THE NAVY AND LAND ESTIMATES.
The number of forces to be employed by sea and land in the ensuing year indicated great designs: 28,000 seamen, and 50,000 men for the land-service being voted. Yet great as this force was, it was not considered sufficient for the emergency even by the opposition, who said that the establishment was far too great for peace, and far too small for such a war as ministers were embarking in. This, indeed, was the opinion of Lord Barrington, secretary at war, who used his utmost endeavours, both with the ministers and the king, to obtain a force commensurate with the undertaking. He in particular urged the necessity of reducing America by means of a powerful fleet, stating it as his opinion that its reduction could never be accomplished by the army, which was the staff on which ministers rested. But it was in vain that Lord Barrington warned and advised his colleagues in office, and counselled the king. It was held, that at present the naval force must be accompanied with an army, and the estimates of ministers were made and carried accordingly. The sentiments of Lord Barrington on this subject are fully shown in a letter which he wrote at an earlier date to the Earl of Dartmouth, then secretary for America. In this letter he remarked:—“First, I doubt whether all the troops in North America, though probably sufficient for a pitched battle with the strength of the province, are enow to subdue it, being of great extent and full of men accustomed to firearms. If the Massachusets—with whom the inhabitants of Connecticut and Rhode Island are said to have made common cause—were conquered they must be kept under by large armies and fortresses, the expense of which would be ruinous and endless. Second, because the most successful conquest that can be imagined must produce the horrors and bloodshed of civil war. Third, because a conquest by land is unnecessary, when the country can be reduced, first, by distress, and then to obedience, by our marines totally interrupting all commerce and fishery, and even seizing all the ships in the ports, with very little expense and bloodshed. To this might be added the punishment of the factious chiefs by impeachment or bill, if their persons can be secured; but till then any judicial proceedings would provoke, not hurt, and confer the palm of martyrdom without the pain of it, which is the perfection of fanatical beatitude. In respect to the other colonies south of New England, a strict execution of the Act of Navigation, and other restrictive laws, would probably be sufficient at present; and a small addition of frigates and sloops would so execute those laws as to prevent all commerce with foreign states. Those colonies should also be left to deal with the Indians, the mother country withdrawing the establishments made since the beginning of the late war for the management of the Indian affairs, and kept up till this day at a great expense. Though we must depend on our smaller ships for the active part of this plan, I think a squadron of ships of the line should be stationed in North America, both to prevent the intervention of foreign powers, and any attempt of the colonies to attack our smaller vessels by sea.” Lord Barrington next advised the removal of the troops from Boston to Canada, Nova Scotia, and East Florida, till they could be successfully employed, and then continued: “If these ideas are well-founded, the colonies will in a few months feel their distress; their spirits, not animated by any little successes on their part, or violence of persecution on ours, will sink; they will be consequently inclined to treat, probably to submit to a certain degree; and in my humble opinion, the whole is then over, for then, with dignity, we may make them concessions.” Had this system of blockade been adopted, there can be little doubt but America would have been preserved to England, for the Americans had then no fleet or any formidable fortifications on their coast. The advice, however, was rejected, and Lord Barrington was only prevented resigning office by the express desire of the king. But though Lord Barrington not only did not concur in the plans pursued by ministers, but sought to set them aside, yet as secretary of war, he obtained the chief odium of their failure. The principal blame, however, seems to be attached to the king: the plans were in reality his own, and he imposed them upon Lord North and the administration.