FURTHER OPERATIONS IN SPAIN.
On the departure of Soult for Oporto the Spaniards again rose in arms, and several places in the Asturias and in the Biscayan provinces had been recaptured. After his return, urged by the importunities of the Spanish government and generals, Sir Arthur Wellesley determined to advance into that country against the French. His projected route was by the way of Plasencia and Almaraz, and his design was to cooperate with the Spanish general Cuesta, who commanded the army of Estramadura. A junction was formed between the two armies at Orepesa on the 20th of July; Sir Arthur’s army amounting to about 23,000, and Cuesta’s to 30,000 men. At this time the French forces were thus disposed:—Marshal Victor was in Estramadura with the first corps, amounting to 35,000 men; General Sebastiani, with the fourth corps, consisting of 20,000 men, was in La Mancha; General Bessolles, with a division of reserve and Joseph’s guards, amounting in the whole to 15,000 men, was in Madrid; Kellermann and Bonnet, with two divisions of 10,000 men, were in Old Castile; Soult had collected the second corps of 20,000 men in the northern provinces; and immediately dependent upon Soult were Marshal Mortier, with the fifth corps of 16,000 strong, and Ney, with the sixth corps of about 10,000 men under arms. Besides all these forces there were 50,000 Frenchmen in Aragon and Catalonia, under Suchet and Augereau; and 35,000 more were scattered over the surface of Spain, to maintain the many posts and fortresses the French had captured in Spain, and to keep open the various lines of communication. It was agreed upon by the British and Spanish commanders to march themselves against the French under Marshal Victor, while at the same time Vinegas advanced against Fuente Duenna on the Upper Tagus, in order to draw Sebastiani thither, that he might not aid Victor; or if that general refused to move, Vineeas was to march on Madrid from the south-east, while Sir Robert Wilson menaced it from the opposite quarter. The combined armies of Sir Arthur Wellesley and Cuesta attacked Marshal Victor’s out-posts at Talavera on the 22nd of July, and drove them in. Oh the 23rd, the British again formed for the attack of the French position; but Cuesta “contrived to lose the whole of the day, owing to the whimsical perverseness of his disposition.” Sir Arthur wished to defeat Victor before he could be joined by Sebastiani, and his disappointment was great when, on the 24th, he discovered that the enemy had retreated towards Torrijos, in order to form a junction with that general. After Victor’s departure, Sir Arthur occupied Talavera; and finding that the Spanish general did not cordially co-operate with him, he resolved to return into Portugal. He writes with reference to this, and to the privations his soldiers were enduring,—“His majesty’s troops have been engaged in very active operations, the success of which depended no less upon their bravery and exertions, than upon the example they should hold out, and the countenance they should give to the Spanish troops; and yet they have been in actual want of provisions for the last two days. Even if I should have been willing, under such circumstances, to continue my co-operation with General Ouesta, I am unable to do so with justice to my troops.” Sir Arthur, however, was soon compelled to recommence active operations. While he halted at Talavera, on a sudden, Cuesta was seized with an irrepressible energy and activity. His columns dashed forwards, with him at their head, to Torrijos; but on the 26th he returned with the French in full pursuit of him. The French halted before they came upon Talavera; but it became evident to Sir Arthur that he would not be permitted to enjoy long repose, and therefore he busily employed himself in examining and strengthening his position at Talavera. While thus employed, a great army was collecting in his front, under Victor, while his old enemy, Soult, supported by Marshal Mortier, was unknowingly rapidly advancing from Salamanca against his rear; and Marshal Ney was hurrying from Astorga, with the hope of falling upon his flank. His front was threatened by 50,000 men, and an equal number was ready to fall upon his flank and rear, while he had only 20,000 British to withstand them, save Cuesta’s army, on which he could not place much reliance. It was under these disadvantageous circumstances that the battle of Talavera was fought. But, notwithstanding their superior force, the French were utterly defeated: out of the 50,000 men which Victor headed against the British, 7,000 were either killed or wounded, and among them an immense number of officers and two generals. On the side of the British 857 were killed, 3,913 wounded, and 653 were reported missing: the Spaniards returned about 1,200 killed and wounded; but the correctness of their report was much doubted. This great battle was fought on the 27th and 28th of July; and by the 1st of August Sebastiani’s corps and the reserve retreated to Illescas, on the road between Madrid and Toledo, while Victor entrenched himself behind the Alberche. By this time Soult had entered Plasencia, whence he designed joining the forces of Victor. Sir Arthur Wellesley determined to prevent this junction; and on the 3rd of August he marched forward to Orepesa, leaving Cuesta at Talavera to take care of the hospitals. On that day Sir Arthur learned that Soult’s advanced posts were at Naval Moral, and consequently between him and Portugal, and soon after he received intelligence that the forces which he had defeated were recollecting and again threatening Talavera. General Cuesta was so alarmed at his position that he sent word to Sir Arthur he intended to leave Talavera that evening, and join the British army at Orepesa, in order to assist it in repelling Soult. Cuesta rejoined Sir Arthur on the next morning, leaving 1,500 in the hospitals unprotected. Sir Arthur was now placed between the mountains and the Tagus, with a French army advancing upon each flank, and with his retreat by the bridge at Almaraz completely cut off. As, therefore, he could place no confidence in Cuesta and the Spanish army, and as with 17,000 British forces fatigued and famishing, he could not hope successfully to fight with two French armies each about three times stronger than his own, he resolved to retire to Portugal. One way was happily still left open for him a little below Talavera, where the Tagus was crossed by the bridge of Arzobispo, and by this route he retreated. Cuesta followed in his route, halting his troops at the bridge of Arzobispo, in order that they might be ready to pass the Tagus at any moment. While here Cuesta was attacked by the French, and lost nearly 2,000 men, and the rest only escaped by taking refuge in the mountains. In the meantime the British army was advancing unmolested towards the frontiers of Portugal. Sir Arthur had his head-quarters at Badajoz, close to those frontiers, on the 2nd of September, and in a day or two a part of his army with the sick and wounded re-entered that country. About six days after his arrival at Badajoz, Sir Robert Wilson arrived on the frontier, having successfully eluded the vigour of Marshal Ney, who was in pursuit of him. The other corps, which had advanced upon Madrid under General Vinegas, had been defeated at Alinoracid by General Sebastiani, who drove it back upon the Sierra Morena and the Andalusian frontier, from which it had advanced. On the arrival of Sir Arthur Wellesley at Badajoz, the French armies again separated. Soult with his forces went into cantonments at Estramadura and Leon, near the borders of Portugal; Joseph Buonaparte, who accompanied Marshal Mortier in this campaign, returned with that General to Madrid; while some French moveable columns traversed various parts of Spain in order to subjugate the country. From this time until the month of November no events of importance, however, took place in Spain. A guerilla warfare was carried on in many distant provinces and districts, and some towns on the eastern coast in Catalonia and Valencia were captured by the French, but the French masses remained inactive. The manner in which this campaign had been conducted by the British army received all due applause in England: the thanks of parliament were voted to officers and men, and Sir Arthur Wellesley was created Viscount Wellington of Talavera. By this time Viscount Wellington had placed his army in cantonments on the line of the Guadiana, in order to cover Portugal from Soult, whose cantonments, as before mentioned, were in Estramadura and Leon. While thus stationed, he heard in November of the defeat of the Spanish troops under General Areizga at Ocana, and of the Duque del Parque at Alba de Tonnes. These events caused Lord Wellington much mortification; and feeling convinced that he could no longer afford assistance to Spain, he marched from the lines of Guadiana into Portugal, in order to defend it against the enemy. Here he laid the foundation of those measures which finally carried him triumphant through the Peninsula. The Spanish junta exclaimed loudly against him for deserting their cause; but it was evident that if neither Soult nor any other French forces had threatened the Portuguese frontier, it would have been impossible for him to have tried another advance into Spain. It was only by drawing on his magazines in Portugal, which were chiefly filled by England, that he could preserve his troops from starvation, and it was impossible for him to co-operate with undisciplined Spanish troops, and proud, obstinate, and incapable Spanish generals. It was in vain that his brother, the Marquis Wellesley, who resided with the junta at Seville as British envoy, laboured to convince the Spanish authorities of the fatal consequences which, must arise from their wretched military system: the dons were all wiser than the marquis, and not satisfied with neglecting his advice, they cast reproaches on his brother. There was a want of vigour and capacity in the members of the junta, and in the Spanish military, and this being coupled with an overweening confidence in their own powers, it was clear that no British force could successfully co-operate with them. In the event of another British army acting again in Spain it would be necessary, as Lord Wellington observed in one of his dispatches to his brother, that the chief command of the Spanish forces should be vested in the commander-in-chief of the English.