boast of having afloat. We have in reserve, at the four ports of Portsmouth, Devonport, Chatham, and Sheerness, not less than 161 vessels of the ‘effective ships of the royal navy,’ and these estimated to carry not less than 6,807 guns. Besides these, too, we have a goodly number of paddle-wheels and other small craft. Though some of the vessels may not, without considerable repairs, be in a state to send to sea, yet most of them are excellent sea-going vessels—far superior, indeed, to anything Russian—and could be fitted out for service on very short notice. Then we have of vessels building—5 at Portsmouth, 7 at Devonport, 1 at Sheerness, 6 at Chatham, 11 at Pembroke, 4 at Deptford, 4 at Woolwich, and one at Mill wall.—Total 39.” The French naval force in the Black Sea, under the command of Vice-admiral Hamelin, was composed of the Friedland, Valmy, Ville de Paris, Henri IV., Bayard, Charlemagne, Lena, Lupiter, Marengo, Gomer, Descartes, Vauban, Mogador, Cacique, Magellan, Sanê, Caton, Sérieuse, Mercure, Olivière, Beaumanoir, Cerf, Prométhée, Salamandre, Héron, and Monette. The squadron of Viceadmiral Bruat, intended to act in the Black Sea, the Sea of Gallipoli, and in the Eastern Archipelago, comprised the following vessels:—Montebello, Napoléon, Suffren, Jean Bart, Ville de Marseille, Alger, Pomone, Caffarelli, Roland and Primauguet. Independently of these three squadrons, and all the frigates, or steam corvettes, which were assembled in the Mediterranean for the transport of the army of the East, were all the naval stations in the West Indies, the Pacific Ocean, the Indo-China seas, and in all quarters where the fishing interest existed.

The first bombardment of Sebastopol took place on the 17th of October, in which the fleet took an active part; but the combined efforts of the artillery, afloat and ashore, failed to subdue the gigantic works which had arisen for the defence.

The allied fleets rendered great services in protecting Eupatoria, which had been garrisoned mainly by Turkish troops, and which the Russians vigilantly watched and incessantly harassed.

Various bombardments and incessant watching occupied the fleets until, in the following year, the grand catastrophe occurred, and southern Sebastopol fell under what the Russian commander called “the fire infernal” of the allies.

On the 14th of November, a terrible storm smote the Black Sea and the Crimea. The tents of the camps were blown away, many ships were wrecked, and many lives were lost. The want of prevision, management, and organization, on the part of the chief authorities of the British, led to costly sacrifices of human life, matériel of war, and supplies.

The operations in the Baltic were not so important as those in the Black Sea. The fine British fleet, commanded by Sir Charles Napier, was aided by a powerful French fleet, under the command of Vice-admiral Parseval-Deschênes. The achievements of those fleets did not answer the expectations formed. The French arrived late in the season, and acted so dependency upon the British, that they did not even attempt anything. The English admiral showed neither spirit nor activity. Partly through his want of enterprise, and still more from the neglect of the Admiralty at home to provide vessels of draught suitable to the shallow waters of the Baltic, no attempt was made to conquer any of the Russian strongholds. The island and forts of Bomarsund were captured and destroyed, the British and French engineers and artillery having the chief glory of the conquest. The British engineer officer, General Jones, greatly distinguished himself.

Operations were also conducted in the White Sea by the allied squadrons, but the assistance rendered by the French was trivial. The allies, particularly the French, arrived too late in the season to effect much.

In the Pacific Ocean the blunders and tardiness which characterized the allies were extraordinary: incompetency was impressed on all their undertakings. The Russians were attacked in their far-eastern settlements, especially Petropaulovski; but the allies suffered signal and sanguinary defeat, arising from the incompetency of the naval officers in command.

Such were the fortunes of the great war with Russia during 1854.

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