PROSECUTION OF THE WAR IN INDIA, AND ANNEXATION OF THE PUNJAUB.
The general consequences of the battle of Chillianwallah (an account of which engagement concluded our relation of the war in India, in the last chapter) were the encouragement of the Sikh sirdars, soldiery, and people, and the renewal of exertion on the part of the civil and military authorities of India for the vigorous continuance of the war. In England the news of the battle produced sensations of alarm, and indignant dissatisfaction. In parliament the subject was mooted angrily, not only by the opposition, but by the more radical supporters of the government. Lord John Russell, however, quieted many fears by announcing, which he did in his most pompous manner, that Sir Charles Napier had been selected to command the army in India. This was received with loud cheers and every demonstration of confidence. Had Lord John stated that an army of thirty thousand European soldiers was about to be dispatched to save the glory of the British arms in India, the tidings could not have inspired a sense of security more complete than appeared to be entertained by the house from the announcement of this one name. Sir Charles had retired from the government of Scinde, having quarrelled with the Company and the governor-general. No two human beings could be assorted with less likelihood of concord than Lord Dalhousie and Sir Charles Napier. With Lord Hardinge the eccentric general could have agreed better; but he was a man so much more just than that nobleman, and so much more able and original in his conceptions as a military man and a statesman, that they also would have been very ill-assorted. Sir Charles Napier, during his government of Scinde, had acquired such a knowledge of the government of India, civil and military, and differed so widely from the principles applied to that government, that there could be little hope of his long retaining any command or government in India. Sir Charles had complained warmly of the way in which the army of India was officered; of the love of ease, and the indulgence in luxury which had begun to characterise the officers of that service; of the little sympathy with their men which the officers of some portions of the Company’s troops betrayed; and of the mode of recruiting, especially in selecting soldiers from the Brahmin caste, rather than from Ghoorkhas, Beloochees, and low-caste Hindoos. These views were so distasteful to the governor-general and chief officers of state in India, that the gallant general was set down as a very troublesome fellow, whose presence in India was more mischievous than useful, who prided himself more on Meannee than Scinde was worth, and whose essays of government there were odd, oppressive, and out of the routine of Indian government. Sir Charles had given just cause for as many complaints against himself as he had made of others; this the government at home knew well; but the board of control, and the board of directors also, felt that the public dissatisfaction caused by the battle of Chillianwallah, must be soothed, and knowing the supreme confidence which the public felt in the eccentric but heroic and intellectual general, they nominated him to the post of commander-in-chief of the army in India. Sir Charles was very unwilling to accept this command, and it was alleged that he only yielded to the importunities of his friend, the Duke of Wellington, then commander-in-chief of the army, who was represented as having said, “Either you go, or I go.” This high compliment was so felt by the sturdy old warrior, that he is said to have instantly acquiesced. The opinions of this brave chief on Indian affairs were much canvassed at the time, and much more canvassed since. Circumstances arose to justify many of them, and in few instances did his predictions fail. It was supposed that the Punjaub would be the earliest scene of his exploits, and concerning it he thus expressed himself:—“A large country full of rivers, mountains, climates, plains, deserts, supplies scarce, and a hostile, well-armed, brave people, apparently resolved to wage a partizan warfare.” The population was, on the whole, better inclined to us than the army, nor did they show so much a disposition to wage what is called a partizan war, as to risk the fate of their country and the endurance of their power upon regular warfare, conducted in well-arranged campaigns and general battle. So far Sir Charles somewhat mistook the people against whom he was sent out as the especial champion of his country, but whom he was never destined to encounter.
His opinion on the constitution of the army has been already glanced at. Concerning its dangers in a campaign, involving long marches and distant operations, he thus wrote:—“Suppose the army in march, and to consist of ten thousand fighting men, and that an enemy attacks the fighting men and camp followers, amounting in the mass to forty thousand or sixty thousand men, of which thirty thousand or fifty thousand are unorganised, unmanageable camp-followers; suppose them to be attacked suddenly, and that when so attacked, they all rush back upon the column of fighting men, as they always do, and always will do, until well organised. When you have painted this pretty picture in your mind—this picture of noise, confusion, danger, and slaughter—I will ask you how the column of ten thousand fighting men are to fight? borne down by multitudes—confused by noise—how are they to form in order of battle? If once, by the exertion of their officers, they do form, how are they to fire?—on their own followers! their own animals! What may happen no one can tell; but human foresight says that the whole will stand a fair chance of being utterly defeated. It is said that this took place, and caused, in a great measure, the Cabul massacre. I can easily believe it.”
The following warnings were prophetic:—“Let the army be in every way worthy of the empire that it won and holds—holds by discipline! Let not the word become an empty boast. Let it not lose its reality. Let not victory lull our soldiers to sleep. Let every British officer recollect that powerful nations surround our Indian empire; that they are rapidly acquiring our military system, our tactics, our arms. Let him compare our earlier battles with our last—Plassey with Ferozashooshah and Sobraon—setting our losses in killed and wounded at each battle in juxta-position. Let us look to these matters, that we may not have to exclaim with Pyrrhus at Asculum, ‘Another such victory will undo us!’”
But notwithstanding the dangers which were thus the subject of the military seer’s discourse, he had a high opinion of the Indian army as a whole, as the following quotation proves:—“The Indian army, when well commanded is indomitable: it is capable of subjugating all the countries between the Black and Yellow Seas. The population from which it is drawn is so numerous and warlike—the land so wealthy—that the noble Indian army may vie with any force existing, in numbers, courage, and equipment. Its discipline and intelligence are in proportion. The European officers are all English, Irish, and Scotch gentlemen, whose honour and courage have created in their troops such an intrepid spirit as to render India secure against every evil from which an army can protect a country.”
Notwithstanding the supposed necessity of Sir Charles Napier’s appointment, no great dispatch was used in his departure, and the public began to suppose that the object of the government in this delay was to gain time for Lord Gough to redeem his honour. This increased the public irritation, which was exasperated by the private letters that reached England from Lahore, and from Lord Gough’s own camp. These letters led the English public to believe that a general panic prevailed, not only in the Punjaub, but at the head-quarters of Lord Gough’s army. The following are specimens of the letters, which, on their arrival in England, so disturbed the public mind:—
“I have much pleasure in giving you the following latest information from the commander-in-chief’s camp, dated 16th instant; it indeed has been a sad business, and it is impossible to predict when our mishaps, and such fearful butchery and wanton sacrifice of life will end or stop, under such a commander-in-chief. Unless the governor-general recalls Lord Gough to the provinces, the chances ate he will not only lose the splendid army under his command, which he has already done his best to cripple and weaken, but he will so compromise the government that the most serious apprehension may be entertained as to the ultimate result of this contest.
“I told you Gholab Singh had an army of ten thousand men not far in advance of the commander-in-chief’s camp, doing nothing, but alive and awake to take every advantage of the first serious mishap that might occur to our army under its present chief; in addition to which Dost Mohammed has a force of ten thousand to twelve thousand Affghans, at a short distance from Attock, ready to cooperate with Chuttur Singh. Gholab. Singh has fourteen pieces of cannon with his ten thousand men, but he is not present in person; the wary chief is abiding his time in the hills; he has, however, deputed a vakeel to offer a nuzzur at Lahore to our resident; but deep craftiness and the most wily treachery are at the bottom of this proceeding. The vakeel has been instructed to apprise his master of every single occurrence that takes place at Lahore, and to keep him well informed of all movements on our part. It is extremely strange our government will not believe in the treacherous intentions of Gholab Singh.
“There are from thirty to forty thousand men in arms leagued against our power and supremacy north of the Jhelum, with a park of artillery, varying, according to reports, from fifty to seventy guns.
“In a letter from Lahore of yesterday’s date, which reached me this morning, it is stated that the commanderin-chief has ordered Brigadier-general Wheeler’s force to join him, but of course, I suppose, not until after the general has taken Ram Singh. This proceeding has been rendered necessary and urgent in consequence of her majesty’s 24th, the 36th, and 58th regiments of native infantry having been rendered next to useless. Sir Dudley Hill’s reserve force of eight thousand five hundred men will have to be brought into active service yet, as troops are required not to proceed against, and be the aggressors of the enemy, but to act on the defensive, and hold our active, brave, and courageous foe in check until General Whish’s force joins, to enable the whole army to advance to Peshawur.
“Our government appear now to be so afraid of the issue of our contest with the Sikhs (as they have neither troops sufficient to conquer them and hold the country, nor money to pay the enormous expenses of this prolonged campaign), that I should not be at all surprised they will do their utmost to patch up a peace, which will, to say the least, be not only humiliating to our arms, but disgraceful to British feelings. I am perfectly certain, however, that the Sikhs will entertain no terms with us, except they are based on our quitting the Punjaub, and retiring across the Sutlej; this is a sine qua non with them.” The same letter from Lahore mentions, “You have, no doubt, heard of the late awful butchery of human life. As usual, the troops advanced without order or any arrangement. The 14th Dragoons led the advance, and, on the Goorchurrahs advancing, the brigade of cavalry, it is said, retreated, afraid, apparently, of being led into another trap like the Eumnuggur one. The cavalry brigade overthrew the artillery, and, galloping right through them, was the cause of our loss of six guns, two of which, however, were since retaken. Brigadier Pope was mortally wounded (since dead), and the cavalry were only brought up by the Doolies at the general hospital. Of the 24th foot, four field-officers, one captain, and seven subalterns, were killed, together with four hundred men. The 30th, the 36th, and 56th regiments behaved well, but lost so many officers, killed and wounded, that they must be sent back, and some other corps sent to supply their place. There were twenty-four officers buried the day after the fight, and many more since. The chief was strongly advised to defer the engagement until next day, but it was of no use. Two shots fell near him, and he ordered an immediate attack, left his position, and joined the mêlée, and was not to be found anywhere to give directions. A more undisciplined attack, or less tactics, was never heard of. He swears that the first officer who presumes to give advice, he will put in close arrest! Poor Eikins was killed in endeavouring to rally the 14th Dragoons. The artillery have demanded a court of inquiry, but I suppose the business will be hushed up, as it it was in the 62nd foot.”
A second letter, dated Lahore, the 18th, gave the following extract of a letter from camp Chillianwallah, 16th January:—
“On the 12th we marched to Dingee, on the 13th we marched again, and at 11 a.m. came upon one of the enemy’s outposts. The 3rd light field-batteries and heavy guns were brought to the front to drive them in, which they did in about five minutes. The infantry was then brought up, and each regiment deployed into line. The commander-in-chief meant to have encamped here, and sent for quartermasters of corps to mark the ground. The enemy, however, about two o’clock, fired a few shots, which came in beyond our flags, and the commander-inchief resolved to attack them at once. The whole line then advanced, getting into thicker and thicker jungle every minute; all this time our heavy guns, which were in the centre, opened their fire, and were answered by every one of the enemy’s, about sixty in number. It would be impossible to describe the action. There was no plan of attack. The three light field-batteries were at one time close to the enemy without any support near them. These were at last ordered to advance at a gallop to support Hoggan’s brigade, and the 46th regiment of native infantry assured the officers of these light field-batteries that their fire alone saved them. The action lasted until dark.
“At four o’clock in the afternoon we were completely surrounded by the enemy, and our artillery firing at the same time to the front, to the rear, and to the flank. Our loss has been tremendous—one thousand nine hundred killed and wounded: we have taken twelve guns and lost six (two of which have been recovered). The loss of our guns was owing to the cowardice of —— who (you will hardly believe it) ran away from a party of the enemy’s cavalry right through Christie’s and Huish’s troops of horse-artillery, knocking over every one of Christie’s waggons, horses and all! They were so crowded among the guns, that the gunners could not unlimber. The result was that the enemy’s cavalry got among our guns, and cut our men down right and left. The —— never drew reign until they got right through the general hospital in the rear, knocking over the Doolies and everything that came in their way. What caused this panic no one knows.
“Of the above one thousand nine hundred killed and wounded, nine hundred and fifty are Europeans. Above thirty-six officers have been buried. Her majesty’s 24th foot lost their regimental colour. The 25th regiment native infantry lost a colour. The 30th regiment native infantry lost a colour—some say two colours. The 56th regiment native infantry lost the standard they took at Gwalior. Her majesty’s 24th foot lost thirteen officers killed, including every one in the list above the junior captain. The enemy are now encamped at Eussool, four miles only from the commander-in-chief’s camp. A letter that I have just seen states that Major Loftie, of the 30th native infantry, was not killed but only wounded, and that Major Ramfield, commanding the 56th regiment native infantry, was killed. In the 2nd Europeans, which behaved nobly, one officer was severely wounded, Lieutenant Nightingale.”
Another letter, dated camp, the 15th January, stated:—
“I dare say you will have heard of the battle fought by our army on the 13th instant. It commenced about 1 p.m., and fasted till after dark. It was a devil of a battle, and many hard knocks and wounds were received, as the casualty list will show. The Sikhs fought with the greatest gallantry, and, as for our men and infantry generally, they were quite heroes. The 2nd Europeans displayed great bravery; they advanced to the charge and drove the Sikhs back at the point of the bayonet; and after this found another body of Sikhs, a regularly organised battalion, armed and dressed like our troops, in their rear. There were also some of the enemy on the right flank. This regiment had to right-about-face and charge to the rear, which they did, killing and wounding a great many of the Sikhs, and took and spiked four of their guns. Nightingale was wounded when about to do this, and Gaynor, who did it, had a most narrow escape. The former is the only severely wounded officer in that regiment, but I trust not dangerously, the ball having passed out in coming round the head, but the bone is fractured. One or two officers had narrow escapes. The 2nd Europeans had but fifty men wounded, and five killed; the cases of the former, some of them very severe, are mostly in the body and legs. There has been a fearful mortality in the 24th foot, thirteen officers killed and eight wounded, while the men said to be killed and wounded amount to four hundred. The 29th foot also suffered much, and the artillery a good deal. All our wounded are doing well, I rejoice to say. The doctors were at one time quite within range of the enemy’s shot, and a bheestie of the 2nd European regiment had his arm knocked off just behind where the surgeons of that corps were riding: a spent ball rolled under my horse’s feet. Lieutenant Weston and Godby, of the 36th native infantry, were wounded, but not severely. Brigadier Pennycuick and his son both killed. I believe we have gained a regular victory, though at first it was doubtful. I hear Pope’s brigade of cavalry got a kind of panic at one time, and came to the rear, but afterwards moved up in good style: there was something wrong with the —— for they drove us in from the rear and dispersed all the doctors, &c., at the field hospital, where I had just arrived to see if any assistance was required. There was an alarm of the Sikhs being in our rear, and then there was a regular ‘bolt.’ Such a night we all passed is better imagined than described—it was so very cold and rainy, with a high wind blowing, enough to cut one in two. Several Doolies were captured by the enemy, and the band instruments of the 2nd Europeans are missing.
“All letters agree in stating that a panic overtook the —— when ordered to charge. I hear on all sides that it would be a wise and prudent measure on the part of the governor-general to recall Lord Gough from the Punjaub, and restrain his ill-judged valour within our peaceful provinces. His lordship fancied himself at Donnybrook Fair, and was in the thick of it, in the mêlée, and lost to sight!
“P.S.—The 56th regiment native infantry was brought out of action with three hundred men, under the command of its junior captain, a cadet of 1840!”
These communications, although affording intelligence which was, unfortunately, too true, were in several respects erroneous. They placed matters in a gloomy aspect, which was not justified by the facts. The battle of Chillianwallah, however doubtful as a victory, and however disastrous as to the loss which we experienced, neither perilled the existence of British rule in India, nor shook the hold of the English upon the Punjaub. The arrival of the despatches, and the issue of an extraordinary gazette, in some measure reassured the public; and as Lord Gough was decidedly and deservedly a favourite, people became anxious that before Sir Charles Napier should arrive out and take the command of the army, his lordship might be enabled to revenge Chillianwallah by a well-fought battle and decided victory. The friends of Lord Gough even entertained the hope that he might conclude the campaign by the entire dispersion of the Sikh army, and the reconquest of the Punjaub. It was very generally felt that the ministry, whatever their private feeling and private intentions, had shown too much eagerness to disclaim him, and to signify, by making their only measure for the emergency in India the appointment of a new commander-in-chief, that they supposed the blame of any misfortunes there to have been exclusively with Lord Gough. Military men pointed out that the previous policy of Lord Hardinge, and the immediate policy of Lord Dalhousie, both as it regarded their military and political management, invited the resistance to our power which had been awakened. The chief apprehensions entertained arose from the course which Gholab Singh and Dost Mohammed might pursue. The former, with his Sikh soldiery, occupied positions that kindled some suspicion of his intentions, while he had, as an ostensible ally, omitted to strike a single blow in our favour. He had collected, it was alleged, one hundred and fifty pieces of cannon; and he was represented as having declared that his control over his own soldiers was imperfect, and that their sympathy was wholly with the troops of Chuttur and Shere Singh. As it was not uncommon for the native princes, when hesitating between the British and their enemies, to represent their soldiers as untrustworthy and dangerous to themselves, Gholab’s account of himself, his province, and his army, caused him reasonably to be suspected. Dost Mohammed rendered substantial aid to Shere Singh; at least twelve thousand Affghans were encamped under the command of that general, and fresh levies were said to be descending the passes from Peshawur and from Candehar towards Scinde. Reports had arrived in England that all the Affghan chieftains were in arms, and that the war of the prophet was proclaimed. The Affghan infantry were without discipline, and out of their own fastnesses it was presumed that they would not display courage; but some supposed that, subjected to the Sikh discipline, and led by Sikh officers, as well as by their own chiefs, they would prove formidable, being physically a fine race, and naturally brave. The reinforcements sent by them, however, were chiefly composed of cavalry, and their efforts as auxiliary to our enemies were too tardy to influence materially the fortunes of the war; by degrees these facts became known at home, and the absence, in Lord Gough’s despatches, of any alarm, and the entire confidence breathed through them and the official tidings from the Indian government, at last wholly reassured the English public.
The following is the list of ordnance and ordnance stores captured from, the enemy in the action of the 13th of January:—
Six of these guns had carriages and limbers, and six were without limbers; all of the pattern nearly in use with our field-pieces.
Two ammunition carriages (one partly destroyed by explosion), one platform-cart, one hundred and forty-four cartridge-liners fixed to shot, sixteen cartridges unfixed, and eighteen port-fires, were also taken.
Assault of Dullah by General Wheeler.—Lord Gough was unable to undertake any active operations after the severe losses at Chillianwallah, until he should receive reinforcements. These he expected from Mooltan, under Whish, and also a brigade of Wheeler’s force, which had been actively engaged in another direction, where he had been detained by the obstinacy of a rebel chief named Earn Singh. This redoubtable chieftain was ascendant in the Baree Doab, and he occupied a strong fortified position on the heights of Dullah. In the middle of January Wheeler attacked this position, but so inaccessible was the fastness that the most he could, do, and that with considerable loss, was to drive out Ram Singh and his followers, whereas the gallant general hoped to accomplish either his capture or destruction. On the 11th, Wheeler ordered the 4th native infantry to take up a position to the northward of the enemy’s post, so as to intercept him in case he should be obliged to evacuate the fort, and retreat in that direction; the main force tarried at Shorpore, where they had been in quarters, until the 13th, the sappers, pioneers, and labourers being engaged in making a practicable road through an exceedingly difficult country consisting of defiles and “ghauts.” This road was laid for about seven miles, as far as the village of Cote on the course of the Ravee, about three miles distant from Ram Singh’s position. On the 14th, the little army of General Wheeler took up ground under the Dullah heights. That day and the next was occupied in cutting roads, transporting guns and mortars upon elephants, and making arrangements for storming the fort. On the morning of the latter day, Captain Hicks, of the 3rd native infantry, was dispatched with four companies of that regiment, and Mr. Hodgson, with two companies of the Guide corps, to take post west of the Dullah heights, on the opposite bank of the Ravee. The precautions taken by detaching these bodies of men were necessary from the topographical character of the neighbourhood. The Ravee, debouching from the mountainous region in which it has its birth, flows through a beautiful valley, where a series of hills runs from east to west, presenting an unequal ridge; on this ridge, overlooking the river, the little village of Dullah was situated, in which Ram Singh had so cleverly fortified himself. In every direction from the village the rock dipped almost perpendicularly, beside being protected by the river, which wound partly around it. Access was by paths, partly lying in hollows formed by former streams, and partly cut through the rock. These paths were circuitous, and nearly covered with brushwood, admitting only by single file of an approach to the platform on which the village rested. On either side of the path were precipices from twenty to eighty feet deep, and huge boulders lay profusely across the way. A few men could defend such a position against very many. The 4th native regiment was to advance against the face of this defence, from the direction where it had taken post some days, and the signal was to be the firing of a gun from the British camp. The 3rd and the Guides were at the same moment ordered to advance, at the same signal, against the west of the ridge, and crown a height visible from head-quarters. As soon as the success of this detachment was ascertained, the remainder of the 3rd regiment, and two hundred men of the 2nd irregular cavalry, who, with Lieutenant Swinton, had volunteered to serve on foot, were to advance upon another face of the ridge, from the little village of Chulbarah, where they had been posted; this party, ascending a spur of the hill on its left, was to co-operate opportunely with the advance of the other detachments. Major Fisher, at the head of a body of regular native infantry and irregular cavalry, with guns mounted upon elephants, were in support, and to ascend (the cavalry, of course, dismounting) when the various detachments had come well into action. There was yet another point upon which an ascent was to be attempted—that which was in front of the camp of the British. Major Davidson, with a few hundred Sikh auxiliaries, regular and irregular, supported by two companies of the 1st Sikh light infantry, under Lieutenant Peel, was ordered to make this attempt.
At the moment for action, the signal gun was fired, but no one appeared to take any notice of it—no men were seen to make their way along the ridge. There was a long pause on the side of the British, the guns of the enemy at the same time firing. None of the detachments appearing on the ridge, Major Butler was ordered to attempt to storm it, in conjunction with the other party already appointed to ascend in front: this was happily accomplished, after a very sharp conflict. Major Davidson was shot through the hand, Lieutenant Peel was mortally wounded, and Lieutenant Christie killed. The detached parties, trusting to native guides, were purposely misled, and thus could not come into action. Ram Singh had by this means the way kept open for his retreat when resistance was no longer possible, and all the skilful arrangements that had been made to catch the eagle in his eyrie were thwarted by the treachery of the natives, who had been, unfortunately, too implicitly trusted in an important service.
Retreat of Shebe Singh from Chillianwallah.—On the 12th of February Shere Singh struck his tents, and retired from the strong positions which he had so skilfully occupied. Lord Gough threw forward his cavalry, but the Sikh general interposed the whole of his mounted force, covering effectually his retreat. On the 15th the English general learned that the Sikhs were at Wuzeerabad, and his spies informed him that the sirdar was marching upon Lahore. It is probable that these reports were correct, but the approach of a portion of General Whish’s army defeated the project. The cavalry of Whish were pushed on to the Chenab, preventing the passage of the ford of Wuzeerabad. The sirdar swept the whole district of supplies, and sent messengers to Chuttur Singh informing him of his dangers, and intimating that he would take post at Goojerat. Chuttur Singh hastened to the support of Shere, and their united forces constituted a splendid army of eighty thousand men, with fifty-nine pieces of cannon, most of them of large calibre, and worked by a choice body of artillerymen. While Whish guarded the fords of the Chenab, Wheeler hastened to join Lord Gough, having cleared the Baree Doab of Ram Singh and his adherents. On the 16th his lordship left Saporee, and arrived at Sundalpoor, a village only a few miles from the Chenab, which separated his army from that of the victor of Mooltan. The latter skilfully fabricated a bridge of boats at Hurreke Puttum, and joined the commander-in-chief. While this was being accomplished, a body of Affghans from Dost Mohammed Khan, who professed to be neutral, joined the enemy. The entire number of Lord Gough’s army, after every accession, scarcely exceeded twenty-five thousand men. The enemy, when joined by the Affghans, nearly quadrupled the forces of the British general. Lord Gough, however, determined to attack him, and on the 20th reconnoitred his position with that object. Shere Singh made the village of Goojerat his head-quarters: this place lay between the Jhelum and the Chenab, nearer to the former; a small river ran nearly around it, but was at that juncture very low, so that its bed was in some places nearly dry. Between this river and the city, the enemy had taken his position.
Lord Gough resolved upon his plan of attack, and early on the 21st put it into execution.
Battle of Goojekat.—Lord Gough’s artillery was in excellent order, and an overmatch for that of the enemy. He determined upon using this arm of offence to the uttermost, and opened along his line a murderous cannonade. His chief danger lay in the difficulty of passing his troops over the “nullah” (or dry bed of the river) under the enemy’s fire; for it was impossible for his infantry to enter the bed of the stream in any direction without being exposed to their musketry; his guns kept those of the enenry hotly engaged. The numerous cavalry of the foe threatened his flanks, and exposed him, inferior as he was numerically in this arm of the service, to another peril. Both these risks he provided against with skill, and conquered them with resolution and energy. The array of battle was superb; the order of the engagement scientific; and all its parts conducted with obedience and alacrity by those to whom they were committed.
The first fault of the enemy was opening his artillery practice at too great a distance; this indicated the number and position of his guns, as well as their range, and enabled the British general to make his calculations accordingly. He advanced his right wing under cover of his superior artillery fire; the infantry dashed into the nullah, cleared it, and stormed a village on its banks, where a strong body of infantry was posted. The enemy’s left and centre were thus separated, and while the British right pressed upon the Sikhs’ left centre, the British left cleared the nullah, stormed another strong infantry post in a village, and completely doubled up the centre of the sirdar’s army. His cavalry made various efforts to fall upon the flanks of the victorious infantry, but the British horse-brigades, with horse artillery, prevented the success of these movements, and punished the rash approach of the Sikh troopers. The Khalsa soldiers fled through their own tents, Brigadier Campbell and the Honourable Major-general Dundas, sweeping round the town or village of Goojerat, drove them in confused flight. Major-general Gilbert followed the fugitives with the cavalry; the defeated Sikhs cast away their arms and accoutrements in the utmost panic. Never was victory more complete, and seldom did victorious battle redound to the honour of a victorious general so signally as at Goojerat.
The loss of the British was three officers killed and twenty-four wounded, the total killed of men and officers did not exceed one hundred, and the killed and wounded of the whole army did not reach in number one thousand men. The Sikhs lost thousands in slain, all their guns but two were captured, and many thousand men were left wounded and prisoners in the hands of the pursuers. The following extracts from Lord Gough’s despatch will throw additional light on the course of the conflict:—
“With my right wing I proposed penetrating the centre of the enemy’s line, so as to turn the position of their force in rear of the nullah, and thus enable my left wing to cross it with little loss, and in co-operation with the right to double upon the centre, the wing of the enemy’s force opposed to them.
“At half-past seven o’clock the army advanced in the order described, with the precision of a parade movement. The enemy opened their fire at a very long distance, which exposed to my artillery both the position and range of their guns. I halted the infantry just out of the fire, and advanced the whole of my artillery covered by skirmishers. The cannonade now opened upon the enemy was the most magnificent I ever witnessed, and as terrible in its effects.
“The Sikh guns were served with their accustomed rapidity, and the enemy well and resolutely maintained his position; but the terrific force of our fire obliged them, after an obstinate resistance, to fall back. I then deployed the infantry, and directed a general advance, covering the movement by my artillery, as before.
“The village of Burra Kabra, the left one of that name, in which the enemy had concealed a large body of infantry, and which was apparently the key of their position, lay immediately in the line of Major-general Sir Walter Gilbert’s advance, and was carried in the most brilliant style by a spirited attack of the 3rd brigade, under Brigadier Penny, consisting of the 2nd Europeans, and the 31st and 70th regiments of native infantry, which drove the enemy from their cover with great slaughter. A very spirited and successful movement was also made about the same time against a heavy body of the enemy’s troops in and about the Chota Kabra, by part of Brigadier Harvey’s brigade, most gallantly led by Lieutenant-colonel Franks, of her majesty’s 10th foot.
“The heavy artillery continued to advance with extraordinary celerity, taking up successive forward positions, driving the enemy from those they had retired to, whilst the rapid advance and beautiful fire of the horse artillery and light field-batteries, which I strengthened by bringing to the front the two reserve troops of horse artillery under Lieutenant-colonel Brind (Brigadier Brooke having the general superintendence of the whole of the horse artillery), broke the ranks of the enemy at all points. The whole infantry line now rapidly advanced, and drove the enemy before it; the nullah was cleared; several villages stormed; the guns that were in position carried; the camp captured; and the enemy routed, in every direction—the right wing and Brigadier-general Campbell’s division passing in pursuit to the eastward, the Bombay column to the westward, of the town.
“The retreat of the Sikh army, thus hotly pressed, soon became a perfect flight—all arms dispersing over the country, rapidly pursued by our troops for a distance of twelve miles, their track strewn with the wounded, their arms, and military equipments, which they threw away to conceal that they were soldiers.”
At dawn next day Major-general Sir Walter Gilbert took the command of a corps of the army, principally consisting of cavalry, in pursuit. The retreat of the Sikhs, or rather their flight, was covered by fifteen hundred Affghan horse, who had arrived just before the battle. These, however brave, constituted a very irregular force, and soon became mixed with the mass of the fugitives. The flight of the Khalsa army was in the direction of the Khoree Pass. At the entrance General Gilbert halted, with the Bombay division, and sent General Mountain through the gorge to Pooran. It was necessary to secure this pass, as, if the enemy had been able to hold it, considerable difficulties might have been thrown in the way of the pursuers, especially as torrents gushed from the mountains, and the weather was wet and tempestuous.
On the 24th the pursuers resumed their march, but by that time the Sikhs had crossed the river, and the British did not succeed in getting sight of them until reaching Noorangabad. During this march, Major Lawrence joined the camp of Sir Walter Gilbert; Chuttur Singh, whose prisoner he was, permitting him on parole to proceed to the camp of the commander-in-chief with proposals from Shere Singh. Akram Khan, with part of the Affghan auxiliaries to the Khalsa army, retreated upon Attock.
On the 27th and 28th, Sir Walter Gilbert brought his forces over the Jhelum, compelling Shere Singh, with the relics of his army, to retire with precipitation. Gilbert was obliged to leave a portion of his forces behind in consequence of the high waters in the river, but by the 5th of March these followed. Before these detachments effected their passage, the armies of pursuers and pursued were nearly equal in number; but the Sikh chief wisely concluded that if he could not, with nearly four times the number of the British, prevent the latter from storming his strong position near the Chenab, he was not likely to hinder them, when their numbers were superior, from crossing the Jhelum. Gilbert was speedily reinforced, and at the head of an army of about twenty thousand men, with nearly fifty pieces of cannon, he so menaced the Sikh general, that the latter intimated his intention to lay down his arms.
On the 8th of March terms of submission were personally discussed, Shere Singh having come over to General Gilbert’s camp. The English general demanded an unconditional surrender; and as the rajah hesitated, the English advanced to Hoormuk. Chuttur Singh and Shere, with several great sirdars, came over to the British camp, followed by the guns taken at Chillianwallah. The surrender of the whole army was arranged to take place the next day. It was not, however, until the 14th that all the Sikhs had laid down their standards and their arms, which they did with the greatest reluctance, their countenances and tones being expressive of the deepest anguish. The conduct of the British was most generous. Each Sikh soldier received a rupee to enable him to reach his home; the cavalry were allowed to retain their horses—a boon which was highly appreciated, many of them expressing, and really feeling, the deepest gratitude. The artillery surrendered amounted to forty-one guns, and a number of tumbrils and carriages: the artillery horses were retained by the English. During the short campaign the enemy had lost one hundred and fifty-eight pieces of cannon, many of them of larger calibre than any in the English army. The detention of General Gilbert in negotiating and securing the surrender of the Sikhs, was favourable to the escape of the Affghans. Chuttur Singh had given up to them the fort of Attock, which they precipitately abandoned, their main force marching rapidly for the Indus. Gilbert endeavoured to intercept them, but was only in time to witness their success in making good their passage, and the destruction of the bridge of boats by which pursuit would have otherwise been made. The Affghans were reduced to less than half the force with which they joined Chuttur Singh, but they drew up on the bank of the river, and offered an artillery fire, to which the British replied in a manner that soon cleared the bank of the Indus of every trace of the enemy. Detachments were sent to take possession of Attock, and also of Hyderabad, on the right bank of the river. The British did not succeed in crossing the Indus until the 20th, when the Affghans had very far distanced their pursuers. They continued their march unmolested, either by Sir Walter Gilbert’s or any other force, entered the Khyber Pass, and proceeded to. Cabul. The sensation produced in that city by the total destruction of the Sikh army was very great. The Affghan fugitives, after the manner of orientals, gave the most absurd exaggerations as to the prowess of the British soldiers, especially of the officers, many of both being described as fiends, who proved their infernal nature by deeds of superhuman daring and strength. An alliance with “Shatan” was of course a mode of accounting for defeat which saved the honour of the fugitives, and satisfied the denizens of Cabul, as well as the wild clans en route thither, that a retreat was wisdom. The government of Cabul became uneasy for the consequences, and Dost Mohammed Khan took measures to placate the British government, whose policy was not to pursue the war into Affghanistan. The government of Calcutta annexed the Punjaub to British India, and thus terminated the Sikh war. The governor-general issued, on the 29th of March, the following proclamation:—
“For many years, in the time of Maharajah Runjeet Singh, peace and friendship prevailed between the British nation and the Sikhs. When Runjeet Singh was dead, and his wisdom no longer guided the counsels of the state, the sirdars and the Khalsa army, without provocation and without cause, suddenly invaded the British territories. Their army was again and again defeated. They were driven, with slaughter and in shame, from the country they had invaded, and at the gates of Lahore the Maharajah Dhuleep Singh tendered to the governor-general the submission of himself and his chiefs, and solicited the clemency of the British government. The governor-general extended his clemency to the state of Lahore; he generously spared the kingdom which he had acquired a just right to subvert; and the maharajah having been replaced on the throne, treaties of friendship were formed between the states.
“The British have faithfully kept their word, and have scrupulously observed every obligation which the treaties imposed upon them. But the Sikh people and their chiefs have, on their part, grossly and faithlessly violated the promises by which they were bound. Of their annual tribute, no portion whatever has at any time been paid, and large sums advanced by the government of India have never been repaid. The control of the British government, to which they voluntarily submitted themselves, has been resisted by arms. Peace has been cast aside. British officers have been murdered when acting for the state; others engaged in the like employment have been treacherously thrown into prison. Finally, the army of the state, and the whole Sikh people, joined by many of the sirdars of the Punjaub who signed the treaties, and led by a member of the regency itself, have risen in arms against us, and have waged a fierce and bloody war for the proclaimed purpose of destroying the British and their power.
“The government of India formerly declared that it desired no further conquest, and it proved by its acts the sincerity of its professions. The government of India has no desire for conquest now—but it is bound, in its duty, to provide fully for its own security, and to guard the interests of those committed to its charge. To that end, and as the only sure mode of protecting the state from the perpetual recurrence of unprovoked and wasting wars, the governor-general is compelled to resolve upon the entire subjection of a people whom their own government has long been unable to control, and whom (as events have now shown) no punishment can deter from violence, no acts of friendship can conciliate to peace. Wherefore, the governor-general of India has declared, and hereby proclaims, that the kingdom of the Punjaub is at an end; and that all the territories of Maharajah Dhuleep Singh are now and henceforth a portion of the British empire in India.
“His Highness the Maharajah shall be treated with consideration and with honour. The few chiefs who have not engaged in hostilities against the British shall retain their property and their rank. The British government will leave to all the people, whether Mussulman, Hindoo, or Sikh, the free exercise of their own religions; but it will not permit any man to interfere with others in the observance of such forms as their respective religions may either enjoin or permit. The jagheers, and all the property of sirdars and others who have been in arms against the British, shall be confiscated to the state. The defences of every fortified place in the Punjaub, which is not occupied by British troops, shall be totally destroyed, and effectual measures shall be taken to deprive the people of the means of renewing either tumult or war.
“The governor-general calls upon all the inhabitants of the Punjaub, sirdars and people, to submit themselves peaceably to the authority of the British government, which has hereby been proclaimed. Over those who shall live as obedient and peaceful subjects of the state, the British government will rule with mildness and beneficence; but if resistance to constituted authority shall again be attempted—if violence and turbulence be renewed, the governor-general warns the people of the Punjaub that the time for leniency with them has passed away, and that their offence will be punished with prompt and most rigorous severity.”
As soon as matters were placed on a footing of order as to the government of Lahore, Moolraj was brought to trial before a special military commission, consisting of four British and two native officers, and a colonel of the Sikh army. The charges against him were:—“1. Having aided the murderers of Mr. Van Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson; 2. Having been an accessory to that crime before the fact; 3. Having been an accessory after the fact.”
The object of pressing the one charge of murder in a three-fold form was to prevent the captive obtaining a verdict of not guilty, if only the first form expressed the charge. He was allowed the service of an advocate; Captain Hamilton performed that office in a very able and ingenious manner. After a trial which lasted fifteen days, he was found guilty on all the charges, and sentenced to death. The sentence was commuted by the governor-general into imprisonment for life at Singapore. This was not accepted by the captive as a favour, who demanded rather to die like a soldier than live a captive. He had borne up with the noblest manhood, and received with a slight smile and composed countenance, but without any bravado, the announcement that he must die; but the commutation of his sentence caused the most passionate lamentations. He desired to be shot at Mooltan, or, if he must he a captive, there to spend his captivity; but to be a prisoner, and expatriated, was intolerable, and he craved to die. The orders of the governor-general were not, however, affected by the patriotic desires of the murderer—for such Moolraj was. His heroic conduct in honourable war won the admiration of the British officers, civil and military, but they could not forget that he murdered in cold blood their brethren. Intelligence of these events caused much joy in England, for the disturbed state of the continent, the distressed and agitated state of Ireland, and in part of England, caused apprehensions that a foreign war might possibly break out, and this at such a time would render conflict with the Sikhs a perilous matter to the empire, as they were the only remaining power dangerous to British interests in India. There were, however, many unfavourable reports raised of the mode in which the negotiations were conducted which closed the war under Lord Hardinge, as well as that which had just terminated. These created dissatisfaction in England, and led to inquiries in parliament; the questions which excited most attention in the country referred to the appropriation of the celebrated Koh-i-noor diamond, and the new regulations about batta, which caused discontent in the Sepoy army.
On the 3rd of July, in the House of Lords, the Earl of Ellenborough moved for papers explanatory of the circumstances under which the crown had granted to the Court of Directors of the East India Company, or to the army in India, property conquered from the enemy; the question involved being with reference to the confiscation of the property taken in the district of Lahore, including the Koh-i-noor diamond, which the governor-general had agreed by treaty should be appropriated to the liquidation of the accumulated debt due by one of the states to the Indian government, instead of devolving to the crown as booty, such booty having always been granted to the armies since the year 1758, as then decreed by patent. The noble earl concluded his speech in favour of inquiry, by stating that, for every battle in India previous to those in the Punjaub, a pecuniary reward, under the name of batta had been given, but not so in the latter cases; and he implored their lordships and the government, if they desired to retain the Indian territory, above all things to do justice to the army.
The Marquis of Lansdowne detailed the circumstances under which the property was acquired, explaining that Dhuleep Singh was not a prisoner, but was treated as sovereign prince when the treaty was made, and doubtless the governor-general considered himself at liberty to conclude such a treaty, and dispose of the property obtained from the state of Lahore in any way which he thought best for the government of India. The subject, however, should be reconsidered in reference to its legal matters.
The Duke of Wellington defended the governor-general from, the implied suspicion of a want of attention to the merits of the Indian army, entered into some technical explanations as to the treaty, and suggested that the subject should be left in the hands of the government at home, and the governor-general in India, to settle the question of booty (there being immovable as well as removable property involved, which could not, strictly speaking, come under the designation of booty), who were most anxious to do full justice to the Indian army.
State of India after the Annexation of the Punjaub.—The peace of India was not entirely secured by the termination of the Punjaub war; the hill tribes in the neighbourhood of Peshawur gave uneasiness, more or less, throughout the year. The enemies of Gholab Singh continued their intrigues, and in considerable numbers had recourse to amis. It was supposed that the English would not again interfere on his behalf, as he had acted more like the ally of Chuttur and Shere Singh, and the other sirdars, previous to the battle of Goojerat, than as the ally of the British. Gholab had, however, the address to engage the Company’s civil servants, and the military men acting in that capacity, on his side; and he managed to hold up the English name in terrorem to his refractory subjects, so as to keep them from maturing, or at all events effectuating, a decided revolt. The Affghans were also troublesome on the Scinde frontier, and by their agents sought to stir up the Beloochees to predatory and desultory warfare.
Troubles in the Gwalior Territory.—The withdrawal of troops for service elsewhere left Gwalior with but few military detachments, this circumstance encouraged the disaffected there, and a partial insurrection took place. Two leading chiefs were implicated. Lieutenant-colonel Graves collected troops, and successively stormed a series of forts, thus putting an end to the power of the insurgents.
The arrival of Sir Charles Napier was hailed with satisfaction, as the prestige of his name had spread all over India. Lord Gough’s departure was, however, a subject of regret, for the venerable and glorious old general had by his heroism, urbanity, and goodness, won every heart. Enemies respected and esteemed him; his soldiers, and all connected with the government of India, respected and loved him. During the autumn long conferences were held at Simla, between the governor-general, the commander-in-chief, and the ex-commander-in-chief. Sir Charles Napier there imbibed impressions unfavourable to the government of India in many respects, and previous prejudices, which he was known to entertain, were strengthened. His views of the constitution and management of the Bengal army, and of the way in which the armies of all the presidencies were officered, were such as to excite in his mind alarm for the fidelity of the Bengal Sepoys, and the safety of our Indian possessions. He subsequently left Simla on a tour of inspection through the Punjaub to Peshawur; various suggestions were made by him which were not attended to; the reforms which his subtle mind saw to be necessary, and his vigorous habits required to be immediately put in force, were obstructed by both military and civil authorities; and it soon became obvious that he could not long co-operate with the authorities of India, either there or at home. He had hardly assumed the command-in-chief when prognostications were indulged concerning his early resignation, which were, unfortunately for India and for England, fulfilled.
In the Madras presidency, disturbances were occasioned by Mohammedan fanatics. Wherever in India Mohammedans resided, they were disloyal. No kindness conciliated them; and in some places, such as Delhi, where they were numerous, an unarmed European was always in danger. In the Bengal and Madras presidencies, the army was to a great extent recruited from that sect, and in the former provinces much to the hazard of the government, for that soldiery united to the fanaticism of Mohammedanism all the pride of caste characteristic of the heathens, and these united peculiarities fostered a deadly enmity to the government whose salt they eat and whose arms they bore. In the Madras presidency, a sect of Mohammedans existed known as Moplahs. It was the custom of these Moplahs to gather together and perpetrate some sanguinary outrage, and then shut themselves up in a strong place, and sell their lives as dearly as possible. By this course they hoped to kill as many Giaours as possible, and obtain a large reward in the paradise of the prophet. During the month of August a body of these fanatics pursued a course of violence and depredation, but were pursued by the police. The fugitives shut themselves up in a temple, a very strong place, from which the police either could not or would not dislodge them. Captain Whyte, at the head of a detachment of the 43rd native infantry, was sent to perform this service; but his men, after firing a volley, fled as if panicstruck, leaving the captain and a few other men, Europeans and Hindoos, to the will of the Moplahs. Their “tender mercies were cruelty,” for they cut the captain and his few brave followers to pieces. The conduct of the native troops was treated as unaccountable—a sudden fear for which they could give no reason; the fact being that they sympathised with the assassins whom they were sent to assail. Afterwards a detachment of the 94th European regiment attacked the temple, and, after some severe fighting, were repulsed; a second onset was more successful, and the murderers who made it their garrison were put to the bayonet.
There were many trials for India during the year 1849. Cholera raged fearfully, sweeping away a large proportion of the population of many villages and large towns, and also laying its cold hand upon many a European.
At a great heathen festival at Trichinopoly, during an outburst of fanaticism, four hundred persons were trampled to death, and a vast number injured. These mad assemblages for idolatrous purposes not only received too much tolerance from the government, but sometimes were favoured with encouragement.
During the rainy season, the country was deluged, and the region of the five rivers, the theatre of such sanguinary war, especially suffered. The floods were so overwhelming, that they were said to have rushed up the rivers at the rate of seventy miles a day, until the whole country was inundated. The torrents which poured along the course of the Chenab swept away the great fortress of Mooltan, so long the prize of conflicting armies. The Sikh nation was exposed to much suffering, as well as signal defeat, and their humiliation was only beginning, for the native princes were on every occasion reminded, at Calcutta, of their fallen fortunes. This may be exemplified in an extract from the “American Merchant Abroad,” by G. F. Train, who attended a ball at Government House, Calcutta, long after the conquest of the Punjaub, just before Lord Dalhousie retired; he thus records his impression of the scene:—“There, too, were the brave Sikhs of the mountain dens, Shere Singh and Chuttur Singh, who held their passes, those bold chieftains who fought like tigers in their country during that memorable campaign of 1848-9, and finally, overpowered by the superior force brought against them, after going through the celebrated battles of Chillianwallah and Goojerat, were brought to bay at Raweel Pindee, where, after the most obstinate war, they surrendered their sabres to Sir Walter Gilbert, the able general, who was made a G.C.B. and a baronet for his bravery and judgment on that occasion. It was pitiful to see brave warriors so painfully humiliated, for they moved about the room in their stockinged feet like so many automatons, shrinking and cringing before their conquerors, evincing the greatest pleasure in receiving the least attention from the civilians in the room. Their appearance without shoes is by order of the governor-general, to remind them of their disgrace, and to show proper respect to those that hold the sway: this, I am told, is the custom of the land. This last tax upon their pride might at least have been passed over, for why strike them while they are down? These princes, it will be remembered, were the chieftains of the Punjaub, and their surrender was the signal of annexing that great kingdom to the British empire. The ameers of Scinde, I believe, are also among the dark faces opposite. Other warriors as brave as they have been unfortunate—the captives, or rather the victims, of Sir Charles Napier.”
The ameers were of course subjected to similar indignities: these things could but inspire hatred among the native princes, which broke out malignantly soon after Lord Canning’s Indian career commenced.